Courcy's Special Alerts

Up until last Friday (22 April) international criticism of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad had been muted, and the lifting of the 40-year state of emergency the day before was taken as a hopeful sign that the regime was willing to find a negotiated settlement with the opposition.  But 22nd April witnessed the death of at least 100 protesters around the country.  And on Monday, the Fourth Mechanized Division under the command of the president's brother Maher was sent to attack Deraa.  Human-rights groups say that 500 people have been arrested in the last two days.  In all it seems that about 400 civilians have so far been shot dead in the regime's campaign to maintain power.

There is no doubt that the contagion that Assad thought Syria was innoculated against through its 'rejectionist' stance on Israel has taken a firm hold, and it would be a brave person who would predict with confidence the survival of Assad's minority Alawite regime.  The days when his father Hafez al-Assad could massacre 30,000 opponents with impunity (as with the Hama uprising of 1982) would seem to be gone for good.  And the regime's opponents now have the successes of similar revolts in Tunisia and Egypt to bolster them, along with the West's military support for the anti-Gaddafi rebels in Libya.  Nevertheless, we continue to remain cautious about calling 'time' on the Assad regime, for four main reasons:

First, there is the nature of the regime itself.  Retaining power is the only certain protection that the minority Alawites have and they are 1) united in this view and 2) prepared to fight for it.  The regime is not being undermined by defections or disunity.  Also, for the time being the regime's alliance with the Sunni merchant class, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo, seems to be holding.

Second, Russia is rallying strongly behind Assad, which greatly complicates the international response to the military crackdown.  Syria is Russia's only remaining serious ally in the Arab world.  Russia has use of a military base in the Syrian port of Tartus, and Syria is Russia's fifth-largest export market for weapons.  It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Russia has stepped up its criticism of Nato's actions in Libya at the very moment that Assad has initiated his most serious crackdown.  The message from Moscow is that the West cannot do in Syria what it is doing in Libya.

On 25 April, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov blamed the Nato intervention in Libya for the escalation in Syria.  He said that the Libyan rebels "intractability" was being fuelled by Nato, and he warned: "Unfortunately it is probably contagious and is developing in other countries in the region in the hope that, if the situation escalates, the international community will come to help.  It is in fact an invitation to a whole series of civil wars."  On 26 April, Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin added his own strong attack on the West for its approach to Libya.  He said: "Is there a lack of such crooked regimes in the world?  Are we going to bomb everywhere and conduct missile strikes?"

Third, while playing lip service to the importance of reform and negotiation, Turkey has invested a huge amount of diplomatic capital in closer ties with Syria under Bashar al-Assad and will not turn on him.  It is a difficult balancing act as Turkey is fond of the idea of the 'Turkish model' being the template for a new Middle East, but it will not turn on Assad if only because of the fear of unleashing serious long-term disorder and reigniting the Kurdish threat from Syria.  According to one Turkish foreign-office official: "Syria has critical importance for us.  Turmoil in Syria could spark intersecting clashes and regional instability through exporting the tension to neighbouring countries like Lebanon."  Turkish officials say they oppose the mounting international campaign for sanctions against Damascus as "not helpful", and they strongly oppose a Libya-style intervention.  According to one official: "The mistakes committed during the first days of the Libyan crisis should not be repeated.  This effort allowed some countries to [try to] change the regime in Libya, something the United Nations resolutions did not impose."  The Syria issue topped the agenda at Tuesday's Turkish cabinet meeting and there will be a further assessment at a National Security Council meeting on Thursday, which will include the participation of the military.

Finally, none of the Western powers is really certain that they want to see the end of Assad as they fear the alternative and what it might mean for stability in Lebanon.  The US has long felt that it can separate Bashar al-Assad from Iran, and a complete fall-out with him now would have the opposite effect without necessarily bringing about his ouster.  Even Israel, we are told, is ambivalent.  In theory Israel would benefit greatly from a breaking of the link between Syria and Iran and between Syria and Hezbollah - and this could be seen by Israel as offsetting its potential losses in Egypt.  On the other hand, although Assad has not moved towards peace with Israel, he has kept the border quiet.  And what would come after him?  On the one hand there could be chaos, radical Islam, terrorism, and civil war, which clearly would not benefit Israel.  Genuine democracy is the other possibility, but such an outcome would increase hugely the pressure on Israel to make peace and to come down off the Golan Heights, something it woud be in no hurry to do while Iran remained unreformed and Egypt's post-Mubarak orientation remained uncertain.

Assad knows all this, and he is being told this not just by loyal acolytes but by Russian advisers.  He thinks he can survive provided he is ruthless in crushing the opposition.  He is probably right, but by no means certainly so.  The intelligence ahead of this Friday's planned demonstrations is that the opposition has not so far been cowed by the use of force.

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