Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

We have been monitoring closely the growing levels of anti-Americanism in Pakistan since the killing by US special forces of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May this year.  We have reported on the associated efforts of Pakistan to further strengthen ties with China and even with Iran.  Public opinion has very much been leading the way and there has been little change on that front.  On the official front, however, there has been a concerted effort to defuse the tension between the two sides, and there does seem to have been some progress.

The slight improvement follows the 20-21 October visit to Pakistan by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  The size and importance of her entourage for that visit was a reflection of the seriousness with which Washington viewed the deterioration in relations.  Clinton was accompanied by CIA Director David Petraeus and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey.  She held four hours of talks with Pakistani officials on 20 October, and on 21 October she met alone with Pakistan’s President President Asif Ali Zardari and Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar.

As a result of these meetings, Pakistan agreed to allow targeted operations against Haqqani network militants in North Waziristan instead of the full-scale operation the US has been demanding.  According to local sources, Pakistani security forces launched a search operation last week in Miranshah in North Waziristan, and an indefinite curfew has been imposed in various parts of the border region.  The main road connecting Miranshar to Bannu in Kyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province is said to have been closed to all traffic.

In return for this, the US has made concessions with regard to its drone attacks.  The CIA has agreed to give advance notice to Pakistan about major attacks that could involve the loss of more than 20 lives and not to carry out attacks at sensitive political times.  The Wall Street Journal has also reported that the US ambassador to Pakistan has been given the right to review and object to CIA planned attacks.  According to the WSJ report of 4 November: “If the US ambassador to Pakistan objected to a strike, for example, the CIA director or his deputy would first try to talk through their differences with the ambassador.  If the conflict was unresolved, the secretary of state would appeal directly to the CIA director.  If they couldn’t reach agreement, however, the CIA director retains the final say.”

From the Pakistani perspective this is something, but it is not much.  It hardly constitutes a re-establishment of respect for Pakistani sovereignty, and it would be dangerous to suppose that the current slight improvement in relations represents a dramatic shift. 

As one indicator of the problems Islamabad still faces, the powerful pro-government Taleban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur has warned that he is thinking of ending the ceasefire he signed with the Pakistan military in June 2009.  He has apparently abandoned the council that was set up for ongoing dialogue with the government.

It is also worth noting that the government’s moves towards renewed cooperation with the US have been done without publicity as it is clear that the public mood remains unremittingly anti-American.