Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

With so much noise emanating from the Middle East, it is important from time to time to focus on the really important factors.  What is happening (or not) in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran is of supreme strategic importance; what is happening in Libya, Syria, and Yemen is less so.  The problem is that the Iranian regime remains untouched by the Arab revolutions at a time when Turkey has already made a significant shift away from its Ataturkist pro-Western orientation, and Egypt, inspired by popular revolt, is making the same reorientation as Turkey.  Events in the past week have confirmed this unhappy combination.

The slightly positive sign from Turkey that we reported two weeks ago, with the withdrawal of the Mavi Marmara from the second Gaza ‘Freedom Flotilla’, has been superseded by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refusing to accept a compromise solution to the dispute with Israel over the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010.  The conclusion being drawn in Jerusalem is that the damage to the former strategic alliance with Turkey is indeed irreversible and that there will be no resumption of the defence, military, or intelligence cooperation that was so important in boosting Israel’s feeling of security.

During his recent tour of North Africa, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was greeted with slogans of “Thank you, Turkey” and “Erdogan, Turkey, Muslim!”.  It is this intoxicating popularity in the Arab Middle East that is now inspiring Turkey’s foreign policy rather than the forlorn hopes of membership of the European Union, and it will drive Turkey towards an increasingly active pro-Palestinian stance.  Davutoglu has now been to Egypt four times in the last six months while Erdogan is due to make a visit within the next 10 days.

Meanwhile, in Egypt itself, there has been a change in foreign minister, and the new foreign minister has being going out of his way to reassure the Egyptian public that this does not mean a retreat from Egypt’s post-revolution reorientation.

When it was announced in May that Egypt’s first post-Mubarak foreign minister, Nabil Abdallah al-Araby, was to become Secretary-General of the Arab League there was dismay in pro-revolutionary circles.  The key point about al-Araby’s short tenure as Egyptian foreign minister was the way in which he quickly re-oriented Egyptian foreign policy back towards a traditional Egyptian one of seeking Arab leadership and away from Camp David.  His sudden and unexpected transfer to the Arab League post caused widespread concern that the move might presage a watering down of Egypt’s post-revolution foreign policy.

Much of the grumbling in Egypt following the announcement that al-Araby was to move to the Arab League was along the lines that the move was orchestrated by the West to prevent Egypt from continuing with the new foreign policy instituted by al-Araby.  One well-informed Arab commentator noted: “The popular reaction comes as a warning to...that group in charge of government in Egypt [not] to adopt alternatives to its current foreign policy.”

Such concerns were heightened by the appointment of Muhammad al-Urabi as the new foreign minister.  Al-Urabi, according to Al-Wafd newspaper, once said: “I believe that Mubarak is an unprecedented leader, and that Egyptian history will not witness another leader like him.”  He also bears the stigma of having served for four years as deputy ambassador to Israel.

However, although a former Mubarak loyalist, al-Urabi shows every sign of maintaining Egypt’s new orientation.  In his first few weeks in office he has confirmed that Egypt is “correcting the course of foreign policy in a way that reflects the Egyptian people’s aspirations”.  He has also confirmed that Egypt’s post-revolutionary concentration on relations with the Arab world and Africa will be maintained.

The new foreign minister has confirmed his support for al-Arabi’s policy of rapprochement with Iran.  In a 9 July interview with the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper he said: “I really felt a serious Iranian desire to establish healthy relations with Egypt more than one year ago during my visit to Tehran...Egypt, too, is ready, but the timing is an issue that will be decided later.  Dr Al-Araby set a timeframe when he said: After the election of the new Egyptian parliament.”

As we reported in our 15 June issue, Egypt has been under huge pressure from the US and the Gulf States not to resume diplomatic relations with Iran, and on 12 June al-Araby said that the decision to resume diplomatic relations will be left to the new Egyptian parliament to decide in about three months’ time.  This looked like a neat way of by-passing US pressure as the US would find it harder to oppose democratic decisions taken by a newly elected Egyptian parliament.  Al-Urabi, in his Al-Sharq al-Awsat interview, seems to have confirmed this strategy.

What is particularly interesting about all this is that while a huge three-way battle for control of Egypt continues to be waged between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 25 January democratic movement, the question over Egypt’s future foreign-policy orientation appears to have been settled.  It is to take Egypt back to the centre of Arab leadership, and to work for a new Mideast order in close coordination with the major non-Arab states of Turkey and (as far as maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia permits it) with Iran.

This might be no bad thing were it not for two factors: the first is that Iran remains highly dangerous and is pursuing destabilizing policies in Iraq and the Gulf; the second is that the re-orientation of Turkey, and now of Egypt as well, hugely worries Israel, and for as long as Israel feels insecure there will be no peace with the Palestinians.

The intelligence consensus in Jerusalem is that it will be at least 10 years before Israel will be able to fully assess the consequences of the Arab Spring.  This is not just because of the uncertainties provoked by the shift in Turkish and Egyptian foreign policy; or by the continuing malign interference by Iran in Iraq, the Gulf States, Syria, and Lebanon; or even by the unfinished revolutions in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.  It is also because of the likelihood of unfulfilled expectations even in those countries that manage reasonably complete and peaceful transitions.  There are, after all, 100m people in the Arab world aged between 15 and 29, many of whom have never had jobs.  They are looking for more than just democracy: they want genuine improvements in prosperity as well.  JdeC.

NOTE:  All of this may go some way to explain an interesting opinion-poll result published this week in Israel which shows Israelis far more positive about Europe than is generally imagined.  According to the survey published by the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev on 11 July, 81% of Israelis would support European Union membership for Israel.

The survey, entitled Israeli Positions on the EU, questioned 1,000 people from a representative sample of the Israeli public, and as one of the compilers of the poll said, the survey shows "Israelis are really into strengthening and deepening the cooperation between Israel and the EU. Israelis understand the importance of the EU for the future of Israel and they want to strengthen the relations."

Israel has in fact never applied to join the EU, but a debate held on the issue was sparked last year after Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi visited the Middle East and said that Israel should be admitted to the European Union.