Andean Group - December 2022

The relentless killing of social leaders and human rights defenders has long marked Colombia as one of the most dangerous countries in the world for frontline environmental and social campaigners. Since 2017, targeted assassinations have also threatened the stability of the peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrilla group, with demobilised Farc guerrillas also being slain in significant numbers as they attempt to reintegrate into civilian life. On 6 September, the government led by President Gustavo Petro unveiled a new scheme aimed at stemming this violence, dubbed Puestos de Mando Unificados por la Vida (PMUVs).

According to a tally kept by the Colombian NGO Indepaz, as of 21 October 147 social leaders and human rights defenders had been assassinated in 2022. Indigenous and civic activists were the most featured on Indepaz’s list, but those targeted came from a wide range of pressure groups including trade unionists, LGBT and black rights activists, and those campaigning for land redistribution. Over the same period, Indepaz tallied the murders of 35 former Farc guerrillas who had signed the 2016 peace accords. In its latest report, published 27 September, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia noted that security threats faced by ex-guerrillas “continue to jeopardise reintegration” and emphasised that “the long-term success of the [peace] process is contingent on former combatants’ security guarantees”.

The killing of social leaders also hampers the fulfilment of the accords by eliminating activists who have sought to organise the implementation of key components of the peace agreement – for example, the rollout of voluntary coca crop substitution programmes, and maintaining pressure for land redistribution. This sees them challenge powerful vested interests in regions that may have only seen an extremely limited state presence in recent decades. With their assassination, the influence of illegal armed groups, drug traffickers, and businesses or politicians linked to these becomes greater, and communities are intimidated into silence.

Petro’s government, which took office on 7 August promising to significantly accelerate the implementation of the peace agreement, has moved swiftly to try and address the threats faced by activists and demobilised guerrillas. On 6 September, a joint statement from the defence and interior ministries announced details of the PMUV scheme, describing it as an “inter-institutional mechanism to attend to the public order situation in the regions”. The PMUVs, which are comprised of officials from the municipal, departmental, and national governments, members of the security forces, and congressional representatives, are intended to form a rapid response system to threats received by social leaders, campaigners, and former Farc guerrillas. As of 21 October, 20 PMUVs had been established, according to Interior Minister Alfonso Prada, while a further 45 PMUVs were scheduled to be launched.

Whilst it is too early to say whether the PMUV rollout will have a decisive impact on assassinations, Indepaz did note that the eight social leaders killed in September was the lowest figure recorded in 2022, compared to the murder of at least 13 per month in the first eight months of the year. Colombia’s peace commissioner, Danilo Rueda, attributed this fall to armed groups’ desire to enter peace talks with the Petro administration. The outcome of those talks, rather than the PMUVs, is likely to have the most decisive impact on the safety of activists and demobilised rebels.

Petro meets Maduro

On 1 November, Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro and Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro met in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, where they pledged to end years of bad blood between the two nations. The two presidents signed an 11-point joint statement in which they pledged to “move firmly and with conviction towards unity and peace between our two nations”. They agreed to security cooperation along the length of the shared border; the improvement of binational transport routes; and dialogue aimed at establishing “complementarity” in energy matters, among other, vaguer pledges of cooperation. Venezuela’s opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, had called on Petro not to “normalise a dictatorship” and instead join “demands for free and fair elections in Venezuela”. He tweeted that Petro’s decision “to visit the dictator Maduro and call him ‘president’ is an action that could dangerously normalise human rights violations”.