Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Iraq is being torn again by sectarian violence, which is escalating alongside continuing efforts to unseat the pro-Iranian Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki.  This is another challenge to Iran at a time when its principal Arab ally, President Bashar al-Assad, is facing an existential battle in Syria; when it is deeply at odds with the Gulf Arab monarchies over the treatment of their Shia citizens; and – of course – when the confrontation with the US and Israel over Iran’s nuclear programme is coming to a head.  As Iran knows that Assad’s hold on Syria is increasingly precarious, the need to resist the renewed Sunni challenge in Iraq is strongly felt in Tehran.  But in Iraq, at least, Tehran holds the stronger hand.

Certainly Iran would appear to have good reason to suspect that its interests in Iraq are under coordinated attack.  Alongside the so far failed attempts to unseat al-Maliki is the escalating sectarian violence.

On 13 June, Shia pilgrims in Baghdad and elsewhere were targeted in what seemed to be coordinated attacks that killed at least 53 people.  This was the worst such violence since 50 people were killed in Baghdad on 20 March.

In the 13 June attacks, at least 18 people were killed by four bombs in Baghdad, placed to kill Shia pilgrims and worshippers as they marked the anniversary of the death of Shia imam Moussa al-Kadhim, a great-grandson of the prophet.

Pilgrims were not the only target of the attacks.  Two car bombs in the Shia city of Hilla were placed outside restaurants used by security forces personnel.  Twenty-two people were killed and 38 more wounded.  Five soldiers were also killed in an attack on an army checkpoint in the south of Baghdad.  There were other deadly attacks in the Shia city of Balad, in Kerbala, and in Haswa.

Three days earlier, on 10 June, at least six people were killed and 38 wounded in a mortar-bomb attack on a gathering of Shia pilgrims in the Kadhimiyah district of Baghdad.  And earlier this month, in another sectarian attack in the capital, 26 people were killed and nearly 200 wounded in a car-bomb attack outside a Shia religious office.

But the divisions in Iraq are not as clear cut as they might seem.  For instance, the two Kurdish leaders, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan region president Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appear to be split, with Barzani strongly opposed to al-Maliki while Talabani is more supportive.  Equally, in the Shia camp, the radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has put himself in the anti-Maliki camp alongside the Sunni-backed Al-Iraqiyah bloc and Barzani.

The split between Barzani and Talabani is interesting.  The PUK and the KDP have a long history of internecine strife going back to the 1970s, and each party maintains total autonomy in their respective areas of control in Kurdistan: the KDP in Arbil and Duhok and the PUK in Sulaymaniyah.

Barzani’s KDP has been moving closer to Turkey, which is opposed to al-Maliki.  Turkey is now the Kurdistan region’s main economic partner.  The PUK, on the other hand, is more inclined towards Iran, which is the second-biggest investor in Kurdistan.

The split between the KDP and the PUK took practical form on 9 June when a no-confidence motion against al-Maliki just failed to secure the required 164 signatures because some PUK deputies withdrew their support.  KDP spokesman Jafar Iminki complained that Talabani’s stance had “surprised” the KDP and could lead to further friction between the KDP and the PUK.

It is possible that Iran is using Talabani for more than just helping to shore up al-Maliki, with an apparent move by Talabani to act as mediator between Turkey and the jailed Kurdish guerrilla leader Abdullah Ocalan raising suspicions that he has been put up to it in order to send a placatory message to Turkey on behalf of Iran.  According to some Turkish sources, Talabani could be trying to remind Ankara – at a critical time - that he can be helpful, but also that he might not always be so if his/Iran’s interests in Iraq continue to be undermined.

What is clear is that the wide fissures in Iraqi society provide ample opportunity for those opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq to undermine the new Shia ascendancy almost at will.  It is equally clear that Iran will not give up its newly acquired influence without a considerable struggle, particularly given its problems in Syria.  The problem for Tehran is that the opportunities for destabilizing Iraq are all too easy to find.  But, on balance, the problems for those opposed to Iran are even greater.

First of all, more instability in the Middle East is not what any of Iran’s principal opponents want, least of all the major Western powers.  Secondly, creating anti-Shia mayhem in Iraq is likely to be self-defeating and would only boost the Sunni extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, which is in no one’s interests.

Thirdly, although Iran clearly relishes its newfound influence in Iraq, its primary interest is to ensure Iraq never again becomes a strong Sunni-dominated adversary as it was under Saddam Hussein, and that at least is assured.  Maximising Iranian influence within Iraq is a clear objective for Tehran, but it is secondary to the main - already-secured - objective.