Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

We issued a Special Alert last week (on 16 September) about instability in the Middle East and in particular about how Western policymakers have underestimated (or at least misinterpreted) the growing importance of Arab public opinion on developments in the region.  We argued that this development makes the Palestinian question more not less important, a point emphasized by the Saudi Arabian warning that its special relationship with the US would “increasingly be seen as toxic by the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims” if the US were to oppose the Palestinians’ bid for statehood and UN membership.  The view of many Western policymakers that the Arab Spring means that the Palestinian question has been superseded in importance by bread-and-butter issues such as jobs is misplaced.  But at least in the Arab Middle East, particularly in Egypt and Jordan, leaders are still trying to moderate and channel public opinion.  By contrast, in Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is stirring up Turkish nationalist sentiment with potentially dangerous consequences.

We have paid a lot of attention in recent weeks to Turkey’s bid for increasing influence in post-revolutionary Middle East based on strong support for the Palestinian cause and alignment with post-Mubarak Egypt.  In order to garner maximum public support for Turkey’s new orientation (and to inoculate himself against military opposition to the break with Israel), Erdogan has sought to play up the dispute with Israel over the latter’s attack on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010 in which nine Turkish citizens were killed.

Of equal importance is the escalating dispute over oil and gas exploration rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is putting Turkey at odds not just with Israel but also with Greece and the wider European Union.  And here, again, Erdogan has not been slow to play on Turkish nationalist sentiment.  It is never difficult to stir up  a Turk on the subject of Greece, but Erdogan seems to have eschewed the role of the responsible statesman and is making little attempt to keep nationalist passions under control.

In New York this week, Erdogan said that by beginning oil and gas exploration, “the Greek Cypriot administration and Israel are doing a mad thing in the Mediterranean.  [The] Greek Cypriot administration’s drilling activity is nothing but sabotaging the negotiation process between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.”  He added: “Turkish Cypriot people also have rights in the Mediterranean.  As a guarantor country, we will support them in their efforts to protect their rights...Our assault boats and frigates are already in the region.”

Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc issued an equally blunt warning from Ankara on 20 September, saying: “If the Greek Cypriot administration makes exploratory oil drilling, Turkey will respond to it.  Turkey will also begin oil drilling.  Naval forces and air forces will also support drilling.  It is not a bluff.  It is the right of Turkey.”

That Turkish Cypriots have legitimate interests - and that Turkey is the only country that is willing and able to protect them – is undeniable.  However, our concern is over the tone with which the current Turkish administration is pursuing its policies, both with regard to Palestine and maritime exploration rights.

The way in which Erdogan’s ‘foghorn diplomacy’ is playing with Turkish public opinion can be seen in a commentary published by the liberal-Islamic Yeni Safak on 20 September.  The commentary warned its readers that “Israel together with Greece, southern Cyprus, Germany, and France are engaged in a full blown Cold War against Turkey”.  It warned that Israel is “inciting the Balkan countries – Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and even Serbia – against Turkey”, and it added that Israel was also bringing Georgia into “a containment strategy...against Turkey”.

In September, Turkey cancelled a planned joint military exercise with Israel and other military co-operation.  Joint exercises had been a feature of close military relations between Israel and Turkey up until the Mavi Marmara incident, as was close co-operation on weapons development.  Now, however, Turkey is representing similar joint military exercises held by Israel with Greece, Italy, Romania, and others as being part of a new ‘Mediterranean axis’ aimed at Turkey.

This is paranoia of a high order, and paranoia is always and everywhere destabilizing.  One of the principal problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, for instance, is that fear of its neighbours is Israel’s permanent state.  Now it would seem that Turkey, under Erdogan, is developing its own persecution complex to add to the region’s volatile mix.

The Yeni Safak commentary warned that “fingers are on the trigger in the Eastern Mediterranean and...just one spark is all it will take to create unending crises or even fighting”.  That may be so, but the Turkish government is contributing to this sense of instability.  At a time when the Eastern Mediterranean requires the coolest heads, Erdogan’s rhetoric is stirring dangerous Turkish nationalist passions and, naturally, reciprocal actions in the countries with which Turkey is at odds.  Apart from being destabilizing, it is an odd thing to do at a time when Turkey’s regional star has so clearly been in the ascendancy.  JdeC.