Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

It will be recalled that in January former Mossad chief Meir Dagan caused a stir by saying, on the day of his retirement, that Iran would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon until 2015.  Then in early May he told a conference in Israel that a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be “a stupid idea”.  At the beginning of last week, Dagan returned to the fray, saying: “The military option is still far from being the preferred one for Israel.  As of now, there are still tools and means available that are far more effective.”

Dagan’s remarks coincided with a visit to Israel by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, and the suspicion in some circles is that Dagan’s remarks and Panetta’s visit may have been prompted by concerns that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was edging closer to a move against Iran.  This suspicion has been further fuelled by this week’s news that Netanyahu has agreed a deal for the return of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in return for the release of 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.  The thesis is that this could be a deck-clearing move.  We have no inside intelligence on Netanyahu’s deliberations, but it is clearly still a live debate within Israeli policymaking circles.  Our own assessment is that the more cautious view will prevail for now for two main reasons.

The first is that the 2015 date probably is accurate, and so that does give more time for Dagan’s “other means” to succeed.  The second is that it is still possible, as Panetta is arguing, that the hardline regime in Iran will be weakened by the knock-on effects of the Arab Spring.  We have argued strongly since the start of the Arab Spring that it would be a mistake to assume that all its consequences would be positive.  In particular, we have argued that it is likely to make the Israel-Palestine dispute more difficult to resolve.

On the other hand, the argument advanced by Iran, that the Arab Spring is an Islamist revolution, is equally untrue.  The Muslim Brotherhood will undoubtedly gain in influence and stature in Egypt, Jordan, and - if Assad falls - Syria.  But that is not the same as saying it is an Islamist revolution, and ordinary Iranians are not buying into the ayatollahs’ propaganda.  They are also fully aware that Iran is siding with the ancien regime in Syria, not with the revolutionaries.  And, as we have reported elsewhere in this issue, Turkey is strongly supporting the Arab revolutions but distancing itself from Iran.  So, while it is still possible that the Iranian regime will emerge from the regional turmoil unscathed, perhaps even strengthened if Assad hangs on and Shia influence is increased in the Gulf States, it is too early to make that judgement.  We believe those around Netanyahu arguing for a policy of ‘wait-and-see’ will prevail for now.