Caribbean & Central America - February 2013 (ISSN 1741-4458)

On 3 February, direct elections were held for 612 National Assembly seats. The Cuban system has only one candidate per seat (nominated and selected in public meetings in the months leading up to the vote), and to take a seat in the National Assembly, they must win more than 50% of the valid votes; if they do not, a new candidate must be chosen and the election for that seat re-run.

Although Cuban electors have no choice of candidate, they are able to express disapproval by refusing to vote or spoiling their ballot. The percentage turnout and percentage of valid votes therefore provide some indication of the degree of public enthusiasm for the electoral process and confidence in the candidates. The results also show the proportion of voters who return a voto unido (united vote: acceptance of the official slate of candidates, rather than selecting them individually), which has traditionally been seen as a measure of support for the selection process. On all three counts, the results of the 2013 poll appeared less supportive of the system (see table) than the past three elections.

Results of National Assembly election

 The significance of these trends is uncertain. The decline in the turnout confirms a waning interest in the political process, which has been observed among younger voters in particular. The ideology of the Cuban revolution puts great emphasis on public participation, so a doubling of the proportion of people abstaining from the election, to almost 10%, might be viewed with concern by the leadership. It also reflects the changing nature of Cuba’s economy and society, with an increase in the number of people who derive their living outside state organisations, a waning enthusiasm for mass mobilisations and revolutionary slogans, and influence of culture and aspirations inspired by contact with the outside world.

The increase in blank or spoiled votes (one in 17 ballot papers in 2013, compared with one in 26 in 2003) may be a stronger indicator of rising hostility to the political system, although the proportion remains remarkably small for a government that has been in power for more than 50 years. A larger proportion of votes for individual candidates rather than the official slate might be seen as an indicator of less passive voting decisions, which would be in line with the government’s own emphasis on encouraging more critical engagement. In previous elections, the official media has carried propaganda beseeching electors to voto unido, but this was absent this time, perhaps confirming less insistence on unity than before.

The 2013 election was also significant as a step towards the replacement of Cuba’s ageing leaders, many whom have been dominating political life since 1959, with a new generation of loyal successors. Although members of the old guard (including the country’s president, Raúl Castro, and his deputy, first vice president José Ramón Machado) remain in the top jobs, 52% of the national assembly’s new intake is reported to be under 35, and the average age is 48.

The proportion of women is also reported to have increased, to 49%. Ricardo Alarcón (75), who has been president of the National Assembly for two decades, has stepped down, creating a vacancy to be filled by the new Assembly when it holds its first full session, on February 24th. Raúl Castro (81) has introduced a two-term limit for the presidency, and has so far completed only one, although he was acting president for two years before officially assuming the post in 2008.

He has given no indication that he will be standing down, and there appears to be little expectation that he will do so. If he retains the presidency, there will be a high risk of a sudden departure due to ill health before the end of his five-year term, so the choice of first vice president will be an important one. José Ramón Machado is 83, and is likely to be replaced. There are therefore at least two important vacancies for leadership positions, both of which are likely to be filled by people who are already in prominent roles.

No official indication has been given of the favoured candidates, but two of the people who have been widely tipped as potential candidates for promotion are the foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez, and Miguel Diaz Canel, one of the seven vice presidents. Their advancement would create a further set of high-level jobs to be filled by younger figures, among whom Josefina Vidal, deputy foreign minister, and Olga Lidia Tapia Iglesias, a National Assembly deputy and member of the Central Committee of the Partido Comunista de Cuba (the Cuban Communist Party), appear to be favoured.

• Seeking investors for Cienfuegos refinery

Cuba is looking to woo international investors to the tune of US$6.0bn to help it continue the modernisation and expansion of its main Cienfuegos refinery. Cuba has previously sought external foreign partners – both public and private – for the development of its key domestic sectors, including the oil & gas, telecoms and tourism industries; but the timing of this latest initiative suggests that Cuba is hedging its bets ahead of the possible scaling back of its Venezuelan subsidies and indications that China is also becoming more demanding of Venezuela. Ricardo Caballero, executive president of Cubavenpetrol, the joint Cuban-Venezuelan entity that administers Cienfuegos recently told journalists during a tour of the refining complex that a final proposal to be presented to international financial investors was almost ready.

  The Russian-built Cienfuegos was closed in 1995 and only re-opened in 2007 thanks to Venezuelan assistance. The new funds would go towards the plan to boost refining capacity from 65,000 barrels per day (b/d) to 150,000 b/d, in addition to the construction of a new natural gas liquefaction plant.

  Cubavenpetrol had originally said that China would finance the project and be paid in Venezuelan oil exports. China signed a letter of intent in 2011, but according to Caballero at present China’s only involvement is in providing the basic engineering for the planned expansion along with the Italian unit of the French firm Technip. Cuba estimates that it has 20bn barrels of offshore oil in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, but three wells drilled last year by Spain’s Repsol, Venezuela’s Pdvsa and Malaysia’s Petronas turned up dry. A fourth is currently being drilled by Russia’s Zarubezhneft. Venezuela sends Cuba an estimated 115, 000 b/d, about two thirds of its daily oil needs. END BOX

• Fibre optic cable shows signs of life

State telecommunications company, ETECSA, recently published a statement in the Communist party mouthpiece Granma, confirming that internet traffic is being carried by Cuba’s first submarine fibre-optic cable, Alba-1, which connects the island to Venezuela. According to the 24 January statement, ETECSA has been carrying international voice traffic since August 2012, while data-traffic tests have been conducted on the cable since 10 January 2013. The Granma statement is the first by the Cuban government on the progress of the cable, which was laid by France’s Alcatel-Lucent in 2011.

  Cuba has had to access the internet via expensive and slow satellite connections. When the testing process is completed, however, ETECSA noted that the launch of the cable “will not automatically mean that the possibility of access will increase,” adding that investment in the domestic telecoms infrastructure is required and that even then the goal is “gradual growth of a service that we offer mostly for free and with social aims in mind.” END BOX

• Internet use

The government reported that the number of Cubans using the Internet had increased by 40% in 2011 compared with a year earlier to 2.6m. This is not private internet access, which remains highly restricted, but rather government monitored ‘intranet’ offered through state-run computer clubs, schools and offices.