Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

This service has been assiduous in tracking China’s growing assertiveness and the reactions to this of China’s neighbours, most particularly Japan and the Philippines.  However, we have also noted the curiosity that India has been relatively muted in its response to this growing Chinese assertiveness, despite finding itself on the receiving end on a number of occasions.  India’s upcoming general election could see a change, and China could begin to experience more ‘push back’ from India.

A good example of the restraint exercised by India with regard to China followed the incursion into Indian territory by Chinese troops in April 2013, which Delhi did its best to play down.

Following further incidents in the summer of 2013, and further fierce criticism not just from the opposition but also from some political allies, Defence Minister AK Antony admitted that India had made a strategic mistake in not responding more rapidly to China’s development of infrastructure along its side of the border.  He said: “I have no hesitation to say that China is in a better position than India in terms of border infrastructure.  It is a mistake, it is all of us who are to be held collectively responsible for it.  It is a historical legacy.”  Subsequently, the government approved the creation of a new mountain strike corps for deployment along the border with China.

India’s underlying distrust of China was revealed again in January this year with reports that the Home Ministry had issued an advisory to the Petroleum and Natural Gas Ministry saying that it should not award exploration and production contracts to Chinese companies for security reasons.

Last week, we reported on another small but nonetheless symptomatic example of Indian distrust of China.  As we reported, the head of India’s SSB paramilitary border force, Arun Chaudhary, recently raised concerns with his Nepalese counterpart about Chinese study centres which are spreading fast in Nepal and which are said to be “indulging in anti-India propaganda”.

But these are all relatively small incidents, and as we have said India has on the whole tried to play down, at least publicly, any idea of a serious security threat emanating from China.  It is this tone of restraint that could change should Narendra Modi, leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), win the 7 April-12 May general election and become India’s prime minister.  Diplomatic sources are already drawing comparisons between Modi and Japan’s nationalist prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and indeed Modi will specifically seek to take India closer to Japan.

As chief minister of Gujarat, Modi has visited Japan, where he was received as if he were a head of government.  Japanese money has also flowed into Gujarat as a consequence of the contacts (and impression) Modi made in Japan.

We are not saying that a Modi government would seek to precipitate a crisis with China (Modi has also visited Beijing, in 2011, where he was equally well treated; and he is not overly pro-Western having been treated as a pariah by the US and other Western powers as a result of his alleged role in the anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002 in which 1,000 people died.)  However, a Modi-led India would be likely to be more sensitive to the potential dangers posed by China.

It is worth noting that in Modi’s first significant comments on foreign policy in the lead-up to the general election he referred to the question of Chinese assertiveness - and Japan under Abe will of course encourage this trend strongly.  Since the early 2000s, Japan has been working to bring India (along with Australia) into a values-based Asian alliance.  In 2007, Tokyo made a joint declaration on security cooperation with Australia, and this was followed by a similar one with India in 2008.

But first, of course, Modi has to win the election.  He is a charismatic speaker who has a clean reputation and an impressive track record in Gujarat, which he has turned into an economic powerhouse.  However, as the leader of the hard-line Hinduist BJP he is also a divisive figure, and when last June Modi was selected to lead the BJP’s campaign committee this prompted the Janata Dal United (JD-U) party to leave the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

The last peak of support for the BJP was in 1998, when it’s support in the polls reached 25.6%. This fell to 18.8% in the 2009 election.  However, opinion poll surveys suggest BJP support could now be running as high as 34%.  Although it is notoriously difficult to convert opinion-poll evidence into numbers of seats, due to the vagaries of India’s first-past-the-post electoral system, analysts say that the BJP could win as many as 200 seats out of the 543 in the lower house.  Importantly, much of the recent gains by the BJP suggest that it will poll well in states where it has been historically weak, including in the south.  Also, success breeds success, and more regional parties could link with the BJP as the election nears.

Another factor is that support for the idea of Modi as prime minister is also increasing strongly.  In 2009, only 2% of voters supported that prospect; now it is more like 34%, with as many as 54% in Madhya Pradesh expressing a preference for the BJP leader.  Interestingly, the BJP’s support is strongest in the 18-25 age group, of which 38% say they will vote BJP.

The ruling Congress party gains more preferences than the BJP only in the 56 and over age group.  On the other hand, the new anti-corruption Aam Aadmi Party (Common Man Party) appears to be making rapid headway among young, urban, middle class voters.

Nothing is certain in this most intriguing of elections, in which 814m voters are entitled to have their say (100m more than in 2009).  And although the election will not be fought and won on foreign policy issues, there is no doubt that China and Japan (for opposite reasons) will be among the closest observers of the contest.

NOTE: While Japan has tried to play the ‘common values’ card in recent years in its attempts to draw the likes of India and Australia into a ‘contain-China’ strategy, this needs to be seen as a power play against China, not as a good guide as to how Japan will interact with its neighbours.

For instance, while it is seeking to use its pro-democracy preference to enhance its position in Myanmar, which under the junta had become a virtual Chinese colony, by contrast it has been reluctant to criticize Vietnam on human rights questions.  Equally, Japan did not criticize Cambodia for conducting fraudulent elections in 2013, and it has been constrained in its reaction to the unrest in Thailand.

The point is that Japan will use the pro-democracy card when it suits it to do so as a means of justifying resistance to China’s growing power; but, equally, it will refrain from criticizing Asian countries about a lack of democratic reform if that risks antagonizing them, particularly in the case of a country such as Vietnam which shares some of Japan’s concerns about China.

China, of course, has its own retaliatory propaganda tool, which it never ceases to use, namely raising Japan’s supposed lack of contrition over its militaristic past.  This was in the news once again during the past week, with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi saying on 8 March that “recent comments and actions of Japanese leaders betrayed the spirit of 1972 and undermined the foundation of China-Japan relations”.  1972 was the year in which the two countries normalized diplomatic relations.

Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga responded by calling Wang’s comments “totally unacceptable”.  He added that Japan has “embraced freedom, democracy, and the rule of law and contributed to peace and prosperity in Asia.  The international community has recognized that.”