Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

It is impossible to get away from the Middle East, but with so much attention focused on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States our own attention was taken more by the appointment of Egypt’s new foreign minister, Nabil Abdallah al-Araby, as Secretary-General of the Arab League – or more precisely by what the reaction to this move says about the orientation of post-Mubarak Egypt.  Further indications from Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian territories also reinforce the view that, for the foreseeable future, any serious move towards territorial compromise by Israel is inconceivable.

The key point about al-Araby’s short tenure as Egyptian foreign minister was the way in which he quickly re-oriented Egyptian foreign policy back towards a traditional Egyptian one of seeking Arab leadership, and the strong approval this received both within Egypt and the wider Arab world.  His sudden and unexpected transfer to the Arab League post had the opposite effect, causing widespread concern that the move might presage a watering down of Egypt’s post-revolution foreign policy.

Much of the electronic chatter in Egypt following the announcement was along the lines that the move was orchestrated by the West to prevent Egypt from continuing with the new foreign policy instituted by al-Araby.  One well-informed Arab commentator noted: “The determination of the rebellious sectors not to be easy on any side that tries to falsify the people’s will and return to the policies that weakened Egypt’s regional and international role has been confirmed.  The popular reaction comes as a warning to...that group in charge of government in Egypt [not] to adopt alternatives to its current foreign policy.”

This small but significant episode is just one further illustration of a point we have been making since the beginning of the Arab Spring: Egyptian public opinion, whether of the secular or religious variety, is less pro-Western than the regime it is seeking to replace.  Moreover, even if the successors in power to Mubarak have no great inclination to be excessively guided by public opinion they are beginning to see the attractions of returning Egypt to the centre of Arab affairs – and that requires a shift away from Egypt’s pro-Camp David orientation.

From the start of the Arab Spring, Western politicians (and editorial writers) have been calling on Israel to respond positively to the pro-democracy movements sweeping the Arab world by making a decisive move towards peace with the Palestinians.  But they have underestimated the uncertainty that the unrest has created in the minds of Israel’s policymaking elite.

There can be no Israeli compromise while there is such uncertainty about the orientation of its neighbours.  Egypt is the most important of these, but there is uncertainty on almost all fronts including Jordan.  Last week we pointed to the hardening of the Jordanian government’s stance on the Palestinian question.  This week, on 22 May, former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat unveiled the platform for the new opposition National Front for Reform (NFR)?in a press conference in Amman.

The part of the NFR’s programme relating to security and foreign policy states: “The level of awareness of our people and the strength of our national fabric is the most effective weapon in the face of internal and external challenges, and it is the first guarantee for the defence of the Arab character of Jordan and to maintain security and stability and its Arab and Islamic identity. Also, there is a clear and present danger from the Zionist state which is a significant challenge, as it targets Jordan just as it has targeted Palestine...In this context we strongly condemn and reject the concept of the ‘alternative homeland’ for the Palestinians, as we condemn the culture of defeat and calls for fragmentation in all its forms. We uphold Palestinian refugees' right of return to their homeland in Palestine.”

To the north, in Syria, there is no guarantee that any regime that would be likely to replace President Bashar al-Assad would be any more sympathetic to Israel.  On the contrary, it would likely be a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated regime with strong ties to a re-oriented Egypt.  In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s position remains strong and undisturbed by the Arab Spring.  It also continues to be armed by Iran, which tested its new Qiyam 1 rocket on Sunday.  The rocket is thought to have a range of a few hundred kilometres, and some Qiyams, first launched in 2010, are thought to have already reached Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, in the Palestinian territories themselves, the rapprochement between Hamas and Fateh continues to cause deep concern in Israel, and not without cause.  In a special al-Jazeera programme responding to President Barack Obama’s 22 May speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a pro-Hamas Palestinian academic was asked whether Hamas should follow the urgings of Turkish President Abdullah Gul and recognize the right of Israel to exist.  He responded by saying: “If it were to recognize Israel, Hamas, as an Islamist movement, would be discredited.  That is, the reason for its existence would no longer be there...”

What we are seeing develop in the Middle East is something of a classic Catch-22.  The Western leader writers are not wrong when they argue that lack of peace between Israel and the Palestinians has added danger in a Middle East where popular opinion has more influence.  As the Jordanian newspaper al-Rai put it this week: “If peace is not established soon, Israel will find itself facing a new Arab generation far more determined than its predecessor.  The democracy that is taking root in the Arab world will ensure that future Arab governments will be more determined to achieve an equitable settlement that restores Palestinian rights.”

But, on the other hand, how can Israel come down off the Golan Heights and retreat from the Jordan Valley if it has reasonable grounds for supposing that it could simultaneously face a hostile Egypt, Syria (whether under Assad or a Sunni successor), and Jordan, while Hamas increases its sway in the Palestinian territories and Iran-backed Hezbollah entrenches in Lebanon?

With this degree of uncertainty on all fronts Netanyahu was never going to spring a surprise during his visit to the United States.  What he did manage to do, however, judging by Obama’s backtracking between his 20 May speech at the State Department and his 22 May speech to AIPAC, is to persuade the president of the futility of trying to push Israel into territorial compromise when so much remains so uncertain.  JdeC.