Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

The most intriguing aspect of the crisis in Gaza has been the way in which Hamas has been distancing itself from Iran, even though it is Iran that has provided it with the wherewithal to target Tel Aviv for the first time.  This is reflective of a deeper motive for its actions.

The proposition that Hamas has been acting on behalf of Iran to frighten Israel out of launching a strike against Iran’s nuclear programme does not bear scrutiny.  Hamas has lost a considerable portion of its armoury, along with its deputy military commander (Ahmad al-Jabari), and Israel’s confidence has been boosted by the successes of the Iron Dome anti-missile system.

It is possible that Hamas and Iran have made a misjudgement, but providing Israel with a dress-rehearsal for what might happen following an Israeli attack on Iran would always have been foolish.  And if the Hamas rockets had been more successful in eluding Israel’s anti-missile defences, that would have sparked an even fiercer Israeli response, including a ground offensive, which would have further degraded Hamas’s arsenal and infrastructure.

Evidence that Iran has not been the motivating factor behind the Hamas rocket attacks, which began to escalate at about the time of the US presidential election on 6 November, came with Hamas Politiburo chief Khaled Meshal’s press conference in Cairo on 18 November.  He was effusive in his thanks to Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar for supporting the people of Gaza, but he failed even to mention Iran until he was prompted by a question.

The following day, on 19 November, the head of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, Sayyid Hassam Nasrallah, remonstrated with Hamas for this omission, quoting a Koranic verse: “And if you are thankful, I shall increase my bounties”.

There have also been some interesting reactions in Russia to the Hamas attacks on Israel, which again point to the likelihood that it is not Iran that has been behind the violence.  Iran, of course, is allied with Russia over support for Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, and in Russia almost all media coverage of the Syrian uprising has been critical of the rebels and supportive of Assad – illustrating that when the Kremlin wants it, the media will dutifully deliver support for the policies it favours.

Yet over the Hamas attacks on Israel, there has been ambivalence.  It is true that the state-controlled English-language Russia Today (RT) broadcaster has been highly supportive of the people of Gaza, emphasizing their trials at the hands of the Israelis and (especially) the sufferings of children.  RT has reported that “at least 50%” of the casualties at hospitals in Gaza are children, some suffering from “horrific burning injuries”.  It gave a similar percentage for the proportion of child casualties in the mortuaries.  It has talked about “massacres” by the Israelis.

But domestic Russian channels have been more equivocal, covering the effect of the Hamas attacks on Israel and emphasizing that Israel is acting in self-defence and that it is attempting to minimize civilian casualties.  On 19 November, for instance, the official Rossiya 1 channel gave a noticeably balanced view, reporting that Israel had suffered attacks from 850 rockets in five days.  It also reported on the success of the Iron Dome anti-missile system in intercepting rockets aimed at Tel Aviv.

The Russian domestic channels have reported on child casualties in Gaza, but not with the emotional footage and commentary used by RT.  They have also made the point that Israel is mostly targeting Hamas leaders and the group’s arsenal of weapons.  Unlike RT, the domestic channels played down Israeli strikes on two media centres in Gaza.  NTV, for instance, said that Israel attacked Al-Quds TV because it was “suspected of giving guerrillas access to its technical capabilities”.

The contrast between the unanimity of Russia’s media coverage of the Syrian crisis and this split over the Gaza crisis is an obvious one, and our sources say that it reflects the fact that the Kremlin does not see the Hamas actions as part of the Iranian-Syrian battle for survival.  If it did, the domestic coverage would have echoed that of the English-language RT.

So what did motivate Hamas to escalate a crisis with Israel at this time?  There have been three factors at work.  First, Hamas was encouraged to chance its arm by its need to boost its street-level rejectionist credentials at a time when its rift with the Assad regime in Syria might have led some to question them.  Second, it wished to consolidate its position in the burgeoning post-Arab Spring hegemony of the Muslim Brotherhood by gaining vocal support from Egypt and Turkey (which has been forthcoming).  And, thirdly, it acted in the correct expectation that Israel would pull its punches in an effort not to widen the rift with Egypt and Turkey.

At the time of writing, Hamas’s plans have worked out exactly as hoped, apart of course from the loss of al-Jabari.

The speech made by Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo on 17 November was especially gratifying, with its explicit commitment to long-term support for the people of Gaza and to the need for an eventual settling of accounts with Israel.  He told an audience at Cairo University: “Everyone must know that sooner or later there will be a holding to account for the massacre of these innocent children killed inhumanely in Gaza.”

On his return to Turkey, Erdogan told the Turkish parliament that Israel was “conducting ethnic cleansing in the region”.  He added: “Israel is terrorizing the Middle East.  Is murdering a 4-year old child self-defence?”

Erdogan was fully supported by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who told Palestinians at a press conference in Gaza on 20 November : “I have today brought greetings to you from Turkish President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and 75m Turks...We will never leave you alone and God is our witness.  Your pain is our pain.  And your destiny is our destiny.  Your future is our future.  The struggle will go on until you are free and until Jerusalem is free.”

As regards Egypt, its solidarity with the Gazans was expressed in dramatic terms by the 16 November visit to Gaza by Egypt’s Prime Minister Hisham Qandil.  It would be easy to dismiss his words of support as mere rhetoric, but the point is that (as the representative of an elected government) he felt obliged to offer Egypt’s full support in the most emotional terms.  He used words that could not have been used by representatives of the Mubarak regime, and he meant what he said.  Qandil told the Gazans:

“I came to you today in support of the Palestinian people on behalf of the Egyptian people...I came today in the name of millions of the Egyptians, who share with the Palestinian people their pains and who follow with concern and great pain what takes place in Gaza...

“What I saw in Gaza today, the martyrs I saw today in the hospital; the child martyr Muhammad Yasir...We cannot remain silent at this tragedy...We will proceed to...establish the Palestinian state with holy Jerusalem as its capital.

"Brothers and sisters: Palestine is the beating heart of the Arab nation; it is the beating heart of the Arab and Islamic nation.  The nation will not become well if its heart is sick.  O ye who believe!  Persevere in patience and constancy; vie in such perseverance; strengthen each other; and fear Allah that ye may prosper...”

It has also been noticeable in recent days that Hamas’s secular Palestinian rival Fateh has been increasing its complaints about Egyptian support for Hamas, with Azzam al-Ahmad, who is head of Fateh’s delegation for Palestinian national reconciliation, saying: “The Fateh movement has felt a change in the Egyptian stand on reconciliation.  Cairo has started to change the clauses it had formulated before and which were the basis for a reconciliation agreement that was supposed to be signed by Fateh, Hamas and all the Palestinian factions before Hamas backed down on signing it.”

The end result of this current episode will be even stronger ties between Hamas and the dominant Sunni Islamist trend in Egypt and Turkey, which may in due course also take power in Syria and Jordan.  Long-term, this is a far more dangerous prospect for Israel than an isolated Hamas supported by Syria (which under the Assads carefully maintained a peaceful border with Israel) and the pariah and distant state of Iran.

Besides, the fact that Hamas is consolidating its links with the Arab Sunni bloc does not necessarily mean that it has completely turned its back on Tehran (or Hezbollah).  On the contrary, its calculation is that Tehran has nowhere else to go, particularly if Assad falls.  Hamas will be rearmed by Iran because it is in Iran’s interests to rearm it, even if Hamas no longer sees Tehran as its principal patron.  And Turkey and Egypt will go along with this because they will not be directly implicated and yet they know that a military powerful Hamas weakens Israel.  They also know that public opinion would not allow them to follow a policy of keeping Hamas weak, even if that is what they will be encouraged to do by the Western powers.

This crisis will pass, but the overall strategic balance continues to shift against Israel, which is why it will have to deal with Iran in 2013.  JdeC.