Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

In our 11 May issue we reported on the importance that Moscow is attaching to the development of a Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and the creation of a single economic space (SEC).  Russia is giving equal attention, on the military side, to the continuing development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  At a time when Russia remains at odds with Nato over missile defence, the Kremlin seems determined to increase the importance of the CSTO within the post-Soviet space, and to enhance how it is viewed beyond that space.

The scale of the Kremlin’s ambitions for the SEC were revealed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in early May, when he said that he saw the SEC as providing a new dynamic for the reintegration of the former Soviet republics – and, eventually, as providing a strategic counterweight to the European Union.  He said: “I am sure that a strong integration-oriented union can radically change the geopolitical configuration of the entire Eurasian space and stimulate integration processes in the CIS.”

The CSTO is a more extensive organization than the SEC, grouping Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  A coordination conference of the chairmen of defence and security committees of the parliaments of the CSTO member states was held in Russia’s State Duma on 9 June.

At this meeting, CSTO Secretary-General Nikolay Bordyuzha argued that international security and stability was “developing inconsistently and not always predictably”, and he argued that in view of this there was a need to develop and improve the CSTO as a means of collective security.  He added, according to the CSTO press secretary, that “the military factor is gaining rather than losing importance”.

As of now, the CSTO’s military capability is built around a series of bilateral and sub-regional initiatives, including a Russia-Belarus force for Eastern Europe and a Russia-Armenia force for the Caucasus.  In addition, there is the 20,000-strong Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) and the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (KSBAR) in Central Asia. The latter comprises 10 battalions, three each from Russia and Tajikistan and two each from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  Finally there is the 3,500-strong CSTO Peacekeeping Force.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin is continuing to grumble furiously about the US’s missile-defence plans for Europe, and the 9 June meeting of the Nato-Russia Council failed to close the gap between the two sides.  Russia’s fear is that Nato’s anti-missile systems will eventually have the potential to neutralize Russia’s second-strike capability.  In particular, Russia fears that interceptors planned for deployment in 2018 and 2020 will be fast enough to intercept Russian ICBMs.

Others, including well-placed Russians, say that these fears are exaggerated as there will not be enough interceptors to undermine the deterrent value of 1,500 Russian warheads deployed on 500 strategic delivery vehicles.  Furthermore, the Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, Lt General Sergei Karakayev, has said that Russia’s Topol-M and RS-24 ICBMs would be invulnerable to any defence currently envisaged.
But for Moscow the issue is as much political as military.  On 12 June, the Russian foreign ministry responded to a visit to the Black Sea by the US Navy cruiser Monterey (which is armed with the Aegis anti-missile system) by saying: “The Russian side has repeatedly stressed that we will not leave unnoticed the appearance of elements of the USA’s strategic infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of our borders and will regard such steps as a threat to our security.”  It added that move seemed to be intended “to show Russia that no-one is going to take our opinion into account”.

It is possible that Russia also senses Nato vulnerability, particularly the inability of the European powers to shoulder their share of the Nato burden.  The Europeans have allowed their share of Nato’s spending to drop from 50% at the time of the Cold War to 25%, a fact highlighted by Anglo-French fears over their abilty to sustain operations in Libya for very much longer.  But with the United States also facing huge pressure for defence cuts, the pressure on the Europeans can only increase.  As Nato Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it earlier this week: “The obvious solution...would be for Europe to spend more on defence.  But given the economic environment, it is highly unlikely that European governments will make any significant changes.”