CourcyInt

If our assessment of Russia’s latest moves is correct (see following briefing), the Middle East equation has just become considerably more complicated as the prospects for an early return to stability remain remote.

The overall picture is fairly clear.  The Arab Spring is ushering in a period of possibly prolonged Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy.  The MB–affiliated Ennahda party won the first of the Mideast’s post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia.  The MB-affiliated Justice and Development Party (PJD) has emerged as the strongest party in Morocco following elections there.  And the Muslim Brotherhood will almost certainly become the largest party in the Egyptian parliament following the elections that began on 28 November.  This latter development means, in turn, that the MB-linked Hamas group will be strengthened in the Palestinian territories, increasing its influence in the West Bank to go with its dominance of the Gaza Strip.  The alternative to the Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria is the Muslim Brotherhood, and the MB is gaining in strength in Jordan where King Abdullah is struggling to maintain stability in a rapidly changing Middle East. 

Alongside this, Iran is set to increase its ascendancy in Iraq following the end-year withdrawal of US troops.  And now, with Russia’s determination to back Assad against both Nato and Turkey (see following briefing), there is a likelihood that Iran will retain its influence in Syria and Lebanon.  Meanwhile, there are signs of a rekindling of Shia unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Into all this must be factored the actions of an increasingly worried Israel, and not just with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme.  On Egypt, there is a concerted effort to play down the possibility of a breach, but the fears of what could happen continue to emerge from various corners.  On 23 November, for instance, former deputy IDF chief of staff Maj-General Uzi Dayan said during a security conference at Bar-Ilan University that it may become necessary to mobilize a counter-terrorism intervention force for the Sinai.  An even more apocalyptic view was put by Professor Eytan Inbar, the head of the Begin-Sadat Centre that organized the conference.

Professor Inbar warned about a possible collapse of law and order in Egypt.  He said: “The collapse of law and order will allow terror groups to rise up.  We could find ourselves in an Islamic lake.  Turkey is not our friend...Syria was not our friend and will not be our friend under a new regime with an Islamist influence.  Lebanon is controlled by Hezbollah.  Sinai could turn into Somalia.”

Israel’s new multi-year ‘Halamish’ defence programme (which is itself under review) goes beyond the previous Tefen plan in adding potential threats from the West Bank and Egypt to the established threats from Iran, the northern front (Syria and Lebanon), and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.  The Halamish plan says: “There is an increasing probability of conflict on multiple fronts.” 

Many influential voices in Israel are still arguing that the Camp David peace treaty will survive the transition in Egypt, not least because of the economic benefits to Egypt of peace.  This is a valid point.  Egypt could lose $1.65bn in aid from the US if it abrogated the treaty at a time when the newly elected government has to cope with a collapse in tourism revenue by 25%, a near 70% decline in foreign direct investment, and economic growth down to 1.8% from 6%, which is only just above the rate of population growth of 1.7%.  Nevertheless, there are ways short of abrogating Camp David in which the new Egypt could become problematic for Israel, such as in its support for Hamas or if, as Professor Inbar warns, it were to lose control of Sinai.  And there is nothing hypothetical about the mounting dangers on the other fronts.  Israel has no option but to prepare for the worst, which is in itself, of course, destabilizing.  JdeC.