Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

*** Bedding in Kim Jong-un.  We reported last week on the amount of visits made by North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un to military units during January and how this was being seen as a sign of his uncertainty about the level of support for his leadership within the military.  There is as yet no sign that his succession is under threat, but sources continue to note the abnormally high degree of control over illegal cell phone usage and the use of foreign currency, and the imposition of extreme punishments for attempted defection.  Also worth noting has been the plethora of articles churned out by Pyongyang’s propaganda machine praising Kim Jong-un’s youth.  Kim is believed to be in his late 20s, and the concentration on the positive aspects of this by the North’s propaganda outlets suggests some opposition to having such an inexperienced leader.  An early test for Kim Jong-un will be the Nuclear Security Summit to be hosted by South Korea in March.  There will also be the general and presidential elections in April and December.  Intelligence agencies in South Korea believe that Kim Jong-un will have no choice but to follow the hawkish stance of his father, and they are expecting some form of military provocation during these sensitive events.

*** Taleban splits.  As the US tries to get into serious discussions with the Taleban ahead of its planned 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, there are splits arising within the Taleban that are complicating these efforts.  The following is a short guide to the main factions:

                - The Quetta Shura, the main faction led by Mullah Omar, seems to have been weakened in the last two years.  It is increasingly having difficulty imposing its will on the other factions.  Its slowness in rejecting the 29 January BBC report of impending talks in Saudi Arabia with the Afghan government is seen as evidence of this.  Also, when former Taleban minister Arsala Rahmani (see pro-Karzai faction below) mooted the idea of handing over a number of southern provinces to the Taleban as the first stage in a reconciliation process, this was rejected by the Quetta leadership.  Earlier evidence of inter-Taleban tensions came with the Quetta faction’s strong condemnation of the 6 December attacks on Shia Muslims in three Afghan cities.

                - The Haqqani network.  This grouping led by the Haqqani family is dominated by the Zadran tribe from the eastern border with Pakistan.  It has close links to al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taleban, and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies.  It is linked with, but independent from, the Quetta Shura.

                - Pro-Karzai faction.  This grouping consists of former Taleban officials now living in Kabul, such as former Taleban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Motawakkil, former minister Arsala Rahmani, and former envoy to the UN Abdol Hakim Mojahed.  This grouping is pushing for direct talks with the Afghan government, but its leaders are no longer thought to have close ties with the Quetta leadership.