Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s three-day visit to Egypt, which began on 12 September, has been greeted at the popular level by what can only be described as euphoria.  Some senior Arab policymakers, however, have been quietly warning that Erdogan, like Icarus of Greek mythology, may be flying too close to the sun.  There are undoubted dangers for Erdogan in the course he has chosen, but regardless of how his foreign policy develops he will have had an irrevocable and damaging impact on the prospects for a comprehensive peace agreement between the Arabs and Israel.

One of the early conclusions of Western analysts about the Arab Spring was that it showed that the Arab masses were far more interested in democracy and bread-and-butter issues to do with jobs and economic advancement than with the Arab-Israel dispute and the fate of the Palestinians.  Much comfort was taken from the absence of anti-Israeli and anti-US slogans during the mass pro-democracy rallies in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere.  It is a considerable irony that Erdogan, a politician who has presided over the consolidation of democracy in Turkey along with major economic progress, should be the one to pull the Palestinian cause back to centre stage.

Some might argue (or, rather, hope) that Erdogan has misread the mood, but his euphoric public reception in Cairo suggests otherwise.  The Arab street is united in its admiration for the way in which Erdogan has challenged Israel over its refusal to apologize for the May 2010 attack on the Turkish Mavi Marmara, in which nine Turks were killed during an attempt to run the Israeli-imposed blockade of the Gaza Strip.  His strong actions against Israel (including the downgrading of diplomatic ties and an increased naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean) in response to the publication at the beginning of September of the UN’s Palmer Report into the Mavi Marmara incident have been compared favourably with the more pusillanimous response by Egypt’s Supreme Military Council (SMC) to the killing in Sinai last month by Israeli forces of five Egyptian soldiers (a sixth died later).  The SMC threatened to expel the Israeli ambassador but did not follow through on the threat.  It was only after a mob assaulted the Israeli embassy in Cairo on 9 September that the Israeli ambassador flew home.  The SMC’s condemnation of the attack on the embassy and its reassurances to Washington that it continues to support the 1979 Camp David peace accords with Israel have not gone down well either.

The signs of popular support for Erdogan in Egypt were everywhere.  Facebook pages were started by fans; editorials lauded his hardline approach to Israel; a speech by Erdogan at the Opera House in Cairo on 13 September was interrupted by standing ovations and chants of “Erdogan, Erdogan; Allahu Akbar”.  The London-based al-Quds al-Arabi talked approvingly of “the establishment of a strategic anti-Israeli alliance between the two largest Islamic states in the Middle East”.  It – again approvingly – said that this new alliance would “aggravate Israel’s international and regional isolation and may also end its military superiority”.  It concluded: “These are characteristics that have been missing from the region and its governments for over forty years, since the Camp David Accords were signed – specifically since 1979.”

But there are complications, and there is a chance that Erdogan could get carried away and over-reach himself.  There are obvious potential difficulties with the United States and Europe, neither of which will welcome Turkey’s turn towards the Muslim east.  US anxieties will have only been marginally allayed by the 2 September agreement by Turkey to host an early-warning radar as a contribution to the US-driven anti-missile defence system for Europe.

There are complications with Iran, which is far from happy with Turkey’s vocal criticism of the pro-Iranian Assad regime in Syria and, of course, with the decision to participate in the European missile defence system.  Speaking on 8 September, Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad said: “Turkey is among our brothers and sincere friends; however, when enemies set up missile shield there and admit it’s against Iran, one should be careful.”

On the other hand, Iran and Turkey are collaborating in a campaign against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, with the Turkish air force attacking Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets and Iran launching cross-border operations against Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) guerrillas.  However, this collaboration highlights another danger for Erdogan, namely the likelihood of increasing Kurdish frustration at being left the ‘orphans’ of the Arab Spring.

There is also danger for Erdogan in the possibility of disappointing the Arab street by failing to deliver on the promise of cutting Israel down to size and delivering an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem.  Pressure for him to tone down his rhetoric, and actions, will come not just from Israel’s supporters in the West but from the conservative Arab rulers of the Gulf states who are fearful of instability and change.

And there is, above all, the danger of conflict with Israel.  As much as Erdogan must be revelling in his newfound popularity with the Arab street, he is unlikely to want war with Israel, yet the threat of a naval clash is now serious.  Following the publication of the Palmer report, Turkey has said that it will accompany future aid vessels going to Gaza and that it will ensure freedom of navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean.  It has deployed three frigates to the area, and it has said that if Israel interferes with any vessel outside its 12-mile territorial waters, the Turkish fleet will become involved.   Much publicity has also been given to the fact that Turkey has produced a new identification friend or foe (IFF) system for its jet fighters, warships, and submarines that supersedes the older American-made version and no longer automatically identifies Israeli planes and ships as friendly.

[As an aside, it is worth noting as further evidence of the extremely poor state of Turkey-Israel relations that the Turkish media have been speculating that three engineers who worked on the new IFF system for Turkey’s Military Electronics Industry (ASELSAN), and who committed suicide in 2006 and 2007, may have been murdered by the Israelis.]

Another potential casus belli between Turkey and Israel is Israeli support for the Kurds.  As we have previously reported, the Kurds are increasingly being seen in Israel as Turkey’s Achilles Heel, and calls for unstinted Israeli support for Kurdish self-determination – as Israel provided for South Sudan – can be heard regularly.  A commentary in the 28 July Yedioth Ahronoth expressed a widespread view when saying: “The Kurds are close to Israel, which they view as a twin sister who shares a common historical fate and a non-Arab identity in a hostile Middle East.  We are now faced with the prospect of the dismemberment of four countries [Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran], each with varying degrees of hostility towards Israel, a prospect that would yield a new ally for the Jewish state.”  The commentary tied the fate of the Kurds to the Palestinians and warned that if these states “decide to ‘fix’ Israel” by supporting Palestinian statehood at the UN, “they themselves will be fixed”.

Turkey’s response to Israel’s threat to ‘play the Kurdish card’ has been sharp.  Most recently, on 11 September, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davotoglu warned: “Any country supporting terror will surely get a response.  Everyone should know this.  No one can debilitate Turkey.  No one should try to test Turkey’s strength...Israel knows what to do in order to end this crisis.”

Officially, Israel is trying to play down the rift with Turkey and hoping for a reconciliation.  Defence Minister Ehud Barak has described the spat as “spilt milk” and said that “ultimately this wave will pass”.  But Israel is, nevertheless, on a hair-trigger alert not just because of Turkey but also because of instability in Syria, the impending Palestinian bid for UN membership, and the deterioration in ties with Egypt.  Israel has reinforced its military forces along the border with Egypt and is supporting border patrols with air cover.  It is preparing for an increase in terrorism targeting southern Israel as extremists exploit the lack of security in the Sinai.  And it has, reportedly, authorized guards in the West Bank settlements to fire on unarmed rioters who threaten to break into settlements if they represent a threat to life.

The main problem for Israel, however, is the way in which Erdogan has brought the Israeli-Arab dispute back to the forefront of Middle East politics and dashed hopes that the Arab Spring would divert regional attention more or less permanently towards everyday issues such as economic growth and jobs.

Speaking on 13 September in Cairo, Erdogan told an Arab League Foreign Ministers’ Council meeting:  “As I have mentioned on every occasion, [the] Palestinian cause...is not only the cause of Palestine and Palestinians, but it is the cause of every state and every nation who are in favour of justice, rights, rule of law and humanity.  The Israel-Palestine issue is not a matter between the two states...It is a decisive matter for the Middle East and for global peace.  Recent developments cannot overshadow the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute was the basic issue in the Middle East.”

Erdogan went on to say: “The Israel-Palestine issue has gone beyond its limits and become a decisive matter for legitimacy of the international order.  As long as the current situation in Gaza continues, chaos will further deepen in the international order about the meaning of concepts such as rights, law, and legitimacy.  It is impossible to maintain the current status quo.  Those who pursue policies based on atrocity, and those who think their power is endless, will lose sooner or later...Let’s hoist the Palestinian flag.”

It would be impossible for Erdogan to be more forthright.  But an increasingly embattled Israel is in no mood to compromise.  On 12 September, Israel’s Minister for Strategic Affairs succinctly summed up the view in Jerusalem when he told a conference on terrorism: “The Palestinians do not want to adhere to their commitments and refuse to recognize that any final agreement will be an end to the conflict.”  While that view persists in Jerusalem, Israel will not reach a final agreement with the Palestinians; and while relations with its neighbours continue to deteriorate it is not going to come down off the Golan Heights or leave the Jordan Valley.  Erdogan has staked his (and Turkey’s) reputation on delivering a Palestinian state; Israel is not about to deliver.  Therein lies the danger.  JdeC.