Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

There is a prevailing view in the Western official circles that Russia is all bluster.  Certainly, as we argued in the main briefing in our 5 October issue, Russia’s strategic position is weak and getting weaker.  But the points on which Russia and the US are in disagreement are growing, and Russia does maintain the ability to cause considerable difficulties for Washington.

Those who say that Moscow is all bluster believe that Russia now has very limited goals and that its policy of remaining friendly with the likes of Syria and Iran is simply a way of maintaining global diplomatic influence rather than an indication that it will go to any particular lengths for these unpopular regimes.  These Western officials believe, in particular, that Russia is as opposed as everyone else to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and that it will eventually come into line with whatever means of coercion the United States deems necessary.  Equally it will court Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s eventual successor as assiduously as it has opposed his removal.

That Russia is in a weak strategic position is a fact.  Its influence in its ‘near abroad’ is being eroded in the west by its inability to make progress towards joining the European mainstream, in the south by the rise of Turkey and encroachments by Nato, and in the east by the rise of China coupled with demographic weakness.  But we would argue that it is this very weakness, and the nervousness it is producing in Moscow, that makes Russia difficult to predict.  And although it is undoubtedly weak, it still does have the advantage of being a major energy producer, and it has its nuclear arsenal and its UN Security Council veto.

Our own sources in Moscow agree that Russia is not overly attached to the cause of either the Iranian regime or Assad’s.  But they say that the Kremlin’s anxiety about the way in which the US is pursuing its policies is genuine.  What no one seems to know, however, is where the breaking point is, or indeed if there is one at all.

On the sidelines of the APEC summit in Honolulu on 13 November, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spelt out in fairly forthright terms the areas where Russia is most concerned.

On Syria, Lavrov complained that the US and Europe had “flatly refused” to recognize reforms instituted by Assad and that they were involved in “the incitement of radical members of the opposition towards a strong commitment to regime change as well as the rejection of any invitation to dialogue”.  He expressly drew parallels with “the Libyan example”, where he said the Western policy of rejecting the African Union plan for negotiations had led to the unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of people.

Lavrov said: “Having sorted out all the facts, I have to state that someone really does not want the Syrians to agree amongst themselves, in much the same way as someone did not want the African Union to help the Libyans agree amongst themselves.”

Nor does Russia yet want to view the Libyan episode as closed.  Lavrov is saying that he wants those who killed Colonel Gaddafi after he had been captured to be tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as war criminals.

On Iran, Lavrov’s view is that the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report has ramped up old and known facts in order to suit America’s agenda.  He said: “The situation around Iran is developing in a way that someone has determined, based solely on the goal of whipping up confrontationist sentiments.”  He added: “There ought to be no adjusting to someone else’s pre-election campaigns the responses that would suit the appropriate countries.”

For Lavrov, it is the unilateralism of US policy that most alarms him, including the way in which it forces companies from third countries to comply with unilateral US sanctions against Iran that go beyond the scope of the UN-mandated sanctions.  He warned: “Extra punishments will lead nowhere.  Libya, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire – everywhere our Western partners chose the policies of confrontation, regime isolation, and change, but in none of these cases has the calm come, or will it.”

The problem for Moscow is that this strategy of ignoring Russian interests is coming closer to home.  There are fears, for instance, that Washington’s attempts to consolidate its influence in the Caucasus is now extending to Armenia.  A commentary in the heavyweight Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 14 November worried that Washington is “pursuing the Big Caucasus project, which was developed by George Bush Jr, the essence of which is to consolidate positions in the region and advance American interests”.

The argument goes that with Georgia already hostile to Russia, and Azerbaijan signalling more interest in the West than in Moscow, the US is now targeting Armenia, which at the moment remains a strategic ally of Russia.  Nezavisimaya Gazeta warned: “Pulling it out from beneath Russia’s influence is a difficult but practicable goal.”  The means of doing this, it is said, is for the US to insert itself into the process for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  This may sound paranoid, but it is a genuine Russian fear.

Another area of Russian concern, again hinting at paranoia, is the fear that various Washington plans for Asia-Pacific economic integration could result in the weakening of Moscow’s control over the Russian Far East.  As one leading Russian academic puts it: “In Moscow they are afraid that Washington, under the guise of integration projects, will try to weaken the Centre’s control over the Far East regions.”

Then there is the question of missile defence, which we have dealt with many times in recent months, and which is possibly Russia’s biggest area of concern as it has the potential to undermine one of its few remaining strategic assets.  It is this concern that is making Moscow unwilling to make concessions on strategic offensive arms.

The talk in Moscow is that the most likely scenario for US-Russia relations in 2012, with Vladimir Putin returning to the presidency, is one of decreasing cooperation and increasing diplomatic confrontation.  No one is suggesting more than this at this stage, but given the seriousness of the problems confronting the US in the Middle East and elsewhere this is, at the very least, an unhelpful prospect.  JdeC.