Courcy's Intelligence Centre

The following key assumptions form the background to our analysis of jihadism and its impact on geopolitical affairs:

1. The war between Islamic jihadists and the Western powers did not begin as a consequence of the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both have been used as a pretext by the jihadists for increasing militancy, but they are not the cause.

2. The definitive statement on jihadists motives and goals was made on 23 February 1998. The founding statement of Osama bin Laden's World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (published in the Arab nationalist al-Quds al-Arabi) listed America's three crimes as the occupation of the lands of Islam in the Arabian peninsula, the devastation inflicted upon the Iraqi people (through sanctions) by "the Crusader-Jewish alliance", and its support for the Jews' "petty state" and the occupation of Jerusalem.

The statement said that these crimes amounted to "a clear declaration of war by the Americans against God, his prophet, and the Muslims". It then went on to declare, in the form of a fatwa attributed to Osama bin Laden, that "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military, [is] and individual duty of every Muslim" anywhere and at anytime.

Backing these words with actions, a simultaneous terrorist attack was launched on 7 August 1998 on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam, killing 258 people and wounding 5,000 others.

It was only after these attacks, on 21 August 1998, that the then US secretary of state Madeleine Albright declared a "war on terrorism".

3. Jihadism is not a response to current events; it is a deep-seated phenomenon resulting from the failure of the Arab and wider Muslim world to keep pace with the West and other rival civilizations such as India and China. The 11 September 2001 attacks on America came after it had helped oust the Soviets from Afghanistan (1989) and after it had supported the Muslim cause in the Balkans against the Serbs (1992-1999), and they came after the Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995) peace accords between the Israelis and the Palestinians (as well as the 1978 Camp David accords with Egypt) and the slow but steady retreat by Israel from its 1967 conquests that they represented. And they came before the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and before its move to oust Saddam Hussein from power (2003).

4. The evidence suggests that restraint on the part of the Western powers or Israel will have no discernible impact on jihadism. The al-Qaeda jihadist phenomenon is exacerbated only at the margins by Western policies.

5. Al-Qaeda remains incapable of mounting a sustained terror campaign in the West, but it is not possible to move from that assumption to the conclusion that threat perceptions should be downgraded. The possibility that jihadists could acquire the capability (they certainly have the will) to use weapons of mass destruction against Western civilian targets ensures that they retain a strategic significance far beyond their conventional capabilities. Al-Qaeda's weaknesses is compensated for by one overwhelming strategic advantage: its perceived willingness to kill as many Western civilians as its capabilities permit, allied to the possibility that these capabilities could soon encompass biological and chemical terror weapons.

6. Al-Qaeda's weakness is in part a consequence of no longer having a safe-haven within a friendly sovereign power. The invasion of Afghanistan was fully justified on these grounds. Vigilance over Somalia and other potential future havens (including Afghanistan again) is necessary.

7. The question of Iran is separate from the war on terror and al-Qaeda. The contest with Iran is one against an inimical sovereign power determined to increase its influence in the Middle East at the expense of its Arab neighbours. Conflating it with the war on terrorism is an error.

8. Ousting Saddam Hussein might have been justified on humanitarian grounds, but it was irrational to see Saddam Hussein as an enemy in the war on terrorism. And the ousting of Saddam Hussein led to two unfortunate consequences. The first was that, rather than advancing the fight against jihadism, it brought jihadism to the heart of the Middle East, providing al-Qaeda with a significant boost and a popular cause for which to recruit. The second was that it significantly improved the strategic position of Iran, compounding the already existing problem of how to contain an expansionist-minded power. It brought Iranian influence deep into Iraq, strengthening its linkages with Syria and southern Lebanon to the extent that Jordan's King Abdullah could warn accurately of the creation of a threatening "Shia crescent".

9. Struggles for autonomy or independence by Muslim groups around the periphery of the Muslim world (the Philippines, Thailand, Kashmir, Chechnya, Kosovo, etc) will continue to provide a rallying point for jihadist militants, and thus a fruitful source of recruits, training, and combat experience.

10. A significant proportion of second and third-generation Muslim communities in the West (particularly Pakistanis in Britain) have become radicalised and a source for the recruitment of young men willing to commit violence on their host communities.

These are the essential assumptions on which CourcyInt analysis of jihdism is based. Developments that might affect any or all of these assumptions are constantly monitored, and the assumptions themselves are under constant review.

Our evolving analysis can be tracked by viewing the Courcy's Intelligence Analysis link in this report.