Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

There are two aspects of China’s East Asia policy – both on display during the past week – that need emphasizing.  The first is its complete disregard for the interests of its smaller neighbours; the second is its belief that it can see off the challenge from America.

China’s almost total disdain for its neighbours, or (put another way) its total belief in the rectitude of its own cause, has been a point we have been emphasizing for months, and this disdain has been on full display during the past week.  China’s view of the territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea and Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea is, in the words of the state-owned Global Times, that “neighbouring countries are attempting to bully China, either individually or through alliances”.

According to the Global Times: “China’s friendly stance was clear when it proposed to put aside the disputes last century.  But Hanoi and Manila have pressed China into taking firm measures.  They brought disgrace to themselves.”  As for Japan, the paper pronounced: “Chinese society is unanimous in not compromising with Japan.”  More threateningly, it added: “A few Japanese politicians think they can profit politically through challenging China.  Eventually they will understand it is a bitter deal.”

According to the Communist Party’s newspaper Renmin Ribao, much of the blame for the intransigence of China’s neighbours should be attached to the United States, which it blamed in a 12 July commentary written by senior editor Huang Qing for “adding fuel to the flames of the South China Sea dispute”.  The paper was particularly incensed by the US State Department’s statement on 9 July that the US considered the disputed Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu by China) to be within the orbit of the Japan-US Security Treaty.  It said “it is absolutely clear which way the spearhead is pointing in these remarks and moves”.

The commentary also castigated Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for her comment that "the time is now ripe for discussing Asia-Pacific democracy".  It said that the US’s policy of “exporting democracy” had produced “only disasters” in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it claimed that even the Philippines, long an American colony and “soaked in American culture”, provided a poor example of economic and social development.

Behind the belligerence seems to be a belief that the US’s announced pivot towards Asia will ultimately be unsuccessful and that China’s neighbours will have no option but to kowtow to Beijing.  This assessment is based on the fact that the US is an outsider to the region.  Renmin Ribao noted: “Geography is an unchangeable fact; the US move in coming from afar to stir things up in the Asia-Pacific region will be a very costly affair.”

China’s confidence will have been boosted somewhat by the fact that it was able to impose sufficient pressure on Cambodia to ensure that, at last week’s summit, the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in its 45 year history, thus preventing a critical declaration on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and Asean members Vietnam and the Philippines.

But that was a limited victory compared with the announcement on 12 July of the creation of a three-way security consultative body between South Korea, the United States, and Japan.  The symbolism of this new arrangement has been given added importance by the ongoing row in South Korea over a proposed intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, which we analysed in our 4 July issue.  As we said, that row was significant because it showed how, for the policymaking elite if not the South Korean public, fear of China trumps historical animosity towards Japan.

The proposed bilateral pact remains in limbo because of public opposition to closer ties with Japan, but the direction in which Seoul is moving was clearly confirmed by the 12 July announcement of the new trilateral consultative body linking South Korea, the US, and Japan.

The significance of the new organization cannot be disguised by its prosaic title of “Steering Group”.  On the contrary, South Korea’s news agency Yonhap was in no doubt that this was “laying the groundwork to build a trilateral alliance”.  This is the first time that the three countries have formed such a trilateral consultative body, and South Korea’s Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan made clear that it was aimed not just at dealing with the threat from North Korea when he said it was being formed “to cope with changing situations not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also the entire Asia-Pacific Region”, by which he certainly meant China.

Where China appears to be on stronger ground is on another point stressed by Renmin Ribao, namely that the United States will ultimately fail in its Asia-Pacific policy because it will “in the end have too many [other] things to take care of” – particularly in the Middle East.

In our view, the public airing of this latter point by Renmin Ribao is of huge significance and confirms something we have been emphasizing for some time, namely the fact that China has no interest in aiding the Washington’s announced pivot towards the Asia-Pacific by making life easier for the US in the Middle East, particularly over such matters as Syria and Iran.

Indeed, the Renmin Ribao commentary came as close as it reasonably could to issuing just such a threat.  The paper commented that “some people” felt that the US was being unwise in concentrating on the Asia-Pacific while it still had so many problems to deal with in the Middle East, and it said that “some voices hold the view” that the US “will in the end have too many things to take care of”.

What the commentary didn’t quite say, but which can be implied nonetheless, is that unless the US modifies its policies in the Asia-Pacific, then Beijing will be quite happy to ensure that the US does, indeed, have “too many things to take care of”.  In other words, don’t expect any help in defusing the crises with Syria and Iran.  JdeC.

NOTE on North Korea:  A month ago, in our 20 June issue, we suggested that “something may be afoot in North Korea”.  The events of the past week confirm that this is indeed the case, and behind this are the signs we reported last week that China may be pushing North Korea towards reform.  It would appear that North Korea is the one area where China is being helpful to the US because it knows that a recalcitrant North Korea is being used by South Korea, Japan, and the US to justify their strengthening alliance (see above).

Our assessment last week that China may be pushing Pyongyang towards reform was subsequently reinforced by reports that when the foreign ministers of China and North Korea met on the sidelines of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh on 11 July, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told North Korea’s Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun that Pyongyang must refrain from further provocations.  The carrot of a visit to Beijing by North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un was also offered.

Whether initiated by China’s promptings or not, as we reported in our 20 July issue, there have also been signs of tension between hawks and doves in Pyongyang, with the military apparently determined to protect its position in the state by keeping up tensions with South Korea while the foreign ministry appeared to be following a more conciliatory line.

There have also been indications that Pyongyang may be worried that South Korea is improving its own relations with regional countries that have traditionally been relatively supportive of North Korea, such as Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma.

Another indicator of change was the 8 July report that Kim Jong-un had called on North Korea to catch up with “global trends”.  According to South Korean sources, Kim had made an internal announcement of new economic reforms.  Now, this week, there has been the sudden announcement that North Korea’s chief of the general staff, Ri Yong-ho, has been relieved of his posts due to illness, and the almost simultaneous promotion of an army general in charge of border defence, Hyon Yong-chol, to vice-marshal of the Korean’s People’s Army.

South Korean intelligence sources, confirming our own earlier intelligence that an internal struggle for power is under way, say that Kim Jong-un is attempting to put his own stamp on the military.

At the moment, we will go no further than emphasizing two truths.  The first is that whatever is happening in Pyongyang, the threat to its neighbours remains minimal.  It is really interested only in regime survival, and past provocative posturing has only been intended to further this goal, not to precipitate conflict.  The second truth is, of course, Alexis de Tocqueville’s timeless observation (made in 1856) that “experience teaches that the most critical moment for bad governments is the one which witnesses their first steps toward reform”.