Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

It has been impossible over the past week to get away from the Iranian question.  Hundreds of thousands of words have been written on the subject to coincide with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington and President Barack Obama’s speech to Aipac, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee.  Unsurprisingly, much of the analysis has been repetitive and contradictory.  Nevertheless, we do believe that some important pointers have emerged during the past week.

The first concerns Israeli policy, and the key pointer here came not from Netanyahu but from Israel’s President Shimon Peres.  Peres is a dove and politically far removed from Netanyahu and his principal advisers, but that is what makes his speech to Aipac so important.  While it was full of his usual urgent calls for a two-state solution to the Palestinian question and almost fawning praise for President Obama, there was also uncompromising steel within the speech on the two key points that matter.  The first was on the total unacceptability of a nuclear-armed Iran.  Peres reiterated that “containment is not an option...Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon”.  The second, and more important one, was on Israel’s “right and obligation” to defend itself – in other words to go it alone if necessary.   The difference with Netanyahu is on timing (how far can Iran be allowed to go) and not on the principle of military action nor on the fact that Israel might have to go it alone.

The second pointer to emerge from the past week is how desperate Obama remains to avoid a military conflict with Iran if at all possible.  On 6 March, he talked about silencing the “drums of war”.  However, this creates two problems.  The first is that avoiding war needs time for alternative policies (sanctions, negotiations, etc) to work, and time is clearly limited.  As we reported last week, by April  Iran will have 85kg of uranium enriched to 20%, which would be enough to produce 15kg of weapons-grade uranium needed for one bomb within three months.

A further complication is that Israel and the US have different ideas of the trigger point for action.  This is because, first, the US is committed to preventing Iran having a nuclear weapon while Israel talks about preventing Iran from becoming “nuclear capable”, which could mean preventing it from having sufficient enriched uranium to make a bomb (see above).  Secondly, Israel cannot afford to wait as long as the US because the “zone of immunity” that Israel worries about is the point at which Iran’s nuclear programme would become beyond the reach of the Israeli military acting on its own. The US, with far superior capabilities, could allow Iran to progress further.  But the problem for Israel is that once Iran is beyond that point, Israel would be entirely in US hands, which is something that even Peres seems reluctant to allow.

The second problem with the non-military approach is exactly how Iran can be persuaded to stop its nuclear military programme when all efforts have so far failed.  No one really believes that sanctions will work within the available timeframe.  And whilst Iran has agreed to re-open talks with the 5+1 group of the US, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany, that too offers delay with no guarantee of success.  It took the group from 14 February until 6 March even to reply to Iran’s overture, and officials say that talks are unlikely to begin until after the Iranian New Year, which is another fortnight away.  It is also worth pointing out that the offer made by Iran on 6 March to open its Parchin military site to nuclear inspectors from the UN, despite repeated refusals in the past, is conditional on a broader agreement on outstanding issues which the two sides have been unable to reach for five years.

So what we are hearing from Washington insiders is that a desperate White House may be preparing to turn to China for the answer.  Those arguing for this solution (or, rather, attempted solution) accept that China is currently absorbed by considerable challenges of its own, including a shift in its economic development model, increasing internal unrest, and a delicate leadership transition.  It is also acknowledged that China has traditionally avoided a leading role in controversial diplomatic disputes.  However, they also argue that conflict between the US/Israel and Iran would be hugely damaging for Chinese interests and that, therefore, Beijing may be persuadable - that it may be prepared to co-ordinate with the US in a last-gasp attempt to negotiate a solution with Tehran.

They may be right on this point.  They may also be right (although it is unlikely) that there could be a possible solution to be found along the lines of what is termed the ‘Japan model’, that is allowing Iran a turnkey nuclear programme that is subject to very close international supervision and restrictions.  But what that doesn’t take account of, though, is the price that China would demand for a forceful diplomatic intervention.

In fact, it is not difficult to discern what China’s demands would be.  A preliminary list would have to include:

- A dilution of the US’s declared security ‘pivot’ towards Asia and more US openness about its developing Air Sea Battle Concept.

- US neutrality in China’s territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.

- An agreement not to exploit any future collapse of the North Korean regime to the detriment of China.

- A reversal of the trend towards multi-lateral US-led military exercises in the vicinity of China, which China sees as evidence of a ‘contain China’ policy.  [For instance, at the end of this month Japan is to join the annual US-Philippines military exercise for the first time.  Australian and South Korean forces are also expected to take part for the first time in the Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercise.]

- A pledge not to support any fledgling ‘China Spring’ movement targeting Communist Party rule.

- Non-interference in China’s control of Tibet and Xinjiang.

- A reduction in US arms sales to Taiwan.

- Support for China’s efforts to convert the 12 countries in Central America and the Caribbean that still retain diplomatic ties with Taiwan rather than Beijing (there are 23 in total worldwide).

- A reduction in the pressure on China to strengthen its currency and on trade issues.

This is some shopping list, and it is also impossible to imagine the US, even under an administration desperate to avoid another war in the Middle East, making such concessions.  It is worth pointing out, for instance, that on 6 March the House of Representatives passed by 370-39 votes a bill enabling the US to impose duties on subsidized goods from China (and Vietnam).  As one international trade expert noted after the vote: “Congress can’t agree on most anything, but it can agree to bash China.”

In summary, we believe the past week has confirmed that Israel is prepared, if necessary, to go it alone on Iran and that (for this reason) the Obama administration is increasingly desperate to find a non-military solution and understands how limited its time is.  This, in turn, our sources say, could be pushing the White House towards a last desperate attempt to get China to exert its influence on Iran to agree to some form of face-saving ‘Japan model’.  But, if our sources are correct on this last point, our own view is that the price of getting China to engage with sufficient energy will prove to be more than the US would be prepared to pay.  Besides, such an attempt is in all likelihood already too late because Israel’s red lines are closer to being crossed than the US’s.  Nothing that has emerged during the past week suggests to us that war will be avoided.  JdeC.