Security & Strategic Review - December 2003
COLOMBIA: Military escalation eases civilians' lot
President Alvaro Uribe has kept his promise and greatly intensified the war against Colombia's illegal armed groups. He also appears to be succeeding; beyond the body count, which has spiralled upwards, a record number of fighters have withdrawn from the conflict (by capture or defection), and the civilian population has been enjoying the least violent year since 1986.
Facts & figures
The intensity of the war has indeed increased. According to a tally by the Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (FSD), there were 2,312 armed clashes in the first 11 months of the year: 73% more than in 2002. On one plane the result has been deadly: the number of guerrillas and paramilitaries killed has exceeded 2,700; on average, it has been running at more than double the rate of 2002. The toll has also been highly asymmetrical: for each member of the security forces killed, 19 on the other side have fallen. Seen from a different angle, while last year there was one fatality among the security forces for every five engagements, this year the ratio has been 1:16.
On the other side of the equation, the number of incidents classified by the defence ministry as `acts of terrorism' was down by 46.8%, from 1,539 in January-November 2002 to 818 in the same period of this year. Also down, by 50%, was the number of roadblock kidnappings by guerrillas, a practice which included the mass abductions known as pescas milagrosas, literally `miraculous catches [of fish]'.
Indeed, kidnappings in general have declined considerably: according to the government's Fondelibertad, by 23%, from 1,511 last year to 1,160; according to the higher FSD tally, by 28.2%, from 2,986 to 2,145. This has been attributed to the general improvement of security, as has the decline of the homicide rate (a broader category than murder) to 50 per 100,000 inhabitants annually, the lowest figure on record since 1986.
All told, since the beginning of the year 11,686 people have ceased to be combatants: 9,283 guerrillas and paramilitaries have been captured by the security forces, and another 2,403 have downed weapons and turned themselves in, seeking the benefits of the government's `reinsertion' programme. That last figure does not include the 1,015 paramilitaries currently being `demobilised' (855 from the Bloque Cacique Nutibara of Antioquia, 160 from a small `self-defence' group in Cauca) — a subject we shall return to further on.
`Decapitation' strategy?
According to what the US Southern Command has been telling the US press, an important element of Colombia's strategy is the `decapitation' of the guerrilla organisations — and it has been working. `Decapitation' was a DEA favourite at the time of the offensive against the Medellín and Cali drug cartels, adopted later by the US military (many will recall its repeated mention in the early phases of the war against Iraq). In connection with Colombia it was mentioned back in May this year by Southcom's director of operations, General Galen Jackman, who cited the killing of three Farc commanders and the capture of three ELN leaders as early fruits.
In early December, Southcom spokesman Steve Lucas, said about the first US-trained commando battalion of the Colombian army, `Their strategy is to integrate operations by gathering appropriate intelligence and use that intelligence to conduct a decapitation strategy. Get the leadership, in other words.' Beyond what Jackman had said in May, the results of this strategy included:
Facts & figures
The intensity of the war has indeed increased. According to a tally by the Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (FSD), there were 2,312 armed clashes in the first 11 months of the year: 73% more than in 2002. On one plane the result has been deadly: the number of guerrillas and paramilitaries killed has exceeded 2,700; on average, it has been running at more than double the rate of 2002. The toll has also been highly asymmetrical: for each member of the security forces killed, 19 on the other side have fallen. Seen from a different angle, while last year there was one fatality among the security forces for every five engagements, this year the ratio has been 1:16.
On the other side of the equation, the number of incidents classified by the defence ministry as `acts of terrorism' was down by 46.8%, from 1,539 in January-November 2002 to 818 in the same period of this year. Also down, by 50%, was the number of roadblock kidnappings by guerrillas, a practice which included the mass abductions known as pescas milagrosas, literally `miraculous catches [of fish]'.
Indeed, kidnappings in general have declined considerably: according to the government's Fondelibertad, by 23%, from 1,511 last year to 1,160; according to the higher FSD tally, by 28.2%, from 2,986 to 2,145. This has been attributed to the general improvement of security, as has the decline of the homicide rate (a broader category than murder) to 50 per 100,000 inhabitants annually, the lowest figure on record since 1986.
All told, since the beginning of the year 11,686 people have ceased to be combatants: 9,283 guerrillas and paramilitaries have been captured by the security forces, and another 2,403 have downed weapons and turned themselves in, seeking the benefits of the government's `reinsertion' programme. That last figure does not include the 1,015 paramilitaries currently being `demobilised' (855 from the Bloque Cacique Nutibara of Antioquia, 160 from a small `self-defence' group in Cauca) — a subject we shall return to further on.
`Decapitation' strategy?
According to what the US Southern Command has been telling the US press, an important element of Colombia's strategy is the `decapitation' of the guerrilla organisations — and it has been working. `Decapitation' was a DEA favourite at the time of the offensive against the Medellín and Cali drug cartels, adopted later by the US military (many will recall its repeated mention in the early phases of the war against Iraq). In connection with Colombia it was mentioned back in May this year by Southcom's director of operations, General Galen Jackman, who cited the killing of three Farc commanders and the capture of three ELN leaders as early fruits.
In early December, Southcom spokesman Steve Lucas, said about the first US-trained commando battalion of the Colombian army, `Their strategy is to integrate operations by gathering appropriate intelligence and use that intelligence to conduct a decapitation strategy. Get the leadership, in other words.' Beyond what Jackman had said in May, the results of this strategy included:
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