Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Opinions about the motivation behind Saudi Arabia’s crackdown on supporters of terrorism and extremist groups is sharply divided: Saudi Arabian media outlets are highlighting Iran and Iranian-supported groups as the real targets, but other Middle Eastern sources suggest that the crackdown is primarily aimed at Sunni extremists and that there is a tentative rapprochement under way with Iran.

On 14 April, a commentary in the Saudi-owned pan Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat noted that King Abdullah had decreed that the ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, endowments and Islamic affairs, and justice, as well as the grievances council and the general prosecutor’s office, are to form a committee whose job it will be to compile lists of movements and organizations deemed to be terrorist.  Four movements already listed are Yemen’s Houthis, the al-Qaeda-affiliated an-Nusra Front, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).  Of these, the Houthis and Hezbollah are Iranian-backed, and the commentary stated: “The anti-terror law is a response to the real terrorists, those who manufacture terror and export it to other countries, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Syrian regime and Iran.”

But the pro-Qatari pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi, published on the same day, took a different view, highlighting the targeting of the Muslim Brotherhood (which Qatar supports) and saying: “Rather than confronting the threat of Iranian expansionism…Saudi Arabia has decided to invent an enemy for itself under the name of ‘terrorism’ instead.”

The pro-Qatari commentary went on to say that by criminalizing the MB and its other anti-terror moves “Saudi Arabia is presenting a new image of itself as a power that is ready to squander Muslim rights.  This is something that Iran has benefited from greatly and has achieved great gains without having to fire a single shot.”

Other sources believe something more complicated is going on, but that it does indeed involve a tentative rapprochement with Iran.  Those arguing for this interpretation say that the motive is what is happening in Iraq.  Although there is now a general belief that the Assad regime will survive in Syria, there is still a fear that the Sunni jihadist opposition group, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), will retain control over wide areas of eastern Syria, consolidate its position in western Iraq, where it is said to be making major gains on the ground, and could gain control of oil resources in the north.  In essence, the fear is that radical Islamist terrorists could become embedded in eastern Syria and western Iraq and threaten Saudi Arabia and others from there.  Faced by this threat, some observers believe that Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran could make common cause together.

Whether the threat from ISIS establishing a jihadist safe-haven in eastern Syria and Iraq is a realistic one or not, there has certainly been some evidence of Iran seeking to mend fences with Saudi Arabia, and of Saudi Arabia being prepared to listen to these advances.  This is a significant change from the first furious reaction of Riyadh to signs that the US was preparing a rapprochement of its own with Iran following the election of the ostensibly moderate President Hassan Rowhani.

On 10 April, for instance, Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Ghazanfar Ruknabadi, talked openly about an easing of tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  Perhaps even more surprisingly, on 6 April Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah said that not only does he support better relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia but that he expects it to happen soon.  The pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar has claimed that it knows of secret talks between Saudi and Iranian officials.

No well-placed Saudi source has confirmed these developments, but it is noticeable that there has been less anti-Tehran rhetoric emanating from Riyadh and Riyadh-backed media outlets in recent months.

If this is a correct interpretation of what is going on, Washington’s influence will have played its part given the Obama administration’s desire to reduce tensions with Iran and to avoid a clash over Iranian nuclear ambitions.  But King Abdullah is also thought to be in favour of better relations with Iran, and the removal of the head of Saudi intelligence Prince Bandar bin Sultan would aid any such move.  Bandar is a noted hawk on Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, and he was behind the policy of using jihadist groups in the battle to topple Assad.  His removal could be attributed solely to the failure of his Syria policy (indirectly made public by the 3 February Saudi royal decree criminalizing Saudi citizens for participating in military activities abroad), or there could indeed be something going on between Riyadh and Tehran.