The LatinNews Podcast

Graham Denyer Willis is Professor of Global Politics and Society in the Department of Politics and International Studies, and a Fellow of Queens’ College.

A political ethnographer, Graham's research and teaching is concerned with practices and assumptions of power amidst inequality, as they work through cities, institutions and informality. He approaches these questions from historical and contemporary Brazil, to question how direct and indirect forms of violence and social organisation matter in the production and maintenance of political authority.

He is the author of two books, both published by the University of California Press. His first book, The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil (2015), accompanies homicide detectives in São Paulo as they negotiate an incipient organised crime group and police who kill 2.3 times per day.

His second, Keep the Bones Alive: Missing People and the Search for Life in Brazil (2022), examines how and why 20,000 - 25,000 people go missing, per year, in São Paulo.

He is now at work on a third ethnographic monograph, which examines the practices and logics of 'trust and safety' in Silicon Valley as vital to a global regime of security and accumulation rooted in platform capitalism.

Professor Willis is also a 2021 Philip Leverhulme Prize recipient for his work on everyday patterns of political order with attention to policing and inequality, via ethnography and a focus on Brazil.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl, your host. Here in Bogotá, Colombia, we have a very special guest to talk all things Brazilian, indeed inequality and security. His name is Graham Willis. He is the professor of Global Politics and Society in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, fellow and Director of Studies of Geography at Queens’ College, Cambridge, author of many books, and, well, an expert on security and inequality in Brazil. So welcome on The LatinNews Podcast.

Professor Graham Willis: Thanks very much for having me.

Richard McColl: It's a great pleasure to be here because, you know, we all know Brazil. We know the size, we know the challenges. We've been reading about the election, of course, latter election of Lula, the Bolsonaristas, Bolsonaro now being banned from running again for 2030. Everything seems to be pointing, at least on an international basis, that Brazil is back. Whether that Lula wanted to obviously display as soon as he got back into power after the Bolsonaro rules years, tax reform, simplifying the complex tax system here in Brazil, fostering economic growth and so on. But let's talk about inequality a bit and security. I mean, I'm looking at Brazil's news. I'm looking at the 4 million cases of dengue so far in 2024. I'm looking at these titles of 64.22 million Brazilians live in households with food insecurity, and yet, well, murders are down. But people's perception is that violence is up under Lula. Perhaps you could give us, Graham, some sort of idea of what is going on in Brazil.

Professor Graham Willis: Thanks for that. Yeah. I think, you know, the real puzzle with Brazil is why this amazing country leaves so many people to struggle on an everyday basis. Right. And we see that in so many different ways. We see that in, you know, questions of dengue, which are really about basic questions of infrastructure and their ability to access health care, living in precarious environments and. And so on and so forth. Right. And I think those things are not disconnected from some of the bigger questions of violence, of acute, you know, interpersonal forms of violence. Of course, there's a very big story that surrounds that recently, which is, you know, around this bigger issue of the rise of particular forms of organized crime groups that exist in Brazilian cities that have spread very widely out of conditions of poverty. And, you know, on the one hand, a lot of people look to these groups and they say, well, these are bloodthirsty criminals who, you know, don't know how to conform to social mores and so on and so forth. But a lot of the research actually shows that they're, you know, the conditions that give rise to these groups are very political. They are long standing questions of people trying to get by in very difficult conditions. But they're also a story of the way that the expansion of the prison system has itself created criminals. And so that's a big story that surrounds the issue of homicides. For those of us who do study questions of violence, the story of homicides is very much a troubled one because the assumption really is that if you have a rise in homicides, there is a problem of disorder or a lack of control of police or of the state, you know, over law. So you have an unruly law or you have disorder in everyday life. And that consequently, if you have a decline in homicides, the state is doing a good job, police are doing a good job. But we actually, what we know, and it's not specific to Brazil, is that actually sometimes when homicides go down, it's because there is a particular organized crime group that has dominated particular communities or has. Has found ways to forge alliances with other groups, or has. Has the means to say to people in places that have been violent, you're not allowed to be violent anymore. This is very much the case in São Paulo, a city that was very violent for a long time through the 1990s. One of the ways that people have mentioned it is that the time of the war in Kosovo, there were more people dying in the city of São Paulo than died in Kosovo, like more than 10,000 people. So it was very significant. But then within a short period of time, the homicide rate declined by upwards of 80%. So today we see around 6,000 fewer people dying from homicides than we do in that period of time. That story replicates itself in troubled ways across different Brazilian cities, all of which virtually have the presence of an organized crime group of some kind or have it in fragmented ways. Rio de Janeiro has a number of them, plus paramilitary groups, basically. And in other Brazilian cities, there are different ways in which the contestation between groups is a major part of the story of rising homicide rates. So I think there's a troublesome story there which we need to think about very deliberately and very contextually, and not just in the sense that, like, it's the state that doesn't have control, and we should hope the state has more control, but of the historical conditions that have given rise to people having to solve problems in a way that is ethically slippery and difficult.

Richard McColl: And I mean, you've mentioned it on a couple of pages. I'm seeing parallels through other Latin American countries, you know, sort of regions of the country where in Colombia was less deforestation because it was under the control of the FARC guerrillas. And now in Ecuador, we're looking at President Noboa trying to take full control of the prison system in order to control, and I would say sort of extinguish the gangs which are strafing the country with their violence. Is that a similar situation that we can see coming out of the prisons in Brazil? I mean, we've seen heinous documentaries and films about. About this topic, but it's something that still continues to this day.

Professor Graham Willis: I mean, he's a key paradox. You know, we see these crises of prison violence. We see them in Ecuador, we see them in Brazil, we see them in Venezuela, we see them in Honduras, all over the place. Right. And often the story is, you know, that people are. The prisons are really bad and people are struggling and there's violence within them. And we know that many prisons around Latin America, Brazil, it's something like 80%. And the government actually states this outright, are controlled by organized crime groups. Right.

Richard McColl: Wow.

Professor Graham Willis: And yet. And yet the solution seems to be let's build more prisons. Right. So we've got Brazil in the 1970s, at a time when prisons figured fairly centrally to public discussion because of the dictatorship, had very few prisons. Actually, by comparison, we had in the tens, you know, somewhere around 50 to 60. Actually, today we have more than 1550 prisons in Brazil.

Richard McColl: Wow.

Professor Graham Willis: Ex. Exponential growth in prison construction across the country. Right. And so this is happening at precisely the same timeline as the rise of organized crime group in Brazilian cities. So we often are trying to think about what the relationship is between the rise of organized crime and the expansion of the prison system.

Richard McColl: Right.

Professor Graham Willis: This issue is something that actually when we look very closely, we see particular kinds of logics, actually. So one of these groups called the Primeiro Comando da Capital in. In São Paulo is very significant. It's spread around many different states. One of the reasons it's so successful is it is because it can compel people to pay membership dues on the outside because they fully recognize that they're going to end up on the inside. So membership dues actually serve almost as though they were a form of insurance, so that when people do end up inside, they'll be taken care of. You don't pay them on the inside, you only pay them on the outside, right? So if you know that you're going to end up in prison and you know you're going to need the protection of that group and you know that they provide good services like beds, clothing, food, things like that, you'll be compelled to pay that membership too. If you sever that relationship somehow, if you make it less likely that people will end up on the inside, and if you make it less probable that they can count on the idea that they're going to need protection on the inside, you're going to change the whole logic of the game. Conversely, if you build more prisons and you put more people in prison, many of whom actually are there for low level drug crimes, we know that according to statistics, it's something like 72% of the Brazilian prison population is there for nonviolent crimes. So things like stealing marijuana, crack cocaine, things like that, but at a level of use, those people end up amidst the populations of groups that look to dominate and provide rules and to establish order. And so actually by expanding that population and by looking to the prison as a solution, what Brazil is starting to see is that it replicates the problem. It makes it worse.

Richard McColl: So I've been reading about, let's say the minor actors in this sort of, let's say the micro trafficking of drugs who get paid a pittance, you know, the boys on the street, the adolescents, and then maybe also get partially paid with the drug itself and become users and then become wrapped up in all this. I can see the issue of them being jailed so young. And also perhaps whilst they're inside, their families have to continue paying from the outside whilst they're in jail. This is an ongoing, let's say, protection racket.

Professor Graham Willis: I think that really depends on what you're talking about and about perhaps the group. That's something that I've seen as much less central in my own research. The families are required to pay. There may be ways that they coerce them, you know, to doing that. But, but I think in fact, looking at that, it loses sight of the larger story, which is really about, about, you know, those low level people who are trying to get by on an everyday basis. Right. You know, so Brazil, for example, invests vast amount of money in prison construction and policing, in security, incredible amounts of money. The National Development bank is financing the construction of prisons. Right. As though this was somehow a good social policy, as though this is somehow a good solution for Brazil's economic Development. But if you look to the forms of social policy actually that could ameliorate people's lives, they're basically non. Existent, right? I mean, you've got Bolsa Família, but the amount of money you get from Bolsa Família is very little and the thresholds actually are very small. Right. So people need to find solutions on an everyday basis for getting by. And if, you know, if they actually, you know, can find some very imperfect means, you know, to make some money, and perhaps it's with guns, perhaps it's with other things, they may be compelled to do that. Right. If the, if the contrary is to fall into food insecurity, for example.

Richard McColl: So the left is traditionally seen as. As poor on law and order. And, and the right seen as traditionally stronger on it from that position that people believe violence to have increased under Lula. So people felt safer under Bolsonaro then Bolsonarista policies. Really.

Professor Graham Willis: I mean, I think it's worthy of a good discussion. Right. I mean, I think what people often misconstrue here is that the right likes to lever insecurity. They like to lever the idea of security as something that absolutely matters. Right. It's something that polls really well. It's something that they can say, you know, wouldn't you want to feel secure in your everyday life? I mean, and let's not forget that was a Clinton policy in the 1990s too. Right? So it's the kind of thing that you can speak across classes, you can speak across populations by saying, like, you know, we're going to pander to your sense of insecurity by saying we can make you more secure. Of course, they never really do, you know, but the story is really one of, you know, you know, we will keep you insecure conditions, but we will suggest that we will make you secure, but without really doing it. I mean, the story there also is the same. If the solution is more security, more policing, more prisons, what you're actually doing is just strengthening logic of organized crime. Yeah.

Richard McColl: And, and you know, if we talk about the megalopolis of São Paulo and the Governor Tarcísio de Freitas of a Bolsonaro protege, a potential challenger for Lula in 2026, and with, of course, as you say, the commando central there in the prisons, is he doing anything specific to ensure that his, I don't know, his image remains up there as strong on law and order?

Professor Graham Willis: Well, I think it's difficult for him to do it. I mean, he could, he can, you know, he can talk about it, but he has no jurisdiction over policing. That's the jurisdiction of the governor. So what he does will be symbolic. It will be speaking to an idea of, you know, of what he can do. But actually the ability of him as a municipal person to make any significant dent on that is very limited.

Richard McColl: And it brings me back to an age old question and concern in the region. Of course, what is the sort of level of trust in the police and of course the military in Brazil, and is there a strong judicial system that people believe that criminals will be brought to justice?

Professor Graham Willis: It's another very fraught story, to be honest. I mean, trust in the state in Latin America is not the strong suit, let's say, you know, and there's good reason for that, right? I mean, you have vast numbers of people who live in conditions of informality where their relations with the state have always been very uneven and they have not been able to count on the state to, you know, to redistribute goods and services in a way that's reliable, you know, and in fact, the story of urbanization in many Latin American cities is citizens organizing, finding ways and means to connect themselves to water, to electricity, to sewerage, to hiring their own people to remove rubbish. And you know, then when you get to the question of security, right, if you know, you can't call the police, or if you know that you're going to call the police and they may show up, and also if they show up, they might extort you as much as they are likely to help you, then you probably will try to find some alternative means to resolve your disputes. And there's vast amounts of interesting research on that story about how the illegitimacy of the state amongst certain populations has led people to find alternate solutions. And that's a complicated story, but ultimately it leads towards de facto forms of policing in communities that have not had strong relationships with the state.

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Richard McColl: And the Judicial system itself,.

Professor Graham Willis: The judicial system is also troubled in a lot of ways. It's troubled in the sense, it's troubled in the sense that, know that people don't feel like they can count on it and that may be true and it may be not true and I'll give an example. A few weeks ago, were doing some field research in Mato Grosso and there was a case along the border with Bolivia where a particular group managed to seize 420 kilos of cocaine out of the back of a truck that was driven by two men. And everybody thought, wow, this is significant. 420 Kilos. It's a lot of cocaine. It's a lot of money on the streets of London or New York. Right. And what happened actually was the judge decided to let them off. And that created a total firestorm that we heard about directly from so many different places, from street corner bars to conversations with public security people, to, you know, hotel people all over the place who were basically like, why did they let them go? Right. We had a conversation with this judge, actually, and I read a bit more about it, and he said, well, you know, these people actually didn't have any previous records. They are very humble people who live in the borderlands with Bolivia, and there's no indication that actually they are organizers in a vast global trade in cocaine. These people literally don't have salaries. They get by in the informal economy. And so, you know, putting them in prison actually will do much worse off by them and may in fact lead to, you know, greater power of these organized crime groups if we do that. Right. But many people don't see that as a possibility or that as a solution. They see, you know, shouldn't we be putting people who are doing bad things in prison? You know, whether or not their motivations for doing what they did are relevant is a different question. So I think there is constant contestation about how to make the justice system actually manage the complexities of everyday life. Right along a border that doesn't have regular outposts. We, were able to drive across it and not see anybody, you know, and that people will find ways to get by. And that's in that case, within a global circuitry that makes vast amounts of money for some people. And actually back to your street level guys, right, who get by on a pittance, they end up being, you know, cannon fodder for the criminal justice system. Yeah, that's a problem.

Richard McColl: It is a problem. I see that kind of decision is incredibly progressive rather than the black and white. You know, you did wrong, you're in jail. I find that quite refreshing, in fact. I mean, these, I suppose the culprits were just drivers making, making ends meet as well. And a capture of that much cocaine seems like a Lot, but in the grand scale of things, of how much is coming through. And it is very interesting to see in terms of security, in terms of uptick in violence, these gangs in the prisons, their industry is extortion, narco trafficking, people trafficking as well.

Professor Graham Willis: I think people try to associate or see an association there, but I actually haven't been able to find much evidence to that case. I do pretty regular work as an expert witness for asylum cases in the United States and in the UK and some of these cases I've been asked specifically, can you show that there is a relationship between organized criminal groups like the Capital or others, and international human trafficking? And the relationship there, as far as I've been able to see is actually very sparse. It relies on different routes and different practices. I think within Latin America in other ways that may be more significant, but out of Brazil I've yet to see any relationship in that way.

Richard McColl: I think it's a fascinating. And would you say that, you know, over time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Brazil is a consumer country as well of narcotics as opposed to previously just a, you know, I would say a transfer country?

Professor Graham Willis: Yes, definitely. Yeah.

Richard McColl: And, and that also extends into Argentina, I imagine as well. So that this changes the nature of the organized gang. So, you know, a local market can be very profitable as opposed to the drugs being seized in, in an international setting. This is really, it's changing the dynamic of crime in the region.

Professor Graham Willis: Yep. I mean, if you think of it this way, right, the state of São Paulo on its own would be the fourth largest country in Latin America. Right. So you've got 44 million people or so just in that state. And then you've got Rio de Janeiro next door which has, you know, 8 million people or something like that. And you have a lot of people whose lives are very complicated and who, you know and who are there as a kind of market for a lot of these drugs. So there is a huge internal market for very cheap drugs which come across borders and which are not heavily policed, though we might think they are. And that makes it really complicated. Right. But there's also, of course, an onward trajectory to where those drugs go. And that's a major part of the story. But you know, ultimately, if you can sell a gram of cocaine in London for, you know, 700 AIs and you can buy it on the streets in, you know, in Cuiabá and Mato Grosso for 40 eyes, you know, there's a lot of money to be made and, and unfortunately, prohibition regimes make that profitable for a lot of people.

Richard McColl: As you know, I see all of these factors pointing to one main issue and the issue of inequality in Brazil. You know, in your studies, have you been able to point at solutions for these, for inequalities? What does the government of, of Lula need to do to focus on, you know, we said if the 4 million cases of dengue, I mean, we don't can't even figure out or even imagine how many cases and how many deaths by the end of the year. These poor people just doing anything to make ends meet. And from an academic perspective, where do you lean?

Professor Graham Willis: Well, we didn't, we haven't talked too much about tax reform here, and I'm certainly not that kind of expert. But, but if you think, you know, I think we're conditioned to think that like, you know, a budget is a fixed amount, right? So if you have 100% of a budget, you disperse it in different ways, right? And that you are bound by your revenue streams and things like that. So you raise, you know, you raise your revenues, everybody hates it, and then you have more money, you can spend the money. So even within that, which I don't think is really the story, even within that, there are very obvious ways that public funds are used in ways that make the problem worse as opposed to making it better. So if were to take the case of São Paulo on a monthly basis, the state of São Paulo spends around $600 per prisoner per month within the state. $600 In the context of São Paulo is pretty much around the medium per capita wage of people in the state. Right. If you look at it within the scope of Brazil itself, that amount of money is right close to around the 80th percentile of per capita income, right? If you looked at how much we're spending on building prisons, on operating them on an everyday basis across the whole country. It's vast amount of money put into punishing people and in effect creating more criminals in a way that is making this problem worse than it is, you know, ameliorating the problem in any way, right? So we don't seem to have a problem piling vast amounts of money into prisons, which by the way, are increasingly debt funded. So someone is making profit out of that system. But we do seem to have a problem raising minimum wages ever so slightly increasing the amount that people get in the Bolsa Família, which, you know, is something like 50, you know, $40 a month or something like that, right? It's. It's really very minimal. And we do know that actually if you give people money in conditional cash transfers or if you find ways to deliver social policies effective, the gains for society are gigantic. So I think there's a normative shift that we really have to see, which is why do we want to continue plowing money into punishing people who we know exist in different difficult circumstances and use that money differently in ways that we also have good evidence makes people's lives better, and not just their lives, but actually makes everyone's lives better. Because if in Latin America everybody lives with fear, everybody is worried about getting robbed on the street, everybody is worried about the drug addled criminal, why do we want to create more of them?

Richard McColl: Right?

Professor Graham Willis: Why don't we think about other effective ways to solve that problem? We have the money. The budget might be finite, but we have the budget.

Richard McColl: It's. It's an interesting situation. I you just, as you say, punishing people, creating more criminals. And yet, if we look sort of the international image of Brazil now under Lula, again we said Brazil is back making however many international journeys, but at home things are very different. The tax reform, what I've read, of course, does aim to increase the funds for the Bolsa Família, as you said. But as you, it's. I worry because as I say, I'm looking at the international, the. Well, of course we know that Brazil is non aligned, but the international way we've got In November, the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, a big deal, a really big deal. And then was it 2024, no, 2026 or 2025. There is the COP30 in Belém. These are, these are troubled cities. The word you use all the time, troubled. And this could once again bring the four of violence, insecurity and inequality that bring it to the fore once again on an international basis. And while this is probably good because Brazil needs to address it's also, you know, paint a very negative picture of this country. I mean, you spend a lot of time in Brazil, obviously you move easily around there so long. But how do you feel about Brazil's desire to become again a global spokesperson, but without having really addressed the issues at home?

Professor Graham Willis: I mean, it's full of paradoxes, isn't it? Right? All the paradoxes. You know, Lula's plan as much as, you know, he does a lot of progressive things. The plan for growth is, you know, let's invest in Petrobras. We Want to produce more oil, we want to fund new exploration. You know, that's a pretty big statement to make when you are like also the country that has the Amazon, right? You know, so you know, how much can you do both of these things, right? So I think there is this story, of course, that, you know, a country like Brazil needs to be able to manage its economy and make do and things like that. But these paradoxes are really very difficult. And they're difficult in people's everyday lives too, right? I mean, that, just that you mentioned Belém. I mean, I've been struck there's a prison very near there that they have tried to rebrand as an environmentally sustainable prison, is the major prison in the state called Americano. And they basically created an economic development zone around it and created a law that said that any company that worked in that economic development zone had to follow the sustainable development goals, right? So we see this strange conflation of inequality and environmental solutions that are very odd bedfellows. You know, there was Brazil, of course, created the sustainability bond internationally. Right? A very interesting thing. And you've got major funders like BlackRock and others who plowed money into it in vast ways to, you know, to try to do something about the environment. But what we're seeing on an everyday basis is that actually, you know, people's logics and reasons for using finite resources for deforestation and things like that is a, is very rooted in long standing forms of inequality. If you're struggling to eat, you know, and if you see everyone around you living the good life or finding ways to make a lot of money, it's very hard to suggest to people that they shouldn't be doing that kind of thing. If you don't have rules people can trust in and believe in, then yeah, you know, you're enabling them. Right.

Richard McColl: And you know, I, you watch Lula wishing to become, or mobilizing himself to become a spokesperson for the region, South America, you know, trying to back up Unasur a bit. I mean, that could potentially help. And transnational criminal gangs. How do you stand on this one?

Professor Graham Willis: I mean, I think it's, I don't think his heart is in the wrong place. I think he's earnest about these things. I think he's earnest about solving problems of poverty. I think he's hamstrung by the nature of the Brazilian Congress and how fragmented it is and the configuration that he's in now. So, you know, I think he wants working people to have good and dignified lives and he probably would try to find better solutions than he's developing now. But I don't think his leadership within Latin America actually would change the terms of organized crime itself. I think that's a much more deep rooted problem of historic forms of inequality and the state basically, you know, being fairly disinterested actually in making people's lives better, even when it's had vast resources to do it. You know, so I think it's hard for, for a president like him to come in and dramatically reshape the game. But I do think that Latin America calls for government that is, you know, that doesn't pander to security as the thing that, you know, that must matter the most and that distracts everyone by saying we will make your lives secure when actually what they do is, you know, something quite different. Right.

Richard McColl: Well, and I'm sure there's a, I'm sure people are shouting out for him to pursue and I'll finish with this. Pursue the Bukele model jail everyone, get everyone off the streets. I'm sure there's a large cadre of people asking for this or clamoring for this. It's, it's been fascinating, it's been absolutely revealing to consider how organized crime, systemic corruption, of course, a word we haven't used so far in the podcast, but we all know, and again, as you say, the right likes to lever insecurity, the issue of insecurity that is a constant through Latin America. And so therefore it's a policy promise always from whomever's in opposition, I think, and of course it's a concern. It's a concern. Actually, I had one final question. We talked about this transshipment of illicit drugs. We talked, we mentioned human trafficking, extortion. I did have to ask, what about synthetic drugs in Brazil?

Professor Graham Willis: Yeah, they don't have the same footprint and partially, I think that's a bit about the Prohibition regime. Right. You know, you don't have a major border that is, that changes the value of your drugs in a way that's really dramatic. Right. So cheap cocaine is plentiful in Brazil, very plentiful.

Richard McColl: And Colombia and Peru produce enough to flood the market. Well, listen, thank you so much for your time and your profound knowledge of insecurity, inequality in Brazil and the region. It has been an absolute pleasure to speak here on The LatinNews Podcast with Graham Willis, who is the professor of Global Politics and Society in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge and a fellow and a Director of Studies of Geography at Queens’ College, Cambridge. Thank you so much for your time. Thank you so much for sharing your knowledge so unselfishly. We've definitely learned far more about the inequality, the business of organized crime, the trust in the police, and so much more. What can Lula do? We will see. As you said, his heart's in the right place. They genuinely believe he wants to help the Brazilian people. He comes from the background, but so much is against him, so much as he's up against real barriers to changing what is believed to be the solution, building more prisons.

Professor Graham Willis: Thanks very much. It's a pleasure.

Richard McColl: It's been an absolute pleasure. This LatinNews Podcast. We produce a podcast every fortnight looking at fascinating topics from the region. Last week were talking about Panama, and the week, well, a fortnight before that were discussing Belize as well. So nowhere is off limits. Thank you again and goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.

Carlos Guevara Mann is Professor of Political Science and Director of FSU Panama’s graduate program in International Affairs, offering a Master of Science degree. Dr. Guevara Mann received his Ph.D. in Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. He has a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from Ohio University in Athens, Ohio. Earlier, he majored in Finance at Universidad Católica Santa María La Antigua, Panama.

Dr. Guevara Mann specializes in International Relations, especially U.S.-Latin American Relations; Comparative Politics, with a focus on authoritarian and democratic regimes; and political history, with a focus on Latin America. He is the author of Panamanian Militarism: A Historical Interpretation (Ohio University Press, 1996) and Political Careers, Corruption, and Impunity: Panama’s Assembly, 1984-2009 (University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), as well as several journal articles on his topics of expertise and nearly 1,600 newspaper editorials.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm your host, Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia. This week we'll be discussing issues taking place in Panama. Our very special guest is Carlos Guevara Mann. He's the professor of political science, the director master of science international affairs at Florida State University in the Republic of Panama and he's the president of a civic and cultural association named the Sociedad Bolivariana de Panamá. Professor, welcome on The LatinNews Podcast. It's a great pleasure to have you here.

Professor Carlos Mann: Thank you very much, Richard, and very pleased to be with you.

Richard McColl: Well, it's an interesting time in Panama. It's always an interesting time in Panama. Of course we did have an episode last year when we talked to a professor of international business, Andrew Thomas, but were talking business, the canal. But this time we can discuss something more. We have elections in Panama on the 5th of May, and this is all taking place under, I would say the cloud of what is where. Former president Ricardo Martinelli. Perhaps you could give us some background. Well,.

Professor Carlos Mann: There's eight candidates in the presidential election that might be probably the most relevant or maybe the most important piece of information for your viewers. Right, so there's eight candidates. This is a multiparty system. Parties do not mean much in Panamanian politics. They're mostly clientelistic personalistic devices. And the term is five years, Right. So every five years we have elections and we've had elections normally. Right, normally since Panama transitioned to democracy in 1989, 1994. Your viewers may recall that in 1989 there was an invasion, a US. Invasion in Panama and the military regime that was in place was removed from power. Panama transitioned to democracy in that period, 1989 to 1994. And since 94 we've had elections every five years as prescribed by the constitution. Right. So one of the characteristics of Panamanian politics is that the government has never won an election in the democratic period. And this is quite different from other countries in Latin America. I think, I think, in fact it's the, I think in fact Panama is the only country with a minimally functioning party system. Right. There are countries that don't have a functioning party system. Right. So that's why I, I emphasize with a many minimally functioning party system that has never re-elected the government. Of course, there's no re-election for the president. The president needs to Wait two terms before seeking office again. And the government party has never been re-elected immediate consecutively during the democratic regime. Right. So that is one of the characteristics of the Panamanian political system. There is real alternation of power in Panama. Very, very real alternation of power. At least up to this point. That has been the situation. And you asked about the shadow of former President Martinelli. Well, the comment about a president not being able to seek re-election is relevant in this connection because Martinelli was the president before in 2009, chapter 2014. So he would not have been able to be a candidate in 2014, he would not have been able to be a candidate in 2019, but he would have been able to be a candidate in 2024. That is this time had. And he was actually nominated as a candidate by his party. But the judiciary, Panama's judiciary ruled against him in a money laundering scheme, in a money laundering case in which he was found guilty. So based on that ruling, despite the fact that he had been nominated as a candidate and he had been accepted by the electoral authority, he was barred from being a candidate in the elections on account of this ruling from the Supreme Court. From the judiciary, rather not the Supreme Court, from the judiciary.

Richard McColl: So this is, you know, again, there was this case, it's the New Business case, as you said, a corruption case and he received a sentence of 10 years and eight months. Of course this would. And now if I'm not mistaken, he's taken, you know, asylum in the Nicaraguan embassy.

Professor Carlos Mann: Yes, that is correct. Yes.

Richard McColl: Right. Okay. Crazy moments in politics from the region. And his, well, I would say an important politician who has held various high ranking positions in the government of Martinelli is José Raúl Mulino. He is he the front runner right now for the elections?

Professor Carlos Mann: According to most polls, yes. According to all polls, yes, he is the front runner.

Richard McColl: Okay, so you've got this man, José Raúl Mulino. Is he likely to be, let's say, a puppet figure for Martinelli? Is there's a benefit obviously to Martinelli if Mulino wins the elections?

Professor Carlos Mann: Well, I do not think he's likely to be a puppet, but that's something that, it's very, that's very difficult to forecast. Right. But I, I don't think he's likely to be a, a puppet because that doesn't seem to be his personality. He is somebody who is certainly aligned with Martinelli, otherwise Martinelli would not have chosen him as a vice presidential candidate. Right. So he's obviously aligned with Martinelli but he, the impression that he gives and his performance in his performance as a minister, he was, he's been twice a minister. So he was first a foreign minister, he was first a vice minister and then a foreign minister, and subsequently he was a minister for security. So the performance he can show as a minister reveals that he is. He has, you know, his own personality and somebody who is capable of taking his own decisions. Right.

Richard McColl: Okay, well, and you said there's eight candidates coming up, and I know that Torrijos. So the son of a former, I would say, military. Military president is running. Who else? What, what is the. What does this field look like?

Professor Carlos Mann: Right, so let me clarify. So, so Omar Torrijos was never a president. He was a military dictator. And he actually never assumed the office of president. He would always have stooges, or what we call them, puppet presidents, but he remained in charge of the National Guard, which is, which used to be the country's armed force. Right. So as a dictator, he was in power between 1968 and 1981 when he died in a mysterious plane crash. And subsequently, the military dictatorship continued, notoriously under somebody called Noriega, whom many of you viewers might recognize as being a. An obnoxious presence in Panamanian politics. Right, so Torrijos's son, Martin Torrijos was a president before, of course, he ran for the party created by the military dictatorship, which ironically has been the main beneficiary of Panama's democracy. Right. This is one of the ironies of the transitions to democracy. Sometimes we have transitions to democracy in which dictatorial parties are. Removed from power, and other times we have transitions to democracy in which dictatorial parties actually manage to continue operating and benefiting from the system. And that is the case of Panama. So Martin Torrijos was the name of the. Of the current candidate who was a president before, ran the country from 2004 to 2009, just before Martinelli. Martin Torrijos, when he ran for office in 2004, was a candidate PRD, which, as I said, was the party created by the military regime. This time very opportunistically, because he wasn't nominated as the party candidate. Martin Torrijos left the party and has become a candidate of the Partido Popular. Part of Popular is what is left of the Christian Democratic Party. You know, Christian Democracy has declined significantly everywhere, and Panama is no exception. It used to be ideological, a respected party. Now it is another Panama's clientelist party. And in an effort to maybe gain more votes than they would have received had they nominated somebody else. They sought Martin Torrijos and nominated him as a candidate of Partido Popular to the presidency. So again, what Torrijos did was leave his own party and accept nomination by Partido Popular. But in essence he remains not just a PRD figure. His roots are in PRD and his identity is closely connected to the military.

Richard McColl: Regime and out of the others, out of the others there, I mean, is there anyone that could strike up, let's say get into a coalition or. They're all running on their own bills. Everyone's, you know, throwing everything at this election behind, obviously second place and beyond behind Mulino.

Professor Carlos Mann: Well, the thing is that the electoral system in Panama is quite inflexible when it comes to the possibility of forging alliances at close to election time. Right. So in, whilst in other countries it could be possible for candidates to coalesce together to align to create alliances close to the election, that is not a possibility in Panama. So, so the term for that or the period for that ended sometime last year, in September, October of last year. So the candidacies were firmly in place by the end of October 2023, which I think is something really terrible because there should be, shall we say, a wider window for this type of alliances to be possible. But anyway that's not the case. Right, so. So each one of the eight candidates is standing on their own. There were alliances created before, but they. Were. Firmly in place by, they were declared to be firmly in place by October of 2023 and no further or no additional alliances were possible beyond that date. Right. And there's a very important characteristic, Richard, of Panama's elections and this is that not only our alliance is not a possibility very close to the election period. Six months I think is the limit before the elections. But also it is a first past the post election and this is different from many countries in fact for most countries in Latin America because most of them, I think it's 13 of them by my last count. I'm, I'm. If it's not 13, it's close to that figure. Thirteen of the 20 Latin American republics have a second round or a runoff election. Right. In case the president doesn't get a substantial majority. In some countries it is 50% plus one. In other countries such as Costa Rica it is 40%. Right. So there needs to, but there needs to be a majority, either a significant majority or an absolute majority. That's not the case in Panama. In Panama, whoever gets, and you know, and this is what actually happens, whoever gets the largest minority of the vote becomes a president and there is no runoff. So Panamanian presidents are normally elected with less than 50% of the vote. The only time in democracy when the president got more than 50% was in 2009 when Martinelli was elected. He got 60%. Right. But before that in 94, PRD got 33%. Last time, 2019, PRD with an ally got 33%. So these are presidents who come to office not in, without much popular support. Right. And because the term is so long, it's a five year term, the potential or the opportunity for losing support is quite significant, quite great. So by the middle or end of their terms, peasants are really despised by the population. Right. So these are features to take into account when considering elections in Panama.

Richard McColl: This is, I find it staggering that you could win the election with 30%. So when presidents are despised, as you say, at the end of their five year term. Well, let's cast a light on the current or the outgoing president, Laurentino Cortizo. He is currently despised by the whole population or he's, you know, or he's sitting pretty as the outgoing president.

Professor Carlos Mann: Well, let me put it diplomatically,. About. 90% Of the population do not approve of his government. So the last, let me say not last, the most recent approval rating I saw was 11%. Of course, all of these are opinion polls and well, not all of them are entirely reliable, but it's, it is certain that Cortizo does not enjoy support among the Panamanian populace. Right. So the government is widely perceived as being ineffective, being corrupt, and most people want it to end. Right. So this is something that is bound to happen when a president is elected with a very low popular vote on the one hand, when the term is very long and when there are no controls in place to mitigate the inevitable tendency towards tyranny and despotism which seems to involve and a Latin American presidents and rulers and, and people who seek office in the part.

Richard McColl: Of the world on that subject, I mean, this sort of slide to sort of despotic behavior. Let's, let's look at the protests that occurred in 2023 in Panama, obviously largely against this copper mine. That's right, the copper mine. I mean, how did Cortizo respond to this? Because everything was a perfect storm at that moment in Panama there's a drought, so no water in the canal, affecting shipping, obviously ships and freighters looking for other routes going to the long route round because of the Panama's lack of water, the canal's lack of water, the idea of creating this mine and diverting rivers for the mine, of course, rivers that would ordinarily, I believe, feed into the canal as well. And then people not wanting the mine. But Cortizo was stubborn. I mean, I would say there was a slide towards an authoritarian behavior from Cortizo, but I'd love to hear your thoughts on that.

Professor Carlos Mann: Well, to begin with, the mine had been going on for a long time, right? So it wasn't Cortizo who initiated the mine, but the mine was operating in a sort of a limbo because the supreme court had declared that the contract was unconstitutional. So what should have happened when the court declared the contract to be unconstitutional is for the mining operation to stop. But then the government, and it wasn't only this government, the previous government as well, what they were doing was trying to create a new contract that would be legal, that would be acceptable, at least in theory, that is what they were trying to do. Now, in practice, the contract was perceived to be right. So the way people saw it, the government was selling out the country to the mining operation. So they were being given very broad concessions, including, as you mentioned, access to water, access to fresh water, including a very large tract of land, including, even including the airspace above the mine, which resonated very badly with Panamanians. And, and in this context, we need to bear in mind that Panama was a country that was subject to, well, I think we could fairly say US domination during a large part of the 20th century. So there is a legacy of, shall we say, anti colonialism or anti colonialist attitude in Panama on account of this very, very prolonged period of US Presence and US. Domination in the canal zone and even beyond the canal zone in, in, in Panama and in the Panamanian government. So going back to 1903, Panama was forced at the time when it seceded from Colombia, Panama, Panama was forced at the time to give enormous concessions to the United States which were considered from the beginning to be detrimental to Panama's sovereignty. Okay, so this is something going back many years. The mining contract, the mining contract that the government negotiated resonated with that. So we need to look into the collective subconscious, the collective Panamanian subconscious, and remember that there's this background of a struggle to assert national sovereignty that included most of the 20th century. Right. On the one hand, on the other hand, like I said before, was also a very high perception of government corruption. Right. So people do not trust the government. People do not trust the. Anything having to do with the public sector. And the sense was. So they're selling out the country for a bribe. That. That was the sense. Right. There were some environmental concerns. I wouldn't say that they were dominating. I think there were some people who were genuinely concerned for the environment. But the main concern and the main trigger for the protests, I think, was the perception that the government was selling the country's resources in exchange for private benefits for government officials who participated in the contracting procedure. Right. And so it was a very lamentable for people. People saw it as something very reprehensible. Right? Not beyond lamentable. It was reprehensible. People thought it was reprehensible that the government negotiated the final version so quickly, sent it to the National Assembly. They approved it in three consecutive readings according to the Constitution. Right. All bills need to be, need to go through three readings, but the three readings were held one day after the other. Right. So there was a 24 hour difference. And then the last reading, after the last reading happened, the President signed it immediately according to the constitution as well. The President needs to sign on any bill. It received the Controller General's office approval as well, immediately. And it was even published that day in the official newspaper. All of these, of course, are requirements for a contract to enter into force. So when people realized what was happening and the velocity with which. Nothing happens that quickly in Panama, right? Nothing happens that quickly. When people realized what was going on, when people started looking into the contract and seeing all the concessions that were being given to the mining company, and when suspicion circulated that there have been hefty bribes, people became, the people became very incensed. And this triggered a, a large wave of protests, as you know, because you were here at the time and you were able to ascertain what was going on, what was the government's attitude. And the government kept silent and wouldn't do anything. I think they were paralyzed. I think that they didn't really expect that anything like this would happen and they didn't know what to do. I think they certainly wanted to go on with the contract. Initially. They may have tried to find a way, find a way to make it digestible to the public. But when they realized that this was not a possibility, that the public were adamant that the contract had to be rescinded then they just pretty much froze and the country was paralyzed with protests and disturbances and problems of all sorts. And the government was leaderless, pretty much. So eventually it came to the Supreme Court to the, that the contract was unconstitutional. And they did so. They found 25 reasons in the contract that pointed to the unconstitutionality of the deal and that seemed to at least sort out that situation at the moment. But then there were economic consequences, and we're going through those economic consequences at the moment.

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Richard McColl: And these economic consequences. Perhaps you could, yes. Expound on these.

Professor Carlos Mann: Well, the mine, the mining company was, as we know, extracting copper. It was a copper mine, chiefly copper, but there was some gold as well, and other minerals. And this was, these minerals were extracted and shipped especially to China and part of it, a smaller part to other countries in the Far east, but especially to China. So this was a mine, this was a mine that was created to satisfy the unending Chinese appetite for minerals. Right. So is interesting and relevant to place it within this broader context. Right? So because the operation was apparently so successful, the mine was contributing a significant proportion or a significant percentage of Panama's gross domestic product for a couple of years, right. Not that long. But since it started operating, copper became Panama's main export. Right. And there's the allegation or there's the view rather than an allegation, there's the view that this didn't really benefit Panama because the proceeds were going to a international company that didn't have any real presence and, well, except for the mining, mining outfit, right. But the profits didn't come to Panama. The government receipts were very low from the copper operation. But there was a significant investment, right? Significant in a physical investment and there were many jobs that were created and people, a couple thousand people that were getting payments and salaries and benefits from, from this company. Right? So there was an impact on, on the Panamanian economy and that ceased. Right. So the real challenge to Panama is to replace that income with, first of all, an operation or a set of operations that are, like I said, first of all transparent, right. Corruption free to begin with. Second of all, environmentally friendly or at least not directly deleterious to the environment. Right. And also something that creates wealth and Produces wealth for the community. That would be ideal. Now there seems, we seem to lack creativity, our leadership seems to lack creativity and a sense of community in order to bring about these results. But that obviously is what is needed and that is obviously what the people want. They didn't want a contract that was perceived to be a sellout. They wanted a deal that was beneficial to the people and to the country as a whole. So this remains a challenge today, right?

Richard McColl: Definitely. So, and of course resulted, I suppose it's a consequence is the reduction the Fitch Ratings to Panama. And, and then I mean, because we look at all these things happening at the same time. The ongoing drought of course affecting the canal and of course, you know, the receipts for ships coming through has not been that great. It's about, I mean, I think it's half the normal number are going through per day, is that right?

Professor Carlos Mann: Not, not that much. And actually the income has not gone down that significantly because of course the prices have gone up, it hasn't been exactly halved, it's been a bit less than that and now they're slowly returning to normalcy. Right. But it is a great worry. It is a great worry because there wasn't enough water to run ships normally through the canal. And the Panama Canal is Panama's emblem. That is, that is the symbol of Panama throughout the world. So, so even if income hasn't gone down that significantly, it is a matter of worry and concern to Panamanians that their emblem everywhere is going through such difficulties. So obviously there's global warming to blame for a significant part of the situation. But then there's also other issues that need to be dealt with and haven't been dealt with, including water supply for the canal. It is evident and obvious that there needs to, that we need to increase water supply. That means bringing water from other rivers because the canal, this is important for your listeners to, to be aware of the canal runs with fresh water. This is not a sea level canal like the Suez Canal in Egypt. This is a lock canal which means that ships are elevated over the mountain range, Panama's mountain range, on a set of locks which are like elevators. Right. And the canal runs on fresh water. Right. So we need an important fresh water supply. And the widening of the canal, which was completed in 2016, if I'm not mistaken, the widening of the canal, meaning that a new lane of locks was added, that widening has increased use of water by the canal. And the problem is that even as use of water has increased. Water supply has not. It has not because other sources have not been put into operation. It has not because rain levels, even though Panama is a country where it rains a lot, rain levels have decreased. There's added problems including deforestation, fires and so on and so forth that have decreased water availability for the canal. So all these problems need to be tackled and we need intelligent, resourceful, shall we say, patriotic leadership in order to deal with this, these problems. And we certainly haven't had that in recent years. So that is a big problem and as I said before, it's. It, it hasn't been that significant in terms of the income. But it is worrisome because if the problem is not dealt with effectively, this will recur. It'll, it'll continue occurring and it'll be more serious and it'll be drier and there'll be less water in the future unless we take care of this situation now. So that's a cause of concern for Panamanians, I would say. You mentioned the ratings. They, the, and it wasn't only Fitch, it, there were other ones as well which downgrade. Who downgraded Panama? Panama's rating overall rating. Right, the country rating. So part of it was based on, on the mining problem, mining issue, but also on the fiscal management, the government's fiscal management. So very low tax returns, very low tax income, faced with a swelling of the public sector. So we have something like 280000 public employees which in a country of 4.5 million people is a huge amount. Most of them don't have a real job. Many of them are sinecures, many of them are being appointed in order to pay political favors. We have a very serious problem with the pension system. It is called the Social Security Administration in Panama. And this pension program is running on a deficit. And there's the very real possibility that there will be no funds to pay the pension. So the government is going to have to step in and find resources. I don't know from where because it doesn't really have resources. Right, but find resources in order to save the pension system from collapsing. The levels of indebtedness have increased way beyond anything that is manageable or reasonable. So it's been like $20 billion over a four year period which is again which is extremely significant for Panama. So when this government stepped in, it was something like 25, 27 billion dollars in foreign debt. Not foreign debt, in government debt, in public sector. Debt, it's now gone up to about 47 billion. There's nothing to show for that debt. So there are reasons of concern. Panama's infrastructure has deteriorated significantly. There have been no serious investments infrastructure, in roads, in other public facilities. So really the situation gives cause for concern. And, and I think that plays into the downgrading by the rating agencies that we experienced a couple of weeks ago.

Richard McColl: This sort of feathers into where I wanted to go as well with this conversation. So very interesting. Now you use the word in a couple of occasions, the need for creativity from our politicians or from Panama's politicians regarding the issues of the mine, regarding the issues of the pension funds, the lack of infrastructure, the lack of appropriate or effective water management. Do you think that José Raúl Mulino is that creative politics politician who can oversee and perhaps tackle some of these issues? And of course, the last and final issue, that of migration, because of course, we're looking at, you know, it's. Was it, I can't even remember the ridiculous amount of people who crossed up through the Darién gap last year, and we're already on course to break the record this year if numbers continue. Is Mulino, I mean, as you say, as we say, the polls point towards him as winning. Is he the creative president that Panama needs?

Professor Carlos Mann: Well, let me just point or clarify that the number last year was 500,000, okay? So there was 500,000 irregular immigrants who crossed the Darién Gap. And that is a terrible, terrible crossing. Not only is it a terrible crossing, it is a crossing in the hands of organized crime syndicates who operate in Colombia and charge people large sums for pretty much abandoning them in the jungle, right? Crossing, crossing over, crossing them over to the Panamanian side and abandoning them in the jungle. It really is a hideous situation and something that. Well, the problem originates in the sending countries, right? The main sending country is Venezuela, which as we know, is a terrible dictatorship. A dictatorship that has created a major exodus, almost nearing 8 million people, right? About a quarter of the Venezuelan population has left. And there's also immigrants from Haiti and from Ecuador these days, other countries as well, Cuba, even China and countries in the Far east are using this, this crossing, but especially Venezuelans, right? So the problem originates in these countries which have terrible conditions. And then the illegal crossings are facilitated in Colombia. And the Colombian government is agreeable to all the situation because these, this is a human trafficking business that occurs in Colombia with the acquiescence of the Colombian government. And Panama is being affected by this situation. So the question directly was on José Raúl Mulino's qualifications. And that's always a very difficult issue to respond to. So I would say that based on his background, he been a cabinet secretary twice before, right? So based on his background, he has cognizance and knowledge of, of the problems. And he's certainly not a newcomer and not, certainly not somebody who would be confronted with government decision making for the first time. So on that account, one would expect that he has a baggage, an intellectual and baggage and experience to rely on in order to make ideally equal decisions for the country. But the country is really what perhaps one would like to emphasize is that the country is going through a challenging, the country is going through challenging times, right? We mentioned some of those challenges. The drop in GDP, the loss investment grade rating, the pension system, this terrible problem of irregular immigration. So can you imagine 500,000 people coming to Panama? This is a country of 4.5 million people. That's 10% of the population. Of course, most of them move on, right? Most of them move on. But it really is a very, very serious situation that is going on in Darién and throughout the country. Panama really has no capacity to deal with this huge issue. And the places where this problem originates are washing their hands at a situation that is causing a great damage in countries such as Panama and other countries as well along the way to the United States, but especially Panama, so Darién camps are overwhelmed with migrants. And these are only a couple of issues that we've mentioned before. There's other situations that need tackling. Education has deteriorated significantly, so there needs to be an overhaul in public education, in access to health as well. There needs to be an improvement in access to health. We mentioned infrastructure before which was pretty much abandoned during this government. So certainly whoever leads the country will need to resort to as much intellectual capacity and creativity as he or she, those two women candidates might be able to garner.

Richard McColl: It's, it's going to be a trying time and we can only hope for the best and that the best candidate or the most able candidate is wins, as you say, wins the minority to get in that fascinating electoral setup that Panama has. Let me take this moment to say thank you so much for sharing so unselfishly, you know, really a bottomless knowledge of Panamanian history and of course politics and what's going on. So we will, all eyes will be on the elections on May 5 as this first past the post. Thank you so much to Carlos Guevara Mann, professor of Political Science, Director, Master of Science international affairs at Florida State University in the Republic of Panama and President of the Sociedad Bolivariana de Panamá. Thank you for your time. Thank you for this update on Panama.

Professor Carlos Mann: Great to talk to you, Richard. Take care.

Richard McColl: It's been an absolute pleasure. We'll be back in a fortnight discussing more issues from the region. I know you have enjoyed this. Please share and promote The LatinNews Podcast. I've been Richard McColl in Bogotá, Colombia. Thank you again and bye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.LatinNews.com.

Victor Bulmer-Thomas is Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of London and Honorary Professor with the Institute of the Americas, University College London. He is also a Senior Distinguished Fellow of the School of Advanced Study at the University of London; an Associate Fellow in the Americas Program at Chatham House, where he was the Director from 2001 to 2006; and was Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, from 1992 to 1998. His publications include The Economic History of the Caribbean Since the Napoleonic Wars (2012), The Political Economy of Central America Since 1920 (1987) and Input-Output Analysis for Developing Countries (1982). He is also co-editor of The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America (2006).

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here’s your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is the LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia, and my very special guest this week is Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, honorary professor at the Institute of the Americas at University College London, emeritus professor at London University, and we'll be talking all things related to Belize on this episode of the LatinNews Podcast. Let me take this moment to welcome Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas on the LatinNews Podcast.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Thank you.

Richard McColl: It's an absolute pleasure to have someone of your caliber on the LatinNews Podcast. Professor, Perhaps we could start this conversation by considering what has happened recently in Belize, when we look at, well, the United Democratic Party in 6th of March Municipal elections in Belize.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, this was a chance for the opposition to win back some seats after its disastrous performance in the last municipal elections. There are 67 seats altogether spread over the nine town boards, and they only won two at the last elections. This time they won six. So they won six out of 67 seats and they captured one town board. But it was seen, I think, correctly, in Belize as a major defeat for the opposition and really a rather strong victory for the incumbent party, the People's United Party, the PUP.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: So it wasn't good news for the opposition, and you can explain it in various ways, but everyone, most people, let's say not everyone, most people are assuming that this suggests that when the general elections are called, and it has to before the end of 2025, but it could be anytime between now and then that the incumbent party, the PUP, will win again.

Richard McColl: And this is under the prime Minister, John Briceño. I am, I assume, okay. And with this victory on the 6th of March, because we can call it a victory for the PUP in this respect, is there a likelihood of a snap election then on the strength of the results?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, the prime minister has said no, but of course, prime ministers always do say no. So I would imagine he's watching. There's no need for him to rush because the news, the short-term news coming in on the political and economic front is relatively favorable. There's no real danger, I think from his point of view, of waiting a year. And I think there's another reason why he might wait, and that is that there are massive divisions within the UDP, within the opposition party. Indeed, the leader of the opposition, Sean Barrow, his position is frankly somewhat at risk at the moment. And I think the Prime Minister feels that it's probably best to take advantage of this turbulence within the opposition party and let it run as long as it can, and therefore there's no need to rush to an election.

Richard McColl: As you said, the economic figures coming through are reasonably positive for Belize. I was reading that the sugar exports in 2024 are. Well, I mean, they estimate US$190 million in sugar exports. What else can rely upon for, let's say, a hard currency?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, Belize has made two shifts in my lifetime as far as trade is concerned. The first is it's moved from being an exporter of forest products to being an exporter of agricultural products. And now it's making a second shift, which is away from commodity exports towards service exports, particularly tourism. And that shift is continuing quite rapidly, so that almost all the agricultural exports are facing problems, including sugar, whereas the service exports, at least for the moment, appear to be performing quite well. So Belize, as far as the structure of its foreign trade is concerned, is beginning to look more like a typical Caribbean island than it used to, unless like a Central American republic, which is in some ways what it was more comparable with 20, 30 years ago.

Richard McColl: I mean, to what can we attribute that change, then? As you say, the economics of changing, let's say, looking outwards towards the Caribbean rather than, you know, tierra firme there in Central America?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, that's a separate issue. It's just that the shift from commodities to services, or from goods to services, if you like, that's not really linked to its geographical position, being both part of Central America and part of the Caribbean. That. That's a slightly different story. But the shift from goods to services is driven by two things. One is that goods exports do face deep structural problems. They're not cyclical. These are problems that relate to scale economies, the erosion of preferences, things like this. Whereas on the services side, it's still true to some extent, and I hesitate to, I mean, I have to qualify by saying to some extent, but to some extent there's still scope for expanding tourism in Belize, whereas in somewhere like Antigua or Barbados, it's much more difficult because they've been at it for so long.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Belize turned its back on tourism until the 1980s. It was the wish of then Prime Minister, George Price, the father of the nation, to have as little as possible to do with tourism because he thought it would reduce Belize to being basically a hewer of wood and drawer of water, doing the menial tasks associated with tourism and not really deriving major benefits. Now is Very much not the view today of those who run the country. And so they still think that there is a lot of scope for expanding tourism, including cruise tourism, where at the moment there is no proper cruise port where the ships can berth. They have to be taken off the cruise ships in small tenders and brought to shore that way.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: So if there ever was to be a cruise port, and I think there will at some point, then obviously that would considerably increase the number of cruise visitors. Whether that's a good thing or a bad thing is another matter. We can discuss that if you wish. But it certainly means that in terms of capacity, there is scope for expanding tourism in the next five to 10 years, whereas doing it with things like sugar, citrus, bananas, shrimp, these traditional commodity exports is much more difficult.

Richard McColl: This is an interesting concept. Is there an area along the coastline in Belize that could be used for a deep-water port?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Yes, there are three candidates. And this is where it's got very messy because the government has not stated publicly which one of the three it would like to see succeed, even though in practice everybody knows which one it is. It's one called Portico, and it's on the mainland just south of Belize City. But that has got shrouded in charges of corruption which involve not only the cruise ship company concerned. Interesting. Not only the local private investor, but both political parties, both the one that's in power now and the one that was in power before. And there is currently a commission of inquiry going through the Senate, but no one is too confident that will get to the bottom of all of this.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: But there is no doubt that particular one, the one seemingly favored by the government, has a lot of, how should we say, issues surrounding it. The other two projects are even more extraordinary in a way. The one that seemed to be the front runner, which is, was headed by a local businessman called Mike Feinstein, that has now gone bankrupt and is now in receivership. And so it's not at all clear what will happen to that one, although the government claims it would still like to see it be completed. How sincere they are about that, I don't know.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: And the third one is the one that everyone was talking about a few months ago because it involves the port of Belize, which at the time was owned by a certain Michael Ashcroft, who made it clear he would not invest in the upkeep of the port, which desperately needs it, unless he was given assurances that his ideas for a cruise port would go ahead. And the government resisted. And Ashcroft carried out a major campaign of Hostile advertising against the government. And eventually a deal was agreed under which the government bought out the port of Belize from Ashcroft. And that would seem to have closed off that particular option. And it certainly has closed it off as far ashcroft owning the port of Belize and starting a cruise port in that sense.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: But the government is now talking about the port of Belize possibly being the place where a cruise port will eventually be established. So it's a bit of a mess, to be honest. But in five years time, I'm pretty sure one of these three will have come through and there will be a cruise ship port where the big cruise ships can draw up, and that will obviously increase the number of cruise ship visitors to Belize.

Richard McColl: It's a fascinating issue, that sort of fighting over the three potential places. But as you say, Portico being the. Probably the most probable, would you say then? I mean, I'm thinking about this sort of as we talk, Lord Ashcroft of Chichester. I mean, we know that he wants to be Lord Ashcroft of Belize. So he sold or he was bought out by the government. This is the present government in power. He was bought out of that port. So it would, I mean, due to the sort of, let's say. Let's say the hostile relations between him and the PUP is this. Does this mean that he's automatically throwing his weight behind the UDP for the next elections?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Not automatically, because Ashcroft is quite good at playing long and complicated games when it comes to both politics and business. And so I don't think there would be anything automatic about that decision. But he is furious about the settlement that he reached with the government over the transfer of the Port of Belize to the Belize government, and is undoubtedly looking to settle scores in some way in the future. And perhaps part of that is the support that he gives to the leader of the opposition. But remember, he was giving that support long before this particular settlement was reached over the port of Belize. So that is not in itself a sufficient explanation of why he's now supporting the same party that the previous 15 years he was fighting.

Richard McColl: I don't want to delve too much into Lord Ashcroft, but there is the ongoing scandal. It's his son's partner who is guilty of having shot and killed a police officer in Belize.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Yes, she's been found guilty of manslaughter, but it, because she pleaded guilty, it doesn't have a custodial sentence attached to it. There was a fine attached to it. And that issue is slightly fading into the background. A lot of people remember it, of course, but it's no longer quite as prominent as it was. And the issue that remains is the question of custody of the children, because as soon as the, as it was feasible, Ashcroft's son Andrew took the children out of Belize to the Turks and Caicos Islands, having been granted permission by a Belize court to do so. And this is very unusual because in Belize, as in most countries, the mother normally gets custody. And so she remains in Belize trying to fight that rather than trying to reverse the manslaughter charge.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: She was very lucky to get a manslaughter charge that didn't have a custodial sentence attached to it. So there's no way she's going to try and appeal that because she'd probably end up losing very badly. So the scandal, inasmuch as it continues to be discussed, relates more to this question of custody.

Richard McColl: Going back to the ports very quickly, moving off the Ashcroft dynasty going back to the ports. Where's the money going to come from, the interest, the engineering know how into putting in a port?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, it depends which group you're talking about. I mean, the Feinstein Group has run out of money, which is why they've ended up in receivership. The government says it would take another 50 million. I think, I guess that'll belize dollars rather than US dollars. But it's not always clear when people talk about 50 million which they're referring to, the bigger the number, the more likely it is to be US dollars. So the fact that government can talk like that suggests that they are open to the idea of that cruise port finishing, but the government itself would not put in the money. Feinstein has ways of financing it, but he is currently in default in terms of the loan he received from a local bank, the Atlantic Bank.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: As for it's fronted by a Belizean called David Gegg, but it's well known that he doesn't have the money. He's a relatively wealthy man, but he doesn't have the kind of money you would need. So there are other business people associated with him, including an Indian businessman, and it's possible that the money would be coming from that. And as far as the third option is concerned, the port of Belize, well, obviously when it was Ashcroft going to develop that, it was Ashcroft who would have financed it. Now we don't know. So I think the financing of it is not entirely clear, but there is money around. And remember that the cruise ship companies themselves have a strong interest in making sure that this port gets completed. And so presumably they would provide some of the money or at least one of these projects.

Richard McColl: Well, that's it. I mean, because if we say the elections in 2025, in the term, as you said, next five years, it will be completed. It's going to be a major policy decision and whoever. Well, as it looks like at the moment, you know, the PUP getting in. It's a major policy decision. I mean, fundamental to Belize in this situation. I thought we could discuss a little bit because we've discussed that, you know, the favorable economy. Favorable, of course, as I said, sugar, I'm sure, obviously tourism. But I did see some statistics about the multidimensional nature of poverty, indirect and direct poverty in Belize and the statistic came up as a 26.4% of households are considered multidimensionally poor. So therefore, you know, lack of food security, health care, education, living standards and employment.

Richard McColl: I mean, are the Belize's politicians focusing on this or is it just something that we get reported in the international press?

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Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, it dep. No, they're very much aware of this and it was a number put out by the Belize Statistical Institute. Of course it's down. It's not as high a number as it was the last time such a study was carried out. So the politician would say we're heading in the right direction. But I think we need to go a bit deeper into all of this because Belize, although it's classified for some reason as an upper-middle income country, is actually a very poor country. Yes. And if you compare it with its peer group in the Caribbean, including not just the independent countries but the non-independent ones, Belize is almost at the very bottom. I mean, Haiti is the poorest by a long way. But you then get three countries, Belize, Jamaica and Suriname, who are sort of second from bottom.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: And whether Belize becomes second from bottom or fourth from bottom depends on which measure of gross national income you use. If you use for example, gross national income at purchasing power parity, then Belize is second from the bottom. If you use gross domestic product at current prices, then Belize is fought. But it, there's a little group. Now if you go back 10, 20, 30 years ago, Belize was not at the bottom. It was much higher up in terms of this peer group. So something terrible has happened in Belize in the last 10, 20, 30 years. And it would be nice to think that this short-term boost that we've seen since the end of the pandemic is laying the basis for a much higher long-term sustainable rate of growth. But unfortunately it's not.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: And so we shouldn't get carried away by talk of, you know, favorable economic numbers or promising growth rates or anything like that. What we're looking at is still very much a short-term recovery. And let me give you one number that illustrates, I think very clearly the problem. In the numbers that are reported about Belize. It's very common to refer to the growth rate of say gross domestic product, but it's very rare that people talk about gross domestic product per head. And the reason is that Belize actually has quite a high population growth. Now how high it is we're not quite sure because Belize is one of those countries which receives a high rate of net migration inwards, not outwards. So this is not like a country like Barbados which has high outward migration.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: This is high inward migration net coming mainly from the surrounding republics, but from some other countries as well. Now, if you assume that population growth is running at about 2% a year, and we'll find out on Monday when the Census results for 2022 are published, then any growth rate of less than 3% a year is frankly leaving you pretty well where you were to start with. And the projections of the IMF and the World Bank are others are starting next year for a growth rate at constant prices of about 2% a year. Well, that's been a lead believes exactly where it is in terms of income per head. So the chances of dealing with multidimensional poverty or anything like that is very difficult in that situation.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: And I'm sorry, you know, to pour rain on the parade, but the fact is that one has to face up to the fact for the last several decades the performance has been very poor. And that's not going to change in the near term.

Richard McColl: Yeah, we talked about migration. You said in within. I know we have to talk about the region a little bit. What is the relationship right now between Belize and Guatemala under the new Arévalo presidency?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, it's definitely helped in power, although it hasn't resolved all the problems. The outstanding problem is the continuing clashes on the southern border on the Sarstoon River. But we're now getting very close to the day when the International Court of Justice gives its ruling on the boundary dispute, the territorial and maritime boundary dispute between Guatemala and Also Honduras, because Honduras has joined the dispute at the ICJ because they have a claim to some of the islands off the coast of Belize as well as Guatemala. So all will be settled possibly this year. Although I suspect that the other cases that the ICJ is involved in particular the charge of genocide against Israel, will push the settlement of this into perhaps next year, into 2025. But given that we've been waiting, what is it now, 100, 465 years?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: I mean, I don't think another year, you know, matters too much. So we're getting very close to a settlement of that. I don't see anything happening between Belize and Guatemala that would seriously rock the boat before that ICJ ruling comes. But there's no doubt that there are continuing difficulties along the border because obviously, from Guatemala's point of view, it's not defined. So it's very difficult to expect Guatemala to act as if it was an internationally agreed border when they don't recognize it. That should change after the ICJ rules. And I'm, I think everyone assumes that it will rule in Belize's favor. I think even the Guatemalans accept that. So that should definitely help.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: So I think in five years time, we probably won't be talking so much about, you know, the difficult relationship with Guatemala, and hopefully we'll be talking about something much more positive. There is actually a partial scope agreement between Belize and Guatemala that's been in place for a number of years and it's working quite well. So at the trade level, it's not massive, but at the trade level, things are happening, which is quite encouraging, I noticed.

Richard McColl: I mean, you talk about the skirmishes, but I notice also that Belizean soldiers are training a contingent in Jamaica to join up with the Kenyan contingent on route to Haiti. Most likely, yes.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: If it happens, the Belize contingent will be very small. It's, it's going to be about 50, I think. And that is really a gesture of solidarity by CARICOM states to a fellow CARICOM member, which is what Haiti is. I mean, given the scale of the problems in Haiti, I'm not sure that this Kenyan mission is going to get very far. It's going to take something a bit more dramatic, I think, to help resolve Haiti's current problems. But certainly Belize will want to do its bit because it takes its membership of CARICOM seriously.

Richard McColl: Well, I mean, it's a good thing. It is important, let's say this CARICOM solidarity. And as such, and especially a country like Belize being Able to put forward some. I was, as we wind this down, Professor, I was thinking about what, you know, you were talking about the different industries, the sort of exportation of goods and its change to services. The major challenges that Belize faces, aside from obviously, you know, the main scourge of the whole region, corruption and so on. But climate change affecting tourism, of course, because we know the tourism on the cayes, deforestation of those, you know, primary forests. And I've read awful things about the increase in gun crime. Perhaps you could go a bit deeper on each of these.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, I can, but the one I think I'd like to focus on is the question of the environment.

Richard McColl: Yes.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: On the sustainability of Belize's economic model. And clearly climate change exacerbates the difficulties that Belize faces. But even without climate change, there would be a very serious problem because coming back to what we talked about earlier on, which is that Belize is shifting to a model much more like a typical Caribbean island, putting more and more of its effort into mass tourism. This is putting and will continue to put huge strains on the natural environment in Belize. Out at the cayes we see it really devastation of the mangroves and the water table and what remains of the caye forest and all that sort of thing. It's really quite troubling and it's not being addressed by politicians.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Fortunately, Belize has a very strong grassroots environmental movement which is constantly drawing attention to the environmental damage that is going on through the shift to a kind of mass tourism. When tourism started, it was all about small lodges, high-end ecotourism and so on. And Belize still does that very well. Very well indeed. I mean, these lodges are absolutely wonderful. But of course it's a small number of people who can afford them. And so it gives employment to a relatively small number of people. So you can see why the temptation to move into more sort of mass tourism has come about. But we shouldn't kid ourselves that this is not without environmental damage.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: And the problems will become much more acute if and when one of these cruise ship ports is established because not only will it bring in many more tourists who will then want to go and visit all these pristine sites in Belize that we hear about all the time. But it's going to do a lot of damage to the mangroves along the coast and the dredging will affect the reef itself off the coast of Belize and all the sort of things that are held up as the points of attraction for tourism industry in the first place. So I would have to say that the growth model in Belize is not a sustainable one as we see it now.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: It can deliver short-term benefits, particularly after the pandemic, but they're going to have to be a lot of adjustments before we can talk about this as sustainable development concern.

Richard McColl: Then of course, it all connects, doesn't it? It all connects when we think of the growth on such a high impact, as you say, long, short-term, but high impact economic model. So we see, I mean, we wind this down again totally. It's elections in 2025, favorable economic results, although perhaps just something on the surface that needs to be addressed in the next, I would say seven to eight months before elections. How do you, how do you see the immediate future then for Belize?

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Well, if from the government's point of view, the immediate future is relatively favorable. The blue bond about which we haven't yet spoken has obviously reduced the debt to GDP ratio significantly and made servicing of the foreign debt much less burdensome. The resources freed up are being put towards a trust fund which is designed to preserve the marine resources into the future. We'll see. Let's hope it does. But at the moment it's a bit of a box ticking exercise, so we can't really be sure that it's yet having the desired effect. But it's early days, I accept that. And this blue bond exercise is going to run for at least 20 years and it's at the end of that we'll be in a better position to see whether it worked out as planned. But in the. Back to your question.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Sorry, just in terms of the short-term. Yeah. I mean, if I was the government, I would be feeling very confident both about the direction of politics and about the direction of the economy. It's just that when you sit back outside of government and you look at the impact on the environment, you look at the nature of the growth model that is now taking shape in Belize, look, you do have some very troubling questions and we don't yet really have satisfactory answers.

Richard McColl: Yes, certainly a lot to think over there. Can I take this moment to say thank you so much to Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, honorary professor at the Institute of the Americas at UCL and Emeritus professor at London University. Thank you so much for your, well, really unrivaled knowledge into the nation of Belize. I know you've written more than 30 books about the region, not Belize itself, but about the region, the Caribbean and so on. It's been truly fascinating to pick your brains about this country and of course to put it into context with its neighbor, sometimes the friction there with Guatemala. But also to look at it now as, you know, a Caribbean island model, I think that's really what we take away from this, is that shift. So thank you again for your time and your expertise on this.

Richard McColl: It has been an absolute pleasure.

Professor Bulmer-Thomas: Thank you very much.

Richard McColl: Most welcome. We've been talking to Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, honorary professor at the Institute of the Americas at UCL, Emeritus professor at London University, all about Belize. We'll be back in two weeks time with further interviews from the region. This has been the LatinNews Podcast and I've been your host, Richard McColl here in Colombia. Thank you for listening and bye.

Outro: You’ve been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.

Professor Hecht is a specialist on tropical development in Latin America, especially the Amazon Basin and Central America. Her research focuses on the political economies of development. She also writes environmental and social history of the tropics, and about large scale concepts, such as Tropicality, through which we understand and represent them. She recently completed a study published by the University of Chicago Press on the Brazilian writer and Amazon explorer, Euclides da Cunha, and the imperial ambitions pertaining to the Amazon Scramble, when European powers and hemispheric aspirants (and Brazil itself) clashed in the remote regions as well as adjudication courts over the immense rubber wealth during the first modern globalization impulse in Amazonia.

Dr. Hecht’s work has been influential in development as well as academic circles. She has worked for many international multilateral agencies, US granting agencies (NSF, NASA), as well as a range of non government organizations, as well as the governments of Brazil, Bolivia and El Salvador. She has received numerous prestigious grants including research funding from the MacArthur Foundation, Pew Charitable Trusts, the Ford Foundation among many, many others. She is also a member of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl here in Bogota, Colombia. Your host, our very special guest is on the line from Los Angeles, none other than Susanna Hecht. She is a professor at the Luskin School of Public affairs, the director of the Brazil center at UCLA, professor of Graduate Institute for International Development in the Department of History and Politics at Geneva, and she's at the Institute of Environmental and Sustainability at UCLA. So with that very impressive CV or resume, we're going to be talking about deforestation. Deforestation obviously largely in the Amazon because when you think about it, the nine countries that have Amazonian frontiers and include the Amazon, well, what a huge issue to be addressing. So Professor Susanna, thank you so much for coming on The LatinNews Podcast.

Professor Susanna Hecht: Well, I'm delighted to be here. I'm talking to you from climate battered Southern California. My road is closed from landslides. So just to keep things in mind, climate change is pretty generalized these days, even among places that view themselves as immune from it. So let me just jump right in here. I think that Amazonia suffers a little bit from what I always call the green blob problem, which is you see it on a map and it's a big green blob. So what we're going to try and do in this podcast, and we don't have very much time, is to go through some of the big questions and big dynamics. There's a lot of data that we're going to be referring to, but we're going to have Richard put this on the LatinNews website because otherwise I'll be doing what everybody does on a Zoom, which is can you see my screen? And too much detail. So if you want to go into the sort of weeds and empirics on this, we'll make sure that this material is available. But in the time we have, we can't possibly do a detailed discussion of all the numbers, but we'll be talking about trends and you can find the information on the LatinNews website. First of all, we'll be talking about pan-Amazonia, which means all of Amazonia. So if you think about the continent of South America, the big bulge is mostly Amazonian. So even though there's lot, there's nine countries of the 13 South American countries, most of them have Amazonian territory. And while most of the Amazon biome might be found in or what's considered the sort of big Amazonian biome. A lot of these countries, I'll go through them for you. This is a little. I'm a geographer, so I, you know, like I have to do these on tests all the time. But think of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and then Brazil, of course, and then the Guiana countries, which everybody forgets about because they're sort of more Caribbean. I always refer to it as the Caribbean Amazon. But it's British Guiana, which is currently under threat from Venezuela for its territory, Suriname, which used to be called Dutch Guiana, and the department of French Guiana, which is. We're talking about it as a country, but it never really decolonized. It's still a part of France. So we're looking at a huge area. It's larger than the continental United States. It's not just one big green blob. There are lots of different kinds of things. But what's important to realize is this. And I'm going to go for just a little historical note here because I think it's important, which is Amazonia itself used to be an independent colony when in the colonial period it was part of the Portuguese empire. When Portugal had an Empire in 1822, basically with the complete collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, the Spanish holdings became republics. And instead of two Portuguese speaking colonies, what happened was that Amazonia, which at the time was called the north, was given into the Brazilian monarchy. So it became part of a kind of internal Brazilian colonialism and never actually went through this process of liberation and individual sovereignty that you saw elsewhere. I think it's important to keep this in mind because many people refer to Amazonia as kind of an internal colony. It's important to realize even though we go, oh, most of the stuff is in. Most of Amazonia is in Brazil. But in the countries, a lot of their area in fact is in the Amazon biome. And that's especially true in the Guyanas, where 90% of their sovereign territories are actually in the biome. So once you start to move it away from the green blob into these different sovereignties, there's a bunch of different things that kind of come up. So one of the things is of course that we have. You might see there's been a lot of discussions about Amazonian deforestation for a lot of reasons. But one of the things that you might want to think about is also that Amazonia is kind of different from the temperate zone. When we think of forests, we have our, you know, Our forests, and they're just not nearly as diverse as what you see in Amazonia. And also that in that green blob, there's different kinds of forests all over the place in the same way that you can think of different forests in the United States or different kinds of forests in Europe, you know. But the point is here that these are hyper biodiverse, about 10 or probably more percent of global biodiversity, all the different kinds of species are found there. So that when you. And they're in complex relationships to each other. So usually if I were cutting down a forest here in Southern California, my little oak woodland here, I'll get an oak woodland pretty much back. If you cut down an Amazonian forest, you miss the possibility of actually getting that same forest back. So it's important to realize that when we cut things down there, you're not necessarily getting the same thing back. So that's one thing that's important in terms of how you might think of structuring or restructuring a forest for landscape recovery or rewilding. This is popularly discussed. So that's one thing, it's really diverse. The second thing is that it operates a lot in the global climate. And I think people, you get so used. Well, there's deforestation and then there's climate problems. But the thing is this, Amazonia is considered to be one of this kind of key points about global climate. And the reason is that it. Well, there's other. Let me just step back a second. It's considered one of the, depending on who you're reading, top five or top seven tipping points in the global climate. What are the other ones? Oh, things like Antarctica or the Greenland ice sheet. Sometimes areas, permafrost areas are included. But also the big tipping points associated with oceanic or oceanic atmospheric currents like El Niño. So the thing about all the other tipping points that I think is really important to emphasize and kind of gets lost in the tipping point, dare we say, blah, is that Amazonia is inhabited and the green it's inhabited by 40 million people. The Greenland ice sheet and Antarctica are reflecting larger, what climatologists call teleconnections. They're reflecting larger atmospheric dynamics. Larger atmospheric dynamics are affecting Amazonia, but land use change and forms of interaction with that environment are also affecting the climate. And one of the things is that Amazonia kind of creates its own rainfall and creates its own atmospheric rivers. Those of us who've been battered by atmospheric rivers recently perhaps have a different view of atmospheric rivers. But the point is it really affects the weather in the Andes. It affects the rest of the South American continent. And it probably has a lot of implications on the currents in the Atlantic, in the Southern Atlantic. So we're really looking at something that is really consequential when we lose it, but also that is reflecting human agency. So if it's reflecting human agency, then we have the capacity to, in principle, to shift the story a little bit. So I really wanted to emphasize that because it's not just about rates of deforestation, although that's important, but rather also about that. This is a big tipping point, and it is also under human control in a way. So this is. If there's any big takeaway that you get from your early morning listening, it should be this, first of all. So let's go now into the questions of rates of deforestation and what does it mean and that kind of thing. Richard, do you want to direct me in any way? Otherwise, I'll just babble on before you.

Richard McColl: Before you get into this quickly. I mean, what I feel is that you're suggesting here as well, I'm not only the human element here, but the Amazonian deforestation is far more volatile than when we think then, I mean, it's a global collective problem. What are we doing when it terms in terms of enforcement? But go first into the figures, and then we can think about the enforcement and regulations being enforced to try and protect and let's reduce the figures of deforestation.

Professor Susanna Hecht: Okay, so let me trot through some of these. First of all, it's important to realize that while we sort of think of deforestation as always being an upward flow, in fact, it's volatile. It goes up and down. And we'll put some graphs on the website so you can look at this. Because what you can see is that at moments there will be sort of dramatic falls in deforestation. One is 1992. Of course, everybody remembers 1992, but that was when there was the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. And Brazil wanted to look good, so they, you know, really enforced low deforestation. So then you get a low deforestation. Then everybody goes home and does what they do, and they go home. And so it goes up and it's volatile. Then what happens is Lula comes in 2000. By 2012, deforestation has dropped by 82%. So there's a lot of things that go on, and I'll get to those in a moment. It's not matched necessarily by the other countries. Other countries have deforestation dynamics that may reflect things like insurgency. So when you have Insurgency in the Amazon, people don't go in because it's kind of dangerous to do so. And there have been quite a few insurgencies. This is part of its big history, is one of insurgency. So let me go back to Brazil quickly. So we drop it by 82%, which is really something. Now it's important to understand that's the Amazon basin we're talking about. There are other kinds of forests at the same time that are undergoing a kind of slaughter. And we can think of the Brazilian Cerrado, which is a kind of savannah ecosystem, which ends up 50% deforested because it's less, far less regulated in terms of its clearing dynamics than Amazonia. But so we get to 2012, we have a kind of weird dynamic. I won't go into the Brazilian history of this moment. But then Jair Bolsonaro comes in and what happens is you see an explosion in deforestation. And why is this? Because he says, go for it. You can just. We're not going to enforce the regulations. Indians shouldn't stand in the way of progress. Forests shouldn't stand in the way of progress. Don't lecture us temperate zone because you use you deforested and developed. And you want us to stay with primitives and so on. There are lots of flaws to that discourse, by the way. But in any case, I'm just repeating it as part of the sort of ideological apparatus. It's important to understand that this volatility comes from a lot of different things. And I'm going to go through them quickly because we really don't have much time. But some of them are because of specific Amazon policies. National integration, for example, or protected areas, new agrarian reform, settlements. Those are all part of specifically Amazonian policies. But there can be other things. There can be sort of the role of Amazon in terms of national legitimacies, national integration and geopolitics being one. The idea of controlling insurgencies, that's been a part of Amazonian history as well. The other thing is that there can be geopolitical and regional things like the Amazon pac, where they basically coordinate infrastructure development and sort of border agreements and so on. It's really sort of more linked to kind of performative and infrastructure and. But then the other thing is that there's also a lot of competing land rights that come from overlapping histories in these regions, which gives you a kind of a land chaos, which is really one of the things that is for Amazonia. So that you have several different forms and several different forms of jurisdiction. Working at the same time. So what that means in practice is this, that. So this is like the simplest way to understand Amazonia is through this land chaos model, which is that if you want to claim land, your best bet is to clear it so that competing forms of tenure or land use go away. And what this is that for various reasons having to do with Roman law won't go into, gives you the sort of squatter rights. It shows what's called effective use. And that makes getting titling or getting access and control much easier. And typically what happens in this case is you throw some cattle on it and claim it and maybe even speculate on it. But the point is that there are several policy things and regulations that can apply. They can be quite contradictory. And in that context, what you can get is a lot of land chaos. The other thing is, let's just face it, global markets, if you want to look at what are some of these drivers, we can just go into that right now. So there are a couple of things. There are three sort of big economies that don't actually require complete deforestation in the region, but have a lot of implications. And they have implications mainly because they also have infrastructure and they're kind of toxic. But one is you might not be thinking about this given the Middle East and everything else, but Amazonia is, I often call, think of it as what we might call Saudi Amazonia. It's got a huge sort of oil, how should we say, a kind of oil semicircle that goes hydrocarbon circle, that goes really from Bolivia all the way over and out into the Atlantic Ocean. So you have to understand that all of the Amazon countries are very interested in keeping, in getting to oil. Even if there have been things like initiatives to keep the oil in the ground and so on. What you really want to understand is that oil is part of every Amazonian country's thinking. So if we're looking at the kinds of questions that we want to think about control, deforestation, one of the things is, except for Colombia, all of them have said, oh no, oil exploration, petrochemical exploration, fine, just jump in quickly there.

Richard McColl: So we've got the left wing government of Gustavo Petro who's saying keep the oil in the ground. President Noboa in Ecuador, I suppose due to his, well, condition of being connected with all of the sort of, let's say business magnates in Ecuador has not really commented on this. Lula in Brazil, we kind of expect him to have a, more of a, an environmental policy. Venezuela, we don't even need to discuss because is it rogue? Is it failed? I mean, you can get into that. That's a whole other conversation. And of course, then, you know, Guyana is keen. Well, the Exxon state of Guyana is. Is obviously taking advantage of their. Suriname, I suppose, has some and others. Bolivia has them. But these governments, do they just sort of quietly ignore calls to keep oil in the ground?

Professor Susanna Hecht: Oh, not so quietly. I think that all of them view this as being an important economic development future for them. This is not the time, the moment of what we might have thought of nationalization of these kinds of resources. And remember that most of them are looking at sort of failed industrial policies. And so that a significant portion of their foreign exchange comes from oil revenue. Brazil just joined OPEC, declined to not even though there's a judgment against developing oil in the mouth of the Amazon. We'll find out. I think that once you see oil, and with Noboa, of course, he's in a state of emergency now because he's essentially presiding over a narco state. And in this case, he overrode a national referendum for keeping the oil in the ground. So under the conditions that he can do under states of exception. So it's a complicated story, but one of the things about oil is that it is not. This is the sort of oil curse, which is that it generates a lot of money and it generates it into national coffers, which of course has a certain level of corruption everywhere in these countries. But the other thing that it does is that it is also highly toxic and polluting in the context where you have very low regulatory capacities. And so these are also poisoning rivers, poisoning forests, they're flaring, they're emitting a lot of CO2, they're emitting a lot of methane. So that these are not the sort of, you know, tightly managed oil fields that you would expect of other places, although even that is sort of open for questions. But they are sort of wildly polluting. But let me go on to another big polluter, which is gold mining. One of the things this is a. There's something that I always call Amazon alchemy, where you take something that is actually illegally produced, you do a certification, and suddenly it becomes a legal commodity. So the Swiss will tell you that 95% of the gold which is. Goes through, most gold goes through Switzerland. They will all say, we have the certificates, it's legal. Whereas actually, we know while there are some areas of gold mining that are permitted, most of it is what we would call wildcat mining. And that is Essentially placer mining, dredging and sort of riparian level mining. What's the problem? There is not just the sediments that go in and ruin the rivers, because this is. You disrupt the riverbed to get out the gold, but also that to create the amalgam which is the gold itself, you need to put it in a slurry with mercury. And mercury is quite toxic, besides driving you crazy. The Mad Hatter, of course is emblematic of that. This is hatters in England used to use a lot of mercury. So they were all crazy. Also the famous Minamata, birth defect, learning disabilities and so on. What happens is now you have this massive flow of mercury into the rivers, but also as you volatilize it's toxic to the trees, it's toxic to the forest, it's toxic to animals. So you have, not to mention humans. So what you have is a kind of, not just the problem of sort of insight pollution, let's say the question of the sediments, but you have a sort of indirect, much more dispersed form of pollution as well. So this now becomes a problem. And then of course you may have roads going in and out. You have also a lot of this is moved on airplanes because it's small and valuable. The next thing, the next economy that I would talk about is timber extraction. Oh, let me just add one thing. Gold mining is a major employer in Amazonia. So one of the things is if you have a failed industrial or other kinds of policies that can't absorb labor, people will move into gold even part time because there's, it uses labor. Another is timber extraction. Again here you get a lot of infrastructure development which also causes deforestation, informal default, informal infrastructure, which is the dominant form. And then the other thing is that this is also largely clandestine. It often goes through a sort of fake certification process or real or the other thing people like to do is mix certified with uncertified and then you can't tell what is what. And they all go out under the stamp of certification. But what this does is it creates a lot of vulnerability of the forests that remain because there's slash underneath that dries out. And it makes these all more vulnerable to fire. And also other forms of deforestation, which.

Richard McColl: Of course we've been seeing of late. The huge, huge forest fires have been taking place. I just wanted, I thought about this and the huge forest fires and the deforestation taking place. And it made me think of the Leticia Pact of 2019, when all of these governments get together and have a nice Jolly talking about what needs to be done. Are these actually effective or are they more, let's say, performative and ceremonial, of a ceremonial value?

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Professor Susanna Hecht: Oh, I think they're important ceremonially and basically what they do is they sort of coordinate infrastructure and border management and what do you call it, overflight regulations and so on. But in terms of actually being coordinating policy, they might, for example, say, well, we'll send firefighters over to you. But in reality there isn't really very much coordination. The coordination really comes about regulation of the borders when you start to have infrastructure crossing them. As you are seeing much more widespread, in a more widespread way right now.

Richard McColl: This ancillary infrastructure, it all comes in, as you said, you need to get in and out for the gold, as you said, you need a Runway or if you've got the oil, all of the construction with the oil, the pipelines. And then I was just thinking of the other possible issues. You talked about timber, you talked about oil, you talked about gold. But of course we've got cattle, soy, coca, in the terms of like Peru, Colombia, I think some Ecuador. What else? I mean there's a lot of things that go on in this area.

Professor Susanna Hecht: Yeah, well, one of the things that I think I was starting to talk about stuff that wasn't actually didn't really require deforestation, that land chaos drives a lot of the cattle development. And also as Brazilian as the Brazilian cattle herd has become cleaner in the sense that it doesn't carry hoof and mouth disease or other kinds of internationally prohibited diseases. What you see is, and that JBS has sort of become a global monopoly and also that the demand for meat globally has increased as global incomes have gone up. So what you see is both a market driver, a sort of land speculative driver and a land claiming dynamic. And also it's subsidized, so. And it's low labor. So that's the other thing is that it doesn't require the kind of labor dynamics or skilled labor that you would otherwise need. This is also one of those things where in the demand for that the particularly the EU has started to put on deforestation free commodities. What you have is animals coming from a deforested farm fattening shortly on a certified farm going into the supply chain. So this is another part of Amazonian alchemy. Again, cattle have been transforming landscapes in the tropics since they arrived in 1500. So they have had this long kind of history in terms of transforming landscapes and ecosystems. I think also it's important to recognize that a lot of it is managed with fire. It goes in and degrades other kinds of adjacent forests. So we start to see kind of a feedback loop of increasing fire vulnerability, especially when we get climate change with it. With soy again, it's important to realize that this is both a market driven and also a subsidized sector. And also that, you know, most of the. It is the world's largest. Brazil is now the largest producer of soy and Amazonia of course is the largest producer of soy as well as a consequence. So one of the things that's important keep in mind about this is that when you start to regulate the deforestation dynamics, soy is kind of like a whack a mole. You can control it in one place, but then it comes up in the Argentinian Chaco or the Bolivian Chiquitano forest or in the Cerrado or the. So it's. So it's what. Or even in Suriname's imaginary intense agro industrial development so far. But they want this to happen. But the point of this is that it expands. It's largely driven by demand for animal feed. People, people are not eating tofu that much even in Asia. So the demand is enormously driven by Chinese and Middle Eastern and European consumers for mainly animal feed. One of the things that's important to realize is that China is the world's, is Latin America's largest trade partner and China's footprint. China is not particularly concerned about deforestation per se. It's more concerned about its sort of market, handling its market. So we do very much see the force of international markets in the expansion of some of these things. Coca, of course, it would be another example. But let me just say one more thing about soy. Soy involves the use of a lot of chemicals and particularly what are called emergent herbicides. So they're sprayed with these herbicides to keep weeds down so that the genetically modified soy can come up, it drifts. The thing about atmospheres and water and air is like things don't stay put in them. So you're having a lot of effects from the usual thing is glyphosate on forests, on fisheries, on other kinds of things. And also we have pesticides. So you have to sort of think of Amazonia as not just the problem, having a problem of deforestation, but also very serious issues associated with toxics that are widespread now. So even if you have a standing forest next to a river, you may have a much more toxic atmosphere than you prefer. These questions also apply for coca. Coca, of course, has a long history, at least a 5,000 year history in Amazonia, but not as a global commodity. And of course, the commodification of this has always been associated with clandestine economies and also a certain amount of violence and insurgency. So in order to just go quickly here, what we also have is some small farmer questions as well. My big point though is when we look at the economies of the Amazon countries, what we see is a very important role that Amazonia is playing in these, in terms of foreign exchange, in terms of national legitimacy and a kind of get out of jail free for countries that are either flailing states or failed states and so on because of the importance of these resources. Well, are there alternatives? I would say that it's Amazon alchemy works here as well, which is stuff that you may have seen the article on carbon cowboys this morning, which is that there's all this offset money that people in the temperate zone pay to continue their behavior in, while paying tropical countries to keep their forests up to suck up that carbon. So there's a problem of corruption in this. The value of carbon in the developed world is undervalued, while it may be overvalued in the temperate zone. And of course there's always the argument about that there's regulatory imperialism, which is that we're supposed to cut our forests in the tropics and you can do whatever you want. So there's a sort of sharp debate, but there are sustainable commodities. And it's really important to think about these not only as nurturing landscapes, but also keeping peasant economies in place because these are somewhat labor demanding and they're valuable. So one is açaí, the superfood that at least as a California denizen and also often Amazonian denizen, I can report is delicious and very healthful and it's not cheap cacao. We now see if you go into fancy food stores, there'll be, you know, a discussion of different kinds of cacao from Peru, from Ecuador, from Venezuela, from Colombia, as being specific, sort of like as you would imagine, for different wine varieties, you know, which is that they discuss the varieties and the features of different kinds of things. You're probably drinking more coffee from Amazonia than you might realize if you drink coffee plants. A lot of it's grown in the foothills of Amazonia and also with climate change, you see some movement more into warmer areas. Also some genetic changes in the coffee, particularly for robusta, which does. Okay, it's not the, it's not that delicious Arabica coffee, but it is the one that goes into most of the blends and like instant coffee, things like Brazil nuts. You might think of these as being kind of luxury items. They all are. But on the other hand, they do they. They generate significant amounts of return in the multi billions. Not comparable to oil and soy, of course, but nothing. And then think the sort of weird things like maca. If I go into my little bodega in my neighborhood, it's got a thing that's full of little Amazonian items that are considered health food. So maca is one of them, açaí powder is another. Cacao nibs. And I could just go on and on, and perhaps this just reflects the manias of Southern California. But the point is that these are Amazonian commodities that are moving into large international markets, but they move into them through a kind of specialty market kind of approach. And they also produce many other things simultaneously, including the capacity to suck carbon out of the atmosphere and other livelihood elements within those systems. So those agroforestry systems are important alternatives. These are. It's sort of the discussion of bioeconomies. What about medicines and other kinds of things based on indigenous forms of knowledge. And there's another question there about biopiracy. We won't have time to go into it, but the point is that it's a really complex place. There are alternatives. Every one of those alternatives has a complexity around it and also a big debate. But the other thing is that the drivers of deforestation are very powerful and very structurally embedded and also have basically oligarchic economies around them, a fair amount of corruption. And right now, if we think about governance in all of those nine countries, we're looking at flailing states, failing states, narco states and petro states. And those. Each of those have serious problems. But one of the things I know about Amazonia is that it can always surprise you. And to quote my favorite Brazilian author, Euclides da Cunha, who spent a lot of time in Amazonia, who wrote about its history, said, such as the river, such as its history, always turbulent, always insurgent. And that's it for me.

Richard McColl: Well, I honestly, flailing and failing and narco and petro. It doesn't sound very positive. But you have talked us through some of the positive natures that deforestation does appear as you say it's volatile, but it goes up and down. I just, I, we need to ask. And we need to. You finish on that wonderful quote. But let's ask one final question of you here. I mean, you get into this, obviously the illegality of everything, the money laundering that must go on. You've talked about the positive side. I'd like to say the bio market of cacao, açaí coffee, maca, Brazil nuts. Obviously these do not pull up the shortfall from petroleum, soy and beyond, cattle and timber. As a final, as a closing commentary here, overall, what role is the developed world playing in trying to mitigate deforestation in this region?

Professor Susanna Hecht: Well, it operates mostly through markets and less through regulation. There have been a lot of activities to come and try and help monitor deforestation better to help support enforcement of regulations, better so that. But it's a place that's touchy because of the sovereignty issues that are associated with trying to control this. So this is why it works in a kind of different way to mainly try and ramp up the local and national capacities for implementing the regulations that they already have. The other thing is the dynamic. The developed world has a lot to say about this, but in essence, soybean is mainly consumed, is extracted. Extracted is consumed mostly in Southeast, in China, in Southeast Asia and in the Middle Eastern world. And those areas are not particularly interested in controlling deforestation. They're interested in cheap commodities. So the footprint of these kinds of consumption patterns may be sort of limited in their own national territories, but they have this very broad international thing. And we can't just assume that just because Europeans and Americans prefer not to have a lot of deforestation, that's a universally shared point of view. The question of increasing consumption of meat and other kinds of living animals involves using these kinds of products. So one of the things is, of course, changing diets, but at a moment in which you have the kind of promotion of eating animal protein as a signifier of class, it's very difficult to say, well, and go back to lentils, you know, so there's that. The other thing is California consumes a third of the oil of Ecuador. So one of the things is decarbonizing some of these systems. But of course it's always whack a mole because there's nickel, there's lithium, there's a lot aluminum that is coming out of Amazonia, not the lithium, but aluminum and nickel and other sort of rare earths that are used in decarbonization and those are requiring infrastructure to go in and get it out. And so while your aluminum mine might not take over the whole world, the energy that it needs requires the development of hydropower systems that are very disruptive of those rivers. And most of the energy is consumed not by the population at large, but by the aluminum industry, which is sending out basically ingots, but not any sort of highly developed products. So the problem that you have with sort of reducing carbon emissions, let's say from the transportation sector, has implications for, because everything comes from somewhere. So what you then have are problems associated with other forms of mineral wealth that come out of these areas. The other thing is, you know, maybe ease up on the gold. But that's if you're only thinking about gold as jewelry and not as a hedge for volatility in global markets. And it's going at something like twenty two hundred dollars an ounce. So it's quite a valuable little commodity out there in a situation in which we have a lot of volatility, both because of the Ukrainian wars, because of, and the Middle East in general, but other areas of uncertainty, shall we say. So there's a lot of things that Amazonia does, which hedges the hedges transitions. And it's difficult to, as I say with Amazonia, you're always playing whack a mole. It's like if you don't control one thing here, but in that same way we've seen deforestation go up, we've seen it go down. So there are, it is vulnerable, it is amenable to human agency, I think,.

Richard McColl: I mean, we could listen to you for hours and hours. Your knowledge seems to be bottomless. But one thing I'm taking from this conversation, and in a minute I'll thank you, but it's the serious economic dependency from all of these countries, from all of these products that we've mentioned. So I think we can bring this to an end here and just say listen. From The LatinNews Podcast and myself, Richard McColl here in Bogota, Professor Susanna Hecht, the professor of the Luskin School of Public affairs, also director of the Brazil center at UCLA, professor of Graduate Institute for International Development in the Department of History and Politics in Geneva, professor of the Institute of Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, author of multiple articles and books. It's been an absolute pleasure talking to you and just scratching the surface, I think of your wealth of knowledge on this topic.

Professor Susanna Hecht: Thank you so much, Richard. And anytime you want to chat about the Amazon, I'm always available.

Richard McColl: I hope we get you back on again to discuss this, but hopefully for good news when we have something to say. Listen, it's really dropped. Everyone stopped eating beef we want well,.

Professor Susanna Hecht: It did drop by 50% in Brazil last year. So you know, as I say, it's a volatile thing. So we'll as I always like to say these days, we'll find out.

Richard McColl: We'll find out. Well, thank you again. Thank you from all of us here at The LatinNews Podcast. I've been Richard McColl talking to Professor Susanna Hecht about many of the complexities revolving around deforestation in the Amazon. I know you've enjoyed it. Subscribe, share and make sure you tune in because we'll be back in a fortnight with further issues and further conversations with experts from the Latin America region. Thank you and goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.

Ivan Briscoe

Ivan Briscoe joined Crisis Group in June 2016 as Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean. He has worked on Latin American politics, conflict and crime since 1996. Before joining Crisis Group, Ivan worked as a senior research fellow in the Clingendael Institute of the Netherlands and in the Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE) in Spain, where he specialised in the study of illicit networks in Latin America, new forms of armed violence and the effects of inequality.

As Crisis Group’s Giustra Fellow for the Latin America and Caribbean Program, Glaeldys conducts field research, formulates policy recommendations and assists in the Program’s advocacy activities related to conflict prevention and mitigation in the region.

Glaeldys Gonzalez Calanche

Glaeldys studied at the Central University of Venezuela where she obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Political and Administrative Sciences with an emphasis on International Relations. She also holds a Master’s Degree in Latin American Studies from the University of Salamanca.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I’m your host, Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia. This week we'll be addressing, well, none other than Ecuador. We'll be coming back to Ecuador for the second time. On The LatinNews Podcast, we have some very special guests, experts in their fields. We have none other than Ivan Briscoe, who is the program director for Latin America and the Caribbean for Crisis Group, and also Glaeldys González Calanche, who is a fellow of Crisis Group as well. Now, Ecuador has been in the news a lot of late, sandwiched between Peru and, of course, Colombia. And we know all about the issues taking place. The violence which has been. Well, what can you say about the violence here? It's the murder rate has gone up to around 40 murders per 100,000 people, the highest in the country's history, making Ecuador one of the most violent in Latin America. Of course, it's been just over a hundred days since President Noboa has been elected in and of course, he came in on, well, a promise to reduce violence and get Ecuador back on the right track. Perhaps we'll start with you, Ivan, there. How did we get to this point with Ecuador so often, perhaps lazily described as a remanso or a seat of peace up in this area of northern Latin America?

Ivan Briscoe: Thank you very much, Richard. It's a pleasure to be with you. But you're exactly right. The shocking, most shocking aspect of what's happened to Ecuador is exactly that abrupt transformation. This has happened over the period of four or five years. A decade ago, Ecuador had a really quite low murder rate compared to other Latin American countries. Compared to its neighbors, it had previously slightly higher rates, but it had never had a large guerrilla insurgency. It had never had any of the sort of cartels which you'd seen in Colombia and in Mexico. It had never been a center for drug production, for example. In fact, it had been very careful to avoid coca production, which took place primarily in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, of course. So for all those reasons, that was why it was described as a remanso de paz. But the process of becoming a criminal center capital, if you like, had begun years back and really started to explode in about 2018, 2019. And there are a variety of reasons which I'm sure we can look into with these things. And one of the most important structurally is the movement of trafficking routes for drugs to the Pacific and to Ecuador in particular as one of the best areas to get into the Pacific Sea trade through its ports. So I think if we're looking at the nerve center of Ecuador's transformation to what it's become today, we have to look at the Pacific coastline and we have to look at towns like Manta, Guayaquil, where the ports are, have become areas in which criminal groups can make hay, contaminate, as they say, containers shipping very large volumes of goods into European and North American markets. Remember that Ecuador is one of the world's biggest exporters of shrimps, one of the world's biggest exporters of bananas, if not the leader, a very big exporter of tuna and other goods. And these are willingly accepted as legitimate trade by markets, rich user markets in the West. And it's through that trade that Ecuador is also allowed, enabled to carry such large amounts of drugs. So I think that is the process which we're looking at and tied to that is, of course, the after effects of the Colombian peace accord of 2016. It was the movement, as it were, of the center of gravity of the drug export activity from Colombia to Ecuador. Not all of it, obviously. Colombia mains a very important platform for drug exports from the Atlantic coast. But there's no doubt that with the FARC disbanding, demobilizing, the Ecuadorian groups stepped up and turned what was Effectively, until about 2016, 2017, no more than an occasional sight for logistic help, for the odd drug transaction into one of the biggest superhighways for the movement of drugs out of Latin America.

Richard McColl: So as we talk about this, as, you know, a transshipment point, and of course, you've mentioned the fallout from the 2016 peace accord with the FARC. Laeldis, perhaps you could give us a bit more of. I know, a bit more information on the ground. How was it that the criminal groups were able to penetrate Ecuador so easily?

Glaeldys Calanche: Well, thanks so much, Richard, for the invitation. Well, in parallel to this process that Ivan mentioned, this shift in the regional drug business that moved towards Ecuador domestically, these local groups have been operating in the country and they have been linked to other types of criminal organizations. But when this shift happened, they managed to associate with transnational criminal outlets such as Colombian groups and Mexican groups, and insert themselves into this chain, into the supply chain and offer somehow a service for them that they can manage to do in the country. And I would also like to point out that another factor that has driven violence associated with the drug business is that up until 2020, there was one big group that was. That was in control of the business, that gave the guidelines of what had to be done. And this group, Los Choneros, worked alongside smaller groups or smaller factions that they had a separate operation, but they worked together. So operation was very pacific in that way because they were all working for a common goal. They were all working in very similar guidelines. But when their historical leader was assassinated in late 2020, these groups did not comply with the new leadership of Fito, which is the criminal and the main leader that escaped from prison in early January. And so after this moment, these smaller factions broke with Los Choneros and they started to rival with this big group full of for coveted spaces, such as port access and access to rivers and also prison spaces within the prisons. And so that's also one of the biggest triggers of these, of violence between these criminal groups, which accounts for more than 90% of the violence in the country. This kind of turf war between these groups trying to. Trying to gain or take some of the spaces that Los Choneros historically had. So right now there are currently two big criminal structures. We have Los Choneros, which is still one of the biggest groups, and their operations date back to the 90s. And we have another faction that has been referred to as the anti-Choneros. So this dynamic between both structures is the one that's driving violence in the country. And that has been a turning point of this was 2020, when this leader was assassinated.

Richard McColl: So you have the Choneros and the anti-Choneros. And so this is where the government's efforts are going. How much can we point back to? As far back as President Correa when he sort of said under no uncertain circumstances, the US would need to withdraw their surveillance sectors. I think it was in Manta, if I'm not mistaken, their radars and their drug enforcement agency from Ecuador. Either one of you who wants to jump in on that one?

Ivan Briscoe: I can say something about that, Richard, because this is an issue which does come up, but I don't think I can give you a definitive answer because the versions you hear from very senior Ecuadorians on different sides of the anti-Correa divide are radically different. And it's very difficult to get a clear line on it clearly from the US security establishment. You tend to hear the opinion that without the Manta Forward operating base, which was disbanded in 2010, Ecuador lost its capacity to track and seize drug shipments. It's not as clear as that there was still a strong relationship between Ecuadorian authorities and the DEA and other drug authorities, there were still very large confiscations of drugs years later. It wasn't the end of counter narcotic policy by any means. And in fact, from senior members of the former Correa administration, you hear some extremely critical remarks about what was going on in Manta and in fact wasn't serving its purposes at all. And you do have large US bases in other countries where there are still significant trafficking flows. I'm thinking of Honduras in particular, so I don't think you can say that's the end of it. I think what you did see under Correa was a gradual penetration of crime into different parts of society. And one of the main reasons for that was the money laundering. Because Ecuador has been a dollarized country since the year 2000. And so it's very easy for criminal groups to take their dollars and park it somewhere in an ailing business in Guayaquil or elsewhere and cover up their earnings. And with money laundering you started, and of course the occasional drug shipment, you started to see gradually the formation of stronger, more consolidated criminal groups. Glaeldys has just spoken about the Choneros, perhaps the most important criminal faction in Ecuador, named after Chone, which is a town in the province of Manabí, the people of Chone, as it were. And that was emerging in the early 2000s. From what we know, from the people I've spoken to recently in Ecuador, it started off apparently as effectively a criminal group devoted to robbing trucks on highways and then moved into drugs. And then of course began through the prisons to become, through their presence in prisons to become an important criminal influence. So all of this would not have been, as it were, the attention, in the attention of the Manta base. Anyway, I think looking at the US as maybe the safeguard which then was removed and no longer existed and Ecuador went wrong is a very simplistic explanation. I think there are a lot of other things going on in a slow burn process and then a fast burn process, because Glaeldys has mentioned this increased criminal rivalry. The other side of that was the state dismantled some of its own defences under severe conditions of economic crisis, under a process of political change. And I think when you speak to former state, very high up in the armed forces or the police, they will tell you we are, we took our eye off the ball, basically, and that was absolutely crucial too.

Richard McColl: So this is very interesting because you moved into the question of prisons and we know that these gangs, as in so many Places are run straight out of the prisons. I saw the other day a an opinion, a poll taken on Noboa's president. Nobody. Well, I would say popularity coming out. He's got 79% trust. 56% of those polled think that he's on the right track. And 52% of those poll believes that Ecuador has improved. And of course you know Noboa's security plans. I mean they seek to assert military control over the borders, the ports, create a centralized intelligence hub, equip law enforcement as you suggested had been, you know, they take the eye off the ball and the making the construction on two maximum security prisons in both the Amazon and on the Pacific coast to be handled by the same Mexican Salvadorian consortium that bought a new jail, that built a new jail in El Salvador. I couldn't help myself. I do have to bring in Bukele. It is all the rage to discuss President Bukele of El Salvador because of his extreme tactics in let's say, I mean, I guess you could say pacifying El Salvador as far as it goes. What do you say, Glaeldys, to the people out there who said yes, that's what Ecuador needed. We need to build more prisons, we need to jail as many gang members as possible. Is this something that he is doing, President Noboa is doing? Do you see it as a success story?

Glaeldys Calanche: Well, the only element that's proving success so far is a mild reduction of homicides. And I think that's what the Noboa government is focusing on reducing homicide rates. It went from 44 to at least 39. And so they're working towards that. And that means controlling prisons, controlling prison access and also try to dismantle these different groups, which we didn't mention that after the violent incidents of early January, the government declared a state of exception and then recognized the existence of an armed conflict. So they identified 22 groups as terrorists or enemies of the armed forces. So efforts are being put towards that. And I think Noboa or the comparison with Bukele has come up recurrently, but he has distanced himself from that approach. He has said that what he's doing in Ecuador, it responds to another nature of criminality. We're not talking about street gangs or the maras that they have in El Salvador. We're talking about local groups that are linked with drug trafficking and with international groups. And so the nature of the enemy is definitely different. And also the policies or this iron fist policy that has been tried to put in the same or trying to put that they're in the same track. But there are some differences. When the government declared their plan for building these high security prisons, I don't think the people really went into the detail of seeing how they were going to because the prisons in El Salvador are for a capacity of 30,000 inmates. And the prisons that are intended to be built in Ecuador are really small, but therefore around 700 inmates. And so there are very big differences. I don't think the plan in Ecuador or the site is and let's try to do this mass incarceration of people and put everyone in that belong in these groups in prison. And I do think that approach will be counterproductive because we have seen in the past in the country that has been something that previous governments have turned to like the violence and crime is rising. So let's try to do this mass incarceration policies. But what they have done is actually strengthen these groups within the prisons. It's where they have their stronghold and they make more people who are maybe not even part of the group insert themselves in these groups. So it's actually fueling violence in the long term, in the medium and long term, and it's giving these groups more power. So I think this approach has to be carefully looked at because it has proved to actually or in one or two years to boost these groups ranks, to boost their power, to extend their influence when these people leave the prisons. And so I think that's an element that's important to highlight. Since the beginning of the operations in the context of the armed conflicts, more than 11,000 people have been detained. And the prison population until then was around 31,000. And we don't know if they have been detained and then released. So the levels of this circulation of people going into prison and then leaving, there's also a figure of pre trial detention which works against this. And people can remain in prison and even up to two years without even facing a trial, or without facing any type of offense, or without even being able to know why they are even detained. So I think that's something that the government is working on to see how after doing these raids and putting so many people in prisons to see how they will arrange in the prison system these different groups. Because that's also an element that's driving violence, the war of these groups among the spaces of prisons. And last week I attended a virtual event in which the Minister of Interior was talking about the advances and the progress that has been made. And she admitted that the control of prison is still not achieved. She said that it has been the hardest part of the policy of the plan to do, and I have seen that inmates have managed to escape. So I think this element of controlling prison is the priority, but there's still knowledge of the challenges that they face in the immediate term and in the long term and when the armed forces will have to leave the spaces because they're currently in control. And what happens when the institution that is in charge of controlling the prisons actually take charge, which is also very. Faces allegations of corruption. So all of this is being talked about and discussed, and I think there are very different elements that separate these two examples of El Salvador and Ecuador.

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Richard McColl: Yeah, I think again, they should be definitely kept apart, but there's obviously the inevitable comparison made. It's inevitable because we're this side of the world. It sort of just lumped it together. Oh, yeah, they're unruly. Again, I think I'd like to just highlight for our listeners that this is the first time, once again, something you said. Glaeldys is the first time in Ecuadorian history that the government officials have declared an internal armed conflict. I think that's. We need to keep coming back to that because aside from Colombia, it's the only country in Latin America with an officially acknowledged conflict. I mean, this kind of terminology, this kind of, I mean, a declaration is very important and incredibly important down the line, as you say, when they need to start withdrawing the armed for and putting, let's say, the regular establishment entities into controlling, as you say, everything hinging on the government's ability to regain full control of the prisons. What happens when the prison authorities come back in? And this leads me to something I've read from Ecuadorian intelligence suggesting that thousands of troops and police officers collude with these criminal groups. Indeed, these bans permeate public institutions at all levels, implicating current and former judges, police officers, prison guards, lawyers, mayors, and even former national assembly deputies. So this web of influence may have been laid bare a little bit. Well, at least in the past case, the Metástasis case, which uncovered a systemic systematic plan to secure impunity for indicted subjects. But how on earth do you unravel all of this? Because this seems totally key with these weak state and institutions. Ivan. It's a tough one, but It's. It just seems to me that this is absolutely key.

Ivan Briscoe: The Metástasis case is at the heart of it. There's. There's no doubt about it. And can I just say a few words about this Metástasis case, because it's extremely important. It was in many ways one of the triggers of the violence in January, but it also, as you said, it laid bare the problems that the Ecuadorian state are going to have. This was an investigation based largely on the phone, cell phone records of a drug trafficker, a drug trafficking enabler who was supposedly killed in jail late in 2022. Leandro Norero, who had links with various drug gangs. His precise loyalties were difficult to identify, so I won't go into that. But he seemed to have been one of the rivals to the Choneros. It's uncle. Anyway, in this investigation unveiled in the middle of December by the Attorney General, a very valiant lady called Diana Salazar, there were over 30 arrest warrants issued. One of them was for Pablo Ramirez, the former head of the Prison Service. And another one was for Wilman Terán, the head of the National Judicial Council in charge of overseeing all judges in the country. Just to give you an idea of the dimensions of the alleged state complicity with crime, these were people who'd been named and mentioned and alluded to or somehow involved in the calls coming in and out of Leandro Norero's phone. This is absolutely crucial. The Prison Service is in the condition it is today, which Glaeldys has described very well, because of the collusion of prison authorities and prison guards, and also the terror and intimidation, of course, of criminal gangs. But when we know from the prisons, which have been entirely militarized today, that there are still people escaping regularly, then obviously there are still some loopholes which are very difficult to control. The judicial system seems regularly to let drug traffickers go in ways which are highly suspicious and which, again, are a part of the plata o plomo dynamic, as it were. The criminal groups threaten judges and prosecutors. Remember that the prosecutor who was handed the case, the investigation in January into the criminal armed occupation of that television and channel in Guayaquil, in those images which went all around the world, which everybody saw in every place, that prosecutor was killed a week or so later, 20 shots in his car. So, I mean, that's part of the dynamic. It's absolutely awful. But so how do you deal with, how do you put into practice a coherent, robust security policy when at various stages, at various parts, in the system of law enforcement, of judicial prosecution, of state officials doing their job, that people can be corrupted. And this I think is, if I may come back to the issue of Bukele is a fundamental difference from El Salvador. It's the extreme wealth of the Ecuadorian criminal groups. I mean, the estimates we've heard of that, the earnings of the main Ecuadorian criminal groups are now $500 million a year, way in excess of what El Salvador's gangs would earn. So their capacity to corrupt and along with that, the firepower which they have gained through that money and through their contacts with the Mexican and Colombian and Albanian and supposedly Russian criminal underworld, the international drug trafficking rings, that capacity gives them a huge power. And so what is the state doing? Well, the state is taking various measures. There's no doubt there's a vote coming up, a referendum in April on various measures and one of them will be whether Ecuadorians can be extradited, obviously with a view to sending them to the United States as Colombia does, en masse so that they can be imprisoned there and tried there and probably more safe conditions there. There is the, obviously there is, you know, there's the plan to, you know, increase state earnings through the increase in value added tax which appears to be going ahead so that there's more money to put in the security forces. But it's also interesting to see what they're not doing because that's almost as relevant. And one of the things that they're not doing with particular urgency, it seems, is trying to locate and arrest the two criminal leaders who went, who escaped at the start of January. I'm talking about Fito, Adolfo Macías, the head of the Choneros, and Fabricio Colón Pico, the head of Los Lobos. And the Lobos were very much involved both in killing the presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio last year and in the uprising early in January. Why are they not going after those two? Because the risks of bringing them into prisons, of them bring into intimate connection with prison guards, police officials, judicial officials are very high. So I think there's an understanding in the Ecuadorian state that they are playing with fire and they cannot trust the entirety of the security forces at their disposal to do the job they need to do. They need to move carefully and strategically and it's certainly not easy.

Richard McColl: This is actually a terrifying, it's a terrifying image that you're painting there. The inability to do anything about the leaders of those two groups, I think. And what of. I know that there's there, as you say, this referendum coming up is this the one also to include US Military on the ground?

Glaeldys Calanche: No. That was part of an agreement that was reached with Guillermo Lasso and that began put him to place the earlier February.

Richard McColl: Okay, yeah. So I need to put this into context then with let's. Let's say President Noboa's. How long has he got left in his term? That's the other thing I see as a very big stumbling block. When are the elections due? Because of course he could only be in charge for the length remaining of Lasso's term. So when are we looking at elections in Ecuador, Please?

Glaeldys Calanche: To mention the popular consultation that has to take place 21st April and that has faced a big backlash by other political forces because there's also a topic of the fight of how is the. This is going to be financed. And they see that this will require a lot of resources that can be put for other things and to sustain the military operations. And as for the presidential and legislative elections and they're expected to be held early next year in February, the first round. And I think that this the remaining of this year and we will see the tensions rise because it will be an electoral contest and so we will see the competition. And nobody also has ambitions to participate in the election and for his political group also to participate in the legislative election. So we will have to see this next months how this will play out and how it will also affect the alignments that we or the very fragile alliance that we see that is in place right now with other political groups, mainly with the Correísmo to advance in this security policies. So I think this will. Or the time or the factor that this government is working against time. And it's also looking to have a next term, to have five more years. And so it also has to weigh that in. And what can they do to have popular backing of their candidacies ahead of the election?

Richard McColl: Yeah, I presume. I mean for the time being there's like as you say, an uneasy and uneasy agreement. But then the Coreista candidate, whoever is going to come in and make as much noise as possible if there aren't wins being, you know, noted down in the Noboa side of things. So do you think he's on the right path, Ivan, or do you think it's just more complexities ahead for.

Ivan Briscoe: I mean, there is clearly a honeymoon at the moment. There was a honeymoon when he took power. It didn't last very long, but he's Recovered it. And he's extremely popular at the moment because he's acting in a very concrete way. As Glaeldys said, violence seems to have receded a little bit, certainly from the levels we saw early in January. There's a sense that again, there's a great applause for the military for the massive detentions. Thousands of people have been detained as part of Plan Phoenix. The sense that there is now a president determined to take this issue on and he's not tarnished with the same brush as Guillermo Lasso, his previous president, who declared over a dozen states of exception and which achieved very little indeed. The move to declare an internal armed conflict, although it isn't really an internal armed conflict, and although these really aren't belligerent groups in the classical sense, it gave, it galvanized the military and the police in a way that we haven't seen before. But I think the challenges are immense. I don't think it's going to be such plain sailing for Noboa. And I think this popularity, which seems, as it were, to draw on the similar numbers from Bukele, is based on really thin ice, actually, because we could see that, we could easily see crime going back up again. There's always the risk that people close to him could be found to be corrupt or to be themselves involved in the drug trade, for all those reasons I mentioned earlier. And let's be honest about it, Noboa comes from a very wealthy family, very deeply involved in the banana trade. And I think we have to be honest that there are people he knows who are close to him, not necessarily in his family, but in his family circle that are probably involved in the drug trade as well. So there are lots of very explosive issues. And of course there's the classic political divide in Ecuador. There's the Correa’s party, Revolución Ciudadana its desire, desperate desire to get back into power somehow. And maybe one day it will find a winning formula, which it hasn't succeeded in doing recently. And so there are all those risks. It's not going to be straightforward for Noboa at all. That said, he does seem to have the goodwill of the people and he has, as you said, a flimsy but somehow political coalition in the national assembly which seems to be surviving somehow, which managed to approve his tax increases, which is unusual in a Latin American country, that there is such cross party approval for these measures. It wasn't easy. So I think for now the luck is with him.

Richard McColl: Well, I know. May it last. If this is going in the Right direction. I have. I just, I see it. So again, as I said, the word complexity is coming back into it when everything is so permeated with this corruption. And I'm absolutely, I'll put this out there. I'm absolutely certain that someone within the circle will be implicated for alleged connections. I'm being very careful how I'm putting this. I'm not going to name anyone or anything, but someone will come out. You know, the Guayaquil families involved in the banana trades and everything else out there. I had one final question to you both out there. We talk about the drugs coming in from Colombia and of course to an extent from Peru. Is there actual coca production taking place in Ecuador as well? Either one.

Glaeldys Calanche: As we mentioned in the beginning, the Ecuador plays a role more in terms of transit and storage. But in the last few years, and there's really no monitoring of this and no reporting of the crops in Ecuadorian territory. But there has been some information released and also from Colombia that crops have moved into Ecuadorian territory and in this border with Colombia and in Nariño, Putumayo in that area. But also that they have seen an increase in laboratories for refining coca in Ecuadorian territory. And I think apart from the increase or slight increase in crops in Ecuador, and I think that the existence of more laboratories in Ecuador is really the most important element. And not only in the border, they have found laboratories in cities, in Quito, in Guayaquil. That gives us a bigger image of how these groups have expanded their operations and into urban areas. It's very different to what happens in Colombia where these groups mainly operate in rural spaces. In Ecuador, it's in cities, in communities that are part of cities and urban areas. So the dynamic is very different and it also affects more communities, impoverished communities that live there and that basically some of them live hostage. And some groups that have a very good stronghold of these communities there.

Richard McColl: Yeah, very difficult that. Very difficult indeed if that we see a shift in that dynamic. But I think this is an excellent place to bring this conversation. Truly enlightening and. Well, just I would say, you know, to talk to two people of your. Of your caliber about such an issue that is. That is in the news, but risks falling off the news because of course, you know, whatever else is going on in the region and in the world, it is so important to keep this up there and to explain what is going on. So let me take this moment. Say thank you so much to Ivan Briscoe, who is the program director for Latin America and the Caribbean at Crisis Group. And of course, Glaeldys González Calanche. Thank you. She's a fellow at the Crisis Group as well. Here in Bogotá, Ivan Briscoe in London, thank you both for, well, sharing your time and bottomless knowledge on this topic.

Ivan Briscoe: Richard, it's been a pleasure. Thank you.

Glaeldys Calanche: Thank you so much, Richard.

Richard McColl: It's been an absolute pleasure. I've been Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia. This has been The LatinNews Podcast. Thank you everyone for listening. Subscribe and share. And we'll be back in a fortnight with further topics from the region. Thank you and goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.LatinNews.com.

Dr. Jacqueline Jiménez Polanco holds a degree in law and a Ph.D. in political Science. She is also an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at Bronx Community College, CUNY. Dr. Jiménez Polanco’s research interests range from Dominican politics and women’s political representation to the LGBTIQ movement, both in the Dominican Republic and in the U.S. Her latest research project, “Dominican Americans and the Politics of Empowerment”, will examine the emergence and maturation of Dominican political representation in the U.S. This project will rely on archival collections housed in the CUNY DSI Dominican Archives—the Anthony Stevens-Acevedo Collection, the Bienvenido Lara Flores Collection, and the Dominicans 2000 Collection. These will allow Jiménez Polanco to examine the early participation of Dominicans in U.S. politics, their links with political organizations in the Dominican Republic, and the effects of grassroot activism in the formation of the traditional and contemporary Dominican political leadership in the U.S. Jiménez Polanco will also interview Dominican political leaders and campaign advisors and examine data collected by Dominicanos USA (DUSA). Jiménez Polanco’s research will be the first to tackle the incursion of Dominicans into U.S. electoral politics by examining archival materials produced by community and cultural activists.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Your host, Richard McColl here in Bogota, Colombia. I have a very special guest on the line here, Dr. Jacqueline Jimenez Polanco. She's from the Dominican Republic. She is the associate professor of sociology of the Social Science department at the Bronx Community College, the City University of New York. Author of many books about the Dominican Republic, but we'll mention a few here. Dominican politics in the 21st century. Continuity and Change Divagaciones dos un antojia de mujeres Dominicanas Lesbianas Bisexualis y Queer. That is anthology by Dominican lesbian, bisexual and queer women. And she has a forthcoming book for this year, 2024. Dominican politics. Immigrants, activists and politicians.

Richard McColl: Welcome on The LatinNews Podcast.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Thank you. Thank you so much, Richard, for having me here.

Richard McColl: It's an absolute pleasure because we kind of ending, I would say, series one of The LatinNews Podcast and the Dominican Republic is yet to be covered on this series. The final major country in the region that we haven't dealt with. And it's nice to wind this up with what I believe is a success story. The Dominican Republic since the 1960s, later mid-1960s, has had a long standing democratic process and has been working diligently, let's say, in terms of the region. In cracking down on official corruption. Perhaps you could put us into context.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Well, Basically, well, the 1960s was a very convoluted experience for Dominicans because after the assassination of Trujillo, the country has a political instability that drove to a Civil War in 1965. And that Civil war was for the restitution of Juan Bosch's presidency. That was the first democratic government we had in 1962 up to 1962, for only seven long months, seven short months, I would have to say. But Dominicans believe in democracy and they wanted democracy to be reestablished. And after the civil war, they have an election that was not a pure election, so forth, because Joaquín Balaguer, who came into power, was Trujillo's puppet and he established a semi authoritarian regime during 12 years of presidency.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: But in 1978, through the first democratic wave in Latin America and the Caribbean, Dominicans actually went into this democratic process and they have the first elections at the time that brought up the democratic experience that we are living until today. Very stable democracy we have never have. Dominicans have never had any sort of attack or attempt at the destruction of democracy, despite the fact that the beginning in 1978 was a little bit conflicted because there were sectors that didn't want the democratic system to be established. But anyhow, the democracy has been very stable. What I can say is that the Dominican people like democracy. And when I was a young student, that I was already a lawyer, graduated from law school and decided to go to Spain to pursue my PhD, I basically believe that Dominicans were more democratic than their leaders.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: So basically, it's the Dominican people that push for the democratic change. And it has been tested through how all these years. For example, the corruption experience that has been a long established system in the Dominican Republic was turned down by Marcha Verde. That was a democratic movement that took place during two years, 2017 and 2018, through the participation of Dominicans from all works of life, but particularly young people, millennials and centennials and representatives representative of women, indigenous, anti racist, LGBTQA organizations, scholars, journalists, all kind of people that participated in that march that has the country mobilized deeply for two years against corruption and impunity. So as you can see, the Marcha Verde was the first mobilization, strong mobilization toward this end. But before that, Dominicans mobilized for the 4% in education through Marcha Maria.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: That was a yellow march that drove to the increase to 4% of the gross national product for education. And also there are other kind of movements in the Dominican Republic that are very active towards the preservation of the natural environment against anti Haitian and anti racist politics, pro LGBTQA, civil rights and full citizenship, women of color, Afro descendants that are being struggling for the recognition of full citizenship to people of color. And also the women's movement pro abortion and against domestic violence. So as you can see, it's a country that is very much involved in what happens on the daily life. But all these expressions are peaceful expressions, different from what happened in Chile and what happened in other parts of Latin America. Marcha Verde was a very peaceful one. And also there was the Plaza de la Bandera. That was the flag.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: That is where we have the flags of different countries of the Dominican Republic. That is a very symbolic center surrounded by the highest courts, in which young people expressed their rejection towards corruption during the municipal elections that took place in 2016. So as you can see, it's a very mobilized country. And I have my own theory for my new book that is that Dominican Americans have acquired very important political position in the United States, despite the fact that many Dominicans that came here in the 60s, they came as tourists, therefore they became undocumented but they took advantage of community organizations where they didn't need a green card or a citizenship to become involved in the community.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And through that community involvement, they develop a leadership that called the attention of major parties, particularly the Democratic Party, that actually recognized that Dominicans could gain votes, could gain money to support the campaigns, and were very well organized. And that comes from their origins and from a land that has been historically very mobilized. If you go to the Dominican Republic and you take public transportation, people will be all the time talking about political and social issues. And you will get. You will get involved into that conversation, despite your will, because of the vibrant world that Dominican talks about those sorts of issues. Of course, they talk about baseball, that is the national, but they talk about politics a lot. So it's a very politicized society, very mobilized, which has influenced also the mobilization of Dominicans in the diaspora.

Richard McColl: I think that point about the Dominicans in the diaspora, the Dominicans in the United States being so organized and this, I would say this fluid relationship then between those in the United States and those in the Dominican Republic and how important that is. But you say it's a very politicized community, but it's not polarized then.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Well, it's not polarized because traditionally Dominicans believe in the Dominican Republic in the strength of political parties. It is like they terribly believe what we say in democratic theories, that without political parties that are not stable democracies and in the Dominican Republic, the people involved both in community activism and in political parties activism as well. So the engagement is strong and the belief in those parties is strong. So Dominicans are very critical of their political parties, but at the same time, they're very supportive of party politics. So different from, for example, what happened in Peru with Fujimori that came out of the blue riding a truck and all of a sudden became the national leader. These kind of things do not happen in the Dominican Republic because they participate through parties.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And traditionally there have been several political parties that have been going on for many years. For example, the prd, Dominican Revolutionary Party, was founded by Juan Bosch in Cuba in 1931. All right, the PRSC, or PR, Partido Reformista Social Cristiano was founded by Balaguer before his tenure, his presidency in the 1960s. And then the PLD, Dominican Liberation Party was founded in the 1970s by Juan Bosch when he detached himself from the PRD. So what do you have now? The parties that are in existence now are nothing more and nothing less than a renewal or sort of also Continuation of previous parties with new names. For example, the current Luis Abinader party is the Modern Revolutionary Party. It came out from a division of the prd, right. So now it's Partido Revolutionario Moderno more than Revolutionary Party.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: That is actually something that has been very typical in the Dominican Republic is the decision of bodies. They split out for any sort of this dissatisfaction between the leaders and they form a new party that become strong, sometimes as strong as the previous one. For example, Leonel Fernández Party, Fuerza del Pueblo People's Force comes from the pld, the Liberation, the Dominican party, Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana, of which Leonel Fernandez was the leader. Dissatisfaction with Danilo Medina, that was the other leader, drove him to form a new party, the People's Force Party. And in some occasions, like in these cases, because there is a technicality for the formation of new parties, it's not an easy thing to do to get the approval of the electoral board for the formation of new parties.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: So what they do is that they use the platform of all small parties that were inactive to actually form the new mass parties, the new popular parties. So in actuality we have the Dominican Revolutionary Party, Dominican Modern Party, Patido Revolutionary Moderno, Modern Dominican Party, Luis Savina there, People's Force, Puerto Fuerza del Pueblo. Fernandez is still the pld, but that has been dismantled because it has lost many of his followers to Leonel Fernández that was the former leader and was the former president of the Dominican Republic for 12 years. And reforming Social Party, that used to be Balaguer Party, that is also very small party. And prd, Dominican Revolutionary Party that also got diminished, you know, through this lead with the Modern Revolutionary Party. But in essence there are three parties competing now for the elections. Erm.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: ABenader, People's Force, PLD, these are the major parties in the history of the country. The politics has been split between either two or three parties and in some cases a four party. But that is very weak in terms of voting. So typically two or three parties. So. But at the same time there is the participation of people in many other parties that are small parties and that they go to elections. So don't expect that as it's happened in the United States, where you have only two strong parties and one small party, that this is the case in the Dominican Republic. There are many other parties. But in essence people vote for those that are more consolidated. It is like Dominicans don't like to put their votes to lose. Okay, yeah.

Richard McColl: So back the winning horse. And of Course, you have elections coming up in May. How are things panning out now?

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Well, there were municipal elections last Sunday, the day before yesterday, right, Last Sunday. And the Avenader Party, the Partido Revolutionary Moderno, Modern revolutionary party won 75% of municipalities of majorities. 75%, Which is a high percentage, right?

Richard McColl: Yes. And.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Fuerza del Pueblo, People's Force of Leonel Fernández, only 6%. And I guess the PLD get around 15 or 16% only. So most of the mayoralties are now controlled by the party that is at the top of the electoral process. You may say, well, what is the influence of gaining the municipal elections? This is very important because this is where people participate and know their representative. Right? So the Modern Revolutionary Party is expecting that this will help them to gain the elections. Besides, the President of the Dominican Republic, Luis Abinader has a very high level of credibility based on his anti corruption and anti impunity politics.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Because previous to this period, the PE led pld, Dominican Liberation Party that has been led by Leonel Fernández and Danilo Medina, had established a cartel politics style in the Dominican Republic in which the party not only controlled the state and all the major institutions in the states, including the high courts, but also became the main supplier of the state. Because the members who were original from working class families, became moguls. So he very rich business people who were the main suppliers of the state. So they were controlling business, they were controlling government. They actually established a cartel. And this cartel also applies the method that counterparties typically apply, I.e.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: To avoid the competition through the elimination of the other parties that make competition to them and also through collusion with those who won through their manipulation of the Tribunal Court as their allies for the character politics that the PLD had established for 20 long years, right? Because they go first, they go in for two periods and in total they make 21st, first four years and then 16 years all the way along. So the expectations that many people had was that this stake at third party would make it very difficult for the country to recover.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Because the Dominican people got to the point to believe that being politician was to be a thief, was to be corrupt, and that people who gained a political position were only ready to get advantage of the resources of the states for their own benefits and the benefits of the allies and followers. So Luis Abinader has transformed, and in the history of the Dominican Republic, this is a landmark, has transformed the belief that people had in politicians. Because starting with his own example, in which himself and his family, his father was a member of the PRD and also have the Dominican Alliance Party. He was a very respectful man. Elizabeth doesn't have anything to do with governmental benefits, with any sort of corruption activities and people like that.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And because of that, you see that in the municipal elections, people gave their vote to Luis Abinader's party. And because of that, Luis Abinader is actually in a position to gain over 53, perhaps even more percentage in the election. So Dominicans are ready for half. Only one round. Wow. Yeah. Because that's how high the credibility and the popularity of Luiza being out there. I give you an example that is very, I would say, very symbolic. While all the presidents in the Dominican Republic took advantage of the political power to become rich, to become wealthy, Luis Abinader decided not to receive any payment, any salary for work as a president. And he worked 12 to 14 hours a day. He's totally involved in every action of the country and every. He's very much acclaimed by new voters, licentenials and millennials.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And all members of society feel comfortable with someone that is not corrupt. So the Dominican Republic, that had been occupying a high position in terms of the most corruptive countries, of the most corrupt countries, is now occupying a good position in terms of the lack of impunity and corruption, at least the efforts that the government has been doing. Because we have to understand that corruption has been systemic. And it's not that things are going to change all of a sudden. But he took a first step was to name Miriam Germán Brito, an independent civil servant, an independent judge, as the procurator, as the Attorney General of the Dominican Republic. So that was the first important step because until now, most of the attorney generals have been, you know, subdue to the president's will.

Richard McColl: Yeah, school friends, as we had here in Colombia. But let's not. Let's not go into that. But this is interesting to me because of course, this success story on anti corruption and anti impunity is obviously these will be major campaign issues. Once again, as you said, it was systemic, these problems and I suppose institutionalized, weakening the institutions, the government institutions and the state institutions. But under Luis Abinader, it's been strengthening then. I mean, these things are happening and producing results for the Dominican people.

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Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: There are several aspects of the Dominican. And I will Call them technicalities again, but in the Dominican judiciary system, that makes things a little bit harder. The system established perhaps one decade ago, because when I was a lawyer, it didn't exist. The medida de coerción. The medida de coerción, the coercion measure is a preventive measure that allows the system, the judiciary system, to either keep people in prison or to keep them isolated from activities during a period of time that is a maximum of two years. After these two years, if the case has not been solved, the person is relieved and the process continues. That actually has this cottage a lot the expectations of the Dominicans. But it's not something that is easy to change because it's embedded in the penal code. You know, we have codification that is very old.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And basically the medida de coerción has been established to benefit those who have economic power, because they are the ones who can pay very expensive lawyers to be constantly disrupting the progress of the judgment of the suit. So as a result of that, people who were in prison, like the previous, the former procurator or attorney general, they were released. They are being judged, but they are at home. And as these people happen to be rich people, they have a good time, they cannot travel, but they still have a life. If you were a poor person, you don't have the chance to get the release, the relief, because you don't have the lawyers to actually incident the process.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And the Dominican Republic has very good incidentalist lawyers that are trained to do that and that gain a lot of money for doing that for rich people. So that coercion or measure is an obstacle for the speed of the process. But we know that happen in all capitalist system. We have the case of Donald Trump in the United States, right? So it's not that the United States can be a very good role model at that level, because capitalist societies always try to protect the rich at the expense of the poor. So that kind of measures actually effect negatively the speed of those processes. But persecution is there and it's good and it's effective. On the other side, there is a second obstacle and is the resources that the procurator has to conduct these cases.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Because in the procurator and the whole system, because there are so many hundreds and thousands of pages for every case that perhaps there is not enough people and enough time to read all those pages and to get to the conclusions of those processes. Right? Because I'm saying it's a systemic corruption. These people were committing corrupted corruption for over 20 years. So this is a second obstacle and third obstacle is that the previous administration made sure that the judges and also the procurators, the fiscales, were prone to their parties. And therefore there are still judges that are not that pure because they are linked to the pld. And there are at least the Attorney General have made sure to clean up the system. System.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: But the systemic corruption in the judiciary system made that the Escuela de la Magistratura that is the paramount institution for having a good and decent justice was also corrupted at the time. So it's something that. It's a step, the government is taking steps. But when it is going to, when is it going to be seen as something with a. Within a spectacular result, like having a politician, a corrupt politician in prison for I don't know, 30 years, that is the maximum in the Dominican Republic. We don't know when this is going, this will going to happen. But what is happening, and that's for sure is that the government is taking two steps. Number one, every corrupt person in his government from his own party is fired. First step and is not taken back.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Second, every corruption committed by people in the current government and party is also persecuted. Right? And the United States help with taking back their visas so they cannot travel to the United States. And, and this is something that is in reality important in terms of the corruption, the persecution of corruption on impunity. But systemic changes, systemic impunity take time to be removed, of course, but the.

Richard McColl: Positive, again, the positive side of this is at least these obstacles are identified and therefore a continuity in the politics could help unwind or unravel some of this a little bit, I guess with a heavily politicized citizenship and of course people very much involved in local politics. This is very positive. Again, I wanted to move on slightly though from this because obviously corruption permeates so much of all business and politics and the establishment. But again, if we look at the last 20 years, when we think of industry in the Dominican Republic, the real success story as well is tourism that I imagine it's off limits from politicians to get involved. Let the tourism industry continue to generate the big bucks for benefits for the country.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Yes, the Dominican Republic is part of an island, right? It has beautiful scenery, mountains, river, warm weather in the, in the, in the seashores and we have very cold weather, cool weather in the mountains. So people have a lot of choices to travel to the Dominican Republic. The tourism area has been developed throughout many years and the current president is also making his Big efforts to develop certain areas that were traditionally abandoned by other people government. So like in the south of the Dominican Republic that have beautiful beaches. So the tourism industry generates a lot of income to the country because generates new jobs, generates new investments and that is important. But the Dominican Republic is also a country with a high level of agriculture and that is not well known. Most of the products that Dominicans consume come from their own soil.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And this is good that doesn't happen in other islands around the area in the Caribbean. So this is something very positive and I travel to the Dominican Republic regularly and every time I see new growth, new agricultural, new items that are being produced there and in the Dominican Republic doesn't have lack of food. So that's very essential. Tourism on the other side is not only the high industry in terms of the traditional touristic areas. There are many places that have very good and very environmental tourists visits and tourist organizations that has been developed in the country for the last 20 years. Still tourism is an industry that we have to see with certain care. You know, because when there is a lot of tourists, there is a lot of garbage, there is a lot of contamination, is a lot of pollution.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: For example, the last year Dominicans received 10 million visitors. That is equal to the population of the country. So in 2023, the Dominicans visitors double the amount of the population. Is that good? Well, that's good for. In terms of money. I don't know if that is so good in terms of the protection of the natural environment. So I think natural environment is an issue that needs to be taken care of by the government. For example, there is the Punta Catalina coal-fired power plant that creates a lot of pollution. That plant that was built with the hands of corruptions of corruption and benefit certain groups during the PLD government is something that needs to be solved. Because having a coal fired power plant in the 21st century is something that is not appreciated by the people. It's not appreciated by other by ally governments.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: So I think the government has to invest more effort in cleaning the natural environment. Unfortunately, there was a minister, Orlando Jorge Mera, very decent, very serious and devoted minister that was assassinated. He was doing a very good job and because of that he was killed by someone who was a political ally and supposedly a friend of him. So. And after his assassination, of course, having someone who has so much empathy with the natural environment and who was applying the law correctly, we have a new minister who's very good as well. But I tell you, is Something that needs high level of attention from my point of view.

Richard McColl: I can understand that. Indeed, one of the first points of course, about being self sustaining in terms of an agricultural and not importing everything is a huge. A very solid base for the Dominican Republic. We do need to wind this down. But I have to finish obviously talking about Haiti, you know, sharing the same island or Hispaniola, if you want to save right back from the beginning. How is the Dominican Republic? How are people reacting to what is going on with the gang culture or the gang rule in. In Haiti at the moment?

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Yes, I am a deep fan, a big fan of studying the history of the Dominican Republic. By the way, there is a book chapter that I wrote about Santo domingo in the 1700. The sexual gender life of Santo Domingo in the 1700s that is coming also this year. And studying Las Casas for several years when I was a research assistant at the CUNY Dominican Studies Institute, I found that actually Taínos call the Dominican Republic home. And Quisqueya, that is the Taíno term, means home. Because it was mainly flat lines, a lot of valleys. In the. In the Haitian side, they call it Ayiti. That mean. Means mountains. And this is where the name Haiti comes from Ayiti. At the time, the island was entire, not divided. But the mountains mark a difference between the eastern and the west side of the island.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: So I also read that Taínos have a very good relationship with the. With the immigrants and the slaves that came from Africa during the transatlantic passage that actually started basically in. In the Hispaniola. That was the name that the Spaniards came to the colonized territory. And they form communities that rebels against Spaniards known as maroons. Los S and Africa melted very well. So the mixture of races. This is to tell you that the mixture of races is very traditional in the Dominican Republic with all immigrants from all around the world that come to the island. So and we are the result of that. However, as an effect of post colonization, we have a divided island because the French occupy the Haitian part. And the Spaniards that were the owners of the entire islands then decided to sell to seed.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: They call it secession the western part to hate to France. And that's where everything started. Particularly the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick. Those agreements were always signed in Europe because it was all about European investments and capitalist benefits. So unfortunately, the island has had this confront historical confrontation that drove to Dominicans becoming the independence from the Haitians in 1844. But then the Spaniards occupied the Dominican Republic again. And the Dominicans needed to have a second independence from Hispanias in 1863. So it's a whole story of invasions. The point is that because Haiti became the poorest nation of the Caribbean and Latin American and was abandoned by the French after its independence, because was the first independent black nation in the world, Haitians have been paying very hard for their independence and that has been. Has conducted to a process of impoverishment.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Impoverishment is a systematic poverty that Haiti has been experiencing. So the point is that there are treaties that were signed to maintain the borderlands, the artificial borderlands. But Haitians are very poor. And when you're poor and you have no resources, you cross any border in order for you to survive. And that's what Haitians have been doing. On the other side, the Dominican Republic is not a wealthy nation. It's a nation with a lot of conflicts, with a lot of problems. And one of the main problems that have been corruption has been playing an important role in the trafficking of Haitians from the Haiti side to the Dominican Republic with the involvement of the police department in that traffic. So this is a situation that has been created for a long period of time. There are smugglers that take advantage of the situation of Haitians.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: To give you an example, the vast majority of Haitian women who are pregnant are treated in Dominican hospitals and they feel comfortable with that because they don't have those resources in Haiti. So Dominicans, in essence have been very kind to Haitians in terms of the people, the relationship. When you go through the countryside, when you go, as I have done and as I do constantly, there is a good relationship between Haitians and Dominicans and there are intermarriages between the two people. So the problem is that how can you, as a country that share an island, can help solve the humongous problems that the other side has? When the colonizers, the previous colonizers, let's say France, Canada, Spain, the United States, etc. Don't do enough efforts to solve the problems of that nation. The Dominican can only do so much. And this is the situation.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: So instead of expanding the idea of Dominicans being anti Haitian, which some Dominicans are and which Dominican politicians are, we have to understand that this is a minority, particularly considered that these are the extreme right in the Dominican Republic. The Vincio Castillo, Joaquín Balaguer and all these people that were anti Haitian, but in essence Dominicans do not express anti Haitianism. Otherwise they would be fighting daily. And this is not the case. Otherwise Haitians wouldn't be fleeing from Haiti to the Dominican Republic. Because you don't want to leave your home if you are well treated to go to another home where you are bad treated. In the population of Haitians, the Dominican Republic is high.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: The other issue is how the Dominican government create the mechanisms to establish an immigration system that favor the presence of Haitians in the Dominican Republic with the respect of the human rights of those poor people. Because in essence all have to do with the fact that they are poor. Because rich Haitians have a very good life in the Dominican Republic. Very good life. And they are honors of. Of constructions, of. Of. Of investment in construction, investment in tourism. Right. So what can they do? And I. And I would like to see. To see these wealthy Haitians working with the Dominican government to help to improve the. The condition of Haitians and. And to create migratory mechanisms that protect Haitians. Anti Haitianism was expressed in the Constitutional Tribunal, the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic with that infamous case sentence or sentencia, in which Dominican.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: The Dominican Constitutional Tribunal I think is the 166,813. The Sentencia. 168 13. If I, I don't have any note in front of me now. I'm just looking at you and you see my memory that I read it. I read it entire. The entire sentencia. It is infamous. It is horrendous because. And I got totally shocked when I read it. I couldn't believe that could have been produced by Dominican judges. So they did. I was told that there were people from other country helping them to build it, but they didn't. And that infamous decision of the Constitutional Court actually affected the return of many Haitians to Haiti or even though they have been living there for several decades and have established. Have. Have raised roots in the Dominican Republic. That was terrible.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: And this is something that has marked the trajectory of the Dominican Republic and affected the. I don't know, the repatriation. Repatriation of people that has nothing to do with Haiti because they were in the Dominican Republic for such a long time. They have their children there. Yeah, that was during the previous government. That decision was taken on the PLD presidency and the Pl. The Pella desk judges. So this is something. Yeah, that is very sad.

Richard McColl: Yeah. As I said, I mean, plenty. Plenty to work on, plenty to do in the Dominican Republic. I think this is an ideal place to bring our conversation to a close. And we have really been informed as to what's going on in the Dominican Republic through your interventions on this conversation. And I'd just like to say thank you so much to Dr. Jacqueline Jimenez Polanco, the associate professor of sociology at the Social Sciences Department at the Bronx Community College, the City University of New York. It has been revelatory, really, talking about this, the elections, the work on corruption and impunity, the issues with tourism and, of course, the environment, and nothing less than Haiti alongside.

Richard McColl: And some of the issues in that, I would say that constitutional sentence, as you said, which obviously is very damaging for Haitians wishing to return to their homeland from the Dominican Republic. So let me take this time to, if you can, see if you could check out her books, Dr. Jacqueline Jimenez Polanco, Dominican Politics in the 21st Century, Continuity and Change, Divagaciones dos Una antolojia de Mujeres Dominicanas Lesbianas, Bisexuality Queer Anthology by Dominican Lesbian, Bisexual and Queer Women and her forthcoming book, Dominican American Politics Immigrants, activists and politicians. Dr. Jacqueline Jimenez Polanco, thank you so much for your time on The LatinNews Podcast.

Dr. Jacqueline Polanco: Thank you so much for having me here, Richard. It has been my pleasure.

Richard McColl: An absolute pleasure is mine. And to the listeners of The LatinNews Podcast, please, of course, subscribe and share. And we'll be back in another fortnight with further interviews about the region. Thank you and goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.

Martin Weinstein was a member of the Political Science Department from 1971-2010. An internationally recognized expert on the politics of Uruguay, Dr. Weinstein did his undergraduate work at Columbia College, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from New York University.

The recipient of two Fulbright awards, he authored two books and dozens of articles on Uruguayan politics, U.S.-Latin American relations and human rights in the hemisphere. In 2003, his former student, Michael Perry, established the Martin Weinstein Scholarship to honor his role as a teacher and mentor.

Dr. Weinstein continues to travel frequently to Uruguay and Argentina and is currently working on a biography/festschrift of his mentor, Dr. Kalman Silvert. His most recent publication is a review of Intellectuals and Leftist Parties in Uruguay, 1958-2006: Frustrated Dialogue by Stephen Gregory which appeared in the May 2011 issue of Hispanic American Historical Review. He will be teaching a course on Latin America for the Osher Institute for Lifelong Learning (OLLI) in the Berkshires of Western Massachusetts in the fall of 2012.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm your host, Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia, and my very special guest this week is up in New York. It's the emeritus professor of Political science of the University William Paterson University, New Jersey, Martin Weinstein, a recognized expert on all things related to Uruguay, author of at least a dozen books and hundreds of articles about the country. But most the ones I know are Uruguay, the politics of Failure and democracy at a crossroads. Professor MARTIN thank you so much for coming on The LatinNews Podcast and for sharing your knowledge of Uruguay, a lesser known country, if I dare say it, from South America.

Professor Weinstein: It's my pleasure. It's sort of an adopted second home.

Richard McColl: Well, and what a wonderful adopted second home to have. Let's, let's jump right in, Professor. Let's, let's talk about, well, democracy today and a bit of the historic background in Uruguay.

Professor Weinstein: Yes, well, Uruguay was conceived in an extraordinarily unique manner. It was actually one of the few countries in the world who was not a signatory to the documents that made it an independence country. The British made sure of that because they needed to do something to stop the rivalry between the Brazilians and the Argentines on the Rio de la Plata. The British knew that if they could keep it safe and open, it would be a great point of access for trade with South America. So they had the two grand party sit down and created a treaty which created the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. Now why is it called the Oriental Republic? Everyone just refers it to it as Uruguay. But that's its official name. It's its official name and all UN procedures, etc. It really refers to the fact that it was this small part of the geographic extension of Brazil right next to Argentina on Rio de la Plata. It was the eastern shore of the Rio de la Plata and hence Oriental. Anyway, moving on. Uruguay had its usual caudillos and civil war kind of fights in the 19th century, mostly goaded on by the Brazilians. And the Argentine were still vying to have more control, if not direct control, but really call the shots for this small country, cousin to the south of one of them and to the east of the other one. Uruguay's game really changed when a remarkable man named José Batlle y Ordóñez, who ran the major newspaper and was quite an intellectual, quite an entrepreneur, became president in 1903-1907. And then again from 1911 to 1914, he was enamored of French socialism. So he had a vision of, he said, we may be a small country, so we'll have small advanced laws. And his idea. And his idea was, look, we're so small, why don't we set up corporations for electricity, for the railroads? And this was his vision. And by. Even though he was Not President after 1914, he dominated Uruguayan politics and his party dominated and controlled the Congress. And so Uruguay, by 1929 had set up an enormous number of state corporations. And to have the opposition buy in it was co participation. The dominant party, the Colorado Party, would have, let's say, four seats on all the boards of these public entities, but the opposition would get three seats. So they early on developed this kind of code in Uruguay where everything could be negotiated and the spoils could be divided. But it wasn't just spoils. It was the idea that, all right, where does our money come from? It comes from the export of the wool and the meat. Thank God for England. What England did by making Argentina its principal supplier, it added Uruguay was just a small appendix exporting the same things. But population difference was such that the impact on Uruguay, especially with a leadership that wanted to use that money to build schools and hospitals and roads and run these state corporations, led to a remarkable amount of civil development, democratic discourse, and a decent lifestyle for much of the population. And Montevideo, the capital of the country, became sort of an oversized head of the whole country because half the population has lived in the capital of Montevideo, the city and the department, like we would call it, either a county or a state. And so that's where everything was, and that's where all the games were played. But the secret rule, not so secret was the countryside was left in the hands of large landowners, large cattle owners, and they weren't threatened by, you know, we're going to take it away. Even though country was socialistic, they simply had to pay large export duties to get that stuff to England and elsewhere. And the government used that money for development. What changed for Uruguay? And I'm going to fast forward now to the 1940s and early 50s. Uruguay had a boom again. And, you know, after a slowdown in the Depression, the whole world had that situation. Uruguay had a very good period in the 40s and early 50s, compliments of a world war and the Korean War. What got Uruguay into trouble after that was they never adjusted to the changing world after World War II and Korea. In other words, Britain had started using Australia and New Zealand and some of its other colonies for a lot of its imports. And the Uruguayans and the Argentines also never really adjusted quickly or rapidly to this changing nature of international commerce. So Uruguay, this, Switzerland of South America, as it was named, and it wasn't named that for the mountains, it was named that for the peace and the banking system and whatever else you want to call it, fell into a really, a period of really little or no growth, a period of tremendous stagnation, which unfortunately led in 1973 to a coup by the military. And that coup was part of the virus, I'll call it a virus that was affecting Latin America in that period. It started In Brazil in 64, it spread. And by the time the coup took place in Uruguay, the Uruguayan generals were simply just. And they were never forced. They, the typical military officer would take their uniform off before they went home. They didn't wear it on the bus, et cetera. When the military took over in Uruguay, it was June of 1973, and what happened was it was a remarkable and shocking event, but it was lost to history for a while because In September of 73, Allende was overthrown in Chile. And so Uruguay, it just is lost any real being on the radar screen, et cetera. The dictatorship would last till 1985. The return of democracy in Uruguay was unique to the extent that the Uruguayan political culture, despite a very draconian regime, it didn't kill as many people as the Argentines did in this period and Pinochet did. But since it was so small, the military really cracked down, controlled it, arrested tens of thousands of people and tortured many of them, just to say, don't try anything, don't mess around. This is what you got. In the early 80s, the military decided to write a constitution and present it to the Uruguayan people, just like in Chile. So I'm up here at Columbia and NYU screaming my head off that the Uruguayans are going to reject this thing. And everybody looks at me and says, you're too emotional, Marty. You're too close to the situation. If Pinochet could get the damn thing passed in Chile, how is it going to be rejected in Uruguay? And my response was, you don't know. The Uruguayans, they rejected the constitution, the military. Uruguay had a quiet nervous breakdown and two years later said, okay, elections, and permitted the traditional parties to come back and run. I can't go into too many details about that, etc. But the restoration of democracy was immensely successful in the sense that the traditional colorado Ruling party of a very competent man became president and sanity was restored. The military had been releasing a lot of political prisoners and they didn't release the head of the guerrilla movement that did exist in Uruguay before the military takeover, the Tupamaros, which were then amnesty. In a very orgoan way, some of this leadership had, you know, killed. Killed some people in firefights, not by assassination, but by, you know, if you're over bank occasionally someone fires back at you, or if you kidnap someone and you get discovered or whatever the case happens to be. They were amnestied on the basis of given how cruelly the situation under which they were kept was. And I have no time to go into that, there's no death penalty in Uruguay. So they had been given the maximum sentence of 30 years and many of them at this point had served 10 to 15 years. So the government said, given the hardship and the nature of your incarceration, we're giving you double time or triple time for how much time you were in prison. Therefore they finished their sentence and therefore they were amnesty. That did not sit well with the military, but nothing ever happened with that. In that regard, a remarkable thing happened. In the early 90s, a Blanco named Luis Alberto Lacalle Herrera beat the Colorado candidate and became the first Blanco to be president on his own. Since the 18th century, there had been a period in Uruguay because of this co participation. There had been a period in Uruguay where the instead of a single person presidency, they went to a collegial executive for almost 15 years. So the Colorado's who were dominant, sharing power with the Blancos and the Blancos won a couple of those elections so that they had the majority on the council. They went back to a presidential system with the 1966 Constitution, which is the constitution still in force. Because of the decay of the economic situation, they realized they couldn't do it as an executive. They needed a presidential system again. And that's when they went back to it. In any, in any event, the early two 2000s saw a bit of a rough patch because of what happened in the US economy in 2008. The Uruguayan banking system almost froze up. But the US government and federal Reserve, et cetera, actually made sure that the Uruguayan banking system did not freeze up. So they never had the banking crisis that other places in Latin America have at this point. I should tell you very quickly that right now in Uruguay is in terrific shape economically. Their peso is incredibly stronger than they would like. And the reason is the crisis in Argentina and the ups and downs in Brazil means that tons of people from those countries park their money in the Uruguayan banks. They also send most of it to the states or elsewhere. But Uruguay is only a country of 3.4 million people. And if you have billions of dollars coming in, your banking system is incredibly liquid. And the peso is amazingly strong in the run up of the dollar, when interest rates went up, the Uruguayan peso actually strengthened against the dollar. In 2022, that was unheard of. And it's still in a very narrow range. And Uruguay has low inflation, but it's still real. Let's say it's 5% a year, 6% a year. But if your peso doesn't devalue, that means prices are going up 5% a year, no matter what. And some years it's more like 8%. So Uruguay is not a cheap country. And with the collapse in Argentina. Now, let me stop here because I probably have gone too much into that. Let's talk about the fact that it's an election year and we can talk about the same two parties, but they are coalitions, the Colorado Party and the Blanco. Where do you get a name of Red and White? You get it because in the civil Wars in the 18th century, one faction wore red scarfs to differentiate themselves from the other guys on horseback in the countryside. And one guy's wore white scarfs. And that's how you get the Partido Colorado, Partido Blanco. But these are sort of coalitions. One is a center right coalition which traditionally had more strength in the interior. And of course, the Colorado's, having run this very liberal social democratic scheme, had most of their support in the cities.

Richard McColl: In the.

Professor Weinstein: After the dictatorship, which ended in 1985, part of the guerrilla movement became a political party. And that political party eventually became a third major party in Uruguay, which started running for the presidency and did not succeed until 2005. But what's very interesting, when the left finally broke through and won the presidency in 2005, they also gained control of both houses of Congress. So a lot of conservatives said, oh my God, this is going to be a disaster. It was not a disaster. Even though there were a lot of radical people in on the left, they didn't try to change anything about the nature of the system. Uruguayans are quite conservative, even though the country is so progressive. If you ask them, why don't you change? When you say, yeah, you know who changes a lot? Argentina, Brazil, we don't need that roller coaster. We're very happy to just have the road pretty smooth. The left stayed in power in Uruguay for 15 years in a period in which Uruguay began to really change for the better. In terms of there were never a lot of cars in Uruguay because typically when cars were expensive and they taxed them like crazy, they said, if people can afford to buy a car and bring it in, I kid you not. The original tax base on bringing an automobile into Uruguay when I first went there in the late 60s and early 70s was 300% of the cost of the car. So you would see a Volkswagen being driven by a chauffeur with a little old lady in the backseat. I mean, so if you fall into distortion or whatever.

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Professor Weinstein: The one area where I would say the frente did not succeed was in reforming the educational system. Now the educational system is good in Uruguay and you can be born in Uruguay, go through and become a doctor, a lawyer, an engineer, an architect, a dentist, and never pay a cent for your education. However, where the system fails is for the working class and lower middle class at the secondary school level because there's a dropout rate in this very middle class little country, there's a dropout rate that is really Central American in percentages. It's really a shame and it's an embarrassment, the inability to get significant. There is reform now happening under the current administration, but the resistance, sadly, and I said everybody in Uruguay is from the teachers unions, which are all controlled by leftist parties. But they are incredibly resistant to changing the system. They're not resistant. Uruguay gave every kid in school onto the left a computer. Every kid in school was given a computer and they're used and they help them get through the pandemic. And there's some very sophisticated people working on programming. Uruguay has a small and very successful software business. It exports in the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of software. Of course, it's mathematics department at the main university and the newer universities that have emerged in recent years have very strong computer science programs. One Uruguayan startup, dLocal, is sort of the square of Uruguay, but it's, it doesn't function for Uruguay. It functions to help Google and Amazon sell their product in Latin America and elsewhere. So it's a fintech company. Don't buy it right now if you intrigued because it Had a big run when it first went public. It was the first unicorn to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange from Uruguay. And it zoomed. But that's not. Anyway, let's talk about the upcoming election. The upcoming election in Uruguay will feature two major coalitions because as the left got stronger and stronger, the two traditional parties agreed to work together and they changed a part of the electoral law. So they combined to throw their support to whoever one of the two parties was stronger. And it stopped the Frente from winning in 1999, but did not stop them from winning in the 2000s. Here there will. There are primaries in Uruguay on June 30th and they're serious. And the first round of the elections will be October 24th. October. I'm sorry, October 27th. And if there's a second round, it will be November 24th. There probably will be a second round. The current polls, which are very early and very good in our way, show a virtual dead heat race between who the. In the government the last four years now and it's a five year term in Uruguay for president has been the Blanco Colorado coalition with a small group of a small military based party that is not in good shape right now. But they also supported and they got about 12% of the vote or whatever. That coalition was headed by the son of the president who was the Blanco President from 1995 to 2000. His name is Luis Lacalle. Who.

Richard McColl: The current president. Alberto.

Professor Weinstein: Yeah, he's been very successful and he's popular, but he. But in Uruguay you cannot succeed yourself in the presidency. You can come back after being out for term. So he has handpicked his chief of staff, Alvaro Delgado. Delgado will be the main candidate for the current God governing coalition. And he's well known because he was the face of the government during the pandemic. He was a senator and a congressman. All of the people who make it into. Into these rounds of primaries are not, are not loose cannon or wild cards or Javier Milei who come out of nowhere like in Argent. He has someone who will run against him. It's a woman named Laura Raffo who's an economist. She's a very well regarded economist. She's done consulting for one of the Boston Banks in Uruguay or whatever Bank Boston or whatever. And she is very respected.

Richard McColl: And.

Professor Weinstein: But I don't think she can possibly beat the guy that's been anointed by the sitting president. I do predict that he will ask her to join the team as his vice president. Strong prediction huh?

Richard McColl: That's a strong prediction.

Professor Weinstein: Yes. Well, it's coming and there'll be a war in president someday. But I don't think in this realm, on the center left coalition, otherwise called in Uruguay always called the Broad Front or the Frente Amplio, which was its original name, the major candidate is the current Intendente, we could say governor or mayor of Canelones, which is the province directly to the east of Montevideo. What's happening there is the future of Uruguay to some extent. That's where the free trade zone is, this huge free trade zone. That's where they're building and this is new to Uruguay. Retirement and communities for people who want to leave the city guard gated, even call them guard gated communities. Many of them are guard gated, but. And they're popping up by the dozens now, just a half hour from Montevideo. And it's beautiful countryside already. And Google is there, and a lot of people are there for shipping because the port of Montevideo is now becoming a major port for transshipment in and out of Bolivia, Paraguay, even southern Brazil. The Uruguayan port has one of the best natural harbors in that area of the world. And the Uruguayans were sleepy about this. I have a friend who I can't go into right now who always said if the Uruguayans had really been aggressive as entrepreneurs, they would have turned Montevideo into a Singapore or a Hong Kong in terms of this part of the world, understand. Uruguay, 3.4 million people. Argentina, 46 million people. Brazil, over 200 million people with huge middle classes and extraordinarily wealthy upper classes and stuff moves in and out, et cetera. The mayor of Canelones, the Intendente is named Yamandú Orsi O R S I and what he's been doing with the five years there is really impressive. He's got an international business in there. They expanded the roads, I mean. And he will be a very popular candidate. He has another popular candidate for the primary as his competition, a woman named Carolina Cosse. And Cosse is currently the mayor or intendente of Montevideo, which is traditionally the stepping point to the presidency because it's the second most important job in the country. She's a bit full of herself occasionally, in my opinion. She's a trained engineer. She was minister of indie industry. She was head of intel, the phone, the state owned phone company. She got in a little trouble. They started a big public theater that was put up by the telephone company and there was a cost overrun, so. But most of that overrun occurred when she left that position. But she was the one who started the project. That will be a hotly contested. In other words it'll be closer than the primary on the other side. But I think at the end of the day Orsi will be the nominee and he will ask Cosse to be his vice presidential nominee. That's. I will not predict the election. I will eventually, but not this early. It's too close. I will. Yeah.

Richard McColl: Can I jump in and ask then? Let's say, let's say we've got an Orsi Delgado election runoff November 24th. I'm not asking you to predict what I'd like to hear because we know that Uruguay is exemplary and it's of its democracy in Latin America and it's come top in the latest transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and so on. What are the major challenges for whoever gets in post 24th November? Let's say, I mean we know that organized crime is increasing through Latin America. Uruguay continues to have issues with Mercosur and the bilateral trade that they would like to do with China. There are some things on the horizon.

Professor Weinstein: Yes, it's very good question and I think the first thing I need to say and it relates to the election. Uruguay has recently had a spate of scandals and the most important one has involved drugs. There's a 32 year old Uruguayan named Sebastián Marset and Mr. Marset set up in Uruguay a drug cartel which he named the first Uruguayan cartel. So you see what kind of mind this person has. Interpol had him on a major list. If you see him, arrest him. We warn him. He was found in Dubai with no passport. They had him, he got an Uruguayan passport and left. And the question became how did he get an Uruguayan passport? When they started investigating at the Foreign Ministry. And Uruguay as you said, is very transparent. So the Congress started looking into news. The judicial and the Deputy Foreign Minister had to resign over it. The, the Minister of Foreign affairs held his job until much later when he called up the now non functioning Deputy Foreign Minister and said listen, do me a favor, destroy your emails about this situation or this. He didn't know that he was taped when he made that phone call. That phone call was given to the press. He then had to resign. This was so serious that Lacalle Pou, the current President who was at that moment in Washington for a meeting, sort of one of those summits of Latin American leaders in Washington and was due to have a one with Biden left to go back to try to deal with the situation. It reduced the government's popularity there. It's working its way through some investigations. Someone got paid somewhere in the Foreign Ministry to issue those passports. There's another scandal which the president has not taken a hit on. He had a personal secretary early on in his administration who went into business for himself and the business was he was getting passports for people who needed passports who were willing to pay for it. His major clients were Russians trying to get out of Russia. No. And of course he was fired and he's in jail. But this called into the whole question is Uruguay lost its reputation? Is Uruguay now just like all the other corrupt, blah. The answer is no. It's a hit to the government, which probably could get reelected more easily if this stuff hadn't happened. But the Uruguayans know that it won't. It's. It will. The Orguans fully expect that it will not be covered up. And, you know, we'll get the rest of it. The word. I don't know how this is happening. Marcet has young children. He's only 32 years old and his family's in Uruguay. I mean, his family is with. With him right now somewhere. He's negotiating a return to Uruguay. So I think he's prepared to stand tr. I don't know how or what the deal may look like, but he's apparently going to come back to Uruguay. If he comes back to Uruguay, he's going to be arrested. I mean, everybody knows that. The frightening thing about this is the corruption it produces and the crime it produces at the local level. Because if you're moving cocaine from Paraguay and Bolivia through the port of Montevideo to Europe, some of it is going to be sold on the streets. And this has created something that is relatively new to Uruguay. The other thing, quite frankly, the world situation for many years now has been one in which inequality is growing and inequality is growing in Uruguay. And there are people on the streets who are not quite on the streets, but people who, you know, can't make ends meet and are willing to, you know, break into a home or a car. And in a country that was as relatively crime free as Uruguay, this becomes a big deal. Because it's not that it may be so bad, but it's so bad in comparison to what you're used to. And that's an issue that a new government's going to face, whether it's the Frente government or it's being Colorado Blanco coalition. That the MERCOSUR thing is very tricky. But you know, Mercosur was always very strange. You know, two small countries joined the two giants, and the two giants really just want to get their way no matter what. And, and Uruguay. Now the current President Lacalle is intent on an agreement with China. And he's been warned that he can't do that outside of mercosur, but he's hoping that it's problematic. Except Milei, as a libertarian. Milei just gave Uruguay his first gift as their neighbor. Uruguayans, because the port is exploding. They need to dredge the Rio de la Plata to make it deeper to bring in the biggest ships. And Argentina, as usual, had stalled and stalled for years. Milei has instructed his people on the Binational Commission on the dredging of the Real, to allow dredging of the Uruguayan channel. That's a big deal. That really is a big deal. And I think there will eventually, I don't know in what manner. I think there will be a trade deal with China from Uruguay. They're also thinking of joining the Trans Pacific Partnership, even though they're on the Atlantic, not the Pacific. There's a, there's a sense of change in Uruguay in terms of. Well, first of all, you see it, the reforms that they made in lowing the duties on bringing cars in. Uruguay is flooded with cars now. You never saw a lot of cars in Uruguay. Uruguay is flooded with cars and they're in love with SUVs. It's one of their major imports. Machinery and cars is a huge major import, by the way, for the audience. People should know that Uruguay's principal trading partners are China and Brazil because they make so much of the same thing and export so much of the same thing that Argentina does trade with. Argentina is at most 8% either import or export. That's all it is. But Brazil and China take 20 to 25% each of their exports. And it's the same on imports. So that, and it's not unusual in Latin America now for Brazil for China to be either the number one trade trading partner or the number two trading partner with almost all the countries in South America. Right. So it's not unusual, but Uruguay had an old standing relationship with Taiwan on, believe it or not, on rice production. So they sell rice and, but of course, the main exports are still beef, wheat, soy software has become significant enough so that they're a company. You know, they're, they're There are some young entrepreneurs with software businesses that are growing and that's really very interesting. Tourism to Uruguay is mostly an Argentine, Brazilian phenomenon, mostly in the summer. But Punta del Este is know coming up with all these names, the San Trope of South America, or I would like to say the Hamptons of South America if you're in New York. No, it's incredible. Just one quick anecdote. When a guy named Mark Zuckerberg, who's everybody named, when he got engaged, he got on his plane with 20 of his closest friends for Christmas New year's and dropped $2 million in Uruguay having a good time for a week. That story was front page. This is years ago. He's been married quite a few years now. But the number of private jets that go into that small airport in Puente, Christmas New Year's times is unbelievable. And the Argentines with money own apartments, they own homes and they still come. It's a relatively short season. The boom time is just before Christmas to the 1st to the 2nd half of January, but into February there's an enormous amount of tourist dollars. What's interesting, Argentines with businesses in Argentina, family in Argentina are in significant numbers giving up on living in Argentina and they're moving to Uruguay. And a lot of them know Punta and they are buying and living full time in Punta del Este. And there are schools, private schools are being built as extensions of private schools. In Montevideo there's public schools being built, they handle because they're coming with families. And Uruguay has made it easy to come and get a tax holiday because you need to invest a relatively small amount of money in order to do that. The biggest attraction and that has helped. I don't know the numbers, but it's in the tens of thousands now, which again, you know, numbers are not big in Uruguay, but you're only dealing with 3.4 million people. So when you say that, you know, maybe 10 to 20,000 Argentines have actually done this, it's a large number and Punta is becoming a year round city. It's, you know, I wouldn't say it's a big deal on year round, but. So the challenge is, I think the biggest challenge, believe it or not, is would still be, and I have a friend at the Harvard Business School who does research on this is still some significant reforms in the primary and secondary school systems to give kids from working class homes and even middle class homes a sense of how their schooling relates to the world and how it relates to their job prospects. They get bored the system is too locked into French, wrote, classical French, rote memorization. And it just turns kids off. I'm not saying that's the, you know, again, they're using computers, they're getting more and it's changing. But it's really for a country that is so stable and has such a democratic political culture, they really need to bring that system forward and reduce the dropout rate significantly. And that would do a lot of things about crime and mischief and other things. And they really have to do something major about stopping the use of the port for the shipment of drugs. There was a recent drug bust in Belgium. This is in December. A shipment of alfajores people who know Argentina and these are a two sided cookie filled with dulce de leche. And everybody eats them everywhere. There was a huge shipment of these to Belgium. It should have set up red flags because there's never been a shipment of alfajores to Belgium. And they were not being shipped directly from the manufacturer, they were being shipped from somebody else. Now there was an inspection and they were shipped from the free trade zone and they were scoped or something with a machine that some guy said, you know, it's not the best machine or whatever, but this is a little on the scary side. It was detected in Belgium 2.1 tons of cocaine. This was one of those shipments that a cartel plans for a year. Never does it again the same way. But it gives you an idea. And all of this happened because of the pandemic or where it was not a major route. The pandemic shut down the airlines, it shut down a lot of stuff. And they said, how are we going to move it out? And they said, the port of Montevideo. That's interesting. I don't want to end on that kind of.

Richard McColl: Well, Professor, I think we do need to wind out, but it's been absolutely fascinating. What I feel, despite the security and obviously organized crime links, is it will still be a positive time when we think of, you know, the democratic and peaceful alternation of power. When we look at the elections and it's obviously no mystery to the political parties what needs to be done in terms of the education. And with this, I would say, you know, pretty progressive attitude towards politics and so on. Perhaps either the Frente Amplio or the Partido Nacional will actually invest in this because it just seems like we can continue to say that Uruguay is a success story.

Professor Weinstein: I absolutely agree, 100%. It will be, as usual, one of the most transparent and clean elections carried out. We don't have time to go into the procedures. But it's virtually foolproof. Elections can be extremely close. No one ever has said, I don't believe the result or it's always accepted because so many people participate in observing in all of the voting places. And it is virtually foolproof. It should be a model around the world. It can't be duplicated because.

Richard McColl: It's a.

Professor Weinstein: Small country and has been that democratic for so long. It has come up with a system that everybody knows that the votes are real and the votes are counted. And they're counted honestly.

Richard McColl: Well, thank you. Thank you so much for your time, Professor. It has been really incredible to go this deeply into your world, politics, culture, society, economics. I'm sure you could. I know for a fact you could wax lyrically for hours on this because we, I think we've only scratched the surface of your knowledge. It's been an absolute pleasure. This has been The LatinNews Podcast. I've been your host in Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia. Our guest is the emeritus professor of Political science, Martin Weinstein of William Paterson University in New Jersey, author of books such as the Politics of Failure and Democracy at a Crossroads. Thank you again so much for your time.

Professor Weinstein: It's been my pleasure. Thank you very much.

Richard McColl: Of course, everybody. Share and subscribe to The LatinNews Podcast. We'll be back in a fortnight with another episode regarding the region and important events. Thank you for listening and goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com

Rosemary Joyce participated in field research in northern Honduras from 1977 to 2009, in the Ulua and Cuyumapa valleys, Lake Yojoa, and the Caribbean coast. The sites where she conducted research date as early as before 1500 BCE to the Spanish colonial period. She employs multi-scalar approaches that consider regional patterns and detailed household archaeology together.

Since 2010, she has been developing collaborations with colleagues in Mexico that bring the household scale approaches we developed in Honduras into a regional scale project in the hinterland of Classic Maya Palenque, in Chiapas.

As a museum anthropologist, Joyce works with curated collections, including photographs and historical archives, in museums in North America, Europe, and Honduras. She has engaged in collections management and exhibition work at Harvard's Peabody Museum, the Wellesley College Museum and Cultural Center, the Heritage Plantation at Sandwich, Massachusetts, the Museo de Antropología e Historia in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and the National Museum of the American Indian, Smithsonian Institution.

Her work with museum collections inspired an interest in disciplinary history. She has published work about women who were early archaeologists in Honduras, and more broadly on the history and sociopolitics of archaeology, using Honduras as a case study. This led to her current work on cultural policy and histories of collecting.

Intro: Welcome to the LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is the LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl here in Bogota, Colombia. My very special guest is at the University of California, Berkeley. She's a distinguished professor of anthropology. Her name is Rosemary Joyce. And we're going to be talking about contemporary Honduras, the issues taking place, the tensions, political tensions undergoing underway at the moment in that country. So let me take this moment to say thank you so much, Rosemary, for being on the LatinNews Podcast.

Rosemary Joyce: Oh, thank you for the invitation.

Richard McColl: Well, it's an absolute pleasure because of course, Honduras, I mean, we know a little bit about it in the press and so on, but you are an expert, you follow the security, the politics and so on. Perhaps we could put everything into context looking at the current president, Xiomara Castro.

Rosemary Joyce: Yeah. So to understand where we are In Honduras in 2024, we have to go back to 2009, at least briefly, and remind people that Honduras was the site of the first 21st century coup. It's sometimes described when President Mel Zelaya was removed from the country forcibly about six months before the next presidential elections because he was advocating for the addition of a non binding ballot resolution that would have initiated a process to revise the country's constitution that initially was condemned by all actors. But it's fair to say that the United States was not unenthusiastic about his removal because President Zelaya, despite coming from a major family of the old colonial elite, had begun to implement policies that were aligning Honduras with the ALBA block and therefore he's usually characterized as the leftist president.

Rosemary Joyce: From the perspective of 2024, the reason that's relevant is that the 2009 election ushered in a period of three subsequent administrations by the National Party, which basically lock down control of the country. The first of those presidents elected has already been convicted of drug trafficking charges, and the second is currently on trial in the Southern district of New York in the US also for narco trafficking. So essentially for the subsequent 12 years, Honduras has been grimly in the hands of an intertwined set of politicians and narco traffickers.

Rosemary Joyce: The election of Xiomara Castro de Zelaya, the wife of the removed president, was carried forward by a new political party, which is also notable because the Honduran politics, although multi party, had been dominated since the 19th century by two major parties, the Liberal Party and the Nationalist Party, and Libre, the party that Xiomara Castro represents arose as a resistance movement to the coup and then organized in successive elections, finally achieving the election of Xiomara.

Richard McColl: This is fascinating. Of course, we talk about Zelaya being ousted in this coup in 2009 and then you've got three terms, so 12 years, as you said, of right wing Partido Nacional National Party, Porfirio Lobo and Juan Orlando Castro Hernández, sorry, Juan Orlando Hernández. And I mean, this pushes Honduras into a sphere where it previously hadn't been, as you say. I mean, do we go as far as to say it was a narcos state?

Rosemary Joyce: So there's interesting research that was done. First of all, Hernández actually manipulated the Congress and the Supreme Court into nullifying the Congress, the constitutional bar against reelection so that he could be reelected. And looking at the two elections of Hernández in particular, there's some very clear evidence of patterns of voting in which narco trafficking communities were excessive in the number of votes delivered, where on the ground observers reported intimidation. So it's clear that there's an imprecation of politicians and narco traffickers that increased. Now it's worth saying that narco traffickers had already begun infiltrating Honduras before 2009. My research in Honduras began in the 1970s, so I witnessed the entire transition to civilian government under the first constitution.

Rosemary Joyce: And it was really in the 1990s that we began to see the increased wealth which is the first symptom of narco trafficking really in most of the region. But it is clear that after 2009, the relationship between the ruling party and the presidency and narco trafficking became much stronger.

Richard McColl: And this, let's say, cozying up or becoming a member of ALBA by Zelaya back in the day. Now, ALBA, perhaps you could give us a little bit of background on this. This is why, you know, why he was ousted. I suppose.

Rosemary Joyce: It's probably the thing that made the US government not enthusiastic about his continuing and caused them to fear that he was advocating the, what's called the fourth urn, the non binding ballot referendum to stay in power. ALBA at that moment provided two things to Honduras that it dearly needed. So Honduras has historically been one of the poorest countries in Latin America, moving back and forth from bottom to second, from the bottom to third from the bottom. So significantly poor. Despite having enormous natural resources, especially mineral wealth, which is what caused Spanish colonization initially and continues to attract international companies and a fairly positive land to population ratio. That should mean that the country could be self sustaining, as well as the potential for lots of hydroelectric projects. But oil there is no oil in Honduras.

Rosemary Joyce: So one of the things that ALBA did in its relationships to member countries that were like Honduras was provide preferential supplies of oil at costs that the government could manage. It solved an energy crisis that had existed for decades in which the normal people of Honduras would often be without any kind of access to energy. So on the one hand it did that, and on the other hand, ALBA provided a variety of grants, outright funds that the Honduran government began to use for initiatives in what it called citizen participation. And it's easy to be cynical about citizen participation. Governments do seem to say we want to have citizen participation, and they mean something very superficial. But in Honduras, a number of these actually addressed the civil rights of previously marginalized groups.

Rosemary Joyce: Honduras has a very complex population composition going back to the Spanish colonial period. A large number of African descended people were brought to Honduras, many of them enslaved, many of them free. And the population today includes well established communities that identify, such as the Garifuna group that descends from enslaved Africans brought to the country by Britain from the island of St. Vincent when they were afraid that the Garifuna would rebel, as had successfully happened in Haiti. The indigenous population, the part that's most internationally recognized as the Classic Maya, their Maya descendants, the Chorti, are sometimes ignored or not seen by visitors, even though they're all around them when they visit the World Heritage Site Copán.

Rosemary Joyce: But there are a number of other indigenous groups, the largest of which is the Lenca, who occupy most of the interior of western Honduras and along the north coast. The Miskito and Pech. And the Miskito are particularly interesting because they have treaty rights that go back to 1848 as a consequence of a treaty between Honduras and Britain, in which Britain gave Mosquito territory to Honduras, which it shouldn't have done, but that was Britain. In. In the treaty, though, there was a guarantee that land that was currently occupied by the Mosquito would be titled to them. And that only began in the 1990s. So ALBA provided resources with which the Honduran government began addressing these and other kinds of marginalized communities.

Rosemary Joyce: So it was less a political reorientation by a member of what would have been called the oligarchy, and more a pragmatic move to have a resource base independent of the US which has always been the major economic partner for Honduras, but an economic partner based on exploitative and extractive industries.

Richard McColl: And of course, this oil for ALBA coming from Venezuela, at that point, it.

Rosemary Joyce: Was coming from Venezuela. Exactly, exactly. Now I should say that Zelaya also in the year before his ouster clearly also began to see the negative effects of poverty and inequality in the country and had advocated for increases in the minimum wage. So he lost the business community in Honduras because he was literally costing them money.

Richard McColl: Yes, I can see how this obviously creates a platform for problems here. But so we get in, we get past these 12 years and this penetration and I would say probably total flooding of all the economies within Honduras by the narco income. And Honduras is a transit country. I mean, it's not a producing country, or am I wrong?

Rosemary Joyce: So it is. It has historically been a transit country. Recently the Honduran press has claimed that coca is now being cultivated in eastern Honduras. One of the problems in actually talking About Honduras in 2024 is the erosion of reliable press, which of course is global phenomenon. But in Honduras was also the. The outcome of deliberate attempts by the Hernández government to shut down the press voices which were opposition. So I mentioned that. That is from the Honduran press. I don't, I have not seen independent acknowledgment of that. But it is clear that the majority of the drug trafficking going through Honduras is transit.

Richard McColl: But I mean, it is an interesting point this, about the production in Central American countries which is believed to have. I would say it's still in its infancy. But of course the whole idea of the evolution of a drugs trade is, you know, the difficult part is that the transportation.

Rosemary Joyce: Correct.

Richard McColl: And to bring the product closer to its end market in the United States would make sense. But again, we are basing this on a report out of the Honduran press which must be taken with a pinch of salt. So this money, these narco dollars have infiltrated, penetrated society up from top to bottom, from bottom top, I would say probably weakening the institutions, which is, you know, a real problem through all of the Americas, all of Latin America right now. And Xiomara Castro has been talking and always talks about promises to eradicate and work against corruption. Is there progress on this?

Rosemary Joyce: So there has not been as much progress as those observers who hoped as you would hope would have been happened. In retrospect, that's entirely predictable and probably a sign that we should take for all of Latin America about how difficult it is. Once, as you said correctly, the political establishment is entangled with this kind of capital to try to disentangle it is very difficult. It's especially difficult for the Libre Party's president, Xiomara Castro, because she was elected without a majority for Congress. So the Libre party has 50 seats in Congress you need 86 votes to pass legislation. And there is a coalition that is sometimes in opposition to her of minority parties, but that's only got 76 votes.

Rosemary Joyce: So what we have in Honduras is the kind of thing that happens in a parliamentary system where the president's party may be the plurality, but it is not the majority. And we have it in the context of a country in which presidential power and congressional power are not balanced. One of the things that Hernández worked hard to do was to increase the power of the presidency. But he came from having been the head of Congress. And that by itself is really important. The Congress has a great deal of authority. For example, one of the key ways to address corruption would be to have a not corrupt judicial system. Unfortunately, the Honduran Supreme Court is reselected every seven years and that process is in the hands of Congress.

Rosemary Joyce: Now this last round, which happened last year, the good news is that there was a formal vetting, so the list of candidates were actually qualified. It seems absurd to have to say that's good news, but previously that wasn't the case. The bad news is the Congress continued to use a policy that international judicial reform consultants have said they should stop, in which each party within the Congress got a certain number of seats to select from the list. So on the one hand you have a qualified list of jurists, on the other hand you have factions choosing their judges that the president of the country has no role in that. So the Supreme Court becomes the extension essentially into the judiciary of the Congress. The second thing that has, I think definitely delayed improvement was the continuation of the previous Attorney General.

Rosemary Joyce: Obviously the Attorney General is the person who's going to bring anti corruption cases, the anti corruption movement. The Attorney General was not changed until I believe November of this last year. So almost two years into the term, the previous Attorney General is now under investigation for corruption, which may be a politically motivated investigation. But the Oscar Chinchilla has been a name that has turned up in other investigations and news reporting. So the judiciary and the Attorney General positions are critical to this. Honduras had placed a lot or Xiomara had placed a lot of emphasis on renewing the impunity and corruption review by the un, sponsored by the un what's called CICIH in Honduras, that has also been delayed.

Rosemary Joyce: Although the Castro government has absolutely been supporting the return of this UN team which had been in Honduras looking at corruption, looking at impunity under their Hernández government left the country. But they haven't been able to return because to do so requires the removal of a series of laws that were passed under Juan Orlando Hernández, which basically enshrine impunity from investigation of members of the government. So you can't have anti corruption investigation unless you can follow with charges against government members. Two, at least of those laws were rescinded last year. So progress is slow. And in retrospect, it's probably a legitimate sign of how powerful corruption forces are in the country.

LatinNews: This podcast is brought to you by Latin News, the leading source of political and economic news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean since 1967. Access Latin News full portfolio of reports at www.latinnews.com.

Richard McColl: I mean, very hard to undo 12 years within four years. But two laws being rescinded. We have to say that to move in the right direction. I mean, let's paint this in a positive note. Otherwise we'll, you know, we'll probably step away from this conversation feeling very underwhelmed. But this enshrined impunity of which you speak, it seems to be something that is so universal through the region and the judiciary and the Attorney General and these politically motivated cases. One thing that you mentioned is that the Libre party having 50 seats in Congress and needing 86 votes to pass legislation.

Rosemary Joyce: Correct?

Richard McColl: In order for President Castro to get legislation passed, has she had to make untoward deals with opposition or smaller parties?

Rosemary Joyce: I don't think they're untoward deals. Basically what this illustrates is that it's not unusual in parliamentary systems to have coalitions. So the question is, what are the nature of the coalitions? Are they based on giving advantages that actually are corrupt to other parties? And so far that's not how this has proceeded. Rather, we have among the coalition of non libre parties, smaller parties that actually are committed. It's not so much about the corruption part. I think we have to leave the corruption part to one side. There are three main themes of the current government. One is corruption. One is improving the economy, which is probably where she's made her best advances. And the third is safety and security. The way that the Castro government has been able to proceed on some of its initiatives with congressional coalitions has been in those other two areas.

Rosemary Joyce: Corruption, as you said, has spread so deeply that there's very little incentive for politicians in general to go along with full throatedly with removal of that because of the worry that they might become targets. And here we should probably acknowledge that once you have that much corruption in a country, it also becomes a kind of a threat to accuse your enemies of corruption in a system in which, despite the fact that the sort of Napoleonic you're guilty until proven innocent thing is no longer part of the legal code, it's still part of the practical, everyday way that people approach law. So an accusation is as good as a conviction in. In neutering somebody.

Richard McColl: Yeah. I mean, and this would again would implicate the press as well because.

Rosemary Joyce: Absolutely.

Richard McColl: Reporting on this nature and of course clickbait, that of that kind of intent. So I mean, it does sound, I have to say, that Castro is improving the economy and working on safety and security. Have security issues worsened immensely under Lobo, Porfirio Lobo and Juan Orlando Hernández?

Rosemary Joyce: Absolutely. During those 12 years, Honduras became one of the capitals of femicide in Latin America. The murder rate in Honduras is usually characterized as one of the highest in the world, if not the highest in the world. Those were not the conditions prior to 2009. The gangs in Honduras are extremely powerful. They are not directly controlled by narco traffickers, but there is a kind of an ecology in which narco traffickers and gangs work together to sort of create these territories. And there is a lot of violence that comes out of gangs trying to force people into cooperation. So internal displacement of people fleeing insecurity because of gangs in Honduras led to over 200,000 people last year relocating within the country.

Rosemary Joyce: These are not the people leaving the country to try and come into the U.S. this is just people moving within Honduras to try to keep from the impacts of gangs. Historically, one of the realities of Honduras has been that it's. Its judicial system works slowly. So pre trial imprisonment of people is quite high. Prisons are not or have historically not been under the control of the government. Really they have more become islands of gang dominated life and recruitment. So sort of a citadel from which gangs have operated. This is became visible in the last year, most tragically in a massacre in a women's prison which was motivated by one gang basically killing women to provide pressure on people who were not imprisoned that the gang was trying to recruit. And no Honduran government has found a good way to deal with these things.

Rosemary Joyce: The Castro government took two steps that are highly controversial internationally. One is to create a state of exception or a state of emergency which basically suspends many of the civil rights that people would otherwise have under Honduras’s constitution that was renewed into January. I haven't seen whether it was renewed again. That was taken in order to try to allow for again one of the long standing things going Back even before the coup is the process of what's called mano dura, you know, taking a firm hand, which the firm hand has often in Central America meant extrajudicial killings, especially of youths, to the extent that having. Being young and having a tattoo has been life threatening for people in Honduras. And of course, gangs do stand out for their, you know, sort of using tattoos as a kind of a meta language.

Rosemary Joyce: So on the one hand, we have the state of exception, and then the second controversial move that the Castro government made was replacing police control of prisons with military or army control of prisons. Historically, again, the police have been incredibly corrupt. The Hernández government ran a lawn exercise that was sort of a theatrical sort of performance of reviewing all the police to get rid of the bad apples. But it is widely understood by international observers to have been theatrical. The army has historically been seen by Honduran people. There's more trust in the army. The army, the military have been seen as I know, as a trustworthy force that is not corrupt. Now, corruption's everywhere, but it is the case that Hondurans don't trust the police, and if they have any trust in any form of security apparatus, it is the military.

Richard McColl: That's incredibly interesting. I just wanted to ask quickly about the gangs that. These are the same gangs that have permeated all of Central America. The Mara Salvatrucha and the D.C. yes.

Rosemary Joyce: And the. There's a third one that. Whose name has just gone out of my head. Yes, These are the gangs that were. Are the product, in some ways, of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. immigration policy, deporting people from the U.S. back to El Salvador and Honduras.

Richard McColl: And this is so difficult at this state of emergency you speak of is. And of course, the mano dura, which again, I think of about any Latin American country that needs to deal with incredibly difficult security situations, they come up with the mano dura and they declare a state of emergency. So we don't see any talk of it being lifted. Is this in some way inspired? Of course, we have to talk about the region by President Bukele in El Salvador. Is President Castro looking at, inverted commas, the success story next door?

Rosemary Joyce: I can't impute motivation on Xiomara Castro, but I can say that politicians in Honduras in general look across the border and see what has been portrayed as a success in El Salvador. And this is again, not just with Bukele. This goes back decades. It goes back before the coup, the first time that mano dura language was used in Honduras, that I know of in the 1990s, the reference was again to El Salvador. So there's a constant kind of presence of El Salvador and Honduras being in some ways similar situations. But El Salvador is often the security situation is worse sooner. The gangs are across both countries. So yes, I think it's fair to assume and that the apparent success of Bukele is, and I use success in quotation marks because there is no real way to assess this as success.

Rosemary Joyce: I mean, this is one of the tragedies of Central America, certainly of possibly of other parts of Latin America, is that the security situation is usually addressed through policing when international research would suggest that more police doesn't make the situation better. What needs to happen is various forms of development aid, various forms of intervention, and those are expensive and poor countries don't have the resources for that. Which oddly enough gets us to the economic part of this. It's easy to say, okay, great, that Honduras now is widely seen internationally as a, a good country to invest in. It has improved all of its economic markers. In the view of the Millennium Corporation of the United States, we could look at that and say, but that's not what she ran on.

Rosemary Joyce: But in fact, that is part of this story that if you're going to ever make things better in Honduras, you have to create an economy that works for its people. And here one of the most interesting things to me as an outsider observing this is that the Castro government, usually described as a leftist government, is in the process right now of trying to institute a graduated income tax and increase income tax collection. Those are two things to increase economic equity, but also to provide the government with the funds that it needs to do the social services, do the interventions, do the other things that it's currently spending far too much, frankly of its budget on the military and police.

Richard McColl: This increase, let's say in collection. This is not going to be popular.

Rosemary Joyce: No, no, I would. And especially not popular with the people who have a lot of money.

Richard McColl: Yes.

Rosemary Joyce: Because even though Honduras is a poor country. Absolutely. It is a highly unequal country with a business sector that saw the opportunities after the move away from military dictatorship in the 1980s and the passage of the new constitution, Honduras was. Had been stabilized by decades of military dictatorship rule and was seen as a place that had a very large labor pool. So the Honduran, successive Honduran governments passed legislation to create incentives for international companies to place manufacturing, primarily small manufacturing companies in the country. So it's likely that most listeners may have at some point crossed some product that began part of its life in Honduras. Clothing assembly, for example, small electronics, things like that. Those companies, as the integration of economies increased with free trade policies, those companies became very successful.

Rosemary Joyce: And the families that owned them basically catapulted to a level of wealth that had never been seen in Honduras.

Richard McColl: I mean, we can see this repeated in other Central American countries. But of curiosity to me, as we wind this down, Rosemary, and I need to pick your intelligence here. How much in fact influence or what kind of voter turnout is there in the communities, as you said, the Garifuna or the indigenous communities in Honduras?

Rosemary Joyce: Oh, that is an excellent question. So speaking from the US where voter turnout has always been low, Honduras usually has a much higher turnout for its elections. The indigenous Garifuna and other marginalized communities are do vote. What has happened historically is that voting by marginalized communities is often captured by patrons by patronage. So one of the problems with the election of Juan Orlando Hernández, that the second election, which was widely seen as likely corrupt and likely stolen, major statistical analyses, including one by the Economist, said this pattern just doesn't make any sense. What didn't make sense was that a large rural population provided a vote that pushed Hernández over the top. That rural population is Lenca population, indigenous population, and it is a population that has been basically addressed in a patronage way and had been by Juan Orlando Hernández throughout his presidency.

Rosemary Joyce: So there they are voting. But and Libre, of course, also came out of the indigenous communities and includes African descendant activists, in large part because African descendant people and indigenous people are also providing the majority of the land defenders in Honduras. And land defending in Honduras is a. Is a risk of fatality. It is one of the countries that has the highest rate of murders of land defenders. So the original LIBRE coalition strongly brought in those other parties, those other indigenous groups.

Richard McColl: It's a fascinating situation to observe, which obviously, unfortunately will not be resolved in a short term. As we finish this, my final sort of comment. It's really a comment. Xiomara Castro has come in to make change to affect effect change. She is having difficulty with, as you said, point one, corruption. Can we suggest that she is clean and uncorruptible, or is she too tarnished by this as well?

Rosemary Joyce: So the. The opposition politicians would like to accuse both Xiomara and her husband Melzalaya of corruption, despite decades of trying to prove that they have never succeeded in a country in which, if there were proof, I think it would have emerged. And most importantly, the US government has been assiduous in its investigations of Honduran politicians engaged in the international drug trafficking, the people that have been indicted include presidents. So there's no concern in the US against that. And we have not seen any of any evidence of investigations of either Xiomara or Mel.

Richard McColl: I mean, again, a positive. Should it be the case? Should it be the case? Definitely a positive. When you send down former presidents, it's a big deal and it does make the headlines and obviously ponderous not making the positive headlines. But we can take a positive from this, of course. So fascinating. How do you see, and again, how do you see Honduras developing then over the next couple of years, the immediate future?

Rosemary Joyce: So whenever we talk about the immediate future in a place like Honduras, we can't leave out the global context of climate change, which is actually driving more and more destruction of agricultural possibilities for a largely agricultural country. That as long as there's this enduring poverty, you won't be able to change the situation in Honduras. Castro's government made one move to try to begin to address this. Again, very controversial from the US perspective in abandoning recognition of Taiwan and recognizing China's one China claim and entering into agreements with China to try to develop what's called the Dry Canal, which would be an alternative route of shipping by land across Honduras. This also will include for the first time effective train access to parts of interior Honduras.

Rosemary Joyce: Honduras is notorious in Latin America for being the only country whose capital city is not that was never reached by a train. So my own view of this, like everybody else's, I think, is that until we get climate deterioration under control, we're going to see more and more poverty and destruction in countries like this. They are paying the debt for the economically wealthy northern countries,.

Richard McColl: A serious issue. And I can only imagine the low lying islands that produce so much income, the Bay Islands, for the country through tourism. This is a real issue. I remember living in Central America, in Guatemala at the time of Hurricane Mitch, of course, which wiped out the whole banana crop there and much more. The tragic loss of life in Honduras back in.

Rosemary Joyce: Well, the Most recent, the 2020 hurricanes in Honduras actually flooded the world Heritage site of Copan, which is in the highlands. So these impacts are of course, as you say, on low lying places, but they're also in the mountainous interior of Honduras, stripping the soil and destroying agricultural fields, but also imperiling the tourism industry. Yes,.

Richard McColl: But I think we've covered a lot. We've covered a lot in this short period of time. It has been absolutely fascinating. And let me take this moment to say thank you so much to Rosemary Joyce, who is the distinguished professor of anthropology at the University of California in Berkeley. It has been a real pleasure and so very interesting to discuss Honduras with you.

Rosemary Joyce: Rosemary, thank you for the opportunity.

Richard McColl: It has been this has been the LatinNews Podcast. We've been discussing Honduras, contemporary politics and, of course, well, the issues taking place in the Central American country. We will be back in a couple of weeks discussing further items and issues from Latin America. We'll be discussing Uruguay. But this is again, this has been Richard McColl, your host here in Bogota, Colombia, speaking to Rosemary Joyce of the University of California, Berkeley. Thank you so much for listening to the LatinNews Podcast. And goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to the LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.LatinNews.com.

Jon Farmer is Editor-in-chief at LatinNews and editor of our Latin American Weekly Report, the company’s flagship publication. Just as comfortable sitting in front of a camera as a computer, he has made numerous media appearances on news networks such as the BBC and CNN. He has participated in panel discussions for Canning House on key political developments in Latin America (the Honduran coup d’état in June 2009 produced a particularly lively debate).

Jon has also worked in Central America, covering elections in Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama, and has travelled extensively across the entire region. A prodigious reader on and off topic, Jon’s special interests include governance and democracy; caudillismo and political leadership; and the challenge of national and indigenous identities.

He holds an MA in Latin American Studies from the Institute for the Study of the Americas, School of Advanced Studies, University of London, where he majored in the International Politics of Latin America and Economics of Latin America.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast, our first episode of 2024. This week we'll be talking about Argentina and President Milei. We have none other than Jon Farmer, editor-in-chief of LatinNews, here on the line from London. And we're going to discuss everything Argentina related because, well, it makes for a great story and perhaps we can go a little bit further, a little bit more profoundly into, well, who is Javier Milei, the President of Argentina and of course, where he stands and what he's doing. So welcome back here on The LatinNews Podcast.

Jon Farmer: A pleasure to be here. Thanks very much, Richard.

Richard McColl: Well, no, I mean, you work on this day in, day out and no one better, I think, to talk about Milei, larger than life character. We know him from all of the pictures in the newspapers, wielding his chainsaw. His, I would say, curious haircut of course, makes the headlines as well. You have plenty of stories about him. But let's start from the very beginning. Where did this guy appear from?

Jon Farmer: Well, I mean, you're absolutely right. I mean he does have this various eccentricities which myriad media reports have focused on, you know, the idea that he practices telepathy with his living and dead dogs to get political advice. And he was a tantric sex instructor. He made his name as a sort of daytime TV personality, as you mentioned. His hairstylist sort of described him as Wolverine. So unstable, but with a heart of gold. He calls himself anarcho capitalist. He's a sort of free market libertarian. So he's in favor of legalizing sale of human organs or transplants. And then during the campaign he was obviously called for dollarization and blowing up the central bank. So yes, he's a colorful character, shall we say. But yeah, where he came from. So I mean, comparisons are often made between Milei and Brazil's former president Jair Bolsonaro.

Jon Farmer: So I mean, obviously from a point of view of ideological point of view, there are, there's an affinity right on the both far right. But Bolsonaro, yes, very much a maverick like Milei, but he'd been in Congress for nearly three decades. Bolsonaro, people often forget that. So Milei, politically speaking was much more of a genuine outsider. This was a guy who did pretty much come out of nowhere. He'd served in, as a deputy in the lower chamber of Congress for two Years. So that's the sort of sum total of his political experience, if you like. And then, yeah, suddenly we have him here with us.

Richard McColl: But he touched the nerve, didn't he? He touched a nerve getting out there and obviously representing everything opposite everything in opposition to sort of Peronist history and Kirchnerism and everything that has been going on in Argentina. Can we say he was a protest vote or people genuinely back his policies? They want to see the central bank blown up.

Jon Farmer: Very good, very good question. So people were drawn to him. You know, he's popular, anti system candidate. The system's seen as corrupt and totally ineffective. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. But if it keeps breaking, you need a different fix. Right. So I think he tapped into that voter sentiment. Populism is seductive, as we know. He's a very charismatic speaker, as you alluded to earlier on that wielding a chainsaw over his head during the campaign. I mean, I think many people warm to that sort of theatricality. But above all, as you pointed out, he wasn't one of them. So he's not one of the same old politicians dogged by corruption who'd mismanaged the economy so badly. Also, I think we need to bear in mind the guy he was running against for the Peronists was the Economy minister, Sergio Massa.

Jon Farmer: So this always looked risky. Many voters saw him as the sort of face of failure with inflation skyrocketing. But you know, it wasn't to allude to the final part of your question. I mean, I think it wasn't because voters have hard right views, you know, or they're suddenly converted to the idea of free market economics or they share some of Milei's, you know, anti abortion views or his attacks on the Pope with, you know, an Argentine, lest we forget, or you know, that they're like sort of turkeys voting for Christmas, they fancy some really savage spending cuts and then to subsidies. No, I mean, I think he was elected in large part, I would argue, despite all of this, not because of this.

Jon Farmer: And this is a point, this is a massive indictment of the political class, or the political caste, as he repeatedly calls them at every opportunity. Just been unequal to the task of governing Argentina for so long. And I mean, I think there was an element of this is a leap into the unknown. But let's face it, the known hasn't exactly been a resounding success. Right. So how much worse can it be? And do people believe me, they can turn it around. Ardent supporters, probably, yes, but others probably not. They're thinking, let's just stick it to the established political class. And so when I say there's a strong element of that in it, there was, of course, but, you know, he won only 30% in the first round of election.

Jon Farmer: So it was really what happened next, I think, was crucial because Patricia Bullrich, the presidential candidate for Juntos por el Cambio, which is the sort of traditional right to center coalition of parties, she endorsed his candidacy after she was eliminated after the first round. So this was a woman who Milei had denigrated during the campaign as a Montonero terrorist and murderer from, you know, the dictatorship days, and part of the political cast which he professed to revile, and suddenly they're sort of embracing. And this, I think. And then he goes on to appoint her, of course, as his security minister. But I think this made him look more reasonable. You know, he put the chainsaw in the shed for the second round campaign. And for supporters of Bullrich, who were perhaps wary of Milei, this was a sort of important signal.

Jon Farmer: This, you know, here's a guy who's, okay, we can work with him. He's. He's a bit rough around the edges, but we can shape him. And crucially, and this is the point that Bullrich kept making, crucially, we can get rid of Kirchnerism.

Richard McColl: You sort of ask yourself is who would want the presidency in Argentina? I mean, it's a poison chalice. We see the cycles of boom and bust. The economy is just. I mean, we've looked at it. I go all the way back to De la Rúa and, you know, the burning of. But, yeah, I was there during that period, and it was quite exciting for me as cutting my teeth as a journalist. But you sort of look back and you go through it all and you're like, okay, Milei is kind of promising an economic miracle. I have to ask you, how does he plan to do so in a country which really has never been able to get it. Get its coffers in shape?

Jon Farmer: Yeah, you're absolutely right. I mean, successive governments have lurched between sort of sharp austerity and irresponsible spending, in debt and currency crises, significant official corruption, though. I mean, that's been a theme sort of throughout. Then this guy comes along, he's promising to restore Argentina to its illustrious past of a century ago, you know, when it's one of the top 10 wealthiest countries in the world per capita. And then he claims that this is all within reach. We Just get the economic house in order. In numerous interviews he talks about Argentina's GDP per capita eclipse in the US in 35 years. So yeah, how does he pull off this miracle? Well, his answer is shock therapy, fiscal adjustment and austerity. I mean there's nothing particularly new there.

Jon Farmer: Carlos Menem, who's a sort of neoliberal idol of milei from the 90s, whose nephew, incidentally Milei, is made president of the lower chamber of Congress. He also used shock therapy to try and bring down rampant inflation. So what's Milei proposing exactly? Well, I mean he didn't waste much time. So he's appointed Luis Caputo, who was the finance minister of Mauricio Macri, the president from 2015 to 2019, as his economy minister. And Caputo like a few days after he'd come in, so he released this sort of recorded message and he said, look, we've always been addicted to deficit in this country and that's got to stop spending more than we have has to stop. But the thing is he's not really talking about weaning Argentines off spending, which is what Macri tried, a gradual approach. He's pretty much talking about going cold turkey.

Jon Farmer: And this is inflation. He said inflation is going to get much higher. He was quite plain about that. He said, you know, people need to be accustomed to an uncomfortable truth that's better than a comforting lie. And Julie, inflation has got significantly higher already. I mean just last Friday, So that's what, the 12th of January INDEC. So that's. The National Statistics Institute in Argentina released inflation figures for 2023 which showed that inflation was 211% and monthly inflation in December was 25.5%. That annual figure actually steals Venezuela's crown in the region, which is a pretty dubious accolade. It wouldn't quite have eclipsed Venezuela, which I think off top of my head was 193%. If Caputo hadn't announced one of his first measures, if massive devaluation of the currency. So there's a 54% devaluation within days of coming in.

Jon Farmer: And this is Argentina had this very artificially high official exchange rate. This went to 800 pesos to the dollar subsequently. So this got closer, although not all the way, but closer to the so called blue dollar. This is a sort of black market rate which is around 1,100 pesos to the dollar. But Caputo, yeah, he's, he said that you need to be swinging spending cuts, but this would start from government. So government would set the example here. There'd be massive cuts in public expenditures. The number of cabinet ministries who reduced from in half from 18 to nine, the number of secretaries of state. So that's sort of one rung below ministry level. So deputy ministry that's also been cut from about 100 to around 50. Public works projects cancelled if they've not started and no more will be put out to tender.

Jon Farmer: Transport and utility subsidies will be reduced and then phased out within two years. I mean these are really onerous for the treasury in Argentina. Have really sort of deepened the fiscal deficit, but getting rid of them or seriously push up the cost of electricity and gas and spur inflation further. It reminds me, actually just talking about that, it reminds me of. I write about Uruguay quite a bit and Uruguay's former president José Mujica, he used to describe inflation as a slippery eel because it was so difficult to get a grip on. But Argentina and Europe, you know, it's an altogether more serious sea monster than sort of in Uruguay, if you like. And this, it would be very difficult to get a grip of.

Richard McColl: It's always the economy, I mean, and this stripping back everything to the bare bones, as you say, halving the cabinet, halving ministry and so on. The promise to dollarize the economy. Where do we see that progressing?

Jon Farmer: Dollarization?

Richard McColl: Yeah,.

Jon Farmer: Well, people don't really want pesos. You know, there's a reason why so many Argentines have savings abroad. They don't trust it. They don't trust Argentine banks and institutions. So they seek refuge in the dollar. You know, it's a kind of anchor in these frequent financial storms in Argentina and the 2001, 2002 financial meltdown when lots of people lost their savings overnight. It takes a heck of a lot to rebuild confidence after experiences like that. Would dollarization solve this issue? Well, it has problems of its own and just getting it off the ground would be so challenging. You can't dollarize without dollars. Right. And even by his own admission, it would need $40 billion. Where are they going to come from? Argentina is up to its ears in dollar denominated debt. The central bank doesn't have enough dollars to cover the pesos currently in circulation.

Jon Farmer: Dollarization, it's not a panacea. It could absolutely lower inflation, but you've not got control over monetary policy. Overspending still possible. Argentina would have to run a current account surplus. The other issue of course is that strong dollar would make Argentina's exports more expensive and less competitive. We know just how important Agricultural exports are to the economy. For instance, Argentina's international reserves were absolutely pummeled last year because of a severe drought which reduced agricultural exports so much and foreign exchange wasn't flooding in.

Richard McColl: I mean, this is a good part for me to jump in then. You've gone through major international themes here. How have investors, let's say, how have investors in Argentina, foreign investors, seen this movement by Milei and the presidency of Milei?

Jon Farmer: I think investors are likely to feel sort of mixed emotions, really. They've reacted with, as they're encouraged by it, local businesses are sort of encouraged by it. I think Milei wants to incentivize foreign investment in the hydrocarbons industry, lithium, renewable energy. He wants to rip up red tape and bureaucracy. He thinks climate change is sort of socialist flim flam, so he wants to reduce constraints on investment. So on the one hand, I think, yes, this makes Argentina an attractive proposition for investors, but on the other hand, there's a serious risk of social unrest, which investors don't want to, as we know, and political uncertainty that goes with that, obviously. And then, of course, threatening to pull Argentina out of Mercosur and the massive problems that this would create with Brazil, which is what he said he'd do during the campaign.

Jon Farmer: I mean, I know he's not going to deliver on that threat now he's in office and he's acting in a more pragmatic way. But it did mark him out as a loose cannon and I think investors will be wary of that. Whilst they're encouraged by some of the moves he's made, for sure, there will also be a degree of caution, I think.

Richard McColl: I think so. And the IMF in general, when we look at that, how are they responding?

Jon Farmer: Yeah, the IMF, that's an interesting one because, I mean, a visiting team from the IMF was just in Argentina just last week, offered very firm support for Milei's proposed changes and his reforms, and it agreed to disperse a $3.3 billion loan to Argentina. This has been held up since last November and another 1.4 billion, sort of ahead of schedule. So this allowed the government to meet impending payments to the IMF, which I think were about 2.6 billion, if I remember.

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Jon Farmer: And the IMF, you know, praised Milei, praised his team for moving quickly and decisively with a Strong policy package and so on after. And this, I think the key part of the statement that I took was after the government, the previous government, had gone severely off track and the targets weren't being met. But it did say, look, the path forward will be a challenging one. And very much like Milei, to be honest, I mean, very much echoing Milei's words during his inauguration. Of all the speeches I've heard at inauguration ceremonies, his was about as downbeat as I can recollect. I mean, he was absolutely. He wasn't sugarcoating anything. And the IMF sort of reiterated that, you know, things are going to get worse before they get better. And.

Jon Farmer: Milei has said, you know, that his austerity measures go way beyond anything that the IMF has advocated. And I think, I'm sure the IMF would rather that than that a government, you know, consistently fails to meet targets. But at the same time, you know, the IMF, just like investors, it doesn't want an explosion of social unrest in Argentina either, and the serious political repercussions that would come from that.

Richard McColl: We'll get into social unrest in a minute because there are points there that I'd like to cover. But you mentioned, of course, Milei talking in his campaign about withdrawing Argentina from Mercosur. This is obviously foreign policy. This is local foreign policy within the region. But where does he stand then, really, as a, you know, as a president taking Argentina forward, is he likely to move towards China, the U.S. brazil? I mean, I. I get the idea that he wants to position Argentina once again as sort of a leading nation from the sort of the Hispanic section of South America. Right. You know, like a spokesperson for the region. How do you feel about this?

Jon Farmer: I think he's been very clear, actually, about his foreign policy priorities. So geopolitically, he wants to bring Argentina firmly back into the orbit of the.

Richard McColl: US.

Jon Farmer: He's been very candid about that. A restoration reminds me of sort of Carlos Menem during his government. It was the talk of having carnal relations with Washington. And that's kind of what that defined ties under Menem. And I think Milei would like to sort of restore that. You know, he doesn't want to be aligned with what he called communists in his campaign. And of course, he included in that definition Communist President Lula da Silva, who's president of neighboring Brazil. And he said at the time in the campaign that he wouldn't have any dealings with Brazil and he'd withdraw Argentina from Mercosur, and he wanted to cut ties with China. I Mean, these are Argentina's two largest trading partners, so this would be economic suicide. Of course. This is the campaign. He's now in government. Things do change, although they're.

Jon Farmer: I'm sure they won't be forgotten. But, you know, after his victory, he did send. So his future foreign minister, Diana Mondino, sent her to Brasilia to sort of try and smooth things over. Actually, he did extend an invitation to Lula to his inauguration. Lula didn't come, of course. Bolsonaro was in attendance, for starters. I don't think he would have been keen to sort of bump into him. And I don't think he'd forgotten a lot of the very offensive comments that Milei made during the campaign. So I think it's fair to say relations I don't think will be close, but I think equally pragmatism will prevail. Argentina needs Brazil more than vice versa.

Jon Farmer: And ties actually probably will be a bit better than they were when Bolsonaro was in power and Alberto Fernández was in power in Argentina, because that was also a shocking relationship from a rapport perspective. And Milei did actually keep Daniel Scioli, the ambassador to Brazil. He kept him in place from Fernandez's administration into his. To Fernandez's disgust, he was like, how could this guy serve under me and then serve under me? It's just inconceivable. But the China thing that you mentioned, I think that's very interesting. So, again, I envisage colder relations there. I think it will be very much focused on sort of commercial matters. But significantly, China has suspended its swap line to Argentina's central bank within a couple of weeks of Milei taking office. So this is cutting off access to cheap funding, which has been in place since 2009.

Jon Farmer: So I think that's really kind of pressuring Milei to take a less stridently, forthright, sort of critical stance on China.

Richard McColl: There's something very key that you said in this is of course there what is said in the campaign and what is done obviously, on the ground now that he's in power and the word pragmatism. And of course, you felt at the beginning that he was being rather moderate with some of his nominations, but I suppose as time ticks on, he'll surround himself with more, let's say, friendly politicians and yes men to be able to force through some of his plans, because, I mean, in Congress he hasn't got a majority. He's threatening to legislate by decree to push all these things. So you figure that he's going to be backed into a corner and will start lashing out.

Jon Farmer: That's entirely possible. Yes. No, I absolutely agree with that. And you know, in Congress, his party, this sort of personalist party, La Libertad Avanza, will be the weakest of any president since the return to democracy in 1983. So his party's got just 38 deputies in the lower chamber. So that's got 257 seat lower chamber, seven senators in the 72 seat Senate. So we're talking a long way of having a majority his party. But you know, he could try and work with Congress, build a consensus, but his attitude I think has slightly alienated potential allies in Juntos por el Cambio so this is the writer center traditional opposition that is kind of keen to work with him but wants to ensure that he remains moderate. So we, you know, we've got the two main parties in it are Propuesta Republicana.

Jon Farmer: So that's the party of Bullrich, who he's his, who was in the elections, lost in the first round, who's now his security minister for the most part the pro as they're called, they're inclined to back him and they got 40 odd deputies. So again, not enough for a majority, but a lot more than he has. And then the other main party in Juntos is the Unión Cívica Radical, the ucr. So this was fiercely critical of Milei during the campaign as representing anti democracy and was actually incensed that Bullrich endorsed his candidacy because it said, look, she doesn't speak for the whole coalition. She did, but they weren't happy about that. Now you know, the UCR has rode back on that a bit. You know, it's now prepared to work with the government, but it's not, there's no way it's going to give him carte blanche.

Jon Farmer: You know, there's massive disquiet about his request for superpowers in particular. So you know there's this omnibus bill that's been sent that Milei has sent to Congress which contains some 564 articles and one of those is seeking legislative powers to basically rule by decree in a whole range of areas in response to what Milei describes as the current national emergency and that this would be in place for two years with the option to extend for a further two years. So that would essentially cover his entire four year term. Now obviously Congress isn't really even parties that might be inclined to support him aren't going to be ecstatic at the idea of essentially being denuded of power in A lot of areas for such a very long period of time. So he hasn't shown, though, any great appetite for negotiation.

Jon Farmer: He's maintained that, in fact he won't negotiate anything in that bill. I mean, I think that is just a sort of tough negotiating stance, ironically, and that he will. He has said he's sort of. How did he put it? I. That he's prepared to take suggestions, I think, is how he put it. So it's semantic. I think there's a slight game of semantics there. So, I mean, I think he would. He probably will ultimately need to negotiate in order to get that through. And it may be that, you know, elements of it will just have to be reformed. So perhaps Congress might be prepared, for instance, to grant him some legislative powers to rule by decree, but for a much shorter period of time and in much more defined areas.

Richard McColl: I mean, I can understand this. And you can understand very much so in opposition to this ruling by decree and for such a long period of time that can be extended and that alarm bells ring. That's when you hear that kind of thing.

Jon Farmer: Absolutely.

Richard McColl: And that's really where you sort of jump in at the idea of social. Or the idea. The reality of social unrest. There have already been demonstrations in Argentina and I know that on the 24th of January there is a general strike. The unions are all in opposition this social. Unless the unrest. And I do know that he's. Are they looking to not outlaw protests, but certainly make protests far more difficult in Argentina right now?

Jon Farmer: Yes. So you're absolutely right. There's a general strike planned for 24th of January, which has been called by the CGT, which is the largest and most powerful trade union movement in Argentina. And this was after he sent this omnibus bill to Congress, the one asking for congressional powers to rule by decree. And this, to my knowledge, is the earliest sort of call for industrial action in a presidential town I can think of. So it's just six weeks into his term. The trade union movement is very powerful in Argentina, as you alluded to there. There's also the piquetero social movements who were empowered under Kirchnerism, who have already flexed their muscles on 28 December with protests in Buenos Aires Province. And then of course, what is the overall risk of further social unrest? I mean, you've got to say it's very significant in.

Jon Farmer: I mean, Caputo did promise to double payments under social welfare programs like universal child allowance and the food card scheme, and he said he'd cut out intermediaries and end the sort of political clientelism, which was rife under Kirchnerist government. So the payments would go directly to those who sort of most need it. But let's face it, if the removal of price controls, food inflation soared even higher than inflation in December, removing energy and transport subsidies. This is going to hurt. This is going to be painful. There's a quote I'm reminded of when I say that Argentina's presidential spokesperson, Manuel Adorni, so he acknowledged there was going to be significant pain, saying there was no option. Then he said, how did he put it? That, you know, we didn't receive a patient with a toothache. That's right. We didn't receive a patient with toothache.

Jon Farmer: We found one intensive care that's about to die. So, you know, the drastic measures were going to be absolutely essential. There was no alternative to this. Coming back to the other part of your sort of question though, yeah, Milei's not naive. He will have anticipated there are likely to be social protests. So Bullrich has drawn up this, what she calls a protocol of public order or anti-piquete plan to try and clamp down on protests. So there'll be very serious penalties for roadblocks. They'd essentially be outlawed in protests. So you'd only be able to protest on pavements, which will be hugely challenging if you've got large numbers of protesters to sort of stick to that. But these penalties wouldn't just apply to those taking part in the protest. These would also apply to those transporting, organizing and financing the protests.

Jon Farmer: So, you know, this is a significant preparation for what I imagine he envisages is likely to lie ahead.

Richard McColl: You see, they're sort of, they've laid this groundwork in all of this rhetoric, as you say, the patient dying intensive care, that things are going to get harder, that inflation's going to obviously worsen immensely before it gets better. So they've made this groundwork for, I would say, unrest. They know it's going to happen. I think I would suggest all of this movement is like, you know, what's going to happen. So I mean, this is Argentina at the end. And my final kind of comment here is, and don't obviously, you know, bet your professional career on this, John. But do we think that Milei will see out his term? Do we think we'll see him being forced to step aside or stepping aside voluntarily before his term is up?

Jon Farmer: You're right. I mean, this is the classic question where you can get made to look a fool a few months down the line. Right. I mean, I think there's a few sort of key points. I'll, I'll back into this one. I mean, I think, look, Milei's not renowned for his emotional stability. He's, you know, he's got minimal political experience. But as we've discussed earlier, I do think he's been quite politically adroit in some areas in terms of his Cabinet appointments and stuff. And then he's been given credit for. He's moderated his stance, but he definitely has an underlying authoritarian streak, you know, and if Congress sort of stymies his agenda, will he sort of revert to this radical, belligerent figure of the election campaign? Well, quite possibly. I mean, by the standards of his campaign rhetoric, yes, he has.

Jon Farmer: He is being moderate so far, but I don't expect this to last if you feel sort of frustrated or thwarted by Congress. And I think he'll keep pushing Congress, he'll keep blaming Congress for failing to support his reforms if things go wrong. He's not afraid to resort to repression if there is social unrest. But there's a lot that's wrong with Argentina. Voters wouldn't be electing someone like Javier Milei if that weren't the case. But will he see out his term? Not many non Peronists have. Let's face it, if he can turn the economy around and reduce inflation, these are two huge ifs.

Jon Farmer: A lot will hinge, I think, on how he pulls through the next few months, when by his own admission, things will be getting a lot worse and whether we see some more sort of green shoots after that, because there will be a limit to how much pain people can absorb before they're expecting it. And I think there's a degree of acceptance of that, but obviously when the reality bites, that might sort of change. But have I got the question.

Richard McColl: That's okay. That's okay. You're not betting your professional reputation on this, but as you said, huge ifs, huge questions. And how much pain are Argentines prepared to absorb if they're not going to see any return on that as well? I mean, that's kind of what I'm getting from this. So, again, like I said, I'm glad you didn't gamble your professional reputation there because you are Jon Farmer, the editor-in-chief of LatinNews, so you've got to be careful on these things. You don't want to look like a fool down the line. Off MIC we could probably discuss what you really think, but let's keep this off Mike and take this moment to say thank you so much for your time and, of course, quite exhaustive knowledge on Argentina and what's going on right now. So thank you. Thank you for sharing.

Jon Farmer: Thanks so much, Richard.

Richard McColl: It's been an absolute pleasure to talk to Jon Farmer here, editor-in-chief of LatinNews there in London. I am Richard McColl, the host of this podcast here in Bogotá, Colombia. We'll be back in a couple of weeks time discussing more issues and topics from around the region. But this has been the first episode of 2024 discussing Argentina and President Milei and, of course, his proposed economic miracle in that country. So stay tuned for more. Thank you for listening. And, of course, goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.LatinNews.com.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo is a Costa Rican Political Scientist. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh and a Master in Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences from Columbia University. He is a Professor in the Political Science Department of the University of Costa Rica, a researcher at the Programa Estado de la Nacion, and the Principal researcher of the Costa Rican chapter of the Americas Barometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project. His research interests include political participation, electoral behaviour, political parties and local politics.

Intro: Welcome to the The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is the The LatinNews Podcast. I am Richard McColl, your host here in Bogota, Colombia. My very special guest this week is Ronald Alfaro Redondo. He's in Costa Rica. He's a researcher in the Political Science department of the Universidad de Costa Rica or the University of Costa Rica. He's also a researcher for the State of the Nation program. And last week, the 23rd of November, they released the State of Nation report. You can find that on their website, Estado Nacion Punto o ereje punto [email protected] and we're going to launch in just a second, but let me remind all the listeners out there that this is the final episode of the year of 2023 for the The LatinNews Podcast. We will be back on the 16th of January discussing, well, the future presidency of Milei in Argentina. But for now, welcome on the The LatinNews Podcast, Ronald Alfaro Redondo.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Oh, thank you so much for the invitation. It's my pleasure. It is. It's good to talk to you this day.

Richard McColl: It's good to talk about Costa Rica. You know, Costa Rica obviously is in the shadow of El Salvador, Guatemala and of course Nicaragua at the moment. But I think we need to discuss what's going on because there's some turbulent times in Costa Rica at the moment. And I think this is best put if we explain who the president Rodrigo Chaves is with regards to the sort of populism taking over the region.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, well, Rodrigo Chaves is the current president of Costa Rica and he's an economist. He worked for many years international institutions like World Bank especially, and now he's going, he's coming to the second year of the administration. It's going to be on May 2024, second year. So it's going, you know, it's coming to half of the administration now.

Richard McColl: So he's halfway through almost to how much can we attribute his election as president to or how important was Pilar Cisneros in this election?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Well, yeah, she was an important part of the campaign as well. Now she's the leader of the Legislative party. Right. The, the officialist. And she is, she's perhaps the closest, you know, the closest person to current, the current president.

Richard McColl: Okay. But of course she's of, you know, born in Peru but sort of grew up her formative years in Costa Rica, which prohibited it, I suppose her from running. My friends on the ground say that she was, I mean, pivotal in garnering support.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, especially because she, she's a journalist and so well known journalist. She was in the TV, TV news for a long time. So she's, you know, a public figure.

Richard McColl: In that kind of thing. So great recognition, of course, for President Rodrigo Chaves. He speaks, he's very straight talking. Some say he's arrogant obviously that doesn't obviously rub people up the right way if he's straight talking. But he comes in really at a time and regionally so where there is a great discontent with the established political class. Can you explore a little bit as to what actually is going on? Yeah.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Well, the president or the current government relies on a very, I would say very simple but very sophisticated communication kind of strategy. Right. The president all, you know, all the weeks on Wednesdays they have like this conference in which many of the cabinet is there and they have this long conversation with journalists and questions and answers. And you know, also they communicate, they have that very sophisticated communication strategy for that. So in, in that way that is a different kind of aspect of the government, but it's a, is in some ways unique for the Costa Rican perspective. Perspective. We know that internationally. So you know, all these leaders, they have this connection or this contact with their bases or the people they support or they rely on. But in the Costa Rican cases, it's in some way unique, especially because even the president itself is a strong figure in terms of this communication. And now we have to go back to the election in 2024 to see what are the conditions under which Rodrigo Chaves is governing now. He was able to attract voters, were undecided, a lot of people were undecided during that campaign. And well, he was the different, the different option, right? He was an alternative for traditional parties or even for the party in government, the Citizens’ Action Party, who was in government during eight years. Right. And well, he attracted those voters, he got the, those electoral support and, but that was for the presidential election, for the legislative election. His party was, he got a small portion of vote and his legislative party now is 10 representatives out of 57. Our Congress is small, but still the president is in minority. The president's party in congress is in minority. So in the Costa Rican system, political system, when you have these conditions, which are not necessarily new because we have seen this in the past, these conditions, you are in a situation in which other actors you depend on. On. On other actors, right? So you are now you have to build coalitions, you have to negotiate, you have to bargain with those actors in order to reach or to get, you know, your things or your interest, your policies, all these kind of factors. But previous presidents in this, in the same kind of conditions, they rely on coalitions, legislative coalitions to move their agenda, right? However, the evidence that we have in our national report about human development, we know that the President in some way abandoned, right. The coalition building process, which in, you know, it turns the things more complicated, right?

Richard McColl: So I mean, he abandoned this, as you say, the traditional coalition, the coalition practice. And also he's doing this, let's say Wednesday, speaking to the people, speaking out. I mean, does he fall under the umbrella of Central American populism in this respect?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Well, in some way, but we can identify some, you know, similar kind of trends or this. However, again, the Costa Rican political system is a decentralized system, right? The, the executive power or the, the executive branch is a key player, is a very important player, obviously, but is not the dominant player, which is a different important differences, right? Especially when you compare the Costa Rican political powers of the President with presidential powers in Latin America. And in that regard the President relies on the support of other political parties, right? Especially in the, in Congress. But you know, abandoning the coalition practice is not necessarily the best strategy, right. For the, for political purposes. Because in Costa Rica the President lacks of the possibility of roll the dice again, right? It is. Well, these are the conditions under the President is governing and those conditions remain all the administration. We don't have midterm elections. We don't have consecutive re election. So the President can be reelected, but he has to wait one period out of the presidency to again to compete. We lack of the midterm. We lack. Well, we don't have reelection, consecutive re election and also we don't have army, right. So and all those mechanisms, the, you know, presidential figures in Latin America has been using those mechanisms to expand their political power, especially when they have these difficult circumstances to govern.

Richard McColl: The issue of having no midterms is very interesting indeed. As you say, doesn't allow him to roll the dice, doesn't allow him to have a period of grace. Indeed. I mean it's very interesting indeed that I was not aware of this. So what is President Chaves's approval rating at the moment?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, well, that's another important, I would say a singular feature or characteristic because President Chaves, you know, start the, his administration with the highest approval rate in decades. 30 Decades. Around around 30 decades. So with his political capital was strong, a lot of support. People were in his side. Most of the people were in his side. I'm talking about approval rating close to 80, right? 80, Right. So which is high for, even for our political context, right? Very high. But you know, in, you know, one of the laws of the old political phenomenons is that, well, you know, approval ratings, high approval ratings are difficult to you know, to, to. To maintain. But also, well, the natural process is this erosion, right? Gradual erosion in. In political support. So the president now is in the around 50s, right? Around 50s. So it has been losing support, but still he still have high popular support. When we compare his administration with previous ones, right? The the high risk of this that, well, the President is coming to halfway of his administration and well, he can still, you know, be exposed to the higher erosion of or support.

LatinNews: This podcast is brought to you by LatinNews, the leading source of political and economic news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean since 1967. Access LatinNews full portfolio of [email protected].

Richard McColl: Well, to be at 50% almost two years in this region is. Well, almost anywhere I would say is a positive thing. But again, dropping from 80% in two years to 50%. But we could see that as predictable. Of course it is. I think he was elected in to try and shake things up in Costa Rica. To try and shake things up and of course to combat a little bit the political elites that of course are behind the traditional parties we see in so many different countries. But these elites, they're not going anywhere. They're not going to disappear in this four year term. So how does he hope to achieve what he does with the rhetoric and trying to combat this?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, that's true. I mean the strategy in this case relies on this idea that he can do or his administration can do different things. So this classic phrase of get things done is one of the right. One of the ideas. However, the problem in the Costa Rican system, political system is that again, you have a decentralized design of power and you have to. The. The. The factor that avoids the system to get like into crisis or gridlock. The, the version of the. The. Our local gridlock. The the factor that avoids the political system to be in that situation is the cooperation, right? Cooperation between powers, the judicial, the executive, the Legislative also political actors, political leaders, if they cooperate, they may have better chances to get things done. Right? But now we, what we are seeing is that the strategy, the style of govern during the Rodrigo Chaves presidency is not necessarily cooperation, right? It's not a cooperative. Cooperative mechanism is more antagonistic. So it produces and provokes conflicts, disputes and gridlock. So it is not so easy for a president like him, with a high popularity, but with very weak support in Congress to move the agenda. Right. And the effects of these disputes, controversies, or just these conflicts between powers, you know, you can see the production of legislation is not so big also, it's not in the most relevant topics for citizens. And he's experiencing this kind of difficulties for moving their agenda, his agenda. And the opposition, you know, they react. And we have a judicialization of the, all the political decisions, pretty much everything.

Richard McColl: Right, so when you say it's a judicialization, what exactly do you mean?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Exactly? Yeah, I'm talking about in the Costa Rican case. The judicial system is a powerful one in terms of they have a mechanism to evaluate whether or not the political decisions are constitutional or not. Constitutional control, the classic version of the constitutional control. Our Constitutional Court is very powerful and citizens, anyone in Costa Rica can ask the Supreme Court, in this case, the Constitutional Court to evaluate these circumstances. And when, I mean everybody, I mean every citizen, even childs, use Constitutional Court to, let's say, when they feel that their rights are in danger, they go to the Constitutional Court and the laws, also the executive decrees, most of them are going to that process. And we know that the numbers and the number of cases that the Constitutional Court is evaluating regarding this constitutional evaluation are increasing, you know, are getting high. And in the last year, we have seen the highest numbers in years.

Richard McColl: So this is almost the dirty tricks campaign by the opposition to put brakes on any change trying to be pushed through by the administration of Rodrigo Chaves.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Right. So if the executive is not interested in, you know, building these coalitions, the opposition is reacting us at the same time. If they know, if they do not negotiate, if they lack of mechanisms to coordinate, to cooperate, well, they are using other tools in some way to block the agenda, the government's agenda. And in the Costa Rican case, we have multiple choices, checks and balances. And there are also autonomies, right? There are institutions, public institutions that are autonomy. So if the President wants to do something in that institution, most of the time their autonomy, legal autonomy is not or doesn't allow the President to do this. This kind of thing.

Richard McColl: And one thing that we need to discuss and obviously will be very present in your research agenda is the attacks by the press on, particularly La Nación, on Rodrigo Chaves and of course, the president's attacks on the press, vice versa. Tell us, I mean, does this stem from Chavez and others exposing that use of the pension money from La Nación for building the park, for concerts? I mean, it just goes on into this strange and convoluted, I would say, a kind of web of corruption.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah. And the relationship between the media and the press and the governments in Costa Rica is always, you know, it's always tense. Right. It's always conflictual, it's always disputes and, but again, regarding what kind of topic they remain. You know, they respect each other. They have this kind of. However, in the last years, we have seen an increase in the number of cases evaluated or analyzed by the Constitutional Court related to the freedom of expression or in general for the relationships between the government and the media. And these disputes are in some way showing that these rights are suffering for that kind of thing.

Richard McColl: Right.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: So that's unusual, very unusual for the Costa Rican context because, well, if media, they cover what the government do and the government also, sometimes they attack the media. Well, but they respect, in general, they have a relationship with, they respect each other. But now, even international reports about the situation in Costa Rica, we have seen a decrease, an important decrease in that kind of issue.

Richard McColl: Is there, would you say, is an increase in the freedom, I mean, a decrease in the freedom of the press in Costa Rica then?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, especially related to attacks coming from the government to different, you know, TV or newspapers most of the time for TV and newspapers and these kind of national ones, the, the oldest ones, I would say.

Richard McColl: Okay, so. Yes, definitely. And, and we need to talk about something else in this conversation as well. I mean, it's something that is always of importance in the region. Costa Rica seems to, obviously, because of its history of a peaceful nation, the nation with no army, as you previously mentioned, and all the checks and balances in place, which seem to be incredibly well respected. But what's the security situation taking place in Costa Rica? We read about the drugs, gangs, a capture recently. We're nowhere near the neighbors, Costa Rica's regional neighbors. But what's going on right now?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, we are going under one of the most, you know, the severe kind of security crisis, especially related to homicides.

Richard McColl: Right.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: The number of homicides in this year has been increasing as any, as, you know, as in any other period in our history. And we have the national police, we have no army, so we cannot rely on that kind of thing or use that, that as a another tool. So we have the national police, we have the judicial system and we are in this. All these institutions are right now under a lot of pressure because of how to manage, how to deal with this kind of thing. And also the government, the Ministry of Security there was a replacement I think mid year this year and because well, something was the present world was not satisfied with the how those things were attack. And again now we have this situation, difficult situation, especially for let's say for tourism and for locals as well. Right. And we now we are trying to, and we have to find out alternatives for dealing with this important, you know, situation.

Richard McColl: This is homicides again as you say, have grown exponentially for Costa Rica. But what, I mean, what is the reason for this?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Most of the, most of those cases are related to drug trafficking, especially gangs and people re involved in this drug dealing kind of thing. And yeah, most of them are men, young men though they use like these arms and you know, with you know, very destructive kind of thing. So but most of them are related to drug trafficking.

Richard McColl: And the gangs, these are multinational gangs. The ones that let's say the trend or from Venezuela or associated with the Sinaloa or Nuevo Jalisco cartels.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah they're in some way associated with basically Mexican in some way or for South America also. And but you know, yeah, those multinational camping. But we, you know, there are locals involved in that kind of thing as well.

Richard McColl: And the production of fentanyl, I read in cost within Costa Rica.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah yeah, we have seen last, I think last week. Well, there was a police operation in order to you know, to combat or. Yeah, this kind of thing which is, you know, very, you know, serious and yeah, most of the, I think that the operation they capture people in different places in the pyramid of this business. Right.

Richard McColl: And finally as we wind this down, I mean President Rodrigo Chaves again as we mentioned previously, shaking things up, trying to take on the traditional political elites. I think we've suggested that there's a petulance there of his, the way he speaks and attacks the press. But let's talk about the future of the welfare state in Costa Rica. Where do we see it progressing at this point in time?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, that's a very important element in our society. The, this society was built in a compromise. We have a compromise, a Common compromise that in order to provide access to health, better education, more jobs and also to protect the environment. And, and we also have a compromise introducing reforms and to modernize all these dimensions using the democratic mechanisms. And we know that the current government emphasize on the fiscal austerity and they are cutting budgets for services that are very relevant for our people, especially public education. They're cutting some resources for transportation, for whole child or food, you know, providing food in, during the child or during the high or during the school full time. Right. For high school, for primary school and also for providing to sponsor kids to go to school. So it is important for our country for our society to you know, to avoid sacrifice or sacrificing this funds or services, public services that are so relevant for our people, especially for the most vulnerable people or neighbors in our country.

Richard McColl: So I mean Costa Rica is running an immense fiscal debt and this is where they're looking to cut budgets. But this could really turn the people against the administration. 50%, 50 Plus percent approval right now. But let's say early next year if more budgets are cut, we can see that approval rating tumbling.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Exactly, exactly. Especially because education is very important. So people, they, in Costa Rica, citizens, they have high expectations, very high expectations about education, about health, about security as well security and other, many other aspects. So we identify some risk in terms of our political or our policies related to protection or to protect the environment because of these cuttings or because ambiguity or because sometimes we are looking or we are in serious risk of diminishing the public mechanisms or tools or institutions or capacities to protect our environment. So now we have to take this situation, you know, seriously and say well, we have, we have depth, we have public debt right now the situation is better now it is time not to commit the same mistakes we ended up doing in the 80s.

Richard McColl: So certainly some very challenging two years ahead for the administration of the president. And Well, I mean how do you see it unfolding? As a final question, how do you see it unfolding?

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, it's, yeah. That they are, you know, there is a lot of uncertainty about this thing. Right. Also we have local elections in February next year. So early in the. So. Well, I'm not saying that the government is gonna, it's gonna have or usually national governments do they do not have like a lot of control of the municipalities because in Costa Rica municipalities are funded by, especially by their own resources, not to national governments. But we have local elections early next year and we are going to start the second part of the administration soon. And the questions here is or the big questions are how are we going to do with the education, security, health, especially for the most vulnerable people?

Richard McColl: Well, thank you very much. We've been speaking to Ronald Alfaro Redondo, who is a researcher of political science at the Department of Political Science, the University of Costa Rica and a researcher at the State of the Nation program there in Costa Rica. Do check out the State of the Nation report, which is found at the website in Spanish estadonacion.or.cr and you can find links to that report available now. Ronald, thank you so much for your time and sharing news from Costa Rica. Always a pleasure to hear about this country because it doesn't get much coverage, but we do know it as the great country with no army and stability there in Central America, very much in, well, opposite to a lot of the countries around it. So it's refreshing to hear about Costa Rica even though it's a challenging time ahead.

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo: Yeah, it is. Well, thank you so much for the invitation again. It was my real pleasure to be here. And yeah, we're gonna see how things evolve in the near future.

Richard McColl: We'll be watching as well. And of course, that is the final episode done here for the LatinNews podcast for 2023. You can catch up with all previous episodes in this period and we will be back on 16 January discussing Argentina and of course, future President Milei. So thank you again for listening and for your support all of this year. The The LatinNews Podcast will be back in 2024. I've been Richard McColl, your host and.

Outro: Goodbye, you've been listening to the The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.LatinNews.com.

Andrew Thompson is a journalist and political risk analyst.

He is a former foreign correspondent (Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Rio) and a broadcaster for the BBC’s Latin American Service.

He is also an Associate Fellow at Canning House in London. Working through La Rambla Research Ltd he writes about economics, political risk, and business in Latin America.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl, your host here in Bogota, Colombia. My very special guest this week is Andrew Thompson. He's an analyst, political risk analyst, covering Latin America. He's the second time on The LatinNews Podcast. So this week we are going to be discussing a special report brought out by LatinNews, and it's called Is the Latin American Illicit Drug Business Changing? Authored, of course, by Andrew Thompson. So welcome back on the podcast, Andrew.

Andrew Thompson: Good to be here.

Richard McColl: Well, no, it's always a pleasure to talk to you and dip into your vast reservoir of knowledge about the region and so on. You authored this new report. Well, how did this come about? This report came about. I mean, rather than, do you know, we're not going to be critiquing the report at all. But six years ago, you wrote a different report called Crime and Security Trends and Solutions, and it had eight main headlines, those of which you address in this report. Perhaps we could give it a little bit of a background for our listeners.

Andrew Thompson: Yes, I think that the problem I was trying to tackle is the fact that it seems that everything is changing in the drug trade and in the life of the criminal cartels that run it. And yet at the same time, it seems as if nothing is changing because it's the same problem that keeps repeating itself over and over. So the report I wrote six years ago was an attempt just to summarize, what are the headlines of the drug problem in Latin America. And I came up with eight, which I'll just run through quite quickly. Number one, a very high death rate linked to the criminal activities of the cartels. This is usually measured in numbers of intentional homicides per year. And Latin America has got, in fact, the worst record in the world. It's got 20, 30 per 100,000 intentional deaths every year.

Andrew Thompson: So that's one of the headlines. Another is that the criminal cartel six years ago showed every sign of being strong, healthy, adaptable and resilient. A third headline is that the economics of the drug business is very strong, which means there is very strong demand for drugs. And in some ways, demand always creates its supply. There'll always be someone prepared to traffic drugs. Point number four, things were beginning to change in the United States with the rise of what you might call the opioid pandemic use of synthetic drugs. Number five, there seemed to be a trend of increasing coca production in Colombia. Number six, there is a massive crisis in the Latin American prison system, which is used as a recruiting ground for lots of cartels and which is also often dominated by cartels who dictate terms to the prison authorities.

Andrew Thompson: Number seven, despite all these problems, there are elements in the judiciary, prosecutors, judges, who are prepared to take on corruption and to face issues like money laundering. And then finally, the region as a whole has a crisis in its criminal justice system. The ability to. Of the combination of police and courts to identify those responsible for criminal activity, bring them to trial, carry out successful trials and get them imprisoned. That capacity is deeply weakened across Latin America. So to cut a long story short, if we jump forward six years to 2023, and we run down those lists of headlines, they really haven't changed much. Some of the names have changed. Some of the cartels are more powerful than they used to be. Some have split. A lot has happened. But as I say, in some senses, it's the same old going round.

Richard McColl: That's very. That doesn't sound positive in the slightest, Andrew, but I can see exactly what you're saying. Even when we think back to sort of anything, obviously reference it, Nixon's war Against Drugs, 1971. There is, or there appears to be no new comprehensive, credible strategy apart from, let's say, drug eradication. There doesn't seem to be anything new. The only, I guess, you know, the two things that sort of pop up with is President Bukele's mass incarceration. But again, that comes back not to. To being a solution because it's the prison crisis, as you mentioned, sort of a point, I would say point six. And then of course, you've got President Petro in Colombia, who is taking on a far more, I would say a holistic approach, but it's, again, not really taking hold. And there's more cocaine production than ever coming out of it.

Richard McColl: What can we say is there has been evolutions. Of course there have, but they seem to feed down the same pathway.

Andrew Thompson: I think it's back to what changes and what stays the same. And in some ways, it is helpful to look at the big drug cartels as businesses, really. And those businesses, like legal businesses, they operate in a changing environment and they adapt to the changes. So, you know, there have been changes and they continue to happen. The rise of fentanyl in Latin America, this synthetic opioid is changing the game in many ways. And if you look at the major Mexican and Colombian cartels, they're adapting to that. So it is quite difficult to see positive change. I think there are some examples and there's this kind of interesting situation where most Latin American leaders will say that the war on drugs as expressed by Richard Nixon half a century ago, has failed.

Andrew Thompson: It hasn't really reduced the violence and it hasn't really reduced deaths from overdoses and suffering from drugs in general. So the problem, I think is that with leaders saying the war on drugs was a terrible idea, they haven't quite come up with the alternative. A lot of people who say that war on drugs is a failure were doing something different. It's not entirely clear how different that is.

Richard McColl: Well, I mean, fentanyl and the opioids tend to be, obviously they're very much the headlines at the moment. And when we talk of the violence or the sort of drug related violence, drug related killings, obviously we need to bring fentanyl, we need to bring China into the issue. We need to bring Mexico and of course that porous border up into the US either California, Texas and beyond. I was reading this, your report. And when it says some analysts have made the correlation and as a proportion of the total population, overdose deaths in the US have now increased to a level comparable with drug violence related killings in some Latin American countries, such as I suppose Mexico and Colombia. This is a shocking detail.

Richard McColl: And so as we say, you come back, the violence is not reduced and yet the US has a climbing death, well, I would say drug related death rate.

Andrew Thompson: Yeah, so you get both sides. The drug producing country, particularly countries like Colombia and Mexico, suffers this great violence which is the battle between the cartels and the state for control of drug trafficking routes, law and order and so on. And in most recent years, both Colombia and Mexico have had annual homicide rate per 100,000 members of the population, ranging between 20 and 30. And per 100,000. And to put this in context, the World Health Organization says that anything above 10 per 100,000 is of epidemic proportions. So that is a murder crisis. That's on the production side. The data from the United States says that on the consumption side, there are now more than 100,000 deaths from overdoses every year. And that works out as not homicide, but death from overdose in the US is around 20 per 100,000 members of the population.

Andrew Thompson: So you have this activity, illicit drug production and distribution, which is killing people at source and it's killing people, you know, it's killing people on the production side and killing people on the consumption side. So it is a terrible tragedy. And there is still, despite its tragic proportions, it is still not clear what governments can actually do to stop it.

Richard McColl: Well, I mean, you know, I suggested in the report we've got the elements coming from China arriving in largely in Mexico. There used to be a cooperation between China and the United States which is now obviously it's not so cooperative and there is a weak cooperation between Mexico and the US So it seems like the perfect storm between these things. Perhaps though we should talk about the fentanyl process just for a little bit of background.

Andrew Thompson: Yes.

Richard McColl: So we leave China, where whatever is produced and then it goes to the ports of Mexico through ports such as I imagine Puerto Vallarta, Manzanillo, obviously on the Caribbean side as well. Perhaps you could continue.

Andrew Thompson: Yeah, I think that the key thing is that it is a triangle. China, Mexico, US when fentanyl became increasingly available, it brought with it one really important difference, which is that up to that point major drugs in Latin America had largely been plant based marijuana, coca for cocaine and poppies for opium. And that agricultural side to the business meant that it was all about finding places to cultivate that are hidden away from the government and from the police and other authorities and managing very large numbers of people. I think the cocaine business in Colombia employs about a quarter of a million people indirectly. So very large, if you like operations. Fentanyl on the other hand, can be made in a laboratory, doesn't need vast amounts of land, doesn't require cultivation.

Andrew Thompson: What it requires are certain key chemicals which are widely known as precursor chemicals and even precursor chemicals which go into the production of this synthetic drug. So from one angle initially you might say, well this is a massive threat to the drug cartels in Colombia and Mexico because it opens up the game to competition and a lot of people could produce fentanyl. However, that doesn't seem to have happened. What does seem to have happened is that various criminal groups in China, allegedly with complicity of the authorities, that's, you know, open to argument, started exporting fentanyl first to the United States, but then as the US began to request the Chinese government take action to stop this flow of exports, which it did. And the Chinese authorities did initially respond positively.

Andrew Thompson: It then became more logical, if you like, to send the fentanyl to Mexico where the big cartels could traffic it across the border into the United States. That relationship has been changing. It's argued and accepted by a number of US experts that China no longer exports any fentanyl directly to the United States. And in that sense, China can say, you know, we're doing our bit. We have done our bit. There's a 1961 international convention which allows governments to cooperate to stop harmful chemicals and drugs, and that's being used. What now happens is the Chinese government says, we're not involved.

Andrew Thompson: But a number of Chinese chemical companies are exporting the precursor chemicals to Mexico, where the big cartels, Sinaloa and Jalisco have created their own laboratories, hired their own chemists, and built an industry that converts precursor chemicals into fentanyl, which is then smuggled across into the United States. So it becomes a. A more complicated triangular relationship. And if you look at the parties to that triangle, there are problems in every combination you look at. So if you look at the China US relationship, it is unlikely that they will cooperate again on drug eradication, because there is a superpower battle going on between them, and they are, if you like, adversaries. So it's very hard to see China going back to the position before 2019 when it was fairly cooperative. If you look at the relationship between Mexico and China, it's always been quite low level.

Andrew Thompson: And that's because in the sense, they're both rivals for access to the US market for, you know, reshoring and all sorts of production activities. There is very little trade between Mexico and China. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the president of Mexico, has asked China to help stop exporting fentanyl. He's got a strange position because he claims that Mexico doesn't produce any fentanyl at all, and yet he's asking China to help reduce the flow. And in some ways, it's paradoxical. The relationship between the US and Mexico could potentially be the most productive in reducing the flow of these drugs. But that relationship is very stressed and strained at the moment over issues like migration. And Mexico has basically been unwilling to cooperate much more closely with the United States.

Andrew Thompson: So you look at this triangle from all the different angles, and you come out with a fairly pessimistic reading of what might be possible in an attempt to control the spread of fentanyl.

Richard McColl: This is a peculiar situation where you have Mexico, the US with, I mean, they're essentially brother nations with so much flow between the two. And I'm not discussing just trade. I mean, population flow and so on. You would imagine a greater cooperation between the two. But of course, López Obrador doesn't have, or at least doesn't show to have a great foreign policy, although I would suggest that United States, Mexico should be a domestic policy given, you know, the absolute joint government and issues that they need to obviously express in this thing. It's, it's very strange to me. Well, with a Biden presidency, it's very strange to me with López Obradorr and of course, elections coming up. Do we see any potential possibility of greater cooperation between the two countries in coming, well, months and years?

Andrew Thompson: I think that argument is basically the relationship with López Obradorr is pretty poor at the moment in terms of cooperation.

Richard McColl: On.

Andrew Thompson: Anti criminal cooperation. Therefore, with Mexican elections in June next year, you would expect the United States to be looking to who wins, who succeeds López Obradorr. Of course, there are US elections also in November next year. So the policy will largely depend on who wins. That Biden is in a difficult situation. He is really, because of domestic pressure and attacks from the Republicans, he's very cautious about the whole migration issue. And what seems to have happened, interestingly, both with Trump and with Biden is that, if you like, the migration issue is Mexico's trump card. Mexico acts as a buffer state by trying to control its southern border with Central America. It has the capacity to help the United States reduce the migrant flow.

Andrew Thompson: Up to a point, different Mexican governments have accepted the whole remain in Mexico approach where, you know, applicants for asylum in the US were to be and are to be processed in Mexico. And it seems that a succession of US Presidents, and this does apply to Biden, have sought concessions from Mexico on migration. And the price of that has been tolerate, to put up with a much less cooperative Mexican stance on the issue of the cartels. And it seems that drug control, while always there in the rhetoric and, you know, some things have happened under Biden, there are some measures that are being taken, but on the whole, it's kind of second fiddle to the big migration issue.

Andrew Thompson: And that means in many ways that Biden is going into an election year partly on the defensive with the Republicans trying to raise the whole temperature around migration.

Richard McColl: And of course, there's what I would call sort of populist statements of, you know, send the military into Mexico type thing. What kind of reality do we really think this is a possibility?

Andrew Thompson: It's a difficult one up to a point. It's posture politics. It's, I am going to sound as radical and as hardline as possible because that may win me votes. And as we've seen in recent weeks, the rhetoric from the United States and from people aspiring for the Republican Party nomination has been very aggressive. So there are some Congressmen who've proposed a bill which would allow US military forces to attack the cartels directly on Mexican soil without the approval of the Mexican government. Some more responsible people have said, well, that's kind of like a declaration of war on your southern neighbor. It's kind of unhinged to put it that way. What's hard to see is if a Republican Party or a Republican Party under Trump comes back into office, how far will they go along that line?

Andrew Thompson: I suppose there's a historical precedent which was back in 2015, 2016, Trump was saying, I'm going to build a wall. And it was clear that the war was in many ways symbolic. It was a rallying cry for the anti immigrant sentiment in the United States. Trump did come to power shortly after those elections and some bits of the wall were built. It's still not a wall across all the frontier, which would be 3,000 km or 3 or whatever it is. And strangely enough, under Biden, a little segment of wall is now also being built. So there's just. It's difficult to say what is rhetoric and what is an appeal to nativist sentiment and what will actually happen. I don't think there will be a war with Mexico. Some actions, some radical actions might happen.

Andrew Thompson: There is a whole debate going on in the United States whether the cartels, which are termed. I've got the exact term for yes, at present, cartel. Mexican cartels are known as TCOs, Transnational Criminal Organizations. And if you are a TCO in US law, there's lots that the government can do. It can freeze your bank accounts, it can intervene in all sorts of ways. But a lot of the right of the Republican Party wants the Mexican cartels to be redesignated as FTOs, which are foreign terrorist organizations. And they're making the argument that the Sinaloa cartel should be treated in the same way as you might treat Islamic terrorists. It's an extreme case. Again, this is, I think this is largely rhetorical and an appeal to the emotions.

Andrew Thompson: Having the cartels designated terrorist organizations doesn't really allow the government to do much more, but it would certainly increase Mexico's irritation and alienation from the whole process and on balance, be counterproductive.

Richard McColl: Yeah, I think so too. Very interesting. And concerning development there, isn't it? This business, it's just so profitable, violent and deeply embedded in the economy. And if we think about that, let's move further south. The fentanyl market, I mean, people are saying, and I know there was you quoted InSight Crime, that the. It's unlikely to permeate very much into South America. But I, my personal feeling is well, it will come. I mean, but again the point is that fentanyl is established small markets where there was already a pre established opioid market. So I'm assuming that's the kind of tri frontier. Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, end of things.

Andrew Thompson: It's an interesting situation to try and see. The argument why fentanyl might not spread through Latin America is that its rise in the United States came about by a particular set of circumstances. And that set of circumstances was that a large number of doctors prescribed painkillers to a very large section of the population. And some of those became addicted to the painkillers and started on if you like, an escalation path which led them from certain controlled branded drugs to other drugs laced with fentanyl. And you had this, if you like, this captive market that has driven the rise of fentanyl across the U.S. arguably it's different in Latin America and South America because that sort of pre existing circumstances is not present. However, like you, I think it is possible that fentanyl will spread.

Andrew Thompson: And some of the things I mentioned in the report that are happening in northern Mexico are particularly worrisome and relevant and this is that a lot of pharmacies in a number of cities close to the US border are selling over the counter painkillers which unbeknownst to the buyer are cut with fentanyl. So they are very powerful potential drivers of addiction. There's another factor here which is if you like, it's a kind of marketing thing from the drug cartel's point of view. Normally if you are going to consume hard drugs, you have to, if you like, buy them on the street. You have to put yourself in positions of relative personal risk because you're dealing with, you know, slightly seedy areas of number of towns and you're, you know, you're following up a contact.

Andrew Thompson: You don't know if they're going to rob you or they'll sell you the drugs or whatever it is. However, the experiment infiltrating fentanyl into pharmacies means you can look at a much more middle class market for drug consumption. Going to a pharmacy is a relatively safe, or it's perceived as a relatively safe thing to do. One of the most awful aspects of this is of course you might just want the drug that is legal and over the counter and completely unbeknownst to you, it's laced with fentanyl. So you are beginning to be, you know, beginning on a road that could lead to addiction. The whole question of drug routes is also very interesting. In recently, in a couple of weeks back, President Petro in Colombia came out and said the geography of drug production in Colombia was changing.

Andrew Thompson: And he basically said that previously all routes led straight north, either through the Pacific or through the Caribbean, but basically going up to the United States. He now claims that the geography has changed for a variety of reasons, and the main route is shifted in a southerly direction. The largest coca production area of the country is no longer in the north of Colombia, according to the president, but in a 10 kilometer strip along the border with Ecuador. And that would explain, or at least be part of the debate about Ecuador's regrettable transition from being a fairly steep, safe and stable democracy to being infiltrated by international drug cartels and finding its politicians shot dead in a very violent and nasty election campaign.

Andrew Thompson: You continue with the argument and you say, well, an extension of this is that drugs might be able to flow through the rivers which are the main source of transit in the Amazon to Brazil and from Brazil out to the Atlantic and eventually up to Europe to major ports like Rotterdam. And there are various variants of that which say, well, there's drug flow from Bolivia, Paraguay, through the triple frontier, Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay down the River Plate network and out again into the South Atlantic. How much this will mark future years is difficult to say. But it is clear that the authorities in countries like Paraguay and Uruguay and of course Argentina are beginning to get worried about the growth of international cartel smuggling routes in the south rather than in the north.

Richard McColl: Is there an evolution then in these countries? I think I know the answer, but you're the expert in these countries being transit countries evolving into consumer countries as well.

Andrew Thompson: Yes, I think there is a definite possibility that will happen. And of course it is a market. And what we know about the drug cartels is that they are very profit motivated and they are interested innovation and developing the whole history of the drug business. You know, you go back to the 80s, you know, there was a transition from cocaine to crack cocaine, which was cheaper, you know, allowed access to a wider, to a wider market in US cities. And there are, you know, there is, there's no point in denying it. There is significant drug addiction in a number of Latin American countries. My, I have a relative who lives in a part of São Paulo called Cracolândia, which is known for, you know, drug abuse and drug use. Rents are fairly low because it's got a sort of fairly bad name.

Andrew Thompson: But there is a significant drug consuming market in different Latin American countries. And it can be expected as living standards increase slowly, unfortunately, but as they increase, the interest in drugs may also increase.

Richard McColl: Coming back to President Petro's statement, I find this very interesting indeed. The geography of coca cultivation and laboratories defined by US demand. It does seem a little bit nebulous from his front. This has been studied immensely in the last few weeks since he said it. And of course the violence into Ecuador. Well, part of the issue as I see it, that we have had an episode here on Ecuador is of course when Correa, President Correa was in power and he basically threw out the DEA and the US military around. I think they had a base around Manta on the Pacific coast. Ecuador's ability to trace and trap and capture transportation of drugs became almost nil. I mean their infrastructure for this.

Richard McColl: And so for me it's a response to the cartels obviously saying, well, you know, most of our shipments are if they're apprehended in transportation routes. Therefore Ecuador is now a viable transportation route where they're not, you know, not as advanced, let's say, as in Colombia. And this to say that everything is moving out of the north, the coca growing areas really not in the north of Colombia. I mean we can talk about Antioquia and the Pacific coast, but the major ones are down with the Venezuelan border, Santander, those have not changed. And then with the evolution of the conflict in Colombia post the 2016 peace accord, we now have, and I think it was quoted, more than 500 different armed crews, you know, numbering from as little as few as two people to the Clan del Golfo, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas who are thousands.

Richard McColl: And as you say, the evolution, you can't just cut the head off or like they, you know, Otoniel he's in, you know, he's in jail. But the Clan del Golfo is as strong as ever. I just think that the Petro very good at talking, perhaps not great on the actual content.

Andrew Thompson: I think there's a potentially wider issue here that's worth bearing in mind, which is I've done a lot of research on the whole drug issue and one of the things that is quite striking is this. I mean we've been talking about it throughout the entire podcast. It's what changes and what stays the same. And you often get people saying XYZ has revolutionized the drug business, but it hasn't. And so for example A lot of the drug cartels going way back to the late 60s and early 70s, the big thing at the moment at the time was marijuana. And in recent years it's been recreational use, medical use has been legalized across a large number of states in the United States, in a number of countries, in Mexico itself, in Uruguay. And yet the trade or the trade in marijuana has not completely stopped.

Andrew Thompson: There still is, you know, it's not particularly the most profitable for the drug cartels, but the cartels will still keep on doing it if there is some money in it. And I think you could, for example, and I think Petro got close to saying this. He suggested that if the world was turning to fentanyl, somehow Colombia would benefit because it would no longer be dependent on all this cocaine and everything that went with it. And I suspect that the reality is that fentanyl is one more drug. The cocaine business is not going to disappear overnight. The heroin business is not going to disappear overnight. Changes, you know, well, changes in the drug business do take their time to work through. You know, other aspects of the drug business might be much more instantaneous.

Andrew Thompson: You know, a top cartel leader is captured and, you know, the alignment of cartels in a particular part of the region changes. But you keep coming back to the very slow progress that has been made in trying to reduce drug usage.

Richard McColl: And I mean, cocaine obviously is not going anywhere. It's the, you know, the market might be in its dip, but what we also see is lots of captures, lots of publicity around the capture the ports and so on. But what has happened, I think in the US and elsewhere is that people are paying the same price but for a greater purity of cocaine. I think that's it. I think this slow evolution of how drugs or which is the next drug is in such a very interesting point. And I think you unfortunately be writing another report in six years time with the same eight headlines. I think this is absolute truth. So we'll go from crime and security trends and solutions to this. The Latin American illicit drug business changing when it is and it isn't.

Richard McColl: That's like you said, the business is just too profitable. And you know, there are the courts and the judges and the lawyers willing to prosecute, but it's so permeated in society, it does follow market economics. The cartels will go where the money is, I think. Have you got anything else we need to add here, Andrew?

Andrew Thompson: Yes. Having gotten to this point in the podcast, I feel a strong need to say something positive.

Richard McColl: I'll go for it.

Andrew Thompson: There is essentially those who say the war on drugs has been a failure often support a whole series of measures. There's never going to be a single silver bullet that solves the drug issue. But there are a number of things that can be helpful in different combinations. So, you know, actually reforming the Latin American prison system would be, would make a significant difference. Treating. If you look at countries like Portugal, which effectively decriminalized part of the drug business and said we should treat it much more as a public health issue. This is about working with addicts to, you know, it's about ensuring they get clean needles so they don't kill themselves injecting with dirty needles. There's a whole series of things that can contribute. And I think in some senses the challenge is there.

Andrew Thompson: For Latin American presidents who say that the war on drugs was a disaster, the onus is on them to try and come up with more effective policies. The other thing I'd like to say, I'm aware this is a big jump, but there is one very significant difference on either side of the Mexico US border, and that is essentially that on the southern side in Mexico, the criminal justice system is under resourced, corrupt, bureaucratic. In a word, it's terrible. North of the border, the criminal justice system is not perfect, but it is much more effective. And one thing that happens is that these major cartels, their business is across both countries south of the border. They settle accounts with a gun. The fighting between cartels is vicious and murderous. North of the border they accept a kind of unwritten rule.

Andrew Thompson: We are generally not using violence. We're running our distribution businesses, we're selling drugs, we're selling fentanyl. But on the whole we try and avoid violence because if we use violence, there is a strong likelihood that we will be identified, brought to justice, brought to court and put into a US Maximum security prison, which unlike some other prisons in the region, are very hard to break out of. You know, verging on impossible. So at the risk of sounding like an apologist for the United States, the reality is that a, an effective criminal justice system does slightly change the, if you like, the balance of forces and leads. You know, all societies have powerful criminal groups. The question is what level of violence do they operate at?

Andrew Thompson: And if something can be done in a Latin American country to increase the chances of prosecution and sentencing, that has to be a positive thing coupled with a whole lot of other more public health oriented measures.

Richard McColl: This is true. I mean, most Latin American countries have this issue. As you say, with the Mexican like just as the Mexican justice system, very difficult to pursue. But again, there are those who wish to pursue it. There are those that must be supported and therefore backed up in this fight. I mean, not a war against drugs per se is 1971, but as you are suggesting now, the credible alternative strategies and of course, reducing violence, I think is the huge detail, not just addiction and obviously criminality, but it's the reduction in violence. Thank you, Andrew Thompson, journalist and political risk analyst for covering Latin America. It has been a fantastic conversation discussing your reports, one from six years ago, one from this year.

Richard McColl: I really hope that within six years time or less that you can write a report that shows again how the business has changed, but for the better for, you know, these economies, these people, these populations.

Andrew Thompson: Thank you very much. And I'm sure it will be difficult to track, you know, the next six years.

Richard McColl: Well, I don't ask to predict that because neither of us will come out smiling, but thank you so much, Andrew Thompson, for your time. This has been The LatinNews Podcast. We've been discussing the illicit drug business. Has it been changing in the last few years? What about fentanyl cocaine? Obviously, as we said, the opioid crisis in the United States. Thank you for listening and goodbye.

Andrew Thompson: Thank you.

Dr. Andrew R Thomas teaches Customer Relationship Management in the doctoral programs at ISM. Thomas is Associate Professor of Marketing and International Business at the University of Akron.

He has traveled to and conducted business in 120 countries on all seven continents. Thomas is founding editor-in-chief of the Journal of Transportation Security, contributing editor at Industry Week, and a regularly featured analyst for media outlets around the world.

Thomas received a PhD in International Business at the University of Bucharest, Academia de Studii Economice, an MA in International Political Economy from the University of Akron and a BA in Political Science and History from the University of Akron.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: Richard McColl, your host here in Bogotá, Colombia. Our very special guest this week is up in Ohio, Andrew Thomas, Ph.D. professor of international business at the College of Business, University of Akron in Ohio, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Transportation Security and author of the Canal of Panama and the Globalization, Growth and challenges in the 21st Century. So welcome on The LatinNews Podcast.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Hey, Richard, great. Thanks for having me.

Richard McColl: No, it's a real pleasure indeed to have you here because you are a total expert when it comes to business in Panama and of course, the business of the Panama Canal, which has been making the news recently. So that's what we're going to discuss.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Sure, sure. I'm happy to do this.

Richard McColl: Okay, excellent. We've obviously been seeing all of the issues of climate change, the lack of rainfall and fresh water in Panama, which is, of course, is absolutely pivotal to the Panama Canal and its ease of running and everything else. Well, I mean, what do we see going forward? Are the rains picking up? Is there fresh water in Panama once again?

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Well, we are right in the midst of the, as we're doing this in October, we're in the midst of the rainy season. The next couple of months, really up until maybe the week before Christmas, will be the heaviest rain. So there's hope that nature will be kind and work in our favor. It's been a tough year we've had before. Probably most recently, 2019 was a year when it just didn't rain a whole lot. Fortunately, as the year went on and we got deeper into the rainy season, it kind of made up for it. So again, I think probably the hope for everybody would be that nature would shine and not maybe shine per se, but certainly inundate Panama with the rain that it needs. You know, the issue, of course, is it's not just rainfall.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: And I think this is probably a blessing in one sense. It's called to attention. And not the ACP, which runs the canal, hasn't known this for over 20 years. It speaks again to, I think, the broader issue of water management in Panama. And that's kind of the story that a lot of people don't seem to be paying as much attention to because it's a little bit more complicated. It's, it's a little bit more national. It's not, it's not a global issue yet, except, you know, for the lack of rain. The you know, the issue probably wouldn't be getting national attention. So I believe, you know, it's something that we should, as folks that are looking at the canal and its impact, its opposition, supply chains and globalization and something that should be discussed as well.

Richard McColl: So when we look at these sort of, this domestic water management, this is a demand for water. The canal itself is competing with population growth, agriculture, copper mines, is that right?

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Yeah, and you could even add light manufacturing as well. And it's also the fact that know. Yes, as you mentioned, population growth. It's, it's. And I'm also a Panamanian as well as an American, so I don't want to speak ill of anybody. It's also just the fact that the water is not really well managed. Of course, to make the canal work, we need fresh water. And to make life go, we need fresh water. And the water management in Panama is, it has been lacking. And again, this has been on the ACP's radar even before they gained complete control of the canal in 2000. That this was going to be an issue just simply because for cultural reasons, for maintenance issues, lots of other stuff that's not sexy and glamorous. You know, water doesn't get, even though they get.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Our home, for example, in Panama City, we get 12 to 14ft of rain a year. And on the Pacific side, I'm sorry, I'm on the Pacific, on the Atlantic side, it's even more, they just, they don't treat water probably the way they should. Maybe, just maybe that's the best way to say it.

Richard McColl: But this is very strange to me that, you know, that the primary business, I would say, obviously Panama, the Canal, what it's known for, sure, they have not incorporated water management. Why the ACP or the, you know, Panama Canal Authority, why haven't they been working on this?

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Well, it kind of speaks to the nature of the way the ACP operates in Panama. The ACP is the, you know, that's a, almost. It is, it's a separate entity. There is a connection to the government in a couple of ways. The board of directors is named the president. And of course, the customer of the Panama Canal ultimately is the nation of Panama, the people of Panama. So they're working on behalf of the people, yet it's not a government operation, it's an independent operation. So what happens within that, within the Canal Zone? They're solid on. The issue though is as we started the conversation, we're talking about what's going on around the canal. And of course, the canal is surrounded by a burgeoning population. It's surrounded by a growing economy that demands more water.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: It's, it's also industry, it's mining, these kinds of things that are, that are draining resources away. And so that combined with this water management issue at the national level, and now, and the last factor, of course, is lack of rain is contributing to, you know, some real challenges for the ACP to do its job. So it's, it, you can't point fingers and say who's to blame per se. It's a very complicated scheme that in one sense has served the canal exceptionally well. The fact that it can operate at a profit, unlike when the Americans ran it, we lost money every year. The Panamanians have made billions on it over the last 23 years, and we'll continue to make billions on it.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: The way that was set up to separate it from the government, though, it does put these challenges and pressures regarding water front and center.

Richard McColl: I mean, it requires then the government to work on its side of things and the infrastructure, as you say, on the Caribbean, I guess, the port of Colón and then on the Pacific coast there needs to be a greater investment in those ends.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Yeah. And then as you get further away from the canal, just again, the, I mentioned in the book, and it's not, again, not to be critical, it's an observation drive around Panama City. You know, we're one and a half million people out of four and a half million live and go buy a government building on any given day, drive by business, buildings, people's homes, and there's leaks, those leaks. And if you continue those drives day after day, weekend, they continue again. Panama is blessed and it has incredible natural bounty, including this liquid asset of massive rainfall and fresh water. I think there's a issue with culture in terms of how people perceive it. They use water almost insensibly. The cost of water is almost free. It's about $10 a month that I pay in Panama City.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: So it is, it is exponentially in people's minds, something that we should, we just, it's free. It's, it's unlimited. You manage that okay, until you get a year that it doesn't rain a lot. And all of a sudden there's these, these moments of upheaval and this upheaval.

Richard McColl: I mean, we can bring them in together. We put protracted drought. The repercussions for Panama, obviously, The issue of this infrastructure surrounding the canal and if we wind back a couple of years and put in the COVID 19 pandemic, we're looking at serious affectations to the supply chain security globally. I mean, let's go back to the pandemic and how did that affect then the Canal and trade?

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Well, like the rest of Latin America, I think of all the regions in the world, at least from my research, Latin America was probably impacted the most negatively of any place. Maybe short of China. We don't really know what went on internally in China. Certainly the lockdowns in Panama were respective of the other nations where six, seven, eight, nine months of hard lockdowns followed by selective lockdowns over the next year and a half. So you know that had, and I think we're really feeling the implications and repercussions of this today more than we even did a year or two ago. I think people are finally realizing that the incredible damage that was done by locking down these economies and now you've seen, for example, the workforce has had lots of issues in Panama. The canal functioned very well during the pandemic itself.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: And again, the canal is not occurring within a vacuum. It happens within the broader nation, the broader region and of course the global economy. So I think we'll see for many, maybe even decades to come the impact and fallout of these lockdowns. From my perspective, the real issue for Panama is a lot of nations will be workforce, the next generation of people to work on the canal. And Panamanians mandate that only Panamanians can work on the Canal. That's a national law. When you have kids out of school, as they were in Panama for almost two years, a lot of them learning, and I'm going to put it in quotes online, when kids didn't have broadband access or anything like that, we'll see the repercussions of this over the next generation or two. So again, functionality of the canal during the pandemic was solid.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: They were very proactive. I'm very positive with the management style in the crisis mode that the ACP exhibited. At the same time though, I think these longer implications might be lasting for way into the future.

Richard McColl: But there wasn't a reduced number of ships going through during the pandemic.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Yeah, it was. As global trade slowed, of course there was the natural fallout, but it didn't last long because nations, and I think this is one of the things I pointed out in the book, nations are going to scramble more and more for energy sources and maybe if you want to talk about this in a minute here, Richard, you know, what is the future of the canal? It's much more on energy, particularly liquefied natural gas coming from the United States going west, or I guess, yeah, going south through the canal, all the way out to the Pacific and beyond. That really are the primary revenue streams for the canal going forward.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: And that didn't really stop much in the lockdowns because whether it's China or India or South Korea, whomever else is buying that liquefied natural gas, they had to keep their homes and run their businesses and do all the things that carbon energy does.

Richard McColl: But tell us about this. So tell us about going forward and the energy market and the affectations, of course, I mean, I've seen, I've been in the canal many times and of course that new construction, the one side for the, I don't even remember what they're called, like the Goliath tankers, I suppose, that goes through. I realize that some of the infrastructure there as well isn't up to, let's say, the original standard of the original canal.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Well, it's interesting. There was always a desire by the Americans and again, as I pointed out in the book, the Americans wanted to get rid of the canal. Harry Truman famously said in 1947, why don't we get out of Panama before we're kicked out? So the canal really, for the Americans, World War II kind of ended the real reason it was constructed in the first place and that was to not to have a two Ocean navy. As we built bigger battleships and then carriers, the canal really became, I don't want to say moved to that move to a second class status, but it really was an auxiliary, if you will, to the American empire. We've stayed with the canal through the rest of the 20th century.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: There were, there were discussions even in, even in the era after the canal really opened for the first time to a good flow of traffic in 1920, that maybe we should build some bigger locks because ships will get bigger. Those discussions happened over the next 80 years. While the Americans, the Panamanians themselves, to their credit, when they knew they were going to get the canal in 2000, they had already said before that the formal transfer that they were going to make an effort to build a bigger set of locks to handle what they thought were going to be these massive container ships.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: And so in 2006, there was a national referendum that was overwhelmingly supported by the Panamanian people to fund the expansion of a new set of locks that would at that time be designed for These massive container ships that primarily were handling the traffic from Asia into the United States, primarily the east coast of the US that was really the reason they were, they were constructed and it had never been done before. Nobody had ever added another set of locks to the Panama Canal. You couldn't google how to do it. So the Panamanians, to their credit, that I thought over time an excellent job.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: There were some problems, of course, if we would have had the same scrutiny, the Americans, that is when they were building the canal back in the early 20th century, I'm sure there would have been Twitter and Facebook and YouTube, who knows what would have been said. So overall, they did it. And to their credit, it came in around budget and I thought it was. And it was done by Panama. They use external contractors in many ways, but it was a Panamanian project and it took place and about eight years, nine years, a little bit longer than they thought. What happened though, in the middle of all of that was two things. First of all, a globalization shifted and the big container vessels never really showed up in the numbers that they thought they were going to.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: And then something that nobody predicted, and I've heard a lot of people out there running around saying they did. I haven't found anybody who predicted it. Starting in 2006 was the American shale energy revolution. And that happened again. It was innovation, it was creativity. It was a very American thing. And again, that was not in the planning of the Panamanians, I assure you. Yet sometimes in life it's better to be lucky than good. And the Panamanians certainly were lucky. I think now they were prepared and they saw an opportunity later and they had that ability to be able to take advantage of moving the bigger LNG liquefied natural gas NGL ships through the canal. And that really, again not planned yet now is the reality for them. That's been a wonderful blessing for the operation of the canal. And again, the shale energy revolution.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: We just have to go back to the early 2000s when we had presidents of the United States saying, you know, we're dependent on foreign energy. We were building massive import terminals in the United States along the Gulf coast to bring in natural gas. Because late 90s, early 2000s, America was really up against it. I, I've said before, you know, the reason the 101st was in Tikrit during the Iraq war, it wasn't because their biggest export was anything except oil. The world needed that energy and America's world leader was going to provide it come hell or High water. Then we wake up one day and the shale energy revolution is happening and the Panamanian expansion melded with that. And now the Panamanians are the recipients of that effort.

Richard McColl: I discussed this in your book, a great read as well. The post war era of growth, you know, goes into. Well, I doesn't go into a decline, but it evolves a bit what it is. And one of the quotes I most enjoyed is right towards the end it's being replaced by a much more uncertain, nationalistic and dangerous world. Perhaps you'd like to sort of give us a bit more of a background on that.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Well, I'm not the first one to observe this. I look at it through the lens of international business primarily. That's my role as an academic and as my earlier books have been on primarily the global economy. When you have, I think, the three pillars of the modern world, which would be carbon energy availability. The security guarantees that the United States provides to the world. It has provided maybe until very recently. And then of course, the opening of markets and the free flow of capital giving capitalists more opportunities to what they want with their capital. Those three things which really have evolved in the last several hundred years, but really gained critical mass post World War II and then even accelerated more after the collapse of communism and the integration of China and India.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: The global economy, that model which has served humanity I think, brilliantly, with all the warts and corruptions and human foibles that come in. We just have to look at extreme poverty on this planet and realize that burning of carbon energy, giving capitalists more control over what they want to do with their capital in a secure world. That's the formula. And that was really a lot of it led by the United States and their allies like the British and the Panamanians and other parts of Latin America. And I think that the Americans have got a little bit more tired of leading that charge. I'm coming from the rust belt of the United States, which is very similar to northern England and eastern France, northeastern France, where the industrial giants of those days are long gone and there's lots of ruination as a result.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: And I think you're seeing significant portions of, at least in the United States, people just say, why are we leading this? Yes, they benefited immensely india and China and Africa and Latin America from the system that we pay for and we've committed to pay for the long term. I think that's waning and I think lots of nations around the world see that it scares them. And you're Seeing I think this more flare of nationalization or regionalization come up and, and really in the face of what's uncertainty coming from the United States.

Richard McColl: Yeah, and you talk about three sort of main points here and you've got the trend, so the repositioning of the global supply chain. So you talk about the potential, if we know about it, implosion of China. And then of course there are global events currently taking place, not least Ukraine, Russia and obviously Israel, Palestine. How are these likely to affect Panama and the Canal?

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Well, I think from a canal perspective, I think that they're blessed. You know, location, location makes them, I think as long as they're connected to the United States and I don't think there's any reason they will never be, especially as the energy revolution continues apace. I think the Canal is going to be, it's going to be a beacon of management excellence and hope and expectation that the world can be returned back to where it was prior to this new phase we seem to be entering into. From a business perspective of the Canal, it really will determine its long term success will be global trade patterns and in this case probably more than anything else will be energy.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: With the Ukraine war and, and with Russia's importance of energy as a source provider for Europe, we're seeing more and more American energy imports go to places like Germany and even the UK and so that affects the canal because there's not transit through the canal because the shale energy revolution is almost exclusively middle. It, you know, take the Mississippi river and go east so you don't need to transit any energy imports to Europe through the canal that'll impact the canal probably in not a very positive way still. Asia, whether it's China and I think one of the reasons China is on the verge of an implosion is because of their lack of energy independence or even energy security, if we want to call it that.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: So they need imports from all over the world, including the United States, India, South Korea, Japan, you know, the biggest energy importers in the world that'll keep the canal functioning well. But yet when there's, higher demand for energy and there's greater distances on that supply chain. I think we'll, you know, we'll see some events that could arise as we've just seen with what's going on in the Middle East that, you know, that can impact, you know, regional and global trading patterns.

Richard McColl: It's, it's true and what I find so very interesting obviously is that there's so many conversations. I mean you are the expert in business. I mean, that's the deal. But when we look at everything else around it and countries like China talking about, I mean previously talking about other canals possible, you know, the canal to connect through Nicaragua, I mean we go Lake Nicaragua and Lake Managua, wouldn't it. To connect. The reality of this is very slim, isn't it?

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Yeah, that doesn't, that's been discussed almost in parallel with the. Yeah, yeah, that's a good word. Forever. There's other things that are, of that are apace. So that I think in terms of supply chain folks and international trade, there's a lot happening in Mexico with trying to shorten the move across Mexico and involving an integrated supply chain with rail, with sea. So I, I think that supply chains always evolve and you know, this evolution is nothing that we should be surprised by. And, and I think, you know, within Latin America, you know, Mexico provides potentially, if you want to call it such a degree of competition for Panama, particularly to. As it results in smaller product categories.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Still though, I think the canal is, is in a solid position over time and the energy, I guess the energy luck that they were able to discover, dig up or whatever the case might be, is going to be a saving grace for them going forward.

Richard McColl: Yeah, I mean, we never really expected and especially under, you know, Ortega right now. I mean a lot of words can be said, but actions are very different. And it's a bit like was it under President Santos here in Colombia when they were talking the Belt and Road Initiative, you know, a railway across Colombia, geography, it just doesn't lend itself not least the political situation and conflict situation. But Panama has, well, aside from 1989, been incredibly stable.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Yeah, it has been. And I, I think, you know, we forget history sometimes. You know, I, Michael Crichton has one of my best quotes I share with my students. You know, if you don't know history, they're like a, a leaf that doesn't know it's part of a tree. And to your point, the, you know, the building of the Panama railroad beginning in 1850 with private capital, by the way, that wasn't a government effort like the canal was. I think that kind of showed capitalists and the governments around the world that in fact Panama was geographically friendly enough that it could, they could sustain some kind of a significant operation, whether it was again the railroad or eventually the building of the canal by The Americans finishing what the French started.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Everybody else who's tried anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere, you know, south of the other Rio Grande, has had some significant issues with regards to logistics and geography and all kinds of other issues.

Richard McColl: Well, it's nice to have this conversation because it's wholly, I think, a positive conversation. You know, I did. I did read just the other day about. Well, we're reading a lot about Darién. The Darién jungle. Yeah, Obviously the sliver of land from Panama to Colombia. The lot, the only unpaved section of the trail, you know, the Pan American Highway. Yeah, I did read that previously the Americans there had been an idea floated of bombing it with nuclear bombs in order to make a connection.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Yeah, yeah. You know, there's been all kinds of discussions about Darién as well. My wife's family's from down around that region. Oh, really?

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Little town called Chepo. So it's kind of on the route of the migrants. When I was preparing the book, I did spend a little bit of time talking at those refugee camps that are in Panama. Folks, I think this kind of goes back to one of the issues that should probably be explored more by researchers or scholars or journalists is that a lot of those folks that are coming in, of course, there's many coming from around the world coming into Colombia, starting somewhere else and then making that terrible journey up the Darién. A lot of the folks I spoke with were not who you thought they might be. They're not just poor refugees escaping brutal oppression. A lot of these are middle class people, formerly middle class people. Some physicians, some lawyers, really small business owners. They got seriously wiped out by the lockdowns.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Again, I go back to that point I made before that. You know, Latin America, I think, took it more on the. On the chin than anybody else with regards to closing the economy. And there wasn't the helicoptering of money that came out like it did in Europe or the United States or other parts of the world. We pretty much just shut everything down to control the virus and then reopened one day and everybody was left on their own. So I think a lot of that working middle class that was rising across Latin America in the last 20 years are very desperate. And you're seeing some of those desperate people risk everything to come through that gap that you mentioned there between Colombia and Panama and work their way up to the United States.

Richard McColl: I believe that the figure by the end of the year is going to be half a million people will have gone through this year, which is just staggering. I was up last Year, this time last year. I'll be up next month up in that area as well. Last year I managed to speak to Haitians, Cubans, Syrians, and they say now there's more Ecuadorians coming through as well.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: That's right. There's Ecuadorians. I spoke to a lot of Chileans, I spoke to Uruguayans, I spoke to Argentines. Yeah. In relatively significant numbers. And you talk to these folks, and these are countries you would never think that these people would leave and travel this way to try to get into the United States. So which tells me that something was really broke when they locked these countries down because they all experienced very similar patterns. And again, this is going to be generational, particularly I think, in Latin America. So I'm sure anybody listening to this is probably very much aware of that. It's a topic I think, though, that deserves a lot more exploration in terms of the fallout from this, because it's massive.

Richard McColl: Well, aside from this sort of digression onto the Darién. But of course it affects Panama immensely because they are the bridge, the land bridge, America and so on. It does sound like the Panama has most things under control, aside from obviously water management. If the rain keeps falling and there's fresh water and climate change does not hammer the isthmus, things look to continue well for the country.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: I think you're right. There are elections coming up, and this is one of the beauties of the post Noriega environment. I'm sure most of your listeners know this. The Panamanians were wise enough to say, you can't run for reelection as president. You get five years and that's it. So we've seen in every election since 1994 that there's been a change in political party. And the political parties are significantly different in Panama. So you have to compete every year or every election cycle, I should say, for about 30 or 40% of the vote, which tends to remain independent, which is more than a lot of more developed democracies, including the United States. So that's a good thing. And the government becomes more responsive. There are elections coming up next year. It appears.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: If you look at the polls right now, there will not be the return of the PRD, which is the Noriega's party, the party that's currently in power. Looks like there will be another president from another party, possibly an alliance. It might be the return of Ricardo Martinelli, who was president three terms ago, but again, that'll speak to the transition away from one political party. Dominating the scene is so often the case across Many parts of Latin America.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: So more robust political environment along with a solid canal, political stability, security. And I would just say the beauty of the Panamanian people. My wife's Panamanian. Our children are, of course, maybe unbiased. But I just find the Panamanian people, like so many people across Latin America, just to be very wonderful and caring and very family oriented, and that's a nice foundation on which to build a good society.

Richard McColl: I think you're very right there. I have been looking at the polls. It does look like Martinelli at the moment is well positioned to come back. I was there when he was last elected in. But, you know, no Panamanian president would be foolish enough touch the canal.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: No. And the constitution is rigid. You know, they fortified it after the American invasion that the Panamanian constitution was reinforced to keep that separation between the government and. Between the government and the Canal Authority. And you're right, it's one of those things. You just don't touch it. That's. It's. It's like. It's like Social Security in the United States. You just don't touch it.

Richard McColl: Well, I think that's a great place to end this conversation. Andrew, it has been an absolute pleasure picking your brains and, you know, your knowledge about Panama and the Panama Canal and obviously international business. We've been talking here on The LatinNews Podcast to Andrew Thomas, Ph.D. professor of international business at the College of Business, the University of Akron in Ohio. He's also the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Transportation Security, the author of 25 books, but the last one being the Canal of Panama and Globalization, Growth and challenges in the 21st Century. So thank you again for your time and sharing your, well, boundless knowledge.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Hey, Richard, thanks so much for the opportunity. I do. I do appreciate it so much.

Richard McColl: Oh, no, it's been a real pleasure and hopefully we'll be able to talk to you again in the future. Maybe after the elections next year.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: I love that. You take good care.

Richard McColl: All right, you too. Bye.

Dr. Andrew Thomas: Bye.

Manuel Orozco is the director of the Migration, Remittances, and Development Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. He also serves as a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Center for International Development and as a senior adviser with the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

Orozco has conducted extensive research, policy analysis and advocacy on issues relating to global flows of remittances as well as migration and development worldwide. He is chair of Central America and the Caribbean at the US Foreign Service Institute and senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University.

Orozco frequently testifies before Congress and has spoken before the United Nations. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Texas at Austin, a MA in public administration and Latin American studies, and a BA in international relations from the National University of Costa Rica.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. My name is Richard McColl, your host here in Bogotá, Colombia. This week's very special episode, we're dealing with the situation in Nicaragua. Our very special guest is Dr. Manuel Orozco. He's a political scientist from Nicaragua. He's been at the Inter-American Dialogue for 23 plus years. And you can see all sorts of comments and articles from him around on, all over the Internet, all over and commenting wherever it needs to be. So, Dr. Manuel Orozco, thank you so much for coming on The LatinNews Podcast.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Thank you.

Richard McColl: Well, it's a real pleasure because Nicaragua should be in the news more. Let's give a little bit of a background. In April 2018, Nicaragua's government, obviously the President Daniel Ortega and the First Lady, Rosario Murillo, they began a greater crackdown and there was social unrest, I mean, major social unrest, killing 355 individuals between April 2018 and July 2019. And since then, they've been systematically dismantling further democratic institutions. It's been a policy of repression, dissent, human rights violations. And this then intensified with the November 21st elections, which I mean widely and thoroughly questionable elections, widely declared as a sham. Perhaps, Manuel, you could give us a bit more of an update.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: I think fundamentally the update is that the situation in Nicaragua is getting worse. The main issue is not much, in. My perspective, what the government is doing vis a vis of the concrete actions, like expropriation of academic centers or personal property of businesses, all the incarceration of individuals, whether they are activists or not. But it's more fundamentally the reason why. They are doing these type of actions, because any dictatorship and even democratic government. Sometimes just transgress the rule of law. And execute these type of things. But in the case of Nicaragua, you're dealing with a kind of tropical Taliban,. In the sense that the power structure that prevails in the country was designed. With the purpose to establish. A political. Structure run by Rosario Murillo and Daniel Ortega, with the purpose to establish not just a dynastic regime, but also a. New belief system, a creed that appears. To be led by a clan within the tribal Sandinismo in a broader spectrum, like that of the Nicaraguan society. So that effort has a philosophy based on creating obedience towards Mr. Ortega as the messiahs of the new. Nicaragua, with the mantra of Sandinismo, Christianity. And socialism, on the one Hand and also using the image of Hugo Chávez as the type of people and person that Ortega mirrors himself at. And so he's been paving this whole. Structure for the past 15 years. And this in 2018 when he realized, in 2019, in fact, after the first. Stage of the crisis, he realized that. He was not popular. They decided to accelerate this type of regime. So all of these activities are a. Consequence of the need to have in. Place power structure that is extremely. Isolating. In the international scene, but also is completely anti democratic, totalitarian, with all these religious tendencies. Some of them are even inherited or taken from the legacy of Muammar Gaddafi, which is Ortega's mentor. So the whole structure of expropriation, the. Elimination of civil society, the destruction of. Reading of the press, as well as the persecution against religious leaders and followers. In general, both evangelicals and Catholic, is part of the bigger scheme to establish this type of system in Latin America, in Central America.

Richard McColl: I mean, fascinating commentary. You've, you've mentioned Chavez, you've met, mentioned Gaddafi, you've called it a tropical Taliban, which I hadn't heard before. But put it into context, how has Ortega then managed to maintain the support of the military and the security forces? Because you'd think they'd be the first to turn on him.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Well, that's a very important point. The way the system has. They have crafted a political management system. Based on four or five different pillars. One is the repressive pillar, the second one is the mediatic one, very much. Similar to the Taliban. You know, the Ministry of Virtu in Nicaragua is led by the Ministry of Communications by Rosario Murillo. The third pillar is the economic infrastructure, led by the head of the Central bank and a few private sector operators. And the fourth one is the institutional makeup within the repressive regime. The police is the one that leads the main repressive apparatus. The military has taken on a sideline position that they are not going to become directly involved. And the hierarchy of the military is in full support with Ortega because they don't see an alternative to rebelling to him. They're afraid that the breaking up of the army will cause a civil war in the country. And so that moral hazard has basically. Kept them. On a standing off position. And in that regard they turn out to support Ortega, at least from a transactional perspective. Ideologically there is no support. Economically there is some clientelism on some. Members of the military, but institutionally, fundamentally, they try to not to be the. Direct repressive engine of the system. I think the way these things are. Going in Nicaragua, the army will have to move in the direction of leading or participating in the repressive apparatus because the circle of power is diminishing. And so the number of people that. Are prepared to do that are the ones who are more loyal. And that will involve some members of the army. But fundamentally, the police is in charge. Now. The police is an institution that is pseudo military in the sense that many of the members of the police today are former members of the army. So the head of intelligence, for example, in the police, is a former military official and a few other people that are in the police right now.

Richard McColl: So there is a possibility, as you say, that the army or key figures within the armed forces may start to speak out against this repression. You think that there's a possibility in the future?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: No, I don't think there is a. Possibility that they will speak out because. While there is a strong dissent, put it bluntly, only 5% of the population. Actually is favorable of Ortega, and those. Are the pretty much loyalists. This clientelistic base includes predominantly people who. Are working within the military or the police or the public sector. But within that, the hierarchy, the decision. Makers, are split basically between giving their. Loyalty to Ortega or exiting. But there is no an exit alternative to them because the international community has. Not signaled any particular way to tell them, if you live, we can provide. You with a safe haven. So they're staying entrenched, but they are. Not prepared at the same time as they see that there is a political. Succession of Ortega towards Rosario Murillo in. The next couple of years or next. Year, in the sense that secession. Gives anxiety to those who are in. The descent, and that anxiety might lead. To some greater tensions. So the government, what is doing right now is performing what is called purges. Against key individuals, key decision makers, in order to prevent a potential uprising within the regime.

Richard McColl: So this purging, I mean, we're Looking at since 2022, the legal status of more than 2020 civil society organizations has been canceled. That's over 3,400, I think now. Since 2018, there have been 12 universities closed. In February, the 222 political prisoners expelled to the US continued arbitrary detentions. And the between September 2022 and July 2023, we're looking at almost 46,000 Nicaraguans applying for asylum in Costa Rica. I think we need to roll back and just say, how did this happen? Since he took power in 2007, it's been a slow process. And if we compare to other. I mean, it's getting faster now, obviously, but if we compare to other countries in Central America, El Salvador has been a very rapid process towards authoritarian movement. But I mean, Ortega has taken his time, but then has moved into this more extreme phase of repression.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: You know, the manifestations might be the same, but again, the context that defines. The reasons why are different. And I think it's important to distinguish. Between Bukele and the radicalization Honduras too. There is definitely sort of a roadmap. That non democrats or non or leaders. Not so prone to democracy are using,. That is based on trying to absorb. And get control of all political institutions while at the same time discrediting the opponents. And after you discredit them, you criminalize. The rule of law. This is the rulebook that many leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean have been using. So that includes, for example, the laws on NGOs, nonprofit organizations to prevent their autonomy and their independence. You also have greater scrutiny over the freedom of expression, the destruction of media operations in several countries, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala. But in the case of Nicaragua, yes,. The list is that again, it answers to a more structured logic. We're talking about 29 out of 32 universities in Nicaragua that have been removed. We're talking about 4,500 nonprofit organizations out of 600 that were legally registered. And it was known before 2019, before the Foreign Agents Law was passed, that there were no more than 5,000 actually physically existing nonprofits. So you have eliminated practically legally 85% of all civil society organizations that are formally existing. You have also destroyed the private sector. The number of formal businesses in Nicaragua has dropped significantly from 170,000 formal businesses to 130,000 today. And when it comes to migration, yes, we're living under the politics of expulsion and exclusion. Between 2018 and 2023, we're talking about 850,000 Nicaraguans who have left the country. That's more than 12% of the population. Is it a humanitarian crisis? Well, I think it qualifies as one. But more importantly, it's again the rationale. Behind this process, because there is a perversity in migration that it's almost like it was by design prepared by Ortega to expel people and get them to send remittances. The dependence on remittances this year is going to be equal to 30% of the country's GDP. Nicaragua has become the most dependent on. Remittance, the most remittance dependent country in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the largest dependents in the world. In the Top five is more dependent on remittances than Haiti. And the political situation, the economic situation in Nicaragua is mirroring in terms of the deterioration to that of Haiti. Haiti's per capita GDP has increased from. 2016 To 2022, from 1400 dollars per capita to 1850. Nicaragua GDP has remained $2000 per capita in the past six years. It hasn't changed, so its dependence on remittances increases. His GDP performance doesn't change in getting. Closer to the conditions of a fragile. State, a very fragile state like that of Haiti or Afghanistan. So the speed of which definitely tells. You more about the reasons why they want to accelerate the system to establish sort of an agrarian society that is very much isolated of the world, with. A strange variant which is so far the regime is living for the next 18 months the decision touch any. Economic activity that is directly connected to the global economy. So they are not touching exchange policies so far. Significantly, they are not having controls over foreign exchange. They are not touching the free trade zone, they are not touching any type of trading activity and still welcome foreign investment. Of course, judicial security is so low that foreign investment is not increasing, it's actually going down. Free trade zone activity has declined. The number of companies have dropped, has left the country. But Ortega is not going touch them because he knows that if it touches the world, then the world is going to react. The question is, why is the world not reacting given the magnitude of repression that prevails in the country?

Richard McColl: Well, this is the question, isn't it? Will the U.S. for example, make good on its threat to suspend Nicaragua from the free trade agreements there? Will the government of President Biden, do you think, move forwards on this?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: I think it's very difficult to say yes because there are a number of reasons that don't help. First of all, from technical standpoint, you cannot suspend a country under the Treaty of CAFTA. What you can do is impose penalties based on violations to some of the trading chapters. For example, violations to the labor and the Environment Agreements, Chapter 16 and 17 for violations of market access among financial institutions of the United States into Nicaragua. That's chapter 12. There is significant control of the state over competitiveness in the financial markets. There is a law of consumer protection, but what the law does is to protect relatives or those who have been sanctioned. So there are restrictions on the amounts. Of remittances that you need to report, etc. So you can impose penalties on that, and that's an important element to do, and pressure that needs to be done. But the Administration this year, this time is very reluctant at imposing sanctions in general because there is a sort of a political risk embedded to sanctions today that is very high because they don't see results. The assumptions on sanctions were the wrong. Ones where they were not very accurate. And so you have some policy failures on the sides sanctions. And that has turned people to look elsewhere in terms of foreign pressure. And I think the administration doesn't understand. The magnitude of the problem in Nicaragua. As well as they are simply distracted by the amount of problems that are taking place. The threat that Russia and China represent to United States is a global one. In military and economic terms is a. Significant threat that distracts the attention of policymaking. The problems in Latin America have also put Nicaragua almost in a fifth place. You have the Haitian crisis of the deepening criminality in the country, the disarray that takes place followed by the Guatemalan political crisis that is making sure that. Are rise to power very weak. And then in third place you have competing political crisis between Ecuador and Peru. So in fifth place you have Nicaragua. And so that makes it harder for the administration to exercise some sort of political clout. And there is another reason is that the foreign policymakers of this administration are dealing are trained to deal with complex cooperation, but with cooperative partners. But today you're dealing on complex cooperation realities with non cooperative and authoritarians. And so your way of how to bang the table against these authoritarians requires some lessons and experiences from the Cold War. But this is a generation of people who did not grow up during that time. So it makes all of this complicated. And the administration is dealing with more domestic policy pressures. Republican. Party that wants inward focus, not outward focus. The they just, you know, the last bill that postponed the whole fiscal budget approval did not include support for Ukraine, for example. And so what you have is just a situation where it's difficult just to make policy only Nicaragua.

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Richard McColl: When you talk about the lessons that we need to take from the Cold War, what exactly are you talking about?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Well, fundamentally there are two lessons. One is that one needs to better prepared on how to deal with authoritarians who are risk acceptant when it comes to continuing the regime status and repressive apparatus. But that means that you need to consider a proportional response to the coercive nature of those regimes. And that includes coercive policies that while they may not be of a military nature, they need to really tackle the vulnerabilities of these autocrats. And one of the major vulnerabilities are in the media, the control of this information, the control of trolls, the hacking that they perform. Those measures need to be addressed and you need to dismantle the propaganda infrastructure that rules. The second one is that the average citizen that lives in the societies do not want those autocrats, do not want those totalitarians. And we need to have the conviction that the democratic values that shape the political institutions in the democracies that we live need to be not only enforced, but also provided as a mirror image to those nations that are suffering violations so that the people see that they are not alone. And I think we have missed that element. The administration has had the summit of democracies, but it's more like a conference event than an event that demonstrate how do we strengthen democracy, how do we address the weaknesses of the rule of law? And it is a key issue because the administration made us a goal to promote democracy and defend it. We actually see a higher increase of authoritarians who do not buy into the. US commitment towards democracy in the world. So we have to be prepared to meet the risks and the challenges that. These dictators are putting in front of. You and draw the line. And there are ways to draw the line. You have this coercive measure, but you also have to be realistic within the context of a country like China that is basically selling its image of being an authoritarian regime, a totalitarian system that tells you that it's okay to be bad, but it's okay to do business with anyone. And that's the image that is selling. In the world in exchange of diplomatic recognition. And I don't think we are very much aware of the threat that China represents in the world in that regard. Because at the end of the day, the absence of democracy is a complete obliteration of human values and human development.

Richard McColl: And, and there was a free trade agreement just signed with China between the government of Ortega as well.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Yes. Which is just a sort of a footprint for the entire Latin American region. China, it's growing in terms of its trade presence, more in terms of its exports to Latin America. 20% Of imports of Central American from China, of goods from the world in Central America come from China, is going to surpass the United States as a major importer of goods. But it's more than that. It's the geopolitical significance that China wants. To have. In the Americas, including the sale and use of 5G technology for the benefit of the regime.

Richard McColl: I mean, when you look at that, it's China, also Russia, of course, in this great chess game about the geography needed, the geopolitics. What is the relationship that Nicaragua and the regime has with Iran at the.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Moment is an ideological solidarity related type of approach. They embrace the belief that Iran, North Korea, Russia, China and Venezuela, as well as Cuba, in that order, are countries that are basically presenting themselves publicly as diametrically opposed to United States. And Ortega is implicitly saying that they are of the same position. And the reality is that they are not saying it only for the purpose to say we're a regime under siege by the United States. They are saying that what the US Represents is not the type of system that they value.

Richard McColl: Okay, but I mean, all of this leads and what one hopes to dissent when we think realistically about this. But are there any signs of dissent from within or is the opposition all just based overseas now?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: The opposition is. I mean, the leadership of the period between 2018 and 2021 is in exile. There is obviously also a critical mass of Nicaraguans who not only not support the regime, it's nine out of 10 people, but there are some individuals who quietly are resisting the infrastructure, the political makeup of this regime. And they may play an important role at some point. Okay. To, to address this, but not for now. I mean, the, the culture of. Fear that the regime has established is overwhelming. There are 20,000 police officers in the country. There is one police practically for every 100 homes. So you are living on a policing state, not including the role of the army.

Richard McColl: So I mean, so we're not going to see any challenges to the regime.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Challenges are. There are challenges against the regime. There are transnational political groups that are operating in networks between Nicaragua and other parts of the world that engage in different type of resistance activities. But again, the way you have to work, this has to be done within. The context of countries like Afghanistan, like. Syria, even like the Gulf countries where the possibility of social protest is not an option. So you look for alternatives to social. Protest, street protest that can have an effect in the vulnerabilities of the regime.

Richard McColl: Okay, So I mean, we're talking about them. Okay, so there are challenges that are available the regime, but it's pretty firmly entrenched. And are we looking at a successor in their son Laureano?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: We're looking at the successor that is going to be his wife. Okay. The. There is a political debt that Ortega owes to Rosario, in exchange of her loyal support, to keep him in power practically four consecutive times, three consecutive times, plus the times in the 90s, in the 80s. And basically the plan is to hand out powers to her in 2025 so she can have an entire year to promote her time for the next election period and then take over. The. The Descent is feeling anxious about that succession because they don't buy into the selection process, which is very unilateral. Yeah, they don't buy into the. The. The individual who's being chosen. Rosario Murillo is not very much liked, even though the past two years they have changed different parts, different features that are more of her side than the Sandinista group. And so that has been an effort to contain the Descent, but it's still strong. I would say that at least half of people within the circle of power are uneasy about Rosario. And once she's in power, there will be more reluctance to work with her. So it remains to understand what is the nature of that political composition, how strong the balance of power is on the side of her. But we're talking about 2027 onward. By that time, conditions in Nicaragua will really be in bad shape.

Richard McColl: Yeah, I mean, we can't talk about cracks in the system when Rosario comes into power, because as you say, 20, if things continue as they are. I mean, you've said that 12% of the country in recent years has left. I mean, it beggars belief what might actually happen, this huge migration leaving the country into Costa Rica and beyond, obviously going north. How is this affecting the relationship with neighboring countries in Central America?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: That. Well, it's affecting it in absolute terms, in practical terms, that there. Are more people going through the border. But there are two important issues. One is that when the Biden administration introduced the humanitarian parole mechanism in June, January of 2023, it cut migration. Basically, it contained Nicaraguan migration. The number of Nicaraguans living through the border basically dropped to less than 1,000amonth from 2035,000 in December 2022. So instead of the administration addressing the. Problem in Nicaragua from a foreign policy. Angle, it just decided to contain migration and let those people deal with the conditions in their home country by themselves. And migration has not increased to Costa Rica this year. It has remained in a stable number of less than 5,000 refugee applications per year, which is. Per month, which is a large number. We're talking about 60,000 applications, but it was 7,8000 last year. And also the. The net entry of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica has remained at less than 500 people per month. Then to the US you see a decline even through the parole. Less than 40,000 people have been admitted through the parole throughout most of the year. You could have had at least 100,000. People, at least coming to the US at this time. And the main issue is that there is a depopulation variable that so many people have lived that you don't have as much as a larger room for other people to live because their obligations to stay are too strong. For example, a person that could live but has to take care of a relative or a minor and is not. Prepared or cannot afford to go in family out of the country. And especially given the restrictions that exist today.

Richard McColl: Yeah, we have to, we have to continue on the issue of Central America. As we wind this down, you know, as you said, the problems that Bernardo Arévalo is going to face and the, you know, the corporate authoritarian elite in Guatemala, the strong hand of Xiomara Castro growing in Honduras, obviously it needs no publicity. What is going on with Nayib Bukele in El Salvador? Can we expect or can we just hope that the presidency of Costa Rica in Rodrigo Chaves steps up to become, you know, the voice of diplomacy in the region?

Dr. Manuel Orozco: No, unfortunately no. I think we may expect the voice. Of President-elect Arévalo leading role and. Maybe Costa Rica followed through. When you think of Central America, you can no longer think only of the. Five countries, but you need to include Belize, Panama and the Dominican Republic. And these are very important countries. Belizean foreign policy has been reluctant to. Continue sort of lining up with Nicaragua. It actually has been more towards the position of strengthening democratization efforts in the region. Then you have a situation of the,. What is called the alliance for Development in Democracy that includes the Dominican Republic and Panama. With Costa Rica, they have a predominantly. Economic strategy to address attraction of foreign investment, et cetera. But they do have also a foreign policy perspective to look into the threats. Of political regimes that might not be democratic. And I think Costa Rica is prepared to get into the bandwagon of international pressure during this government if the other partners join in. And I think we're likely to see. Some important steps in that direction. But you have to understand also the nature of political developments taking place in Central America. The threat of Martinelli winning politics has. Led to a political coalition of parties aligning against, in the election against him. You also see a new political movement in the Dominican Republic forming a coalition of parties in order to secure a new transition. And even in Honduras, there is a. Coalition building established against Libre, against Zelaya and Castro in order to prevent the radicalization of Zelaya in that country. And then you have Guatemala. Guatemala will have a difficult ruling space,. But it will ensure certain policy gains. And I think that's a key issue. To see how it unfolds. And even in El Salvador, Bukele will win the election. He will leverage his popularity to be reelected. But his policy performance hasn't been that successful. He has leveraged on the anti crime period at the time when the,. The gangs were weakening. But his economic performance is lousy. He is not delivering. And El Salvadorans will realize that is the economic stupid.

Richard McColl: The economic stupid, as you say. So listen, let me take this moment to say thank you so much for your time and your profound insights into Nicaragua and of course beyond into the region because, you know, connecting Belize into this, connecting the Dominican Republic and of course, much overlooked in this area. Forget Panama, but the elections coming up are very important. So thank you so much to Dr. Manuel Orozco of the Inter American Dialogue, political scientists from Nicaragua based in the United States. It has been a revealing, somewhat negative, I think, outlook on everything if we think about what's going on in Nicaragua. But we hope for the best in the future.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Thank you very much.

Richard McColl: Thank you. It's been an absolute pleasure speaking to Dr. Manuel Orozco.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Thank you.

Richard McColl: This has been The LatinNews Podcast dealing with Nicaragua. This week I've been Richard McColl, your host here in Bogotá. Thank you for listening.

Dr. Manuel Orozco: Bye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.LatinNews.com.

Manuel is a PhD student in the Harvard Government Department. He studies the comparative political economy of development, with an emphasis on political parties, the politics of violence, and how the two interact.

His regional focus is on Latin America. His writing has appeared in the Journal of Democracy, Slate, and the Washington Post. At Harvard, He has taught and helped design courses on formal theory, research methods, organized crime, and comparative politics. In 2021, Manuel received the Derek C. Bok Award for Excellence in Graduate Student Teaching of Undergraduates.

Originally from El Salvador, Manuel has an AB from Harvard (2016) and an MSc from Oxford.

Richard McColl: Welcome to the LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogota, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl. This is the LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl here in Bogota, Colombia. My very special guest this week is Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, a PhD candidate in political science at Harvard and he's from El Salvador. So we shall be addressing the situation. Yes, El Salvador is in the news a lot, obviously, primarily because of the controversial president currently in power, Nayib Bukele. And, well, we'll be talking about his security policy, his economic policy, and of course his threat to democracy because of course we've been seeing that popping up as he's concentrated power very rapidly over the past three years. So Manuel, welcome on the LatinNews podcast.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Thank you, Richard. It's great to be here.

Richard McColl: No, it's an absolute pleasure to be talking with someone so knowledgeable about El Salvador. I think before we get into security and before we get into sort of the authoritarian nature of President Bukele, let's talk about the rise of President Bukele prior to becoming president. Where did this guy come from? Sure.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: So Bukele really enters the political scene in 2012 when he becomes mayor of a small middle class municipality in El Salvador called Nuevo Cuscatlán. He runs under the banner of the FMLN, which is historically the kind of traditional left wing party. And he does very well. He does a good job as mayor and he also is a very good politician. He has a fresh style. And three years later, he runs and is elected as mayor of San Salvador, which is besides the presidency, the most visible and powerful post in the country. This sort of sets him up to really be a natural presidential candidate. Now what's interesting is that during this time, so while he's mayor of San Salvador, kind of starting in 2015, while he's mayor of San Salvador, he starts to clash with his party, with the FMLN. The FMLN is a party that Bukele and his family had been close to for decades. Bukele had described himself before this as a leftist. He once, and you can Google this, he describes himself as a socialist. He said the FMLN is the only path. And now as mayor of San Salvador, he starts to criticize the party. So the FMLN is in government, they hold the presidency. And Bukele starts saying things like, you know, they're just neoliberals. They're just as bad as the right wing party. They're not implementing Structural reforms. But anyway, to make a long story short, eventually the FMLN decides to kick Bukele out of the party. And this sort of represents a critical moment for Bukele. He announces that he's going to create his own party. But because he gets kicked out of the FMLN so close to the presidential election of 2019, he strikes a pact of convenience with this small party called GANA. And he goes on to win that election in a landslide. He wins with 53% of the vote, which is about 20 percentage points above the second place. But to really understand what that means, you need to know that since 1989. So between 1989 and 2019, when Bukele selected, two parties, had a. Basically a duopoly over electoral politics in El Salvador. The FMLN, which we've already talked about on the left, these are the former guerrillas who then become a political Party in the 90s and ARENA on the right. So Bukele becomes the first candidate from outside of these two parties to win the presidency since the early 1980s. And more importantly, he does it on a platform that is all about running against his establishment. So Bukele is a traditional populist. Is. I often get asked, is Bukele right wing or left wing? And I say, yes, he's a populist.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: His entire platform is running against these two parties. He calls to them, los mismos de siempre, the same ones as always. He accuses the FMLN of being adding a 2.0. Basically, these are sites of the same coin. Anyway, his election truly marks a sort of a break, a critical juncture before and after in the Salvadoran political system. And the narrative, the populist narrative really resonates with Salvadoran voters, who, at this point, I think rightly so, are pretty sick of this establishment. So that's where he comes from.

Richard McColl: And I mean, so as a populist, neither right, neither left, both right, both left. Who can we say is the real Bukele? I mean, that's the thing, because we just. We watch these announcements and declarations and stigmatizing all dissent and this populist authoritarianism that he, you know, he displays.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Who is he?

Richard McColl: This weaponization of social media, the baseball cap backwards in the UN and the selfies everyone wants to call. He wants to call himself a millennial, and then, you know, the coolest dictator. These are all very good sound bites, and they're all very good for imaging and social media. But who is the real Bukele?

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: You know, it's. It's the truth is it's hard to tell. I think here's, so here's a couple of things we can say for sure about him. So number one, he has been consistently populist. And I think that's telling because, you know, I don't know him. We would have to interview him. But I do think that he genuinely believes in this idea that this political establishment and this network of economic elites behind it. I think he truly believes that this is the source of El Salvador's problems. And I think it truly believes that this has been the source of El Salvador's problems, basically since El Salvador has existed. So I think that's one thing we can say for sure. The other thing that he has demonstrated is that if there is a guiding principle behind populism, it is the search for power, right? The very reason why we see him sort of shift from left to right in different areas whenever it's convenient is because he's making calculations about what is going to allow him to maintain as much power as possible. You know, I'm not a, I'm not, I'm a political scientist. I'm not in the business of psychological profiling. But I think it's pretty safe to say that those two things are very important for Bukele. And I think it's safe to say that those two things have been consistent.

Richard McColl: I mean, this is it, isn't it? I mean, you talk about the populist and the need to stay in power is. It's nothing will stop a populist strongman from trying to win re election. So he'll do anything, as you say, he'll jump back and forth between whatsoever, continue extending this state of emergency which he's been extending month by month since March 2022. But again, before we get into security, because I know it's going to take up rate portion of this conversation, I want to know. There was so much noise about El Salvador taking on the cryptocurrency as an economic policy. Tell us about the economics going on. What is the economy like when we refer to the cryptocurrency in El Salvador right now?

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Sure. So the economy in general is not great. The biggest, there's sort of two issues regarding the economy that keep this government up at night and that will probably continue to do so. The first, and this is, this has now been true for a while, is that the Salvadoran government has an unsustainable amount of debt. And this becomes very important when we talk about Cryptocurrency in a moment. The second problem, and this has been especially true in the past year and a half or so, Salvadorans are increasingly saying, the thing I'm most worried about is essentially the amount of money in my pocket, the cost of living, inflation. And so far Bukele's government hasn't really had a clear answer to this. It's very easy for, you know, me to give you the 30-second version of a security policy, the 30-second version of his foreign policy, the 30-second version of a bunch of things. I can't really give you the 30-second version of his economic policy because there hasn't been a clear economic policy. But those two things I think are important to understand both for the current context and for the context in which bitcoin gets introduced. And so bitcoin is introduced in sort of the second half of 2021. And there's two ways of looking at what was going on. Actually to be fair, there's three ways of looking at what was going on there. The first is a little closer to the official narrative. And the official narrative goes, this is good public policy. On one hand, it's going to generate jobs, it's going to reduce the costs of receiving remittances, which are very important, particularly for lower income households. And it's also going to help incorporate more people into the formal economy. And in addition to all that, it's sort of going to put us on the map internationally and it's going to bring investment. This is kind of the first rationale for Bitcoin adoption. The second, and you know, there's some evidence for this. The second rationale is that this is essentially a pet project of some of Bukele's closest allies and in particular his brothers. And you know, not to, I don't think going down that rabbit hole is particularly productive. But you know, it's worth saying there is some evidence of this. The third perspective on bitcoinization though, and I think there's a lot to this, is that this was a bit of a Hail Mary to try to solve the kind of medium term fiscal problem without having to resort to more painful measures. If you think about it from Bukele's perspective, it would have been ideal. We know now that this is not what happened. It would have been fantastic if he could invest some money into the bitcoin market, see that money go up. In addition to that, sell some bitcoin backed bonds, which was a thing also sort of failed spectacularly. But that was an idea, right? And In a sense, if that worked out, fantastic. If it didn't, the costs were actually not very high. We can say now, two years later, yeah, bitcoin's not very popular and he's lost some money. Say more about that in a second. But has it really had a political cost? Not really. Has it made the economic problem worse, the fiscal problem worse? It has, but not qualitatively. So. So this is. This is sort of. So I think there's some truth to all three of these perspectives on Bitcoin adoption. I tend to think of that third idea of this basically being a sort of Hail Mary carries a lot of weight. Just to kind of wrap up. Yeah, the gamble didn't really work. Right. So part of the problem is sort of by design, there's very little accountability around bitcoin. And so we can't really say for sure what the numbers look like, but we can at the very least take Bukele at his word. And so Bukele says that he's invested about $125 million in Bitcoin and his losses stand at around 40 million. If we just. If we just look at the value of bitcoin and compare it to what the value was when these different purchases were being made. So that's about a third in losses. And kind of what's ironic about this is that amount, $40 million that were lost in bitcoin, is exactly what El Salvador's debt payment that was coming up was. It was $40 million. Curious. So the. Yes. So the. So, you know, obviously his critics made sure to point that out,.

Richard McColl: But.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Look, yes, this was in. In terms of helping the government climb out of this fiscal hole. This was unsuccessful. I think that's fair to say. It was unpopular. Mosalid search status was a bad idea and it didn't really take on. But I do think it's important to acknowledge that it has been successful in terms of putting El Salvador on the map. Right. For better or worse, that part of it has worked. So that's the bitcoin story, I think.

Richard McColl: Yeah, I mean, that's true. That it was on the front page of every newspaper. Everybody uses El Salvador as a point of reference for this. And of course, it doesn't do any damage to his image overseas. Something that has been damaged recently. Before we move on, I would like to ask, when bitcoin was introduced and sort of made legal tender and so on, how far did it permeate society? I want to put the most superficial example out there. Were you Paying for a pupusa with bitcoin. Could you go down this route?

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Sure. So to answer the pupusa question specifically, yes, there were some places where one could pay.

Richard McColl: Incredible.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: One could buy a pupusa using bitcoin. But a couple of caveats. So there is some. I apologize. Let me take a step back because you need the following data point to kind of understand the answer. So one important characteristic of the bitcoin reform was that the introduction of bitcoin was to be centralized through this wallet app that was created by the government. It's called Chivo. And so most of what we know about whether this took on comes from sort of data we have on whether people have been using Chivo, the wallet. And sort of what you see is that right as the reform was being rolled out, there was indeed a surge in the use of Chivo. And when you surveys, when you ask people why they decided to kind of give bitcoin a try, the answer has to do with this. With this, basically this cash bonus that. That you got just by kind of downloading the app and. And kind of playing around with it a little bit. Okay, so this is all to say that in sort of in the early days and weeks, there was for sure a moment when Salvadoran sort of turned to bitcoin and said, all right, let's see what you're all about. That appears to have fizzled out fairly quickly and fairly permanently. You know, yeah, sure. There are still some places, particularly sort of more touristy hotspots.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Where you can go and buy a pupusa using bitcoin. But has this fundamentally transformed the way Salvadorans go about their. Their daily economic life? Absolutely not.

Richard McColl: Very interesting. The 40 million. Very interesting that it's his brothers and of course, the lack of accountability to be able to chase and trace bitcoin. So we'll move on a little bit. And we need to talk. We've talked about the economic policy of bitcoin. In the recent episode, we spoke to Dr. Manuel Orozco, the inter American dialogue, and we discussed Nicaragua, and were discussing the region and so on. He said, well, look at Bukele. He has no economic policy. The economy doesn't go well. It's just shielded by the whole bitcoin story. And then he mentions the security situation. The maras or the gangs were already in a decline when Bukele came in to create his security policies. Before you respond to that, obviously this goes hand in hand with the authoritarianism of Bukele. The issue or the idea of the Gangs and to try, and I would say neuter them, I think is what I want to say is. But before we get there, he has been able to obviously ride a wave of populism, a wave of popularity through creating this, you know, this security situation in El Salvador. And you sort of say at what cost? The threat to democracy, the storming of the legislative assembly back in the day, this concentration of power that we've previously mentioned, the ability to find the judges to evade problems of him running again for presidents in 2024 by questioning the legality of the constitution itself. And at the same time, what's he done? I'm sure he's done something to change the electoral system, because if you could explain why he reduced the size of the 84 member legislative to 64 seats and the number of elected municipalities from 262 to 50, this all goes hand in hand. There's a lot in that last intervention. Perhaps you'd like to explain some of it.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Sure. So look, you're totally right. If you let me just put it this way. If you were to draw a graph of Salvador democracy, this is a line that starting in 1992 up to 2019, it goes up and up and starting in 2019. And that's because of this process of concentration of power and the erosion of checks and balances. And we could talk about that. I think you pointed out some of the, kind of, some of the greatest hits of the Bukele presidency. But yes, right now this is a president who has essentially accumulated the entirety of political power really under his thumb. Let's talk about this electoral reform because I think it's gone under the radar a little bit.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Let me tell you what the reform does, and then we can talk again about some of the possible reasons behind this. So as you said, basically, you know, this reduces kind of, you know, dramatically the number of mayors as well as the number of legislators. And it does so in part by redistricting, by kind of sort of lumping together district into. Into now bigger districts. And really what we need to think about is, okay, well, what are the, what are sort of the political consequences of doing this? And anyone familiar with sort of the recent trends in American politics will be aware of this idea of gerrymandering.

Richard McColl: Yes.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: So one thing that some of us have done, and I can't take credit for all of these analysis, but one thing you can do is you can go back to the last time there was there were elections for mayors and for Legislators. So this was in 2021. And you can do the following exercise. Let's look, just look at the vote, look at how people voted, and look at how many mayors and legislators they won in that election. Great. Now do the exact same thing. Applying these new rules, applying these new boundaries, this new electoral formula, and look at what happens. Look at who is benefited and who loses. So here are some numbers. So under the old rules, in other words, in the real world, in 2021, Bukele and his allies won about 76% of the seats in the legislature. That's a very big number. They did great. Okay. If that election had happened under the new rules, they would not have won 76%. They would have won 93%. So that's pretty significant. But, you know, they already had a super majority. Let's look at mayors, though. In that election, Bukele's party won about 58% of all local governments. That's still pretty good. Under the new rules, Bukele's party would have won 93% of local governments. The FMLN, under the new rules, would essentially disappear. Arena would hold on to, I believe, I'm sorry, I don't have this number in front of me, but would hold on, I think, to one or two seats in the legislature. And like a handful of local governments, GANA, Bukele's ally, the party that allowed him to actually reach the presidency, would also virtually disappear. So if one does that exercise, what the new rules do is they basically give Nuevas Ideas Bukele's party, a complete dominance over electoral politics and over these sort of formal levers of power.

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Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Now, obviously, people may choose to vote differently, and who knows what's going to happen between now and the election. So, you know, these numbers are just kind of an academic exercise, but they do tell us something about what might be going on here and how these new rules may have been drawn. The other thing that this sort of allows Bukele to do, and this is kind of, at least for me, a slightly harder argument to wrap my head around, is it sort of allows Bukele to purge his party a little bit. And, you know, people often think of Bukele as like this powerful, strong man who doesn't need anyone else and rules on his own. You know, that's. That's kind of true, but I think he has felt for a while that his party is a liability. His mayors, his legislators, they aren't as popular as he is. There have been a few cases of mayors and legislators kind of walking into scandals and being engaged in shady business. And so what this allows him to do is, well, now I have to choose about a quarter as many people to run for mayor. I can now filter out people who are not totally loyal to me, people who don't have a good reputation. And we've seen some evidence of that. So that's the story of the electoral rules. And by the way, I should say, right, the kind of other side of this, the Bukelista narrative is, look, we had a fat, corrupt state. We were wasting a lot of money on a lot of mayors and a lot of legislators, and we didn't need to do this. That narrative, by the way, has been pretty successful and convincing Salvadoran voters. But, yeah, that's the story of the electoral rules and the electoral system.

Richard McColl: So, I mean, we're looking at 20, 24 elections. Obviously, he's poised with 93% already. The opposition, very possibly the traditional opposition of the FMLN and the ARENA could disappear.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Yes, that's a. That's a real possibility. My sense is that they probably won't. I think they will survive in some even more diminished shape. You know, they might hold on to a couple of local governments, and they might be able to elect a couple of legislators. So I think they'll be around. But, you know, they. They really will be kind of not like a paper opposition. Right. Not a real opposition in any meaningful sense of. Of that word.

Richard McColl: Okay, well, it's that moment. We have to. We have to dive in to security. And that's what I know people are listening for, obviously, because it's the most newsworthy and. And I think so very visual story coming out of El Salvador at the moment. So El Salvador, as well know, had an absolutely dreadful history through the Maras. You know, I would say the deportation of gangs started in the 1980s from the Los Angeles area back down. And of course, they come back fully intact and, you know, with their own sort of command system. We don't need to get into that too much. But the Maras, the MS-13, and the Barrio 18, but essentially had the country on its knees in terms of security and so on. Bukele comes in. He says, There's 70,000 free. You tweeted this or put on x. There are 70,000 free gang members in El Salvador, we're going to jail them all. He has arrested arbitrarily 70,000 people. And he now says, and this was, you know, this is in September 2023, that there are still 43,000 free gang members out there. It's peculiar to me that obviously these figures. He is popular because he has created security. Let's not lie. The situation was dreadful. You couldn't cross the road, people couldn't manage their own sort of business. And you're not even a corner shop without paying some sort of extortion or protection fee. Murders sky high. I'm sure it was the murder capital of the world for a while. Obviously there's popularity to this thing and it's far be it for me to pontificate from the security of my home. You know, it's like, well, this is against human rights. This is so on and so forth, but we know it is. So tell us about the security policies. Tell us what is going on now. Her.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: So there was you just said many interesting and insightful things. But so let me just say as a side note before we dive in, into it, that these numbers that you quoted, in fact, all numbers related to this policy should be treated with extreme caution.

Richard McColl: Yes.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: The point is that if you, if you take and representatives of his government at their word and assume these numbers are correct, the numbers don't really add up. And we can talk about what that might mean in a second. I just, I just sort of wanted to. To put that out there. I don't want anyone to accuse you or us of spreading fake news. So just want to clarify. So what's going on? As usual, I would like to just take a step back first and point out a couple of things. So there is a lot of talk about the Bukele model. And right now the Bukele model is an extremely repressive model. It is the most dramatic sustained crackdown against criminal organizations certainly in recent years potentially in Latin American history. It's really important that we understand and not for kind of political reasons, but just so that we can understand how this works. It's really important that we remember that for two years before this war against gangs, the policy was completely different. This was a policy of negotiating with the. These same gangs, of striking a deal to keep homicides down in exchange for a number of benefits. This is very crucial. And the reason why is the following. Basically every experience we've had with crackdowns like these In Latin America, there are some exceptions, but basically every experience we've had like this teaches us that these crackdowns backfire. They backfire in the sense that they lead to more violence. And this is usually, I'm simplifying here, but this is usually because criminal groups spike back. This is about as close as we can get to kind of an iron law of anti crime policy. The most fascinating aspect of Bukele's crackdown is that this didn't happen. There was no moment after the crackdown when the gangs gave any sign of fighting back. And I would suggest that if we want to understand what's really going on here, we need to be able to understand why that was the case. Now, my own argument, I'll give you a couple of. I'll give you a couple of suggestions, all of which I think are important for understanding the presentation. My own argument is that the effectiveness of the crackdown has a lot to do with the pact that came before it. And so what you need to know about the pact is that the pact generally lowered homicide rates. There were a couple of blips along the way. When the gangs did go on short killing sprees. After every blip, the government would come out and say, we're declaring war on you. Repress for a day or two. But then things would go back to normal and everyone would come back as a negotiating table. So the pact, in the sense, sort of taught gangs that this is how things work. So in March 2022, when there is a new blip, what does the government do? The government comes out and says, we're declaring war on you. And then it starts repressing. I think at this point, the dynamic of this pact has taught the gangs that what they should do now is to just lay low. And in a couple of days, just as we have in the past, we're going to be back at the negotiating table. Of course, that's not what happens. And now we know that this crackdown has been going on for, you know, a year and a half. There are some other theories about this. So one theory is that in reality the pact never really ended. There is a. There. The one theory is, look, Bukele might be repressing sort of primarily, kind of like the grunts and the foot soldiers of these gangs and also a lot of innocent people. People. But you know, he does seem like he's still giving benefits and maybe negotiating with some of the higher folks. This, by the way, is the people who believe in this argument. Look at these numbers that we learned about last week, say there's still 43,000 gang members out there and say, there you go. I told you the gangs are still out there. They're not fighting back because they're still getting some sort of benefit. And you know, there's another set of theories. There's any number of theories we could discuss about this. But let's talk about what's happening right now and more importantly, what's coming up. The current situation appears to be one in which the Salvadorian government has arrested more people than it can really handle. And so just for context, this is about 2% of the population is currently in prison. Before the state of exception, Salvadoran prisons were already terribly overcrowded. I think we can all imagine what they look like now. And when I talk to officials in the Bukele government, what they say is we've sort of backed ourselves into a corner. On one hand, we can't really, we don't really have the capacity to keep these many people in the prisons, particularly if we're still going to go out there and arrest another 43,000 gang members. But on the other hand, how do we release them, assuming that they truly are mostly gang members? As Bukele says, you obviously can't put them back into the streets assuming that there really are a lot of non gang members among us who have been arrested, as many organizations say. And you know, even the idea of potentially suddenly releasing 20,000 people like this can lead to massive disruptions in sort of the social fabric of this country. And so I know, because they told me that some of the people in charge of looking at this are terrified. They don't really know what to do.

Richard McColl: It's an incredibly concerning moment. And perhaps we wind back a little bit. As you say, the pact was already sort of, let's say, yielding results prior to Bukele. It's a suggestion here. So Bukele, what kind of relationship does he have with these top level, would we say officials? No, these top level leaders in the gangs themselves.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Are you asking me about Bukele personally or Bukele's government?

Richard McColl: Well, either way, which one's more interesting?

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Sure. I think Bukele's government is. So as far as I know, and I could be wrong about this, as far as I know, we actually don't have any evidence of Bukele himself sort of ever even having met any. Any top gang leaders. Again, I could be wrong about that. And I'm not saying it hasn't happened. I just don't know of any evidence. The relationship between his government and the top gang leaders actually begins before he even becomes mayor of San Salvador. So during that campaign, members of his inner circle start to basically reach out to gang leaders from San Salvador. And what this allows him to do basically is to run a campaign to enter gang turf and run a campaign once Bukele is mayor. The, that relationship allows them to actually implement some public works, as far as we can tell. And this is basically coming out of investigative reporting by El Faro, as a side note, absolute treasure of Latin American journalism. Everyone should go read El Faro, please.

Richard McColl: The best.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Absolutely. But anyway, so this relationship then basically seems to translate as Bukele becomes president, this relationship sort of becomes broader. There is evidence, for instance, that many high level gang leaders were released from prison before their time was up. And not only that, there is some evidence that at least one of them was actually aided by the government in leaving El Salvador and reaching safety, I believe in Mexico. And so, as is often the case with these relationships between public officials and criminals, we are not able to see almost any of the actual information, the actual data. We can only see the tip of the iceberg. But I think that sort of gives you a flavor of what may or may not be going on here. So in other words, to summarize, this has been a relationship between Bukele's inner circle and gang leaders that has been developing for a while. The big open question is whether that relationship is still alive today or whether there truly has been a break since the, since the crackdown. For what it's worth, my sense is that there probably has been a break, but the truth is we can't say for sure. And that's going to be a really important question for how things develop moving forward.

Richard McColl: Well, as we always know, sooner or later the truth will out. But for now, as you say, it's a tip of an iceberg. I think we need to wind this down, but we could take hours discussing this. But I want to just ask because of course Latin America, people and governments and people coming up to elections are looking at the Bukele model. You know, there's the cost of living issue, rising crime, or the perception of insecurity in very, in a great deal of countries, not least where I am here in Colombia and in other, I know in other Central American countries, they're all calling out for the Bukele model of, you know, no tolerance, total security. But is this model, is El Salvador really the safest place in Latin America, as Bukele says.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: I think it very much depends on who you ask. And so for the average person,.

Richard McColl: The.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Evidence that we have suggests that yes, right now, El Salvador is a very safe place, that's what all signs point. I don't know if it's the safest place in Latin America, but El Salvador is a fairly safe place. But for example, if you are a young man living in an underprivileged community, if you happen to have a tattoo on you, and if you happen to, I don't know, maybe have some neighbors who don't like you, or an ex girlfriend or ex boyfriend who doesn't like you, then El Salvador is really not at all a safe place. There is nothing protecting you from the police or the military showing up in the middle of the night and taking you away. So my point, I think is, yes, when we measure it by kind of these traditional indicators, are there murders, are there extortions, are there thefts? Yes, this plan has worked, it really has. But it's come at a pretty high cost and I think everyone needs to think about those costs very seriously. By the way, you know, I know we don't really have a time to get into this, but I would like to remind anyone listening that there is a strong case to be made that the only reason the crackdown worked is because Bukele spent two years negotiating with the criminal groups and that allowed him to take them by surprise. So if you wanted to really implement the Bukele model, that's what the Bukele model is. The Bukele model is extensive negotiations during which you essentially lull the criminal groups into sleep and by the way, during which you concentrate as much power as you can politically followed by a crackdown. So if anyone wants to give that a try that speech. And in a political campaign, I'd love to watch.

Richard McColl: So it's a two year run in of negotiations and of course, therefore identifying all the people that you need to jail to therefore concentrate power as well. And then of course, the crackdown seen as popularity. It's been fascinating, Manuel. It really has. My knowledge of El Salvador was very much superficial, but much more related to the civil war period. And then, you know, post civil war and then, of course, just what I've read in the press recently. So to have you talking about this in such depth and with such authentication authority has been a real pleasure. And I know that the listeners of the LatinNews podcast will have enjoyed this. We have been talking to Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, who is a PhD candidate in political science at Harvard. Manuel, thank you so much for your time.

Dr. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez: Absolutely. Thank you for having me, Richard.

Richard McColl: It's been absolutely great. This has been the LatinNews Podcast. We will be back in a fortnight with further information about the region, but thank you again to our interviewee. That's it. Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, Ph.D. candidate in political science at Harvard University. Check out his writings. He is, of course, on X, Twitter and elsewhere. Thank you for listening to me. Your host, Richard McColl, here in Bogota, Colombia. This has been the LatinNews Podcast. And goodbye.

Outro: You've been listening to the LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.

Anand Persaud is Editor-in-chief of Stabroek News, an independent daily newspaper in Guyana founded in 1986. Mr. Persaud joined the newspaper in 1989 and became Editor in 1993. He has been editor-in-chief since 2008.

In 2022 he was awarded the European Union Delegation Human Rights Award in Guyana in recognition of his work in promoting the values of the EU and playing a role in highlighting international issues through his publications. He continues to advocate for independent journalism, urging the government to facilitate easy access to information for journalists and the need to revise the current Access to Information Act.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl.

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I am your host, Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia. Our very special guest this week is in Georgetown, Guyana, Anand Persaud, who is the editor-in-chief of the Stabroek News. And we are going to be talking about Well, obviously, Guyana is in the news for all of these discoveries, the oil discoveries as they were found in 2015. And this is game changing wealth for Guyana population of 800,000 people, more or less. And the GDP of the country is set to well, they say it's set to quadruple to 13 billion by 2025. So we really want to look at what might happen or what is happening to Guyana. So, thank you. This is good. I'm going to give it over to Anand to talk about the situation presently.

Anand Persaud: All right. Good day, thank you very much for having me. so you know essentially the oil discovery is really the story of this period since 2015. so essentially we're up to about 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent that's been found and this figure of course is growing all the time So because there are further exploration wells, ExxonMobil and its partners have sunk and are sinking many more wells. And only recently, last week, I think they have bid for another offshore block to continue this. So they found a mother load in what they call the Stabroek Block, which is very similar to the name of the newspaper. So they've found so far about 11 billion. And they now have two platforms producing. in the Atlantic. So roughly about 380,000 barrels of oil a day, not an insignificant amount for a country that didn't know about oil until 2015. A third platform with the rated capacity of about 220,000 is going to come on stream maybe in a month or so.

So essentially you could be up to about 600,000 barrels a day, which is a fascinating figure when you consider where we were before. But it does, of course, come with a whole series of jeopardies and issues that relate to climate change and the internal dynamics of being an oil producer. That is, do we have to look at whether or not we are early victims of the Dutch disease, the resource curse? All of those are problematics. How are we beginning to distribute the wealth that we have? Are we trying to reduce the gaps between the haves and the have-nots? So it has come with a whole series of challenges that will test us from here on in.

Richard McColl: This is it. I mean, what I'm reading the most and what I've researched the most is there's a focus on what could go wrong. I mean, we can list those. Will the money be used wisely? Will it entrench the current government in power? Will it entrench them? Obviously, there's a huge ethnic polarization in Guyana, the Dutch disease, as you said, and of course, corruption. So, I mean, how do you feel about this right now with the current President Irfaan Ali and the People's Progressive Party/Civic? How do you feel that they're moving ahead with this?

Anand Persaud: Well, I think there are definitely things to be concerned about. I think definitely as it relates to the Dutch disease, what you're seeing is a concentration of quite a lot of resources in the oil and gas industry. So even though the government says we are going to move away from the oil and gas industry and invest in other sectors, we are not seeing that as yet. You know, all up and down one of the main rivers in the country, the Demerara, everything has now been assigned to warehouses for oil and gas, lay down yards, different areas dealing with waste disposal. So everything that we're seeing here is definitely in line and in sync with concerns about the Dutch disease, that is the confinement of all of your resources into one sector, as opposed to using your oil resources early to diversify and to sort of like to begin looking at high paying jobs and other sectors that can bring you a different kind of development and sustainable development in the years to come.

So though the government has said that it's investing in areas like Soya and livestock feed and agriculture. There have been a lot of initiatives that have started, but I think it's too early to say that they can be successful or that enough is being put into them. So there are concerns about that area. There are also concerns that a lot of people raise continuously with us that only a certain class of people and only a certain group of contractors and others are benefiting from the outflow from oil revenues and that obviously is of course a concern. We do, we have established you know a sovereign wealth fund, our equivalent of a sovereign wealth fund, and we've begun to put away for intergenerational equity but people say what we're putting away is not enough and that the expenditure into the economy is going to become problematic because it's going to overheat, absorptive capacity is sort of limited and What you're really concentrating on at the moment is a lot of infrastructural development.

But a lot of the people down at the bottom are continuing to complain that they are seeing the outturn of a significant rise in the cost of living that isn't being alleviated for them. Whereas the people up at the top may be earning much higher as a result of this. We've actually been doing a series which is in its 41st installment here this week. We speak to 10 people from all across the country and we just simply ask them about the cost of living. I mean, usually people always complain about the cost of living. But what we've seen is that they tell you in great detail how the prices of a lot of basics and staples have gone up. And people down at the bottom are sometimes having to make decisions about whether or not, you know, they can afford this meal or that meal, transportation for their children. medication for elderly or for themselves and so on. So there is that really intense battle that's going on at the bottom about how it is we are benefiting from this thing.

You know, we've been producing oil since 2019 and how are we benefiting? And that discussion has begun and I'm not sure that the government has fully accepted that they need to address that. What they've done, they've been handouts, you know, like with all governments they want to be the benefactors, they want to be the people who are going to take the credit, and then you have the handouts. But those handouts are not part of a comprehensive overall program that looks at how you can lift people out of either poverty that's extreme or poverty that is burdened. So there is that discussion that has begun. And I really think it has to be looked at in the remaining two years of this government's term. There are other issues, but those are some of the major things that are on their horizon.

Richard McColl: Well, you're discussing this, you know, as you say, these reports, interviewing people across the country. And if we if we give some background, roughly 40 percent of the population lives in poverty in Guyana. And what you're saying then perhaps is that we're not seeing the necessary investment into health care, education. But there is some investment into infrastructure. These are kind of handouts.

Anand Persaud: Yeah, so there's a lot of investment in infrastructure. As a matter of fact, quite a lot of hospitals are going up. But what people over here consistently complain about is the lack of adequate basic care. That is, you may go to a health center and need a wrapping for some wound that you have, only to be told that we don't have the gauze today or you'll have to come back the next day. So this government is good at big infrastructure. They're into that. So hospitals are being built. And, you know, the infrastructure to go with it is being built. But do you have the adequate staff? Do you have the facilities? Are you able to order drugs in such a way that an outlying post has the basic supplies that it needs? So those are the basic issues that go with having all of these resources, but still making sure that you're taking care of basic health care needs and you can portion medication from a central point all across the country.

As opposed to having some without and having one standard of care in one part of the country and nothing at all in another part. So I think those are the disjunctions that are occurring and I'm not sure that the government is fully in tune with what it needs to do to get that done. And so those are the things that you know we record people on a regular basis complaining about. What's the sense of building a specialized maternity and child care hospital if you know at the prenatal level. You're going to have issues at health care centers or you have to go to the main hospital and you wait for three hours before you're seen. Because we continue to see cases like that and people do complain about them.

Richard McColl: It sounds a lot like running before you can walk and the basic things are not being done you know okay the great big brand new hospital but yet without the necessary insumos as we'd say here but the necessary medications and so on and so forth. So but let's talk about the politics a little bit then because you said there's two more years that's plenty of time for Irfaan Ali, the president and his People's Progressive Party/Civic, the PPP/C to, to, you know, really, really, you know, get enough handouts out there to ensure that they stay in power. Are we seeing that as well?

Anand Persaud: Oh, sure. That's definitely on the cards, you know, so some of the big infrastructural projects are meant to be winners for the next election, those are going to be automatic shoo-in. So once you deliver those, you can be guaranteed that you are going to win. At least that's the thinking. So there is a new bridge that's going over one of the main rivers and it's meant to be finished sometime next year. Whether or not it'll be finished is another issue because one of the things that goes with all of these big structural projects and they're finding it out is that you give these things out but what you find invariably with a lot of infrastructure projects, there are shortages all over, shortages of contractors, people. material resources, so sometimes your plans never work that way. So even though there are like three or four different things that they can point at in infrastructure work that they expect to win the election with, it's not a sure thing, there's no guarantee.

But they are definitely interested in spending to ensure that they get themselves re-elected in 2025, of course, as you can understand. And of course there's a little subtext here that in 2020 during that election They battled for five months with the incumbent to ensure that their results, the final result was accepted. The final result being that they had won and they were trying to roll back an attempt to rig the elections. And finally, they succeeded with the help of the international community and so on. So when they came in after that five month gap, they were intent. I think there was a resolve that we'll do everything that we can to ensure that we don't lose this election. And knowing that they were then coming in. on the backs of this incredible jackpot of oil, you know, everything is set in train. We are going to spend our way into winning next election. Now that is, that could be a good thing for them, but it's not necessarily a good thing for the country.

That is, if you have this unrestrained spending that leads to delays or leads to projects that are not done the way they should be done, you can end up with a bigger disaster. But they are definitely headed towards the expectation that in 2025, they will win and they will automatically get back in and they see this oil bonanza is sort of like leading to, you know, government in perpetuity, at least for, you know, the next foreseeable decade or two. And I think they're very excited about that. But, you know, that also raises concerns about are they going to be accountable enough? Is there this aura of invincibility and something about having all of this that they don't need to sort of be accountable to the public over? And that I think is something to be concerned with. of course, independent media and other parts of civil society try their best to restrain that sort of like psychology and thinking.

Richard McColl: The idea of an aura of invincibility is quite terrifying when you think of the democratic process. So that brings me sort of the ethnic polarization when it comes to voting in Guyana with this success story of, you know, huge, again, as we say, game-changing wealth and of course this party in power are people going to shift will this change the voting patterns will you find people from the sort of Afro-Guyanese People's National Congress people who have loyally voted for them will they shift towards the progressive party just with the handouts and so on

Anand Persaud: Well i i don't i don't think so we've just come off of a local government election, which was meant to be one of the first indicators as to whether or not this handout syndrome could definitely work in your favor. So in Georgetown, which is the seat of the capital and the stronghold of the opposition PNC, as you mentioned, there was an attempt to spend large amounts by the PPP/C in the hopes that they could sort of significantly change the equation in Georgetown. So originally they had I think as many as eight seats out of 30. And so they've improved their standing, but they were not able to shift that. That is, despite the handouts, despite the alliances and attracting over some prominent Afro-Guyanese from the other side. they were still unable to win the capital.

So I think it's been a sobering experience for them because I think it tells them that we're not necessarily going to be able to defeat their opposition as handsomely and as handily as we might think, just simply by handouts, because we have this deeply entrenched divide that is ethnic, political-based. And so they're working on that front, but they're also working on the other front. That is, there is a 10% indigenous population. that both sides have been trying to cultivate because 10% in the context of our voting could essentially be maybe a seat and a half or two. That would be enough to swing the election one way or the other. So both sides have been working very assiduously to try to attract that 10% to their side. And it is a floating vote. It's increasingly independent-minded. A lot more of the indigenous people who come to Georgetown, migrate to rural areas. They have their own views and feelings about things, and they're not necessarily homogenous in the way they think politically and how they might vote.

So the 2025 elections could produce still results that are interesting if, for example, you find an inspirational leader who comes up and says, okay, the indigenous people will speak with a different voice and speak a different voice, and we will endorse who we like. So It could be interesting, but both sides are trying very hard to cultivate support from that arena.

Richard McColl: Well, that's fascinating. What kind of things are either side doing to try and court this indigenous vote?

Anand Persaud: Oh, yeah. Well, you may have heard that we had this huge carbon credit deal tied up with Hess, which is one of Exxon's partners in the Stabroek Block offshore. So what this government has done is to say, of course, there is. good reason for it, that is, HESS is providing jurisdictional credits, it's taking up jurisdictional credits and providing 750 million U. S. over 10 years. So essentially 75 million U. S. per year. And since it pertains to forested areas where indigenous people live, what the government's position has been is that a portion of that will now be assigned to each indigenous community. your oodles of money that are now going to be assigned to indigenous communities for them to come up with their plans for use of this money so you know it's been a lot of interest in that a lot of energy in the sense that people have now you know a lot of these groups have begun submitting plans and programs to be financed by this massive tranche of money so that is one way that the government is trying to entice over those communities.

So, you know. So the thinking, though, is that the communities will take the monies, will use them for the things that they are intended to be used for. But that doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to vote your way when the time comes. But there should be significant development in those communities, let's say, over the next two years. If they use this year's tranche in 2024 and 2025, I think by that time, there will be significant changes in those communities, more infrastructure, more abilities to earn income. Is that going to change how they view this government or the opposition? Well, it could be an open question then.

Richard McColl: That's very interesting indeed that the kingmakers could be, I would say, the most traditionally overlooked community in Guyana itself. When we look at the development, as you mentioned, the development along the rivers for the warehouses and everything else being set up for the oil industry, of course. Does this not encroach into indigenous land?

Anand Persaud: No, in the Demerara, which is where we are here, the Demerara River, there are a couple of indigenous communities further up the river, but they're not necessarily affected by those. There may be other areas in other parts of the country where we are running. One of the major projects, too, is the piping of the associated gas from the Exxon wells to shore. We then are going to be setting up a gas to liquids plant and then a liquids to energy plant, which is meant to cut energy costs by 50%. Now, that is another one of the promises of this government, another major promise that we are going to cut your energy costs by 50% by the end of 2024. So that's another major promise that has been made that could go south, depending on how things happen. But for the most part, most of the infrastructural work is going on. in Demerara, which does not really include significantly on indigenous areas.

Richard McColl: Okay. Because I mean, of course, we read as well about the land selection policies that have been accused to favour one side rather than other, the East Indian population, I'd say. Is that something that you've been seeing taking place?

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Anand Persaud: So what the government has tried to do over the last three years is to come up with a figure of how many house lots it's going to hand out. And it's also building some houses, which they do provide to certain groups. So there have been allegations that some groups are being favoured. I do not see that as such at all, because what they do is they open it up and by a lottery, you can pick your lot out of a bag and that's your lot used to develop. So I don't think one can reasonably say that. I haven't seen any evidence of discrimination in how they address that. What you may be able to say is that perhaps maybe land has been allocated in in certain communities as opposed to other areas where They may need development, but they're not being addressed. So I want to make those arguments. But from the evidence so far, from the house lots that have been handed out over the three years, it seems it's really whoever applies, they can come forward.

And then on the day of allocation, everybody puts their hand in a bag, and they pull out a lot, and they get. So there haven't been plausible and cogent cases put together of I've been discriminated against. There will be cases of discrimination, I'm sure you'll find, but that may go both ways. So I don't think there has been any ground to be able to say that.

Richard McColl: Okay, very good. And so back to the oil again. So let's just do that. We have 14 offshore exploration and production blocks, and the bidding came to a close on the 15th of September, I believe, or 12th of September. Well, 12th of September, ExxonMobil continues to be a major player. Who else have we got in the mix?

Anand Persaud: Well, the two other major players would be Total and the government of Qatar. They are interested in those blocks. The others are smaller companies. But I think one of the major things I think we should learn about the oil and gas and because it's something that really does hold a lot of faults and could result in a lot of shortfalls in terms of the revenues that we were supposed to expect that i think listeners should understand that for every 100 barrels of oil extracted 75 of that goes to cost oil and then the 25 percent is split evenly between us and exxon mobil and its partners so we essentially get 12.5 barrels out of every hundred plus we also get two barrels from them for royalty. So we end up with 14.5 barrels out of 100 barrels. That is our take. That's our profit. It's a very low figure when you look at things and when you consider that they're finding more and more oil.

So what the big argument here has been that certainly if when you found 1 billion barrels of oil, this was the agreement, the more you find the take to the country should increase because this is our resources. We should be able to argue that and we should be able to have more. So we shouldn't be locked into a deal at 1 billion barrels that is similar to 12 billion barrels, because really we should be having a higher take. That's one of the issues. The other major issue is that out of the 75% that you've taken as cost oil, we need to be sure that is indeed cost oil. And that in that 75 barrels that you took, six of it was cost oil, but then you also snuck away with 15 barrels that you're not supposed to have. because that's essentially even above your profit. And so one of the major things that we were waiting for is an audit that had been initiated by the former government in 2019, which showed that about 12% of the claims made by Exxon were unacceptable and were not substantiated.

So what it essentially meant was that 12% of their 1.67 billion U. S. claims could not be verified and should have been struck out. And that would then locate our concerns in the area of auditing. That is, you could very well be duped and you could very well be denied. oil and really should be due to you because your partners are claiming costs that don't exist. Now, we were expecting that this report, the final report done by this UK audit firm, IHS Markit, was submitted to the government in 2021. And for two years, it lay hidden until we broke it in April this year. Two years after it was submitted. When we broke it in April this year, it was the first time anybody knew publicly that 12% of the claims could not be substantiated. They still have not finalized this thing that is working out how you then recapture what is owed to the country. But in the meanwhile, there was even a more scandalous development.

That is, though the final audit report was issued, behind the scenes, ExxonMobil and the Ministry of Natural Resources had been discussing cutting the figure that was contested, 214 million US to 3 million US, which would have meant that we would have gotten zilch, really from this work done by IHS market audit. When we published the fact that the revenue authority in this country had accepted the 214 million figure and that should be the final one, that forced the government to then say that at ExxonMobil. and the Ministry of Natural Resources had been engaged in unauthorized negotiations, and those must now come to an end. But what was happening there was, there are two things there. That is, the first, artists found that there were large expenses that could not be accepted. And secondly, even that figure, ExxonMobil, was engaged in surreptitious dealings with the government ministry to have that figure brought down.

Now, in any other place or in many other places, that would have resulted in dismissals of the minister and the head of the petroleum unit. So far, nothing has happened, but we are going to continue to push that. But it shows how we have to be very vigilant about what is happening here, because people have argued and argued convincingly, and the evidence is dear to see, to be seen, that the government operates as a partner to ExxonMobil and its partners, as opposed to being a caretaker of revenues for the country and a steward of the country's future and interests. So it is one of those major issues that we have to look at going forward. There is a second audit that has just been finished of $7 billion in expenditures, and that has not seen the light of days yet. So nobody knows for sure what has been found in that audit, but that is just as important. So auditing their expenses is extremely important because they're hiving off as much as 75% of your take on a daily basis. And that is something that has to be examined carefully.

Richard McColl: This is a real concern. There are people behind this, of course there are. I mean, this comes back to the issue of corruption that we mentioned previously. I'm curious then, on this effect, well, you guys have to keep, be vigilant, as we said, you have to keep pushing it out there. But how do you, how do you police a company such as let's say Exxon or so on and how do you police if they're not making these reports and these studies public it's very difficult indeed

Anand Persaud: Yeah, so I mean ExxonMobil is known globally as a behemoth that can navigate through all kinds of interstices and get past things you know it has this reputation and of course if you went back to 2016 which was one of the reasons and one of the grounds on which we were saying, and everybody's argued for the last seven years, that is this contract that they concluded with us in 2016 should have been abrogated because when we were forced to negotiate it, we did not have a single expert on our side to confront Exxon. So we sat opposite the table with Exxon without a single oil and gas expert, certainly even an independent oil and gas expert, because Exxon has access to people across all Areas of the oil and gas industry. So finding somebody who is not contaminated with ExxonMobil connections would be difficult. But we sat across the table in 2016 and agreed a production sharing agreement that locked us into this thing of a 2% royalty and the 75% cost oil without a single expert on our side. So how could that agreement be just?

There would be very good grounds for overturning it because we had nobody. There was no parity or evenness in terms of negotiating skill. And so that's been one of the things that everybody in civil society and the newspapers have lobbied for seven years to have it overturned. ExxonMobil is completely adamant that it won't do that. And the government is also unwilling to do that, which should raise concerns and eyebrows. That is, why would you come in in 2020 knowing fully well that you've had this dastardly contract done, but yet being in charge and being responsible for the future of the country's revenues, you wouldn't consider bringing them back to the negotiating table. So that has been one of the things that has raised concerns about the way the government is approaching Exxon. And it's more of a partner and sort of a shareholder than trying to look out to the interests of the country.

Richard McColl: Locked in is, of course, the key thing here. Is there any possibility that this might change?

Anand Persaud: Only if we ended up at arbitration, but it does require both sides to agree that it will have to be negotiated. So if neither side is agreeing at the moment, that is a problem. However, what quite a lot of people in civil society have done, maybe three or four hardy souls, they've approached courts on a series of things here, including things like their environmental permits being applicable for years longer than the law allows. And there have been challenges in court that have actually yielded results that have obviously concerned both ExxonMobil and the government. There was one several months ago where a judge ruled that ExxonMobil had to provide a full guarantee in the event of any spillage in the Atlantic. Because you can imagine that in the Atlantic, we do not have at all any kind of ability to contain an oil spill of any sort.

And more than that, an oil spill occurring where they are located could infringe on other areas and pollute other waters, you know, Trinidad, Venezuela and other places in the Caribbean, leaving us with a massive bill to clean up and liability. So this judge ruled that ExxonMobil has to provide this guarantee. Now, this has been appealed by ExxonMobil, but it's also been appealed by the government of Guyana, the Environmental Protection Agency. has also appealed quite unbelievably a decision that is really in favor of the country and the people of the country. So when you have your own environmental agency appealing a decision that is meant to favor the environmental standards and status of the country, you have to be worried.

Richard McColl: Well, I mean, keep up the good work because you need to keep revealing these issues that are not out there as much. You mentioned Venezuela. That's a good moment to segue into Venezuela. Of course, Venezuela claims all of the Essequibo, two thirds of Guyana. And of course, that includes that includes a lot of the oil and the production and so on. I mean, what do we see? You never know exactly what the regime of Nicolas Maduro might come up with in order to keep himself in power.

Anand Persaud: Yeah. Yeah, so there's a lot of irony there. I mean, historically, Venezuela has worked very hard to ensure we didn't tap oil resources. So, you know, one of the claims of Essequibo, you know, the claims to Essequibo arose out of the Cold War period, where there was this confrontation, this battle definitely between Soviet and U. S. interests and so on. It arose out of that, but there was also this avariciousness on the part of Venezuela to deny it. to deny Guyana access to oil and gas resources. So over the period from 1962 onwards, you know, you know, they intimidated and used warfare in many different ways, you know, overflights by F-16 fighters and other things. And until we got to the point in 2015, because the actual well that we found in 2015 was off not the Essequibo, it was off the Demerara. So it was in an area. that was completely out of the area of claim by Venezuela. But even that didn't stop it. It then issued a decree a couple of days after this find was made extending its line.

Over in the direction of this well into another county. So that was unbelievable, but that was Maduro making his act. But you obviously have to look at what it is they're doing, but our approach to the International Court of Justice for a final settlement of this matter is really our hope at this point that we will be able to win a ruling from the courts that the 1899 arbitral award is full final settlement of our boundaries and that we wouldn't have to be concerned about, for example, exploration of Essequibo closer to where Venezuela's border is, that we wouldn't have to be concerned about that. But as of now, you know, we're taking up, we're trying to make sure that the International Court of Justice case moves ahead with Venezuela originally not participating they have now lodged documents and The court is now deliberating on that. The other issue, of course, is there are domestic issues and how that might impact and whether or not, you know, they may do something that is out of the ordinary.

And we have to sort of pay careful attention because we've taken in about, I think, estimates, maybe 35 to 40,000 people who fled during a very bad period. A lot of people who are from the indigenous communities that neighboured our northwest region. So we do have various areas where we have to have engagement with Venezuela. And hopefully, you know, whether or not there's going to be a prospect of free elections there and, you know, discussions there internally, we have to look at that. But one thing that has always stood out for us is there is no part of the Venezuelan polity that is on our side. And that no matter who is there, we will have to have concerns about. their intent as it relates to Essequibo and the fact that they will continue to push aggressively. So our main aim is to ensure that we elicit a ruling from the International Court of Justice that will provide us now with some sort of cover that will prevent them from taking any action that will be untoward or along military lines.

Richard McColl: Of course, I recall the maps in Venezuela with all of that section of the Essequibo shaded in red you know contested area And then comparing yourselves with Suriname, how do you see the progress there in neighboring Suriname?

Anand Persaud: Right, so they have a major decision that is coming in terms of Total deciding whether or not they will proceed with a lucrative oil well. So Total has visited and they had discussions with the Surinamese president. And I did mention to you that Total has interest in one of our blocks. What I think it's trying to do there is to see whether or not they can have unitization across the boundary. So in case they could tap both sides, they'd have some sort of agreement to be able to do that. But they are on the verge of making an investment decision, which will come sometime I think in 2024. So if it does come then, then Suriname is going to be able to sort of tap into significant resources at the current price. The Surinamese economy, of course, continues to be very difficult and even though they have been extracting onshore and they've had access to other resources, their economy, of course, is in a very difficult position.

And, you know, so they're waiting to see if this decision is made by Total that will provide them with, you know, even greater revenues and allow them to sort of like get on more even keel, you know, so we'll see how that goes.

Richard McColl: Well, we hope obviously all the best. I mean, we've heard the whole situation that's taking place, not only in your country, but in neighboring countries, it does sound very challenging indeed. But of course, there has to be hope. There has to be hope that this, again, this windfall will reach the most needy and, of course, the population in Guyana. You must have hope.

Anand Persaud: Yeah, I mean, and, you know, that's the thing about newspapers. We deliver hope on a daily basis. I mean, that's the whole purpose of being there. I mean, we've been here since 1986. So this is, you know, our 37th year. So we deliver hope by trying to hold people accountable. And the whole purpose of doing that, like I said, was sort of like encapsulated in what we did as it relates to that audit report. That is, we are giving you hope by providing you with information that helps you to sort of understand how your government is functioning, whether or not it's doing what it is it should be doing and leaving you to help decide. how you can participate in the process. And that I think is what we try to deliver. That is, we are a forum and a voice for people to raise their concerns, but also to see from the work that we do. how they can then become more active citizens and how they can advocate for themselves. And I think that's really important.

Richard McColl: Fantastic. Thank you so much for your time and for your such profound knowledge sharing it with us here on The LatinNews Podcast. I've been Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia, speaking to Anand Persaud, who is in Georgetown, Guyana. He is the editor-in-chief of the Stabroek News. It has been a really really interesting conversation about something that obviously does not get as much coverage as it may need. So thank you so much for your time. Thank you for your knowledge and being here on The LatinNews Podcast.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com.

Dr. Carmen Martinez Novo received a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the New School for Social Research, New York. She has taught at Northeastern University, The Latin American Faculty for the Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Quito, Ecuador, and the University of Kentucky amongst others. Her research focuses on indigenous identities, politics and rights. She has also studied racism, paternalism, the anthropology of the state and Latin American elites.

Her previous research at the Mexico-U.S. border focused on the formation of ethnic identities through intercultural interactions. On this topic, Martinez published Who Defines Indigenous? Identities, Development, Intellectuals, and the State in Northern Mexico (Rutgers University Press, 2006). The book studied the impact of non-indigenous government officials, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, and economic elites in processes identity formation among Mixtec migrants at the Mexico-U.S. border.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl here in Bogotá, Colombia. My very special guest this week is Professor Carmen Martínez Novo.

She works at the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida, and she is the editor-in-chief of the Latin American Research Review. Her latest book is Undoing Multiculturalism: Resource Extraction and Indigenous Rights in Ecuador. So that's what we're going to be talking about, the indigenous movements, but also security issues and the second round of elections in Ecuador coming up very soon.

So welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, Carmen.

Carmen Martínez Novo: Thank you, Richard, for the opportunity to share my ideas with you on Ecuador.

Richard McColl: It's incredibly topical, incredibly newsworthy right now. Ecuador is making all the front pages across the world. We have very divided elections coming up. Lasso is stepping down, stepping away, and we've got these two candidates, the Correista candidate, González, a kind of pro-business, I would say, young man, Noboa.

Perhaps you could give us a little bit of background on these two candidates.

Carmen Martínez Novo: Thank you, Richard. Luisa González, she is a new person in Ecuadorian politics, but she's in the political party of Rafael Correa. And I understand that during the political campaign for the first round of voting this year Correa was very much present in the campaign.

So it was clear to Ecuadorian electors that Correa was behind Luisa González. So that's... And Correa was the president of Ecuador, for 10 years, for a decade. He's a leftist. He self-defines as a person of the left. He's also a Catholic, so he's conservative in some social issues.

He's very complex as a political party and as a politician. And then on the other hand, you have oh, and regarding also Luisa González, so she presents herself as the left, but she's also conservative in terms of abortion and some other social issues because of this Catholic background.

And on the other side, you have Noboa, who is the son of Álvaro Noboa. His family comes from banana companies, so he's kind of a banana tycoon. He's a business person. He's a young person. His father tried to be the president of Ecuador five times using his own money but he didn't reach the presidency.

But it seems that the son is a younger politician. He presented himself as friendly to the environment, and even though he comes from a business family from the coast of Ecuador. What I hear from kind of Ecuadorians is that his family, the Noboa family, is not understood as a kind of coming from the old colonial landowning elite.

It's more like a nouveau rich family. Also linked... Kind of a marginal elite, but very rich. Starting, their money starts in the 1950s. Perhaps in the Ecuadorian coast, they consider the old elite people linked to cocoa, to, from which they make chocolate more than the people linked to bananas.

Bananas come later in Ecuador. So he comes from the banana companies

Richard McColl: So would we say he has more influence towards Guayaquil and maybe González?

Carmen Martínez Novo: towards Quito? Yeah, so he has more influence on the coast. The coast is the business center of Ecuador, while the highlands is the state center and the intellectual center.

But interestingly, González is also from the coast, and Correa is also from the coast. But González is from Manabí, like in northern of Guayaquil which is a province that has a lot of population, is very pro-Correa, and it's important in elections. But it's not like a business center in the same way that Guayaquil is.

Okay. But both Correa and Luisa González have also lived for long periods in the highlands. Of course. So they also have links to the highlands.

Richard McColl: Okay.

Carmen Martínez Novo: So perhaps kind of Noboa is stronger in kind of the coast at least Guayaquil.

Richard McColl: And this election coming up obviously is very tense, and there's all sorts of aggression surrounding the election because of the security issues that, again, have been dominating the headlines.

Ecuador has been largely absent from the type of violence that Colombia has obviously been affected with for the long-running conflict, and a major producer of cocaine. But it seems that obviously the transshipment area is moving very much so into Ecuador. The cartels are in Ecuador and so on, so this, this violence has increased.

And indeed, we had the tragedy of the assassination of presidential hopeful Fernando Villavicencio. So this spiral of violence and drugs gangs in Ecuador has become the number one issue in this election. How do both of these candidates address the issue of security?

Carmen Martínez Novo: I can talk a little bit about the background of violence.

What I understand after reading different kind of analysis of why violence has started in Ecuador to be an issue. Even though being between Peru and Colombia, it has been a peaceful country, for many years. For instance, I have seen several presidents being ousted from Ecuador without any people dead.

let's say a president would be ousted, and then one, two people die in the uprisings, but it's only because they fell from a car or because they had a heart attack. So there was no violence even though there were, like, a lot of very strong street protests. So that's very interesting about Ecuador.

Why did it become a violent country? So analysts point to several reasons for it becoming more violent. One is during the period of Correa, Correa decided to close the military base of the United States in the city of Manta, in Manabí, actually. And that made the country easier for the cartels to move to.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Carmen Martínez Novo: Because the American base used to surveil, traveling from that place, from Manabí to the United States and all that. So that's one thing, one issue. Another issue that people mention is that it has to do with Colombia. With the peace process in Colombia the FARC always look at Ecuador as a place to rest, and they didn't want to have any violence in Ecuador because they didn't want the Ecuadorian government to join forces with the Colombian government against them. So they always took care of not having violence in Ecuador. But after the peace process, there are several irregular groups that are smaller, and that don't have that priority of not intervening in Ecuador. And after that you have some kidnapping of Ecuadorian journalists and things like that. So Colombia is one factor. The close of the US military base in Manta is another factor. Some analysts say that dollarization is another factor because it allowed the cartels to launder money in Ecuador because Ecuador had the US dollar as a currency. So that's another factor.

I think the Correa government was not very effective with security. At some point they had an open immigration policy, so a lot of people moved to Ecuador, even if, like, planning to move afterwards to the United States. So that's another issue. They even... I'm an anthropologist myself. They even had an anthropologist as the vice secretary for security.

So they thought of security more as a social issue of fighting against poverty. And so perhaps there was some issues there about not building a strong security. And the final factor is that Ecuadorians voted recently under Lasso against extradition of criminals, which makes Ecuador like a haven for cartels.

They know they cannot be extradited, or for other kinds of mafias. So I think there were many different factors there. I wasn't present in Ecuador during the campaign so I cannot tell you exactly what, but what the analysts say is that both Noboa and González don't have security as their main issue, which is curious. They won. They are the two main candidates. But there were other candidates for whom security was more important, like Villavicencio, who was assassinated, and Topic. And Topic is very interesting because at the beginning, a lot of people thought that he had a chance because he was called the Ecuadorian Bukele and that he was totally focused on security. But there was something. A lot of people started to associate Topic with Correa because his family made a lot of money as consultants under Correa. So there were, like, some people argue that there were two Correa candidates, González and Topic, because he was, like, he's a nouveau rich, making money under Correa.

in consultancies. But then, so interestingly, he wasn't chosen, even though his main focus was security. So for these two candidates that are the main candidates for the second round, their security was not their main issue. Their main issues were more like social policies and other things.

Richard McColl: It's, it's curious. We think, oh, wow, if you think of Correa with leftist tendencies, but as you say, conservative beliefs towards the Catholic Church. Of course that, there is a strong vein of Catholicism in Ecuador. You cannot ignore Catholicism. And but if we say that, like Correa is, it was poor for security, when we know that the left is usually genuinely pretty poor in Latin America for security.

So it's very interesting what you say about all these different elements coming together, and then of course, González and Noboa not making security the number one issue, but social policy, like you say. Very, it's very interesting. But let's get on to the next topic to discuss because

Carmen Martínez Novo: May I say something about Correa and Catholicism?

Richard McColl: Oh, sure.

Carmen Martínez Novo: And so Correa was a leader that created a constitution that is very presidentialist and allows the president to have a lot of power, and he was an authoritarian and a centralist. He centralized a lot of power in his person. So I think in terms of security, he was very skillful, but he was more focused on prosecuting his own political enemies.

parts of the left that didn't agree with him, more than exterior enemies like the cartels or other countries or... So he was very focused on staying in power and actually prosecuting his political enemies. And regarding his Catholicism, so he was a Catholic volunteer and he claims a background in liberation theology, but he's very conservative in terms of abortion.

He was ambiguous about gay LGBTQ rights. On the one hand, he supported them, but on the other hand, his Catholicism made him conservative. So he's very some people say he's a populist, so he's very complex in terms of he says one thing. And he was originally pro-environment, but later he wasn't.

Very contradictory as a leader also.

Richard McColl: That's the interesting thing, as we say. And what we're getting into is, of course, is this the issues of resource extraction in Ecuador and of course how they link to indigenous rights. And when you mention Correa, the complexity, first of all, that very memorable photo opportunity with the oil on his hand and, again, populist rhetoric.

But then he ended up saying, he criticized what he called infantile environmentalism. Could you explain that phrase?

Carmen Martínez Novo: That's very interesting. Originally, the Correa government was made up of an alliance of different groups. And environmentalists were very strong, led by Alberto Acosta, who was actually the person who led the creation of the 2008 constitution in Ecuador.

So these environmentalists were very strong in Correa government at the beginning of his government, and they wrote a constitution that is still operating, in which they have, for instance, it's the first constitution in the world to have the rights of nature. And the rights of nature not in terms of people enjoying nature, but in terms of nature itself, like nature is a subject of rights.

And I think they have influence from some academics that are post-humanists, that they see kind of nature as an agent and things like that. So that's very complex. But then at the end, Correa became more pragmatic as a populist later in his government. He marginalized the environmentalists. And he said that as a

well, the famous things that poverty policies were his kind of priority, and that they couldn't be poor in a, or own a bag of gold and things like that. That they needed to exploit the oil. And so that's contradictory. He originally, he had a plan for the Yasuní National Park, which has one of the most biodiverse areas in the world.

His plan was to leave oil under the earth, which is something that won in the referendum in the last election. But later he was asking for money, and particularly European governments responded very well and gave him money to keep the oil under the ground. But afterwards he decided that he didn't have enough money from the governments of the Global North, and he had to exploit the oil.

However in around 2014, the, as the oil prices went down, and that's when countries like Venezuela and Ecuador go very strongly for mining. They shift from oil to mining. So there are some conflicts regarding oil areas, but also mining areas, and that's similar to Venezuelan policy.

And he tried to present himself as still as an environmentalist, but more like a pragmatic environmentalist. You could exploit oil and mining with being kind to the environment. But that really didn't work out that way. And the environmentalists were pushed to the side. So that created like a conflict also with the indigenous movement.

Richard McColl: So we're saying that, Mining increased under Correa, so he played off one hand against the other. Oil prices were down so he could say that also the Yasuní National Park will be left alone, 'cause of course it doesn't make economic sense to exploit that right now, but mining increases. So if we now bring it forward

Carmen Martínez Novo: I would say that he kept exploiting oil.

And actually, the Yasuní is very interesting. There is a very good analyst, Milagros Aguirre who is an Ecuadorian journalist, but she claims that the Yasuní started to be exploited. Even when they were asking European governments for money, they were already building roads and exploiting the Yasuní park.

So exploitation is there. And she says that kind of this last referendum is actually really not that important because the Yasuní, the oil in the Yasuní is already being exploited. And the referendum is not talking about the whole Yasuní park, but only about a particular oil block, and there are, like, seven oil blocks in Yasuní.

So there is a lot of... It's populist in a way too. So that's been exploited, but he also shifted to mining because of the particularly copper mining. Copper became very expensive in the 2000s because of Chinese demand. China was modernizing itself, and also it's a very important component for electronics, and in the electric grid, and many other things.

So copper became very prominent in Ecuador.

Richard McColl: I find that very interesting, what you say, is, as you say, there's seven or so blocks of petroleum exploration in Yasuní, but you have a referendum, in the first round of the elections, where the majority of the electorate vote to, outlaw oil extraction from the Yasuní, but it's already happening.

It's already happening

when we put that into the environmentalism and of course indigenous rights whoever wins this second round, be it Noboa or González, they only have up until mid-2025. So they only finish Lasso's term. They're not gonna have any time at all to really affect anything, and I would say that the indigenous movements are already probably, CONAIE, the indigenous movement are already mobilizing to make their lives a little bit more difficult, I would say.

Carmen Martínez Novo: Yeah. Although the indigenous movement is having its own problems. They say to begin with the candidates, they won't have a lot of time, but some analysts, like Pablo Ospina claim that what is gonna happen in these two years is a realignment of political forces. There will be a weak government because of they won't have a majority in the in the assembly.

But still they will be able to perhaps do some clientelism, realign the political forces, and prepare for the next elections. Yeah. That's what he argues is gonna happen. But regarding the indigenous movement itself, if somebody is interested in deepening on this, in my book, I do a kind of long history of what happened to the indigenous movement under Correa.

But what I say is Correa was very skillful in dividing the indigenous movement. And because there was a moment in which a lot of the let's say mixed mestizo people or white people in the indigenous movement or the political party of the indigenous people, Pachakutik, was always intercultural.

There were mestizos and there were indigenous there. And the indigenous movement is also, I also see it as an intercultural movement with allies that are from the church, and also from the traditional left, from the Communist Party. So it's always a mixed group. And a lot of the mestizo people left Pachakutik and joined Correa at some point.

So Correa had a lot of leftists who knew the indigenous movement very well. And one of the arguments that I make is that these people were very skillful or, of knowing the social movements from within, and being able to divide them. And the strategy that Correa used to divide the indigenous movement was to, on the one hand try to give things to communities and to the middle leadership, kind of skipping the upper leadership, stigmatizing the upper leadership and working with middle leadership and with the communities.

That was one strategy. Sometimes they repress and prosecuted the indigenous movement, particularly Yaku Pérez was one of the people who were more harshly prosecuted. The other person was Marlon Santi, who is now one of the people claiming to be the coordinator of Pachakutik. He was also anti-Correa and Correa prosecuted him.

He was the leader of CONAIE at the time of the Correa government. So he prosecuted the upper leadership, and he worked with other leadership and with the communities. So you have the indigenous movement being... However, in some areas where extraction was affecting them communities stayed on this anti-Correa side, but in other communities they received some health or some public works, and they were pro-Correa.

So they are very divided right now.

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Carmen Martínez Novo: The reason why the indigenous movement didn't support one candidate is because they are completely divided.

You have some leaders, let's say Pachakutik, which is the political party first. So you have two people claiming to have been chosen as coordinator of Pachakutik right now. One is Guillermo Churuchumbi who used to be the mayor of a city in the highlands. It's a city very, where they produce a lot of flowers and people working in the flower industry.

So he's the leader there, and he's pro-Correa. And then you have Marlon Santi, who was prosecuted by Correa and stigmatized, and he's anti-Correa. So you have Pachakutik having two halves and not being able to decide on who's the current leader. And then you have CONAIE also. The leader in CONAIE is Leonidas Iza.

Leonidas Iza, I think he's a, comes from the Central Highlands, and I think he's more linked to the left than to the church. I think the, the indigenous movement also have two backgrounds. Some are closer to the traditional left, some are closer to the Catholic Church, to liberation theology.

Is, so Iza is closer to the traditional left, and he's more urban. And he argues for an alliance between urban popular groups and indigenous people, and he's the one... I think he's pro-Correa, but he doesn't say it. That's the interesting thing.

Richard McColl: Ah.

Carmen Martínez Novo: He tries to keep the indigenous movement independent.

They are a social movement, and they are not pro any candidates. But I, my feeling is he's, if you look at his performances or speeches in 2021, in the former election and in the current election, he's always ambiguous but ends up supporting Correa that's the kind of the weird thing.

And then you have Yaku Pérez, who was... Yaku Pérez appears prominently in my book. He was a very serious activist who starts defending anti-mining, pro-water in the Southern Highlands. Very serious environmental activist. He was prosecuted by Correa. His partner is a social scientist and political scientist, a Brazilian-French woman.

She had to exile herself. Her visa was canceled. So he was totally prosecuted in the Correa government. But he ran for president in 2021, gets 20% of the vote, but then he decides to leave Pachakutik and then start his own political party, and that seems to have been unsuccessful.

But he's more of the kind of environmentalist aside. So I think the indigenous movement, it seems to be very... I'm not sure. They have some demands that, according to analysts, are impossible to fulfill. On the one hand, they want Ecuador to stop extraction. But on the other hand, they want Ecuador to continue a subsidy on fossil fuels.

So it's very contradictory. They want Ecuador to continue subsidizing gas and oil for people, but on the other hand, not extract oil. So it's very, his demands are very contradictory. Okay. But on the other hand, I'm not sure. I think they, if Leonidas Iza himself will be softly supporting González.

That's my feeling.

Richard McColl: Is your feeling, and I would say the same.

Carmen Martínez Novo: But what I think, why I think Noboa is a strong candidate, I think they will be very equal in the results, very close. But the interesting thing is, okay, so Correa has a very strong following of about 30%. They won 30% of the votes in the 2021 election.

González has 30%, 33, like around 30% of the voting. These are very faithful people following Correa, and some of them might be indigenous, might be on the Iza side of the indigenous movement. And then you have a, what Noboa is going to do perhaps if things work as I'm thinking he's going to gather the anti-Correa vote.

Lasso did. Lasso was a very weak president, but Lasso was able to very closely win the election because of being able to get the anti-Correa vote. I was an observer in the 2021 elections as a foreign observer for the elections. And both Yaku and Lasso were gathering some of the anti-Correa.

People who were prosecuted by Correa, and so on. And this is the thing. There is like a group that in Ecuador that is center-left but is anti-Correa. Left, certain center-left, but anti-Correa. And in 2021, they were willing to vote for Lasso. Lasso was a right-wing candidate, a banker, but he also presented himself and his people as liberals, as people who would, were able to, were willing to talk to other social groups, while Correa didn't talk to anyone.

He was very authoritarian. And so right now it could be the same scenario, like Noboa presenting himself as a business person, somebody who will know how to run the economy, and Ecuador is facing a very deep economic crisis after the pandemic also. So he's like, "okay, I'm another kind of business person who knows how to run the economy."

But I'm willing to be a liberal. I'm a younger generation who is more open to environmental issues and climate change. That's the way he's presenting himself. I'm younger, I understand climate change, and the environment. I'm also a business savvy, but I'm also perhaps a liberal who is willing to talk.

So my feeling is Noboa is gonna get three kinds of votes. He's gonna get the votes of the right and the elite, the business people. Also in the highlands, they will support Noboa. Then he's gonna get the Villavicencio votes because the Villavicencio people will not vote for Correa or for González, who is Correa's representative.

Villavicencio made his career and was harshly prosecuted by Correa. He had to hide in the Amazon, and he actually denounced the corruption in Correa's government. So Villavicencio's people are not going to support Correa. Zurita has 16%. So you have, let's say, the 20-something of Noboa, plus the 16% of Zurita, plus perhaps the 3% of the Yaku people, and the people in the indigenous movement who won't vote for the representative of Correa So it's if Noboa can gather all the anti-Correa votes, he might win, even if closely.

Richard McColl: It's enough, you think? It's enough

Carmen Martínez Novo: to win. And the thing is González made perhaps a mistake on her side, or perhaps not, but Correa figured very prominently in her campaign. So people say that activated the anti-Correa people remembering Correa side.

Yeah, so that's kind of the scenario if,

Richard McColl: So could Noboa or González's potential victory, either one of them, hang on what they say about the extractive industry? Could that be the issue that flips people one way or the other?

Carmen Martínez Novo: Interestingly, this is, one of the contradictions in Ecuador that even analysts don't understand is how can the environment win the referendum while the two candidates are not as strong on environmental issues? Yeah. Because on the one hand, you have González, who clearly said that, "We will exploit the oil and the mining and so on," which is what Correa did in his last period.

So that's clear on her side. And Noboa is not as clear. He says, "I'm a younger person caring for the environment and climate change," but obviously he's a businessman, and as soon as he's in power, he will be a pragmatic, and he... And the budget in Ecuador has always depended on oil and mining. So I don't think he's a strong pro-environment candidate, even if he claims to be.

Richard McColl: So

Carmen Martínez Novo: So that's one of the contradictions. But I think there is this group that is very strong on the environment. You have the people who were pushed out of Correa's government, who come from environmental NGOs, like Acción Ecológica.

Acción Ecológica is an older generation of very active environmentalists. And then you have a younger generation, Yasunidos. And the Yasunidos tried to gather the signatures, and they were told that the signatures were fake, but they weren't. So I think that's what is behind the referendum.

But one of the contradictions is having two candidates that are not pro-environment, and then a pro-environment referendum

Richard McColl: Yeah

Carmen Martínez Novo: winning with a majority. I think there are these social groups, urban, middle class. I think Yasunidos and Acción Ecológica, they are related, like they in related as families, like they belong to the, like the Yasunidos are the children of the, all the environmentalists basically.

Richard McColl: But I just find it totally, you've detailed the complexities, you've detailed the contradictions in this, and then having two candidates who are likely to not be strong environmentalists, as you say, Correa the Correista González will exploit the oil. Noboa, young businessman, he knows that the money comes from oil.

So I'm just thinking again about the CONAIE the, you know, the indigenous parties. They have played a role in bringing down three presidents in eight years, and between 1997 and 2005, and the protests against Guillermo Lasso and Lenín Moreno were incredibly strong. So I have to ask as we wind this down, what do you see as, an anthropologist knowing so much about the indigenous rights in Ecuador and so on, and the indigenous movements, how likely do you see future unrests and protests from this side, from the indigenous side?

Because they're very powerful.

Carmen Martínez Novo: Yeah. That's very interesting. Yeah, and it's not only, sometimes they call things indigenous uprisings, but it's a mixture of people because, and one of the strengths of Leonidas Iza as a leader of CONAIE is that he's about alliances between indigenous and the urban poor.

So there will be urban uprisings where not only indigenous might participate, but also poor people. People are suffering a lot in Ecuador because there are no jobs, there is the effects of the pandemic, and also, according to analysts, people are starting to migrate massively out of Ecuador again

Carmen Martínez Novo: Because of the economic situation. So probably people will have reasons to protest particularly... I don't know exactly how González would operate, but if González operates like Correa, they will be stronger in repressing the indigenous movements. Because Correa also had uprisings against his government, but he was more repressive while Lasso and Moreno were weaker, and that's why the uprisings also were able to emerge.

So in Correa's eyes they were very smart in repressing the uprisings. But there is another element there, which is the drug trafficking and the cartels. And one thing that is very sad, but I observe, I was recently presenting my book in different regions of Ecuador, including indigenous regions, and there are regions in Ecuador where people don't have...

Like indigenous people or poor people, they don't have a lot of hopes in terms of their economic future. There are no jobs. Their only possibilities are perhaps migrating to the city and working in construction, or there is a lot of unemployment. So people don't have a lot of expectations, but then the cartels come in and that's what I'm very scared of as a student of indigenous political economies also. If these poor people in different regions of Ecuador don't have any options and suddenly the cartels come in and they say, "Can you transport this? Can you keep these things in your home?" Or things like that, they are going to offer perhaps opportunities to people who don't have any hopes.

That's my fear. That actually can work as a deterrent to uprisings because there will be economic opportunities there for people maybe. I'm thinking that I used to work on Mexico before I worked on Ecuador, and it has been interesting for me because I have also been visiting Mexico as the problem with the narcos became worse and worse.

But one thing that happened in Mexico is that at the beginning, the narcos are the cartels and are specific people, but at some point, and you work on Colombia so you know a lot about this, but at some point they penetrate the whole society.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Carmen Martínez Novo: The elites, but also the poor and every social class. So my fear with Ecuador is that the narcos will start to offer opportunities and penetrate society, different groups and that can worsen the violence.

But on the other hand, that perhaps can open doors for people who don't have any hopes, so

Richard McColl: It would be a different set of violences that come through that. But that duplicitous nature of the cartels could come in, offer an economic solution, and avert unrest and protests is a fascinating concept, although very troubling indeed.

that's just something that

Carmen Martínez Novo: I'm thinking about. I don't know if

Richard McColl: That could happen. You're the expert. I'm leaving it... You're the anthropologist, and you know the regions. It's a very interesting duplicity of what could happen, and your concerns, of course, are incredibly well-founded.

Carmen Martínez Novo: The reason I thought about these possibilities, because I was in a very remote region of the highlands that is very rural, and there is not a lot going on there. And there used to be, like one elegant restaurant in the city, and suddenly I went back this year, and there were, like, 12 very elegant restaurants.

And people were saying that their violence was starting in popular neighborhoods there, and that the city was not used... It was mostly used for storage.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Carmen Martínez Novo: But if you imagine very poor people with no opportunities, their only opportunity is to migrate to the United States, perhaps crossing the Rio Grande with the, the barbed wire or crossing the Sonora Desert and crossing the Darién Gap, and all these things that are so dangerous, and the other opportunity...

Yeah, so that's why I thought about this. Yeah. It hasn't happened yet, but I thought, "Oh, maybe that's gonna open opportunities that are gonna bring other kinds of violence there," because sometimes when people kind of protest and I think it's not only the Indigenous, but the Indigenous in alliance with other groups.

But sometimes the Indigenous are the avant-garde of other groups. It is because of sometimes economic desperation and lack of opportunities and injustice and all these things, but

Richard McColl: Plenty of challenges in this

Carmen Martínez Novo: Although I would say that in my view of the 2019 uprising under Moreno and then the 2022 uprising under Lasso, is that the Correa groups had some participation because they wanted turmoil to argue that these governments were neoliberal and were doing very poorly.

And the other thing that we have to take into account is that the economy of Ecuador is in shambles, but it's not only because of the neoliberal governments of Lasso and later of Moreno and Lasso, but because also there was a lot of overpriced corruption under Correa when there was a lot of oil money because oil prices were very high, and a lot of money disappeared, and there was a lot of corruption.

But the Correa people are blaming the neoliberal governments, but there is a big responsibility on the people who were in power for 10 years when there was a lot of money which disappeared. So, as a last thing, I want to say that.

Richard McColl: Thank you. I, as I say, lots of challenges, not the greatest outlook for Ecuador in coming years.

The tensions are very visible, as you have clarified and talked about in this conversation. Let me just say thank you so much to Carmen Martínez Novo, who has shared her profound knowledge of Ecuadorian indigenous movements, extractive industries, and so on. Thank you for your time.

Carmen, of course, Carmen Martínez Novo is a professor at the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. She's the editor-in-chief of the Latin American Research Review, and her latest book, Undoing Multiculturalism: Resource Extraction and Indigenous Rights in Ecuador, is now available.

Richard McColl: Carmen, thank you so much for being on The LatinNews Podcast.

Carmen Martínez Novo: Thank you, Richard, for the opportunity to share my ideas about Ecuador with the audience.

It's been an absolute pleasure, enlightening as always. This is The LatinNews Podcast. I've been your host, Richard McColl, here in Bogotá, Colombia, and we'll be back in a fortnight with another episode of goings on and important issues in the region.

So thank you again for listening, and bye-bye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com

Jenny Pearce is a political scientist who specialises in Latin America. She works with anthropological and participatory research methodologies on social change, violence, security, power and participation in the region and beyond. She considers herself a peace scholar, committed to theoretical development of the field of peace, power and violence as well as empirical study.

She has conducted fieldwork since the 1970s in Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela. Professor Pearce has also developed a body of work around participation and exclusion in the global North, bringing learning from Latin America (South North learning) to the realities of urban conflict and tensions in the de-industrialised north of England.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl

Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl, your host here in Bogotá, Colombia, and our very special guest this week is none other than Jenny Pearce, research professor at the Latin America and Caribbean Centre of the London School of Economics, and also an unrivaled knowledge for Colombia.

And we're gonna be talking about Colombian politics, President Petro, and let's talk about challenges ahead, and of course, this first year of Gustavo Petro's presidency. So welcome on The LatinNews Podcast, Jenny.

Jenny Pearce: Thank you very much. Very pleased to be here.

Richard McColl: I know. It's a great honor for us to speak to you here, because I know you're traveling a lot and doing a lot of investigation into Colombia at the time.

But okay, so let's get into this. President Petro one year in now a bit longer than one year in, things seem to be a little bit rocky. at least we look at the opinion polls, they don't seem to be very much in his favor. Reforms are again on unstable ground, but we can say that this is a politician, a president trying to work for the good of the country?

Jenny Pearce: Yes, I believe he is. And you don't get many presidents who've had a life as he has had. He's been tortured in prison, forced into clandestinity was in an armed guerrilla group, although he wasn't a combatant, but he comes from a very particular history, and I think it's important to recall that, obviously.

But also, he's an interesting man in terms of an economist, an intellectual. He went to University of Louvain at one point in his life after he was actually being threatened again only about 10 years ago or so and came in touch with the idea of climate change. So he's come from a left background, but I would say he's not stuck in some left past.

I think he's opened himself up to some new ideas. Climate change is one of them, but I also think he's much more what we would have called in the sociological, the philosophical language, a sort of post-structuralist Foucauldian type of thinker. Very interested in some of the Italian post-structuralist thinkers, and so an interesting man.

Richard McColl: He is an interesting man indeed, and I think one thing that was very refreshing in his inauguration speech was two things, in fact. Well many things, but the two things that really appealed to me was that he did talk about saving lives when he spoke to the armed forces.

"You're going to be judged on saving lives, not lives taken," which I thought was a wonderful about-turn after, I guess, time immemorial here in Colombia. But and also, and the second thing was he talked about various violences that affect Colombia, and I thought these were, this is a new way of thinking.

Have we seen this being put into play in this last year, in this year of his presidency?

Jenny Pearce: I see it in what he's attempting to do. I see someone who, as you say, understands violence in a very different way. He's lived it. But also he's opened his mind to the fact there isn't just one kind of violence, the violence that people know about in terms of the armed movements and the criminal violences.

He's aware of other kinds of violences. This is why he's also taken to an idea of security, human security where he's looking at a security approach that would reduce violences. So he definitely has come to his presidency with very different ideas certainly around that topic of violence, but also around what he understands by peace.

And I suppose one would have to look at the idea of total peace, as he calls it to see how he's trying to put this into practice. Now, it's a very complicated discussion. I'll try and be concise. But what he's trying to do with the idea of total peace is he's basically arguing that you can't just tackle one form of violence if you are going to really give sustainable peace to Colombia.

So he obviously wants to implement what was not implemented in past presidencies around the peace accord of 2016, and he wants to bring in some of the reforms that should have been done but weren't after that accord. But he's going further than that with the total peace. He's also suggesting that in order to address so many other violences other than the armed, more politicized violence, you have to actually engage with negotiations with criminal groups.

This is incredibly controversial. For me, he's a man beyond his times, if I was in Medellín earlier this year a city that has been through so many forms of violence. I've watched the mutation of various violences in Medellín. And even amongst people who've really on the left and progressive, they find it hard to accept total peace, right?

Because people, for instance, do not wish to conflate a political armed actor such as the ELN

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Jenny Pearce: with the Clan del Golfo, which is clearly an overtly criminal actor. And so there's a huge discussion around precisely what could be achieved through total peace. But I actually believe on the ground there are very important things going on.

And one of them is to try and connect to the young men who get brought into armed groups, into criminal gangs. So already in Buenaventura and in the prison in Itagüí, in Medellín, there are processes going on in which he's trying to invite gang members to come into a process of total peace via his peace commissioner, Danilo Rueda.

Very controversial, but I do believe there's a serious intent behind this to try and think differently about violences in Colombia.

Richard McColl: So really we could reorganize what paz total or total peace means because it seems here the general, the general understanding is total peace means every group that in its totality.

Whereas you're suggesting that total peace is far more addressing all the different violences on the ground. It's far more theoretical than the, the, I would say the superficial. We've got to get the Clan del Golfo, AGC out. We've got to get the Nueva Marquetalia, or we've got to get

Rather than just that, it is far more theoretical in its reach than. We're looking at an entirely academic thing.

Jenny Pearce: And maybe that's the problem. Many people can't grasp a vision so broad. But the, there is real thinking behind it. For instance, one of the things is if you don't tackle all the various armed groups, other armed groups are gonna come in and take their place, so you need to have an overall strategy that's gonna bring in as many people as possible to stop the ongoing criminalities and violences.

Now, clearly this is an incredibly difficult thing to do. As you mentioned, the Marquetalia, Nueva Marquetalia, and of course with the Estado Mayor even those ex-FARC groups provide a problem for Petro because the Nueva Marquetalia was actually signed the peace accord and then Iván Márquez and others left it.

And the Estado Mayor of the FARC, ex-FARC, is, are the ones that never signed the peace agreement. So he's got a problem as to, legally, what do, can you offer? Can you offer the same thing to a group that left the peace accord, to a group that never signed a peace accord? And that's just those two groups, without talking about the ELN as another armed group and the Clan del Golfo as a criminal group.

And then many would say that ultimately those ex-FARC groups have become merely criminal groups. So what is at stake here really is the fact that there is no agreement on how to understand all these different expressions of violences and criminality. And I think this makes it very difficult for the government to actually get convincing messages out there and to get the support of the population.

And I think one of the things that I picked up in my most recent trip is that actually there's not a lot of confidence or trust of the process.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Jenny Pearce: People want to see quick fixes, and there is no way there is going to be a quick fix to the problems Colombia has faced with respect to these various armed actors and the various violences in which they're involved.

That, I think, is one of his major problems. He will not get a quick fix, and in comes the media to attack him for the failures, and no one sees the effort on the ground with very few personnel. He hasn't got enough people working around the whole total peace idea, and I think that's another problem.

But innovative it is. Yeah. And I think it's putting on, out there on the agenda a new way to think about violences and criminal groups, not only in Colombia.

Richard McColl: But I think this is so very interesting as you talk about the messaging and a certain degree of incoherency of the messaging. I think that President Petro has this all in his head, but he's perhaps not great at getting it out to convince the rest of the population.

And of course he carries with him the stigma of having been, a, as a former guerrilla, the M-19. And so there's a segment of society that will never forgive him. And, there's a justifiable reason for this, having, people who have lived through the worst years of the conflict, you know, back in we say the '80s and the '90s, early 2000s, remembering this and remembering what's happened to family members and so on.

And of course they just can't get past this. But as you say, nothing previous to this has worked. The peace accord with the FARC very good complete peace accord, but of course then had four years of backtracking and being strangled by the presidency of under Iván Duque.

And we're picking up, Colombia is picking up the broken pieces of that to go again. And you think, as you said, Petro might be a man ahead of his time in what he's trying to do, but it Would we have been better in Colombia had Petro won over Duque to continue what was agreed in 2016 with the FARC to push it through what was signed up into the Constitution and so on?

Jenny Pearce: I think Petro is committed to the reforms that were at the heart of the Peace Accord of 2016. He absolutely has a track record of supporting a grand reform. One of the issues that really matters to him, as well as climate change, is actually productivity in the rural area, food production, enabling peasants to grow food and have a good life in the rural areas and to look after nature.

He really believes in that. And I think, he's also, of course, tackled the drugs issue which no one else really wants to talk about still. But, he is very clear that until the drugs issue is tackled at an international level, he can't easily just himself solve that problem in Colombia.

And I think he's right on that. The, So I think there's a lot of issues that Petro has in his head at least that really were much more in tune with the potentiality for that 2016 accord to actually really address something of what had led to some of the armed actors taking up their arms.

Unfortunately, of course, that isn't how, the way things have gone. And now after the four years of the Duque government, he's now left trying to offer this vision to a country, which as you suggested, I think is quite cynical about what can be achieved. And faith in politicians isn't high in the political system isn't high.

People in rural areas still live with those armed actors, and that shouldn't be forgotten. I think Petro's trying to do something really important, but I know that it's the armed actors are Although we have a ceasefire with the ELN and a very interesting process around trying to get some participatory discussions going on how to address the issues that matter to them, this will take time.

And in the meantime, a lot of rural communities still suffer from armed actors. And just to look at the number of social leaders killed this year, the latest figure is something like 93 social leaders. That is people who are really fighting to preserve rights and independence in many of the rural areas of Colombia and who've been victims of violences over the years from various armed actors.

Richard McColl: And that's just it. As you say, everybody wants a quick fix. This isn't a quick fix. This is generations we're looking at to ease out and reconcile with, again, the violences that have taken place. Now these social leaders, and I think this, this ties us in nicely are working tooth and nail to protect communities and for rights and so on the environment and traditional practices.

Of course, they're working overtime right now because it's election period. It's pre-election period for October. We have the local national elections, so governors, mayors concejales, and everything, and we're seeing that machinery moving into play now. How do we think that the, let's say the coalition of the Pacto Histórico or of course how do we think they're going to do in these October elections?

Because it's very much a litmus test of the presidency

Jenny Pearce: it looks very pessimistic for Petro and already his popularity has plummeted. But also, I think one should discuss the fact that he is a real enemy to a lot of people on the Right. And a lot of the elites. I don't use that word lightly.

I work on that concept. I'm not doing what some accuse some people of saying the elites are to blame for everything." But I'm trying I think there is evidence, and we have evidence that there is a sort of very high concentration of political and economic power in Colombia.

And clearly Petro is in their sights, and a lot of the media are owned by very wealthy people, and they have absolutely amplified a whole series of what are broadly called scandals in Colombia, which are to do, and it relates to the issue you've just raised of elections. Which is that Colombia has, I think, a real political culture of clientelistic electoral politics, of what I call transactional politics, in which money has flowed into campaigns.

Rural and regional leaders have backed candidates that can, to enable them then to bring money to their areas. And all this has been part of Colombian politics for some time. Two major moments have really done a lot of damage to Petro who's, who stood on a platform of being anti-corruption, trying to change politics.

And I'm one of a number of people, I think, who actually believes he's sincere, right? But the scandals who, that have been associated with him, one of them to do with a campaign manager, Armando Benedetti from the coast and his own advisor and organizer, Laura Sarabia, who worked with Benedetti at one point then came to work for Petro.

And they I won't go into all the details of this, but the scandal is about the fact that Benedetti has claimed he gave a lot of, got a lot of money from dubious sources to invest in Petro's campaign. And then the worst one, which actually became the noise of the moment at the time of the exact anniversary of Petro's first year, which is his son who ran his campaign also in the coast.

And now we know, because first of all, his ex-girlfriend proclaimed it, and then he has admitted it, that money that came in from dubious sources went to his own personal enrichment, but also to the campaign of his father. He says in the latest interview that his, that Petro did not know that money was going into his campaign, but we've yet to see, because now there's going to be a further investigation.

I think what's important is that Petro has made it very clear he's not going to interfere with the judicial process against his son. So that is really significant that he's prepared to do that. Because many accuse him of being anti-institutional. I don't, I think he is actually trying to protect institutions, but nevertheless, this has done him a lot of damage, and it doesn't look good for October.

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Richard McColl: Yeah, the damage is done, as you say. The damage is done because it, we all know about Nicolás Petro and we all know about this scandal.

And whether it comes out or not that, that Gustavo Petro is clean and did not know anything about it's there. It's always going to be hanging over him. There's also this, a recent a recent allegation that he took money from dubious sources in the Llanos as well, but I think he's also been able to shoot that one down for using a poor metaphor there.

But he's been able to deny that one. But it's, this, this sort of brings me into it. As you talked about the political culture of sort of transactional politics, look at what's going on with the Odebrecht scandal and, that to me is one of the greatest obviously you know, examples of this.

And you had is it I can't remember. President Uribe's minister for transport who was taking a huge I think I want to say Gabriel García Moreno, I want to see, I can't say. He took a huge bribe. Then you, on, in President Santos's presidency you have huge bribes going everywhere. Sarmiento is up in New York a week or so ago and, obviously has to pay a huge fine because they've been found guilty of these things because the company is registered in the New York Stock Exchange, and yet there's no case going on here in Colombia.

And this just goes to show, doesn't it? That you can be judged in the US, but in Colombia it's business as usual.

Jenny Pearce: Yes, absolutely. And the corruption that's embedded in this transactional politics means that so many contracts that you depend on the state, either regionally or locally and nationally for these contracts, and the Odebrecht scandal shows construction company from Brazil that used all sorts of bribes in many countries of Latin America.

But certainly this has impacted on the Santos government and on the on other governments. The corruption over the parapolitics scandal under Uribe, which was also about how paramilitary groups would pay for candidates who would support their positionings in Congress. A, a third of the Congress was actually packed with candidates that have been paid for by paramilitary groups who are involved in drug trafficking, as well as in supporting the army to deal with counterinsurgency processes.

So in other words, we've got a sort of deeply embedded corruption, and I think this means that anything that can be used against Petro will be used. But it is, I'm afraid it's perhaps because more because I'm not Colombian and I go there, but I'm very pretty shocked, to be honest, by the fact that I've always seen these corruption scandals in the history.

And then all of a sudden it's Petro that's where the great scandal is. Yeah. The media really use that. Now, that doesn't mean to say I don't think Petro he should be acknowledging anything that was done to corrupt his campaign. I'm, he absolutely needs to acknowledge anything, and I'm not in any way letting him off if there's evidence that he did know and that the money flowed into his campaign from dubious sources.

But just to say that this is an endemic problem in the nature of political life in Colombia, and it is certainly not just Petro, but I also question myself whether Petro I don't actually believe Petro is a corrupt politician.

Richard McColl: It's, again, it would, it depends on the people around him, and we look at someone like Armando Benedetti and who is, a political lizard up there in the Caribbean coast and who knows what's going on.

He's from those, those, those big families up there that control so much and have their connections to everything. Which brings us quite nicely to the work that you have been doing and I know that you've been working with Juan David Velasco of the Universidad Javeriana. And you have a report which is many years in the making called Elites and Violence in Latin America.

And Random House Penguin are going to be coming out with a book in the near future. We don't have a title, but it's about the problem of reforms in Colombia. So perhaps we'll start with the reforms, and we'll talk about the elites and 'cause, because this has been one of the major stumbling blocks.

Tax reform majorly watered down but pushed through, but then we're looking at all the other reforms that need to be done: health, pension, justice. In everything, electoral reforms, everything. But now that he does not have a majority 'cause the Pacto Histórico umbrella has splintered and the liberals have gone off elsewhere and so on.

The U Party, so Santos' party's gone off elsewhere. He's not going to be able to get these through, do we think?

Jenny Pearce: It's gonna be a very uphill journey. And Petro started off trying to build a national accord with different parties, opposition parties, and he did. It lasted till April this year. But in the end, it broke down.

And he's now surrounded himself much more with loyal people and has had to manage a congress where he has a deep opposition. And it's going to be very hard to get these reforms through. I have to say that a lot of people recognize Colombia needs reforms. And also it's very interesting that internationally, for instance, the OECD has not seen the reforms that Petro has put on the agenda as being particularly radical.

Richard McColl: No.

Jenny Pearce: So one of the things that's quite difficult to get a balanced view on is actually, are these the radical reforms of an ex-guerrilla of the left, or actually are these reforms that Colombia needs and which have to be fairly transformatory to really make a difference to the country, but which are going to upset the interests of people who have an economic stake in some of the fields where Petro wants to introduce change.

So I, myself I feel having worked on Colombia for many years and this work we've been doing around elites for many years as well it does feel that there is a real problem in Colombia of reform. Now, for this book, and I'm not going to go into detail here obviously, but I have gone back to the very different moments of attempts to reform, make reforms in Colombia.

And it is so interesting from the reforms of 1936 and the reforms of what's called the Frente Nacional when there was attempts to bring in agrarian reform, it's it's, they get scuppered, right? It has been incredibly difficult to actually build a country where people as a whole, rural and urban, feel they are, have a stake in the society, they are recognized, their needs are going to be put on the agenda.

And it, Colombia remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. Its land ownership is one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world. And that inequality and the poverty that's associated with it means that without serious reforms, it is hard to see how the country will progress. And I think this issue of how the country progress is very important because Colombia has a productivity problem.

It has a problem of educational attainment other than a few. Our study of elites show how the elites of the country in the in different spheres, because we look at various elites, we call constellation of elites, how many come from the very same universities, right? Yeah. Los Andes obviously being one.

And so it means that what you understand to be orthodoxy or what you understand to be acceptable change is very limited. You have in Colombia a very important technocratic elite. These are people that have been trained in Harvard. They're very good intellectuals, very brilliant minds, but they are very much part of an orthodoxy, and they've kept the country in a macroeconomic stability.

And so that through that orthodoxy. But it does mean that they are very upset at any challenge to that orthodoxy, including questioning of the sort of neoliberal economic approach, the market-driven approach that has dominated the country for quite a long time. And what definitely Petro is trying to do, he's very influenced by Mariana Mazzucato, an economist at the UCL.

And the idea that the state should be a driver her argument is that the state has always been a driver of most innovation, even though the market takes it forward. Petro is very much influenced by that. And so he's trying to bring the state in order to make transformations at very varied levels in society, from agrarian distribution and making sure agriculture gets its real investment in agriculture to labor reforms which give

the labor reform, which has been highly disputed by the opposition in Congress because they think it will stop people employing, the formal sector employing more people and that would badly affect the informal sector. It'll grow. The informal sector is already over 50% of employment just comes from the informal sector in Colombia. But actually, one of the things that Petro's trying to do is reduce working hours from 48 hours a week to 42. When you think, we in England, we won the eight-hour day, 40-hour week some time ago, it's not revolutionary to seek to reduce working hours.

Richard McColl: The, that's what it is. Again, I think it's a whole issue of messaging and then of course the platforms by which the messages get out because as you mentioned, so many of the people in charge or who have something perhaps in inverted commas to lose are the ones who own these media outlets, and therefore, we don't get the kind of reporting perhaps needed, and let's let's reduce it so that people could understand it and perhaps not deliver it in a very Petro academic fashion. But sometimes you get the feeling as well is that there is, again, that cadre of society here, which is anything Petro, no. Anything at all, no, because again, the stigma surrounding it.

I wanted to ask as well is that, as we said, you said that he's surrounded himself with allies and people who are going to be faithful blindly faithful to his to his cause and the cause. I see him in the next few years, or the final let's say the next three years, doubling down on this because it, you know, obviously reaching out to the other parties has now been unsuccessful.

Is he going to be running a dysfunctional government for the next three years?

Jenny Pearce: It's, at the moment it doesn't look good, right? And I think one of the issues is precisely what Juan David and I have come to the conclusion, is he lacks his own technocratic.

Richard McColl: Yeah

Jenny Pearce: support.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Jenny Pearce: He's dealing with people who are in his ministers, who are in his circle who haven't got experience of governing.

And so it's inevitably going to be very difficult for him. But it's not only, it's not only that is the problem is not only do they not have experience of governing, and also people who know Petro do acknowledge he's not a great communicator. He's a bit of a loner in his kind of the way he governs.

And that's a difficult thing, but he's also under attack all the time. For me, I sometimes think how humanly does he live this? Even what happened over his son Nicolás. He's a father and this whole issue of what happened to his son personally must be really painful and terrible, and he may be he didn't handle it very well.

His son is also suffering from the fact he feels he had an absent father. But at the end of the day, Petro is a human being, and I think, he's got an incredible job on his hands trying to bring about change without this support of a well-experienced technocratic set of people around him, trying to build some sort of accord or agreement for change with people who really do not want him to survive and who will do everything they can to bring him down. It's a very difficult few years ahead, and while what one can think of is maybe he won't achieve what he set out to achieve, one could think, has he put the issue of change on the agenda? A new debate restarted the conversation, for instance, on violence, on what the meaning of security is. I think one of the criticisms one could make perhaps, and I think this is true of the left in Latin America, that they don't treat security very seriously.

So that in order to bring people with you for the total peace, I think he needs to have a good relationship and a new form of policing which can really help people to feel safe and then accept that you can do negotiations with their different actors. This is very difficult for him, right? And it's not, he's not alone.

If people who, in Latin America who want to bring about a any sort of change, they don't tend to have already thought through the security policy. And people like AMLO in Mexico turns to the military. Which is not a very progressive agenda for many. So I think he's facing very difficult obstacles and, but who knows?

Who knows the surprises of history. Climate change is here with us, and perhaps people will begin to realize that he's one of the few presidents that is taking climate change utterly seriously, and also trying to ensure that it's not the poor that suffer its consequences. He clearly wants to support the poor to be able to adapt to climate change in the rural areas, and also to find an, a sustainable agriculture that could actually help the country to wean itself off other imported food products.

Richard McColl: And food. I it's interesting as we talk about, wind this down, but it's, the whole the whole issue of this being the government of change, the government that to bring about change, and of course, scandal after scandal being revealed or very capably released at each point.

It, people are saying, "Oh, it's the government of change only because it's on the left. It's the government. It's the same, it's the same politicians, the same cut type of government again corrupt as usual." But I do think, he definitely wants change. I do believe this and, and I don't want to anger listeners who perhaps are not in agreement, but he does represent a different politics than what we've had.

And the scandals that he has, which are dreadful, and as you say, he's a father, how can he be dealing with that around his son, and the scandal's ongoing. They do pale in comparison to previous presidents and their scandals. You mentioned the parapolítica. Nothing is coming to the fore about Duque, President Duque and Ñeñe Hernández.

Santos' government has remained remarkably shielded from the Odebrecht scandal, and these are huge things. And now we're talking about something that which I hate to say it in this fashion, It would be strange had there not been illicit, or funds from illicit sources in a lot of political movements in Colombia because it's so normal.

And yet they seem to be really focusing on this fact. Absolutely. And I think it's important to remember because you mentioned the ceremony of his inauguration and the different messages that took place. And in thinking about someone who's geared to change, he absolutely made sure that inauguration ceremony recognized indigenous population, the Afro-Colombian.

Jenny Pearce: He's got a vice president who's from the Afro-Colombian community. He has done his best, I think, to reach out beyond a kind of narrow sense of who should dominate Colombia, who should govern Colombia, and to try and also his vision, which is not only to do with the sort of ELN process, but he's also trying to get participatory discussions going around, generally around total peace and around the other ideas he has for change.

He had participated processes before he did the national development plan. They weren't all tremendously successful, but some were. This isn't going to be, as we said before, the sort of quick fix where everything comes out perfectly. But he's trying to do something new in Colombia, which for me, having, lived through the violences of Colombia for many decades, for me, is very refreshing, important and vital.

And the issue will be, whether he can in the next three years at least leave a legacy of the fact that Colombia needs to think of a transformation in a much deeper way than perhaps some of the existing powers would want to accept.

Richard McColl: Oh thank you. I think that's a perfect place to end this.

Thank you so much for these thoughts and of course for going into great profundity about Colombia. Of course, we must keep looking out for your book, which will have a catchline, the problem of reforms in Colombia elites and violence in Latin America and so on, with Juan David Velasco.

As soon as you have a title, please let us know. When do we expect it to come out?

Jenny Pearce: In the first months of next year.

Richard McColl: Okay, so quite soon. Yes. So quite soon. That's...

Jenny Pearce: We think probably March, April, if all goes well.

Richard McColl: All right. Keep us in the know because of course, as Colombian followers, Colombianists, we all want to know about this book.

I'm sure you'll be doing a tour here in Bogotá and in Colombia, so we'll meet in person then. Definitely. But let me take this moment to say thank you so much to Jenny Pearce, who is the research professor at the Latin America and Caribbean Centre of the London School of Economics, for her time and sharing some really quite incredible insights into this, the first year and future years of Gustavo Petro's presidency.

Jenny, thank you for being on The LatinNews Podcast.

Jenny Pearce: Thank you very much. Lovely to be here.

Richard McColl: Thank you everyone, and please of course subscribe to The LatinNews Podcast and check back in two weeks when we'll have a new episode out. I've been your host, Richard McColl, here in Bogotá, Colombia. Thank you for listening

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast.

For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com

Jo-Marie Burt is associate professor of political science and Latin American studies at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. At Mason, she has served as director of Latin American studies, co-director of the Center for Global Studies, and associate chair for undergraduate studies. She is an affiliate faculty in global affairs, Latin American studies, conflict analysis and resolution, and women and gender studies. Burt is also a senior fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a leading human rights research and advocacy organization.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl

Richard McColl: This is episode 10 of The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl, your host here in Colombia. My very special guest this week is none other than Professor Jo-Marie Burt. She's of the School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and the president of LASA. And we're going to be talking about the upcoming final round, second round of elections in Guatemala on August the 20th.

So welcome on The LatinNews Podcast.

Jo-Marie Burt: Hi, Richard. Nice to be here with you.

Richard McColl: It's a real pleasure. It's a real pleasure. Guatemala is a country that's very close to my heart as being the place where I first cut my teeth in Latin America as a young man. But so I'm constantly, reading up on what's going on and obviously in the last few weeks, last few months, things have ramped up because of the elections, and we are facing an interesting time just watching what is unraveling.

So perhaps you could give us a little bit of background on these last the final round between Bernardo Arévalo and Sandra Torres.

Jo-Marie Burt: I think the headline here is that the outcome of the elections were quite a surprise to virtually all Guatemalan observers long-term and short-term observers of Guatemala.

Arévalo was polling, something like 3% in the public opinion polls, not that they're necessarily all that reliable in Guatemala, but and there were six or seven candidates polling well ahead of him, all of them at some point or other connected to the very conservative very corrupt networks that currently hold power.

And it was, I think, all of our assumption that one or another of those candidates were going to be the ones making it into the second round. And so it'd be, as, as Vargas Llosa once said with regards to an election in Peru, AIDS versus cancer. None of the outcomes were gonna be good.

And lo and behold, Zury Ríos, for example, for, who for many people were very concerned. Zury Ríos, the daughter of genocider Efraín Ríos Montt was polling, fairly well. She was expected to possibly make it into the second round. She came in sixth, seventh if you count the people who didn't who spoiled their ballots.

So that was also a surprise. So I think that's the top story, the surprising result of Bernardo Arévalo coming into, coming in second place and competing going to be the person to compete in the second round against Sandra Torres, who is of course an old political part of the political establishment in Guatemala.

She's the former First Lady. Her husband was president. Álvaro Colom, Colom was president many years ago. This is her third attempt to be president. But what we've seen since then has been a very determined effort on the part of the sectors who control power to essentially erase Bernardo Arévalo and his party, Semilla, from the electoral map one judge accused his party of falsifying signatures to register as a formal party and therefore ordered the suspension of the party of its legal status.

The attorney general's office then proceeded to move on that judicial ruling. And then of course, Arévalo and his party filed an injunction. And so it's been this kind of it's actually very hard to keep up with the judicial ping pong that's been going on in the days since the first round.

Really since the judge and the MP the prosecutor's office have been trying to shut down Semilla, the Semilla Party. But we are hoping that the elections will in fact take place with Sandra Torres versus Bernardo Arévalo on August 20th 20 days to go. So there's still three weeks.

It's a very uncertain climate. There are a lot of tension, but there's also a tremendous amount of hope, and this is a word I have not used in a sentence about Guatemala in a very long time, right? So there's something that's very exciting about the whole situation. At the same time, there's a lot of reasons to be worried

Richard McColl: Yes, and this is what I, this is what I was feeling at the same time is like, okay, you have, let's say, the political elite establishment, same old business in Sandra Torres on one side, the Unidad Nacional de Esperanzand then of course you've got Bernardo Arévalo, very symbolic character due to his family ties, and everything up against him.

But can you imagine the hope of someone from outside of the establishment getting in, ruffling up some feathers? I'm supposing that should he win, should he be allowed to win, should he win, should the elections take place, there's a lot of shoulds there, There are a lot

Jo-Marie Burt: of ifs there, yeah.

Richard McColl: but should he win, he wouldn't have a majority to be able to you know, push through all sorts of changes and reforms that he would like to do so, but he could, it would be change in itself. And I was looking at this the, accusations of him having sort of dead people signed up to, for his party in 2019.

It sounds quite spurious, this one. What kind of can we lend any authority to these accusations, or is it all entirely politically biased campaigning?

Jo-Marie Burt: Oh, I think that it's really politically motivated. There, there's often irregularities in any elections process.

We know that from, United States as well, right? That's not an unusual occurrence for there to be some, some problems, some irregularities. But systematic and but what's really happening is that judges and prosecutors who are extremely close allies of the present regime Right?

They're the ones who are pursuing these efforts to have Semilla Party canceled. And I think that and they're not the fact is these are not people who just have popped up. These are people who have been systematically engaged in corrupt and anti-democratic actions for quite some time now.

Just to give you an example the judge who ordered the suspension of Semilla is also the judge who was involved in the case against José Rubén Zamora, the publisher and owner and editor of elPeriódico. Guatemala's most important daily newspaper, which no longer exists because he was arrested about a year ago.

He was sentenced to six years in prison on absolutely spurious charges. And the judge and the prosecutor who have accused Semilla are were recently, I should say designated by the US government, by the US State Department on, on the Engel List, which the Engel List, which is a list of people who are sanctioned by the US as a very serious- sanction of individuals who are deemed to be corrupt and/or non-democratic actors. And these are not, it's not just some judge or some prosecutor. These are people who have a long history of engaging in quite dubious actions designed to undermine rule of law undermine Guatemalan democracy, difficult, as challenged as it is, et cetera.

So I think that's the thing to, that we need to think about here.

Richard McColl: So these, these this small but incredibly powerful, incredibly entrenched elite, what, as okay, we talk about corruption, and I guess we talk about Guatemala as a transit country for, illicit goods and so on. But what do they really all stand to gain out of this serious continuing backslide of the democratic process Right

within Colombia? Colombia, Guatemala, sorry.

Jo-Marie Burt: Within Guatemala. I think it's important to step back a little bit and look at the last several years of what's happened in Guatemala, 'cause I think that's the only way you can understand what's happening right now. So Guatemala experienced a very unique period.

Some people call it the Judicial Spring, which is a play on the word Democratic Spring, which was inaugurated in 1944 by Bernardo Arévalo's father, who you alluded to a moment ago, the first democratically elected president in Guatemala's history, right? Juan José Arévalo. And that 10-year experiment of Democratic Spring was brought to a brutal end in 1954 with the CIA-sponsored coup against his successor, Jacobo Árbenz, a story many of us are familiar with.

But in the, around the around 2007, 2006, 2007 the United Nations set up this body in Guatemala, the International Commission Against Impunity, CICIG, and along with some very dynamic and trailblazing prosecutors and judges, CICIG became it really led a unique experiment in trying to rebuild or build really the rule of law to deal with the longstanding problem of impunity and corruption in Guatemaland impunity for present crimes primarily.

There's also impunity for past crimes, which also began to advance while CICIG was in Guatemala, though CICIG didn't really have a mandate to engage in those kinds of cases. So I'm thinking about the trial against Ríos Montt and other trials. But the CICIG's mandate is really focused on present-day organized crime, corruption, and political crimes.

When I say political crimes, things like illicit campaign contributions, right? And so CICIG began a very rigorous process of strengthening judicial and prosecutorial independence, autonomy improving their investigative skills improving security, a whole slew of reforms and trainings and so forth that really did help strengthen like I said, autonomy and independence of both prosecute, the prosecutor's office and the judiciary.

And but what was also key, of course, is there are, these trailblazing new faces in the Attorney General's office, people like Claudia Paz y Paz later Thelma Aldana, both the attorneys general back to back. In the judiciary also, they created special courts to deal with very complex crimes, including organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking, gang violence, and of course, human rights abuses as well.

They had greater levels of security, protection, training, and so forth. So in the course of these, the 10 or 15 years that, that CICIG was in it was like around 12 years that CICIG was in Guatemala, it was this unprecedented effort to strengthen the judiciary, strengthen rule of law and combat corruption and impunity.

The problem was, as many people have noted they got to be a little too good at their job. And at some point they weren't just investigating this politician, that politician. They put a president behind bars. They put a vice president behind bars, Otto Pérez Molina, Roxana Baldetti, several government ministers, but at some point their investigations turned to the economic elites And several members of Guatemala's, very powerful economic elites were being investigated for illicit campaign contributions.

And at that point, the elite's like, "Enough is enough." And so you begin to see this kind of concert of interests congealing military folks who are angry about human rights prosecutions going on in Guatemala Conservative politicians who are angry that many of their allies either have been prosecuted or being investigated or could be investigated, and the economic elites who have now been touched by CICIG.

So there's this confluence of interests in Guatemala, it's known as the pact of the corrupt, el pacto de los corruptos which start trying to roll back this incredible experiment in accountability in Guatemala.

Richard McColl: Wow.

Jo-Marie Burt: And so in 2019, in effect, CICIG gets shut down unilaterally by the Guatemalan government.

They close their doors and thus begins the slow rollback of everything that had been gained up until that point. And so that's between 2019 and 2023, which is essentially the time period of this Giammattei came in, I believe, in 20, 2020. So it's basically the last, three and a half years of the Giammattei government have been an effort to consolidate this pact of the corrupt, to consolidate their power, to assert their influence and control over virtually every state institution.

And they've largely achieved that, which is one of the reasons why people were fearful that the elections themselves were not gonna be free and fair. And I think it is important to say that the Supreme Elections Tribunal, which is now being hailed as the heroes of this process because they are defending the right of Arévalo to run in the second round elections, but they also canceled three presidential candidates including Thelma Cabrera from an indigenous community leader who came in fourth in Guatemala's last election.

They canceled her on a really on a very spurious charge involving her vice presidential candidate, Jordán Rodas, who was the former- Yes human rights ombudsman. And they canceled two other, Roberto Arzú, of the right, and Carlos Pineda someone with allegedly shady background but who was starting to rise in the polls, and they canceled him as well.

And they didn't cancel Bernardo Arévalo, I believe, I think many of us believe, because he was not registering really in the polls. He was, like, getting 2% or 3% in the polls. So at the time Guatemalans go to the polls on June, I believe it was 25th your choices are Zury Ríos, Manuel Conde, who is Giammattei's candidate, the ruling party candidate.

It's Sandra Torres, who herself was facing an corruption charges a couple years ago and somehow managed to get her way out of that and a few others. And what happened is most Guatemalans actually voted for nobody. Yeah. Many Guatemalans simply didn't turn out to vote, and the number one vote getter in the actual paper ballots was nobody.

You, people either spoiled their ballot or they didn't choose anybody. So that's the number one voter. And then it was Sandra Torres with something like, I don't know, 15 or 16%, followed by Arévalo with something like 12%, and then all the others well below that. So the surprise candidate comes to the fore, and suddenly the whole game has changed, and the elites the, this pact of the corrupt are utterly taken off guard.

They did not expect this. They believed they had these elections in the bag, one or the other. Maybe not Giammattei's candidate, but they knew they could work out a deal with Zury Ríos or with any of the other multiple conservative and allied candidates of this pact. They would do.

They would work it out somehow. So now what's happening is there's two things going on. One is they're trying to cancel Semilla to get And that's still ongoing. The, and there's a temporary injunction, but the attorney general's office is still investigating, and there still is the risk that they could legally you know, not legally but suspend their legal status.

It would not be legal to do so. It's actually not legal to do that. And these corrupt sectors are working Sandra Torres to make sure that if first of all, to make sure that she wins so that they don't have to deal with Arévalo, and that if she wins, they have a very clear agreement with her that their impunity and their power remains intact.

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Jo-Marie Burt: That's how I see what's happening right now

Richard McColl: a perfect storm of all these things coming together.

But at the same time, as you say, the elites really became legless by getting rid of those three other candidates that they would've been able to have dealt with. 'Cause, I assume that I know that Roberto Arzú must be, Alvar- is it Álvaro Arzú's son that is 'Cause we're looking at, I'm thinking of Yeah

the list of presidents, Portillo, Berger, Arzú, Colom, Giammattei, Morales, they all represented, didn't they? They all represented these interests, and so you, Oh, yes look at all of these characters and you start to see the same surnames over and over. Really The same characters. And yet they really they messed it up for themselves, and now what do you do?

Okay As you said, you're trying to and the, so this puts another, and I hadn't thought of this, but of course, if this ongoing attorney general investigation and potential suspension of the Semilla party and Arévalo wins, could they then overturn, his victory in a, in an election if this takes place?

Jo-Marie Burt: Legally they could not do that, but-

Richard McColl: It doesn't seem to have stopped them previously.

Jo-Marie Burt: This is an unprecedented situation, so it's not something we've seen before necessarily. But I don't doubt that they would go to every length possible- to prevent a Semilla victory. What has been quite stunning to me has been the massive international response calling on Guatemala, urging, exhorting Guatemala to respect the election results, knowing all the all the flaws that went into that process- and allow the Guatemalans to vote. So that's really been stunning to me. The United Nations, the United States government, European governments, the EU the OAS, I think the attorney, the secretary general of the OAS is in Guatemala as we speak. Latin American governments. Uribe actually signed a letter with a bunch of other conservative Latin American presidents calling on Guatemala to ensure free and fair elections, when Uribe has historically been a very close ally of these very sectors that are trying to cancel Semilla.

It's really quite fascinating. Although there are, it is important to say, there are divisions and conflicts within these elite groups, and obviously it's very difficult to trace all that and to understand what's happening. But for example, A few maybe a week or so ago, Ricardo Méndez Ruiz, who is the president of the Foundation Against Terrorism, which is a pro-military organization set up in, in 2013 to counter the organizations and the attorney general's office that were prosecuting Ríos Montt for genocide.

And it's since grown into essentially the right arm of the attorney general's office. Everyone sees, everyone that I know sees it that way anyway. And Ricardo Méndez Ruiz tweeted something about criticizing President Giammattei for allowing his sort of key advisor reported friend, let's just say, Miguel Martínez of what's the word I'm looking for?

Of, Getting involved in decisions about promotions within the Guatemalan Armed Forces. And as someone who's very close to the Guatemalan military, including the old guard retired generals, Méndez presumably is speaking for them, saying, "Yo, Giammattei, you're you're messing you're getting your nose in where it doesn't belong."

So there are definitely divisions going on. Sometimes it's not very clear what's happening, but that's another thing to keep in mind as well. So when there are divisions among elite groups, that's an opportunity for reformers, for civil society, for social movements to push, to pressure for change. And so this moment is particularly, I think, ripe for the kind of change that Bernardo Arévalo would represent.

Even though what you said before, that if he were to win, he does not have anything close to a majority in Congress. Congress is gonna be controlled by these different right-wing and slash corrupt parties. So it's going to be a very difficult slog for him should he in fact become the president of Guatemala.

Richard McColl: So as, and truly fascinating. There's a league against terrorism and of course the link there to Uribe in Colombiand of course, the, another nice link is the, of the CICIG's guy, Iván Velásquez, who of course is a real bugbear for Uribe down here in Colombia, being the current minister of defense, who was then declared persona non grata- Yeah

in Guatemala when he went after Jimmy Morales back in the day. So the links are quite strong. Absolutely. And I'd like to go back a little bit and put this into context, not only of the region, but when we talk about the sort of toppling of Jacobo Árbenz back in '54, and it was the CIA-backed coup out of Honduras, I think.

And they got up into is it Zacapa? Like the rum. Yeah, Zacapa. And that's when Árbenz said I, I quit," and went into exile in France. And this is all major Cold War machinations taking place. Yeah. Are we still?

Jo-Marie Burt: Yeah.

Richard McColl: Are the elites still fighting the Cold War?

Because when you look at the, when you look at the things that, you know what you were talking about, Ruiz. I've seen the billboards that he's got up there and he's talking about Venezuela and everything turning Yeah a new Venezueland that seems to be Latin America's greatest example.

Jo-Marie Burt: It's the it's the classic trope of the Latin American right to try to discredit anyone center And from center to left of being the next Hugo Chávez or the next Nicolás Maduro. I work in Peru as well, and I've seen it, I've seen it. It's, it In 2011 against Ollanta Humala, the main argument of the right-wing and the elites was, "Oh, he's gonna be a Chavistand that it's, Peru's gonna become another Venezuela," which it, of course, it did under Humala. On the contrary. and so it's a I just think that's a classic trope of the right in Latin America at this point, and I think a lot of that has become very globalized. Those- those discourse, like gender ideology. It's something that the right all over the region is using now.

One of the things that I do in Guatemala is I research war crimes prosecutions.

Richard McColl: Sure.

Jo-Marie Burt: So I'm sitting, me or my team are sitting in, courtrooms where former military, retired military officials or soldiers or paramilitaries are being accused and prosecuted for a series of crimes against humanity, whether it's torture, sexual violence, forced disappearance, massacres, et cetera.

And the discourse that you hear all the time is that, from the right, from the military, from conservative sectors, is that the people who were defeated, the supposedly the guerrillas, are now fighting the war in the courts. And so in their mind, yes indeed, the Cold War is still being fought. It's just the terrain has shifted.

But beyond those courtroom scenarios, I think that in general, the right in Guatemala still very much has that Cold War mentality. Although, I think it's more, like I said before, it's more of a trope. It's more of a discourse than anything else. Because who, who exactly are they fighting?

To pretend that Semilla is, communist or it's just it's absurd. It is a centrist political party that's participated in elections. Yes, they were active in the anti-corruption protests against Pérez Molina in 2015, which resulted in his stepping down and being arrested right?

Many folks didn't like that on that side of the fence. It's just it's really absurd. It's really absurd. But it's real. It is real, a real part of the discourse, and the consequences are real because when you have power behind you, when you have the power of the courts, when you have the power of the attorney general's office, when you have the power of the social media that Méndez Ruiz, through his different online accounts has to attack people, to indict people, and in some cases to actually arrest people or alternatively to force them into exile.

I'm sure you're you're aware that there are now dozens of Guatemalan judges and prosecutors, mostly people involved in anti-corruption investigations or trials, are now in exile.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Jo-Marie Burt: As are countless journalists, human rights defenders and so forth. So though the Cold War discourse is, it seems bizarre and unreal, because it is backed by power- and lawfare the consequences for Guatemalans who are actually trying to change things is very real. we're not even trying to change, they're just trying to do their job. The prosecutors who, were investigating corruption, they're just doing their job. And now, dozens of them live, in Washington DC, in Costa Rica, in Mexico, and so on and so forth.

Richard McColl: That's it. I saw the figure of 30-plus prosecutors and judges, journalists forced into exile or jailed, and there have been 750 threats against journalists, or that have been reported that so far in this period. But the, when we put it as moving from a Cold War standpoint, but let's move it in this kind of last phase of our conversation into a regional standpoint because, we have a backslide in Guatemala, but we have a political elite who just want business as usual.

Whereas if we look at look at the rest of the region we've had a slow, steady slide into dictatorship in Nicaraguand then you've had a kind of breakneck speed slide into, I authoritarian regime in El Salvador. You knew I was gonna say that. Absolutely. And then you've Yep

Xiomara Castro looking at El Salvador as well it seems. Guatemala not likely to take this kind of road, or is there a fear?

Jo-Marie Burt: I think it's important to distinguish, there are different kinds of authoritarian systems, right? So the two that you pointed to, Nicaragua and El Salvador, as it turns out, are extremely personalized dictatorships.

Richard McColl: Yes.

Jo-Marie Burt: We see the person, we know their name, we know who they are. It's Ortega and his wife Murillo, and in the case of El Salvador, it's Bukele. In Guatemala, it's really a corporate system. The authoritarian system that has been installed in Guatemala, or that is being installed, partially installed, you know, it's always one of these things that how authoritarian is Guatemala?

If there are elections and there's a chance that Arévalo could win, it's not 100% authoritarian, is it? Unless they stop him from winning, which then, oh yeah, maybe it is. It's one of these things that, it's difficult to come to a concrete, I think, definition. But I, the way I see it is that the rule of law has been eroded to the point where it's nearly impossible to qualify Guatemala as a democracy.

At best, it's an authoritarian system where there are still elections, and what we hope comes out of this process is that if Arévalo wins and takes power, what we hope is that there can be a restoration of rule of law in Guatemala, because without rule of law, there is no democracy. Even if there are elections, it's still not a there's that, it's an old trope, the fallacy of electoral democracy.

Just because there are elections doesn't mean it's a democracy. There have to be a whole slew of other conditions, and I think one of the most important ones is rule of law. So without rule of law, which, right now it's And you can see it in the this back and forth ping pong between the judges, the prosecutors, and the Semilla party.

You can see how difficult it is. It is illegal for a judge to cancel the legal status of a political party once the electoral process has taken place. It's it's in the Ley de Partidos. It's a law, and yet there they are canceling Semilla. So that's the what I mean when I say rule of law is not very effective in Guatemala.

And when the elite, yeah, and what, I just the last thing to add, and when the elites control, they control virtually the entire judicial system. They control the attorney general's office. They control the Supreme Court. They control the Constitutional Court. The only way that there is a margin of independence for actors in those places to be to act according to the law.

Now whether that's gonna happen in the next few weeks remains to be seen. The TSE, the Supreme Tribunal, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has surprised many of us because we were all complaining, as I said a moment ago, about the decision to suspend the candidacies of three key individuals in these elections.

That's a really problematic pattern of behavior on the part of those authorities. And yet when they, when it came to this effort to cancel Semilla Party, they responded according to the law. They resisted those efforts. So there, that's what you wanna see, right? You wanna see space for individuals in these different, institutions to uphold the rule of law.

Otherwise, it's going to be a slide into this kind of corporate authoritarian system that is going to be very difficult to reverse.

Richard McColl: Corporate authoritarian system. It just sounds, it sounds terrifying, but I, the last point I was going to bring up was the TSE. We are surprised. We have been surprised.

Yeah. One would have expected them to toe the line. Forgive me for being so negative about it, but one would have expected- Yeah in this situation. But, so I think we are obviously on the threshold of change or much of the same. Business as usual in Guatemala.

Jo-Marie Burt: But I think what's so extraordinary is that the vote, the way people voted forced the TSE officials to act in this surprising way correctly.

And that's a that's an incredible thing, right? To see the force of democracy actually, pushing institutions that in some ways have been co-opted to do the right thing. That's, it's incredible. We hope that continues, sincerely.

Richard McColl: And finally, if should these Sandra Torres win or even, either, obviously one's gonna win are the people going to take to the streets?

Are we gonna see, unrest or violence? I think if either way, if it doesn't go according to which of a party hopes.

Jo-Marie Burt: So that's a good question. If Arévalo wins, I don't think people will go into the street to protest. I think there might be other kind of actions in protest, right?

Yeah. But maybe not. Maybe they'll say, "Okay, we've gotta deal with this." Even though international pressure is such that, "Okay, we're gonna give we're gonna let this guy have, but we have all the other institutions." "So we are going to asphyxiate him." And there's precedence for this. Peru, Pedro Castillo, not a great president, but that's exactly what they did to him, right?

Yeah. And look where he is now, in jail. Yeah. And the right now controls Peru. That's one model. If Sandra Torres wins, I don't see Semilla, this is not a it's a centrist, anti-corruption party. They are not going to They may protest, but it's going to be peaceful protests. I don't think that, I don't see necessarily the likelihood of violence should either of these two win.

Where I see the possibility for violence and real instability is if the power structure that currently holds the reins of power in Guatemala prevents these elections from taking place, or there is a clear effort to alter the outcome. That's where I see danger. I think- So if they just let things go.

Either way- they don't have it they don't have total control, but they still have a lot of control.

Richard McColl: Yeah. I think there's no better place than to end it there. It has been enlightening to talk with someone who has it so clear what's going on in clearly a very complex situation between the two parties, the two interests in Guatemala at the moment.

So let me take this moment to say thank you so much to Professor Jo-Marie Burt of the School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, and the president of LASA. It really has been a distinct pleasure hearing your thoughts on what's going on in Guatemala at the moment.

Jo-Marie Burt: Thank you, Richard, for having me and for taking time to talk about Guatemala.

It's so important that international eyes are on what's going on here right now, so thank you for that.

Richard McColl: You're most welcome. This has been episode 10 of The LatinNews Podcast. I've been your host, Richard McColl. Thank you so much for listening. We'll be back in a fortnight with a further interview about episodes and goings on in the region.

Bye-bye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com

Renata Segura

Renata Segura started her career as a reporter on Colombian TV and a nationally-distributed magazine, before working at the Jesuit-led NGO CINEP in Bogotá. She got her Ph.D. in political science from the New School for Social Research in New York in 2007. Between 2002 and 2019, Renata worked at the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, a program of the Social Science Research Council.

Diego Da Rin

Diego Da Rin is a social science researcher, journalist and consultant on Latin America and Caribbean for the International Crisis Group.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl

Richard McColl: This is the LatinNews Podcast, episode nine. I'm Richard McColl, your host here in Colombia. My very special guests almost need no introduction at all.

In New York, I have Renata Segura, who's a deputy director for Latin America for Crisis Group, and in Paris, Diego Da Rin, who is the expert for Haiti for Crisis Group as well. So welcome on the LatinNews Podcast. It's a great pleasure to have you both here indeed. We're going to be discussing Haiti, as you probably could have guessed, and I think we have to start with the lack of real news or, up-to-date news about what is going on in Haiti right now.

We get snippets of incredibly negative and incredibly awful happenings, kidnappings, self-defense groups. and essential lawlessness. So I'd like to know from either one of you to start, what is the actual situation now in Haiti? Please, perhaps Renata.

Renata Segura: Sure. I think we can summarize it by saying that there is an overlap of a political crisis, a security crisis, and a humanitarian crisis.

Since the assassination of President Moïse two years ago there really has not been a legitimate government in power in Haiti. What happened after the assassination when there was a lot of debate about what, who was the right person to succeed Moïse in power the international community turned to who is now the Prime Minister Ariel Henry because he had been appointed to become prime minister under Moïse's government.

Haiti has constitutionally a government that has both a president and a prime minister. And he has been the person in power since, but he is not a very legitimate leader and the majority of Haitians don't trust him as the right person to lead into the next stage and convene elections, which is really something that is urgent that happens soon, but that the conditions are really not there.

The other thing that has happened is this expansion of violence that had been growing before, but that has exponentially increased since the assassination of Moïse. The power vacuum that resulted after his death empowered gangs that had existed in Haiti for many decades, and who used to be mostly the private armies of either political or economic elites, to really grow, to cut some of the ties that they had with the elites, but in turn to become much more of an exploitation presence in the neighborhoods that they control, and who have been expanding the control of the territory.

They right now control around 80% of Port-au-Prince. They control most of the roads that come in and out of the capital, and they are now growing into neighboring areas. And that has in turn made a humanitarian crisis that had been growing even worse. In particular, we're very worried about the lack of food and access to food.

The WFP just put out very dramatic numbers about how difficult it is for most Haitians to access food and for some of them to really be in the most serious of the food crisis. But there's also been difficulties accessing other services such as hospitals, clinics educational services, et cetera.

So it's really an overlap of those three crises that makes the life of Haitians very difficult at this point.

Richard McColl: And perhaps Diego, do you have anything else to add on this point?

Diego Da Rin: Yes. The most important thing right now you have three different crises and, of course, an economic crisis as well.

But the main driver of all these crises is the expansion of the territories that gangs are controlling and the power the military and political influence they have been having over the last three or four years since the MINUSTAH left. The MINUSTAH was the peacekeeping operation that was in Haiti between 2004 and 2017.

And since then, the security forces the Haitian security forces have been simply outmatched by the power the gangs have. And many Haitians tell me that for the last three years there has been so many first times. It was the first time then that the gangs occupied and controlled the Supreme Court, the first time when they controlled the south, the road that connects the capital to the southern part of the country, then the one to the north, then the one to the east.

Then they blockaded the port with the largest stock of fuel in the country. So right now, the gangs are very much in control, and the Haitian state has collapsed. Public services are barely functioning, and the gangs are the ones who rule in the capital and in other parts of the country

Richard McColl: And so who can we say then are the big players in these gangs?

Can we name some of the big players? I have heard of the self-defense groups. the Bwa Kale, but who really control different parts of the country and Port-au-Prince and these lines of communication, let's say?

Diego Da Rin: We can trace back the history of the gangs to the early 2000s, but the gangs have been expanding their power and their the territories they control over the last three years.

And one very important feature in how they are functioning lately is that they have been making alliances between them. So you have in the capital two very important and powerful alliances, the G9 and the G-PEP, which are fighting for military supremacy in the capital and its surroundings. The G9 is led by a very a well-known leader in Haiti and at the international level who makes himself called Barbecue.

His name is Jimmy Chérizier. He was formerly in the police. He was a police officer in an anti-gang unit for 12 years in Haiti. And as he is one of the older gang leaders the gangs are led by very young people from 20 to 30 years, and very much by men who have been living in gangs in, in areas affected by gang violence since they were born.

Richard McColl: Renata, these gangs taking control of these areas, it might sound like a very superficial question, but what do they stand to gain from these kinds of military situations?

Renata Segura: Their life for a young man, particularly in Haiti, is very difficult. There are very few job opportunities. Even though Haitians are very proud of sending their kids to school and they make incredible efforts to give their children some access to education, really the paths to build a life that is within the legal boundaries is really minimal.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Renata Segura: So really these are survival mechanisms for a lot of young people in Haiti who unfortunately have had no choices but to go to violence. And so really this is a survival mechanism in terms of making money. They kidnap, they steal. And then with these sort of more survival needs comes, has come like a very worrisome extrapolation of just really barbaric violence, right?

We're seeing rape, we're seeing sexual harassment of multiple forms. We've seen really just people burning their victims alive. So it's something that starts in a way as the only way in which you can make a living, and has become just a little bit of a reign of terror that gives these men power, that gives them status, and obviously gives them, control over the population, which unfortunately right now is the greatest asset that they have to get what they want.

Richard McColl: And when we look at the sort of legitimate authorities, because there's a, parallel authorities, but legitimate authorities, have they just the Haitian military and so on just withdrawn to tiny regions and tiny areas of Port-au-Prince to defend those? I'm having a difficulty in my head trying to imagine how this all the formal and the informal sit alongside one another.

I don't know who wants to answer that.

Renata Segura: No, I can start and then Diego can jump in. I think there's several things that are important to, for the audience to know because it's very particular in Haiti. First of all, there were, until very recently, no armed forces. The armed forces had just been revived by the president last year I think, if I'm not wrong.

Richard McColl: Okay.

Renata Segura: And they had been eliminated many years ago because they were seen as a source of violence within the country that was not really a adhering to the rule of law. So really the weight of fighting these gangs relies on the national police, on the HNP by its acronym in French.

The HNP unfortunately is completely outnumbered and outgunned by the gangs. And there is really high levels of corruption and collusion. You can understand why, right? These policemen make $200. They have very little weapons. They live in the same neighborhoods where the gangs live.

It's like you could make the analysis similar to what happened in many places in Latin America, plata o plomo, right? You join us or you get killed. You have very little choice. So the police has been very ineffective. They have had very small successes here and there, but there is a very big international effort to try to bolster it because it is the only national actor that is, at this point in time really leading the fight against the gangs.

Now, the other thing that has happened, and it is very important for us to differentiate between the gangs and this movement, which, it has been known since the early in this year, Bwa Kale, is the sort of proliferation of self-defense movements within the Haitian neighborhoods.

We say the proliferation because the press has been portraying this as something that has just been created or it's new. That's not exactly the case. Haitians have had, because of this history of a very weak state historically, they, there is a tradition of getting organized and react to either security crisis, but also natural disasters, which is something that unfortunately Haiti has also faced so much.

With this expansion of the gangs that have occurred in the last two years, Haitians in several parts of, particularly Port-au-Prince, but other regions too, have organized themselves to, fight the gangs. And so the connections between the Bwa Kale and the police itself, it's a topic that is difficult to really ascertain with clarity because it's confusing, and obviously the research on this is, it's not very easy to do.

We know that there are policemen that live in the neighborhoods where the Bwa Kale movements are rising, that cooperate with them, that on occasion, for example, might lend them their weapons. But there's not necessarily a state self-defense group alliance like, for example, there was in Colombia in the '90s.

We don't see that sort of institutional cooperation, but more of an informal cooperation. But obviously, among certain sectors of Haitians, there's been a welcoming of these self-defense groups because they are stopping, they did at least momentarily have an impact in reducing the levels of assassinations, of kidnappings.

And so we see this rise of an informal, sort of mechanism of defense, which is understandable, but it's really not desirable. First of all, because obviously even if the state in Haiti is very much nonexistent, the ideal would be to have a rule of law. Having people take justice in their own hands, it leads very frequently to mistakes, to excesses.

I think these people called the international attention because they killed and burned, 17 suspected gang members. Nobody's doing proper investigation behind them. Rumors can lead to assassinations. People can use this for personal revenge. So it's troublesome, but we also understand what is happening behind them.

Richard McColl: As we say, so there's absolutely no rule of law, no order, and just quite phenomenal levels of violence, as you say. And it seems to me is, this violence, as you say, this is absolutely awful. massacre of 17 people burnt in the street and so on. It's got that feeling as to warn off others.

We are these people, this is what we do. Don't do it because this is what will happen. But, and as you mentioned, Renata, you mentioned that Haiti of course has suffered it just seems to suffer so much from natural disasters one after another, earthquakes and so on. And then the people don't get a break.

So where do we see this going? Diego, where do you as the expert on Haiti, where do we see Haiti going from here?

Diego Da Rin: The problem right now is that we have two very important crises, the political one and the security one, that are very interlinked. And so you can't advance in lowering the levels of violence and finding a sustainable solution to the security crisis without addressing the political conundrum right now.

And because political instability has always led in Haiti to more insecurity and to the expansion of the gangs in the past decades. So right now, and what we have been recommending in Crisis Group for almost one year now, is that we have to address these two issues simultaneously. But it is very it

I think that everybody agrees right now that the Haitian security forces, the Haitian police, is not able to push back the gangs with such little effectives and in the state of the current state of the Haitian police. The security forces need an international mission.

There are ongoing discussions right now on what the composition would be, how many police officers or military personnel would be going to Haiti for how long which will be the exact mandate of that mission. But one thing is certain: without an international mission, the security crisis will only deepen, and this is very hard to imagine how can, every day I try to imagine how worse can it be tomorrow and every day we have proof that it can worsen.

So Haiti needs a security mission very soon. But sending a security mission could worsen the political crisis if there is not a political agreement between the acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry and the forces of the opposition who are asking him to let them structure a transitional government with enough checks and balances so as not to have just one person who is in charge of all the decisions made by the state, which is what has been going on for two years now.

Richard McColl: The official line from them, from Crisis Group is yes to an international intervention.

LatinNews: This podcast is brought to you by LatinNews, the leading source of political and economic news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean since 1967. Access LatinNews' full portfolio of reports at www.latinnews.com.

Renata Segura: Intervention is a very strong word but we're trying to bring ideas. What we think it is important that the Haitian police receives the support that it needs to be able to fight the gangs, and that is not going to happen just with sending them money and weapons. It is unfortunately necessary to have soldiers on the ground that come and help.

We are very cognizant about the really difficult history of intervention, both in terms of UN forces such as MINUSTAH, which was successful in curtailing violence, but then did other terrible things as, for example, spreading cholera. Albeit not on purpose, obviously. But the, we understand the reluctance that there is on the part of Haitians to welcome another peacekeeping operation.

And as of now, that is not what is being discussed as a plan A, let's say. And obviously there are a lot of strong feelings about American troops or other troops from countries that have been playing a role in the colonial past of Haiti, which is far from easy.

But there is a growing consensus, I think, within Haiti about the importance of having troops come and help at least bring down the levels of violence to a point in which we can have elections, when there can be a little bit more normalcy to have a political transition that is legitimate.

I think what Diego was pointing at is very important. The great problem of sending troops as the situation stands is that it might end up legitimizing the government of Henry, which is really not the ideal situation because so many Haitians are opposed to him. So what would be ideal is a deal between Henry and the Haitian opposition that really brings more of a power-sharing agreement to the next years to come in which they welcome troops.

Partially because everybody in Haiti essentially understands the need for troops. But the troop contributors, those countries which might be in the position of sending people, are not going to do it if they think that the moment they land they're going to face protests, they're going to be called invaders.

We're looking at operational difficulties that are going to make this task very hard. We're looking at gangs that live with the communities in shanty towns, in very difficult spaces. It's not going to be operationally easy. And so the fact that there is likely to be collateral damage, that there might be civilian casualties, this can be really explosive if you don't at least have a sufficient base of support among the majority of Haitians in the terms in which this mission is welcome.

We've had extensive conversations with multiple parts of the opposition. I think while at the beginning after Moïse's assassination, there was a lot of hesitance against having the troops come. Right now the situation is different. And the majority of the people that we speak with say, "We understand we need help, and Haiti is not gonna be able to do this alone."

But there is a great fear among some of the sectors about just consolidating a regime that they see as the prolongation of what has been a very corrupt series of governments by Moïse, by Martelly before him. And so there is also this urgency among certain sectors within Haiti, which we fully understand, to really break the cycle of corrupt governments that are really only looking to enrich themselves and not provide for the people, and they see this as a moment in which this can happen.

Fortunately, the stars don't seem to be aligned that way right now. And clearly the daily deterioration of the security situation means that it has become really urgent to have troops get to Haiti ASAP.

Richard McColl: But what is the likelihood of Henry then actually saying, "Okay let's do some power sharing a transitional government until we can have free and legitimate elections alongside an international peacekeeping accompaniment."

Let's put it out there in a nice way, not an intervention. What is the likelihood of this happening? Maybe Diego.

Diego Da Rin: Ariel Henry is as was Moïse, as was Martelly, a very unpopular leader. And the he wasn't elected. He was named by Moïse before he was dead, but he didn't have all the formalities.

He didn't swear before Congress to become prime minister. So there's big question about the legitimacy of him being the, at the head of state right now. And the thing is that if he's after two years of the assassination of President Moïse, if he is still in power is because he has the backing of the international community.

And as long as the international community, and mainly the most influential international partners of Haiti doesn't, don't pressure him to get involved and to sit at a table to get in negotiations on governance issues, he will be constantly refusing to engage in any negotiation of power sharing with the opposition.

Richard McColl: I know. And also, when we talk about the reputation of countries going in to aid Haiti that, we've had obviously, as you say, the colonial type of oppressors and the US or the French or, the Spanish and so on. Would it be a more appropriate thing to see regional powers, regional governments, Central America, South America, would they be more accepted as peacekeeping forces?

Renata Segura: Yeah, that has actually been a hopeful development in the last few weeks in which CARICOM has become a bigger actor in trying to mediate the situation, and there was a meeting that we thought was hopeful. It did not come to fruition as we were expecting, but at least it's the start of a conversation.

It took place in Jamaica a couple weeks ago. A group of experts from CARICOM was in Port-au-Prince last week. So we are seeing in particular the Caribbean region standing up. The OAS could be a logical actor, but because of the way in which the region perceives the OAS as too aligned with the US and divisions within the Latin Americans and the US right now, perhaps the OAS is not being able to play that role, but CARICOM might.

And so we're hoping that CARICOM might be a, a more appropriate conduit. If they do send troops that come from the CARICOM neighbors, they see them as peers. They don't see them with the kind of resistance that they would see a force coming from France or the US, although that's not on the table, so that is not actually going to happen.

But yes, we are hoping that CARICOM can continue to increasingly play this mediation role and really try and convince Henry to get to the table. We have to say that obviously it's not that the internationals have it hasn't occurred to them to ask Henry to sit at the table, they have been asking and there's been negotiations, but it's been very difficult to make it happen. The international community has to deal with Henry. He is the person in power. He is the prime minister. It's not that they could be like, I have no idea if they regret it or not.

I've never had a conversation with anybody who has told me that, but perhaps they're like, "Okay maybe this was a mistake," but it is what it is at this point, right? So this is the only government that there is, and they need to engage with him. And so I am sure there are people that are trying to get him to sit at the table, but perhaps a stronger message needs to be sent.

And there was a renewal of BINUH, the UN mission which happened last week at the UN, and we were pleased to see in several of the interventions from the ambassadors that there was a lot of emphasis placed on actually Henry coming to a wider agreement. From the US to China to Ecuador, multiple member states actually emphasized the need for a broader agreement.

So hopefully the government will understand that this is a necessary step in order to be able to bring a little bit of stability into the country and this happens soon.

Richard McColl: It sounds to me that in order to get Henry on board, Henry, you're going to have to dangle some very attractive options for him.

Have you seen anything going on in the background? The carrot and the stick.

Diego Da Rin: No, I haven't seen that.

Richard McColl: Because something has to give. Yeah. And he doesn't sound incredibly accessible on this. Of course, he has been approached. I do have to ask, 'cause of course where I'm located, what is going on with the Colombian mercenaries who obviously took down Moïse?

Diego Da Rin: We don't have much information on that. The case is being instructed in Haiti by the fifth judge in who is in charge of this case. He has been in charge of the case for one year. He had three months initially to give some results about his investigation, but we haven't heard anything about that.

And there's the judicial process in the United States that is going on as well. There are 11 people arrested in Florida, and the main suspects there are the ones with CTU, which was the private military company that planned the attack. The main question that I think will remain after the sentences will be said in the US is who was the mastermind?

Who, maybe not who paid them, but who wanted that to happen?

Richard McColl: And in the interim period, as we go back into this territory, we're looking at levels of poverty that are as yet unknown in Haiti. Look, let's try and see ourselves two months from now.

We're here in July, so August, September. Where do we see Haiti in two months from now? Could we say that Haitians will have a bit more access to regular human rights as in running water, schooling, healthcare? Will the gangs step off a little bit because it ends up that they're killing their own people, it's, this is between families. That's what seems so strikingly depressing and sad.

Diego Da Rin: The thing about Haiti is that you have no certainty whatsoever what will happen in the next hour, the next day, or the next month. Maybe one of the gang leaders who have been featuring themselves as defenders of the poor and who have been building their political images of themselves might want to kill Prime Minister Ariel Henry as some politicians maybe were involved in the in the assassination of President Moïse.

Maybe they will be able to control the whole territory of the capital, and they will be actually in control without being in power. The only thing is that the human suffering of the civilians will only increase.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Diego Da Rin: That's the only thing we know

Richard McColl: And as we wind this down, how much of this sort of income coming through Haiti is from narcotrafficking coming up from obviously Colombia, Venezuela, and the like?

Diego Da Rin: Haiti has been a transit hub of cocaine and other illicit drugs. But, there's not so much information on Haiti. we have very much more information about Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, or even Cuba, Jamaica. But Haiti, we don't have data. Customs don't work really well.

There are not many seizures of drug shipments, so we don't have much information on that.

Richard McColl: The absence of law and order does suggest that it is a very lucrative let's say, transit hub. But as we close this down, let me say thank you to both of you, Diego Da Rin, the Haiti expert for Crisis Group, and of course Renata Segura, Deputy Director for Latin America in New York.

Is there anything else that we are overlooking about Haiti that needs to be said? Either of you have final comments?

Diego Da Rin: Maybe on the latest developments. We were talking a little bit about the Bwa Kale movement and all these self-defense groups that have been proliferating in the capital mainly, but in other parts of the country.

These self-defense movements have been collaborating informally, as we said, with some policemen, but also with gangs. And if you see the recent history of how gangs were created, many of them started as vigilance brigades in some neighborhoods to prevent attacks from right-wing paramilitaries in early 2000s.

So in the previous months, we saw a respite in violence because gangs were astonished by the courage of people who were standing up to them with machetes, with sticks, with bottles. But we have seen an upsurge in violence, and maybe if the gangs are to engage in large-scale attacks against these self-defense movements, maybe the self-defense movements might evolve and add to the whole ecosystem of illegal armed groups.

Richard McColl: and self-defense- Which

Diego Da Rin: is very worrying

Richard McColl: movements could move into politics, too

Renata Segura: As they have in many other places in the continent, and that's a very worrisome thing. Colombia, Mexico being the obvious examples of what to worry about. I think two things that we have not been able to research in depth one really that we do think it's an important issue and we raise whenever we have the chance to speak to the general public is the importance for the US to really take a hold of the weapon trafficking that is happening

to Haiti. We know that the majority of the weapons that are coming to the gangs are coming through Florida ports. And it really should not be so impossible to check that the, boats that are coming with food and other things are not hiding weapons in this cargo. It's something that we have raised numerous times with the American government, and many others have, but it's something that we are happy to see being repeated more often in the international environment.

This is something that is crucial. It is much more difficult to set up an international force to come to Haiti than to stop feeding weapons and particularly ammunition to the gangs. And unfortunately, this clashes with a very complicated and convoluted gun rights conversation in the US, and Second Amendment and so forth, but the truth is that there that's the lifeline for the gangs

is coming through the US, and so that needs to be taken into account. And the deportation of Haitians back from the US to Haiti is also now contributing to the situation. This is a moment in which Haitians are leaving because they don't have a choice. This is something that actually we have seen happen with the police, is that a lot of the policemen are trying to migrate to the US and elsewhere.

And so when we see deportations sending people back to Haiti, it's just adding more fuel to the fire 'cause it's not like these people are going to find work or ways to support their families. So the US could do those two things internally to try and bring things down. But we do appreciate that countries such as the US and Ecuador and others are really trying to mobilize the international community to send some support to the HNP, which is something that is urgent.

Haiti is not on your daily news, but it is very much on the daily conversation in international politics around Latin America. It is very much at the center of the conversation at the UN and other places. So we are hopeful that this sort of sustained attention, at least among the diplomats, means that it's not going to just go away like so many other crises, like Nicaragua.

Nobody speaks about Nicaragua, and that is a massive mess. At least people continue to speak about Haiti. It is terrible that it's the horror of what's happening that is putting it on the table, but at least that means that perhaps the world is not going to look away this time. But it is indispensable that the world also sends a very loud message to Henry that it is very important that he sits with the opposition.

He needs to create a situation that welcomes the troops in a way in which the troop contributors can feel more reassured. And perhaps this is something that can switch the dynamics internally.

Richard McColl: We need international help now. That's the reality, isn't it?

The conversation continues and amplifies and at the same time, things like the US thwarting the transportation of weapons to Haiti I can see these happening at the same time could be of help. And then perhaps something like, a food aid and so on really to help.

And medicine. Again, the basic needs to start with. But then the dialogue with Henry needs to be strong, fast and effective, I think. Let me take this moment to say thank you to both of you. Not immensely positive, but, you've given your views from a very academic and very well-informed background.

So I thank you for that, and I know our listeners will indeed be grateful for such insights. So thank you to Diego Da Rin, the Haiti expert for Crisis Group, and Renata Segura, the deputy director for Latin America at Crisis Group as well. It has been a fantastic episode illustrating some of the intense complexities in Haiti.

So thank you again, everyone, for listening to episode nine of the LatinNews Podcast. I've been your host, Richard McColl, and we'll be back in a fortnight talking further about the region. So don't go away.

Outro: You've been listening to the LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com

Ana Milagros Parra is a Venezuelan political scientist. She has worked both as a researcher and interviewer in human rights organizations, later specializing in political risk analysis. Ana Milagros obtained her degree in political science at Rafael Urdaneta University and has been head of political analysis in the strategic risk analysis department at IURISCORP, a corporate legal consulting firm. She has been quoted in media such as El Mundo, elDiario.es, El Pitazo, Runrunes, Caraota Digital, Newsy, and Diario de Cuba, among others.

On November 5, 2019 she headed the conference "International Sanctions: Assertive Recommendations to the Entrepreneur's Environment", held at Impact Hub Caracas, together with Rafael Álvarez Loscher. On January 24, 2020 she led the conference "2020: The year of evolution of business models in hostile scenarios" at the offices of IURISCORP, again with Loscher.

Intro: Welcome to The LatinNews Podcast, a fortnightly deep dive into key developments from across Latin America and the Caribbean. Here's your host from Bogotá, Colombia, journalist Richard McColl

Richard McColl: This is episode eight of The LatinNews Podcast. I'm Richard McColl, your host here in Bogotá, Colombia. My very special guest this week is Ana Milagros Parra.

She's a political scientist and consultant based in Caracas, Venezuela, and yes, we're going to be discussing the presidency of the regime of Nicolás Maduro, what's going on in Venezuela at the moment. Unfortunately, the news has slipped away from the front pages, but Venezuela is very much an item that needs to be discussed.

So welcome so much on The LatinNews Podcast, Ana Milagros.

Ana Milagros Parra: Thank you so much, Richard, for the invitation. I'm so excited to talk about my country.

Richard McColl: Yeah, it's an absolute pleasure because, we've got you there in Caracas, so you are on the ground. You are seeing and witnessing what's going on.

I think the place where we need to start, let's start looking ahead, and then we'll come backwards. And I want to start with saying 2024 there are presidential elections, and already the government in power, Nicolás Maduro as president, is looking at creating what is known as a mega election, something that's incredibly illegal, I believe.

Ana Milagros Parra: Yeah, that's not legal because we should wait until December 2024 to have the presidential elections. But we have to remind everyone that even though the government is creating this narrative of propaganda that Venezuela it's okay and Venezuela is not a dictatorship, we live under a dictatorship, and they manipulate all the laws in the country for the to their favor and the political agenda, no?

So they want to make the Presidential elections with the mayor election and the regional elections for them to make them easier They don't want to make election fair elections because they know they're going to lose, and then we have the primary election, the Las Primarias, that it's an election that is from the opposition.

There's not, the state is not involved in that. The opposition tried to involve the CNE. That is the, this power that, the electoral power. And, but they couldn't make it because the CNE is not giving them the freedom and to choose the candidates. So we have to know we live under a dictatorship that doesn't want to make free elections, and they don't want to allow a really strong opposition person or a candidate to go to the presidential elections.

We have María Corina Machado that's at the front runner. We can call her like that. And she is now unable to participate in any public thing because they put this sentence in the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia. So now it's illegal for her to go to an, an election, no? So they want to create an opposition that is comfortable for them and is not like a threat for them staying in power.

So that's, that in mind, knowing Venezuela is not a democracy, Venezuela is not fixed because we have this propaganda narrative that say, "Venezuela se arregló, Venezuela, it's okay." It's not like that. We still live in a country we don't have these public services. I don't have running water, no, I don't know, half of my week.

And we still have this emergencia humanitaria compleja mean people are dying. People are struggling to have, A fair wages for them to live and salaries. So Venezuela is the same that you read in the newspapers maybe two years ago, maybe three years ago when Juan Guaidó was popular.

And when you read this migration crisis and, most of the people here in the country are not here, and we are really used to it. Yeah, it's not It's now a reality. That you know that a friend, that your family is divided because they are outside of the country and you can't even see them.

So that's what the country, that the government did to us, and they still keep doing it even though we have the opposition, we have some things about international community. We have the International Criminal Court coming here and saying, "Yeah, this government violates, violates human rights," and all that stuff.

But we have this political scenario when they are trying to say and project to international community that, that we are okay and we are doing fair elections, and that's not true.

Richard McColl: Yeah. And I did see also that the CNE, the CNE, was replaced recently, and President Maduro's wife is now on the committee creating the, a new one.

This is this doesn't paint a favorable picture for anyone in any opposition at all.

Ana Milagros Parra: Yeah, it's like saying, "Okay, we are gonna create this power, the CNE, the Consejo Nacional Electoral, that regulates legally all the elections in theory." And we have before that the new CNE, we have it's, wasn't the best, but we have two opposition rectores, rectores inside that.

But it wasn't comfortable enough for them. They wanted a CNE that it was under their power, under their control. So the presidential elections don't become a threat for them in, in power, so they change it. They didn't ask the people, they didn't respect the laws, and they want to put a lot of Chavistas or Maduristas. I don't like to call them Chavistas who are not under Chavez anymore but people from the National Party and the Government Party inside the CNE to control everyone. So that's like the major red flag that we are not gonna have fair elections. And they did that because they the, la primaria, the opposition, they started to ask the CNE to assist them in their elections.

There were a lot of discussions inside the opposition whether or not to use the CNE because they have this side of the opposition saying, "Why are you going to ask our perpetrators or our the government to go and really being involved in an election that is only for the opposition?"

And the other one was saying, "Okay, but we are gonna have to use the CNE to the presidential elections, too." But at the end, the government did what they did to do best, that And they changed the power for their, they change it to keep going with their political agenda and not allow the opposition to have fair elections and to really make them difficult to choose a candidate.

And the most popular candidates are now illegal. It's illegal for them to go and go to a presidential elections. That's totally illegal. That's not legal, but they keep doing it. So we are not even we're, I'm still thinking if we're gonna have the primary elections, and I don't think the government's going to allow that.

And it's really, it's really hard for us being here trying to really organize and go and choose a candidate for to represent us in a presidential election that is it's not gonna be fair. And then the government is saying, "Okay, I'm gonna choose the candidate, and you're not gonna be able to do it.

So I'm gonna put it more difficult for you to choose it and to really create a strong opposition for me in the 2024."

Richard McColl: And a mega election, as we mentioned at the very beginning, would be the presidential election and then all state elections

Ana Milagros Parra: Yes

Richard McColl: at the same time

Ana Milagros Parra: with mayors and governors.

Richard McColl: And so they would be able to put all of their, I would say, their finances together and basically push all the Maduristass into power.

Ana Milagros Parra: Yeah. And at the same time they're doing it because it's going to be more difficult for the opposition to organize itself and really go to a big election because we have to be really focused on the fact that the government of Nicolás Maduro is. They implement this strategy to divide the opposition and to make them basically incompetent to really be opposition. We are, like I said, we are a dictatorship that make, violates human rights and we don't have freedom of speech. And everyone that is real opposition, because we have another opposition that is created by the government, but the real opposition, they are really scared because everything that they do can be repercussions, legal repercussions or even end up in jail.

Richard McColl: So that, that, I see that as very difficult indeed because, of course, if they don't give, legitimacy to the opposition and then they don't allow for the opposition to have a coherent platform and network that therefore they can completely stifle and smother them in 2024. So this is, this doesn't look good.

It doesn't look good at all. It's, we can't say very many positive things at all. I do need to it seems to me, it seems to me looking at this from here in Colombia that President Maduro feels, perhaps he feels less pressured right now to make Yeah any concessions to the opposition and to appease the international community since there, there's a bit of a, there's been a left swing in the region.

We've got Lula in Brazil, we've got Boric, who obviously spoke out against human rights abuses, which was, incredible. But Boric in Chile, got Petro here in Colombia. So Maduro's feeling comfortable. Sanctions are, have been lightly relaxed by the Biden Administration in the United States.

Is, has this given Maduro a real sense of security then? I don't know if it's security because when you are in a, in an authoritarian regime, the president he's always thinking about the threats in their inner in his inner cycle. But yeah, we put, like you said, the international community right now is not that hard on him, like it was before.

Ana Milagros Parra: Like it was Juan Guaidó. We have this right-wing presidents that they were really vocal against Nicolás Maduro, against his regime, and against the human rights abuses. Right now, we have this swing to the left, and a lot of presidents in the region are comfortable with the Maduro presence and the, and Maduro in the presidency, and they're trying to wash his face saying, "Okay, he's not a dictator.

He's just a bad president of Venezuela. It's not a dictatorship. It's just a bad democracy." That's something that Lula said, and even though, and even Petro came here and he stretched Maduro's hand he's forgetting that he's accused of crimes against humanity for the International Criminal Court, and that's not something we can forget.

And if you come here to Venezuela, you can see, okay, some businesses, maybe people are more in the street, but that doesn't mean that we have freedom or we have we're in a democratic country when we can say we have rights, so yeah, the international community's not that aggressive with Maduro, and he feels more comfortable in this dynamic, international dynamic because the opposition is not strong enough.

And we have another thing in the agenda that is the Russia and Ukraine war.

Richard McColl: Yeah.

Ana Milagros Parra: When that happened, Venezuela is not the most relevant topic because we have a war in that side, a war that is what started with that, with, for a Maduro ally. That is Russia. Putin and Maduro are, like, basically best friends or really good friends.

So yeah, we have another thing in the agenda. It is not Venezuela, but that doesn't mean we're not bad and we're not and Maduro is still, it's the worst, it's a worse dictatorship than it was before. Because he feels more in freedom that, or more comfortable doing what he does because he doesn't have the eyes of the world above him.

So that's really, it's dangerous for us and I worry a lot because I can, myself a Venezuelan, a consultant, a political analyst, that I'm always reading about the news, it's really hard to see in a couple years. That all the international community, most in the region, basically forgot about Venezuelans and about or they want to forget that Venezuela is not a democracy and is really a threat to all the region.

A, a security threat, it's a threat for all the political systems around the region because you have a dictatorship that is being comfortable with all the governments and, or most of the presidents in the region. I mean if I were a Colombian, I will be really worried that he's totally okay with being okay with Maduro.

You have to see, and that's something that's happening because Petro is being, like He's not that comfortable being around Maduro anymore. Basically with this inhabitación, I don't know how to say that in, in English. When you stop a candidate for running for public,

Richard McColl: Office

Ana Milagros Parra: For yeah, for public office. And Petro put some tweet saying, "Okay, no one should be target of that," and, but it's not frontal. It's not something, "I'm going against Maduro." It's just really passive with that, but I can see Petro being really friendly with Maduro, and he's not that close to him because it's costing him some popularity in Colombia.

Yes. But just because of that. It's not like he's not vibing with Maduro. He's not his friend. It's just because he's having these political costs inside his his country.

Richard McColl: And then of course he can, let's not go too much into this, but of course then he can point to those tweets and say, "But listen, I've I've reprimanded," as you say, passively President Maduro for this.

You mentioned Juan Guaidó, the interim president or the interim government. This is something of the past now. What, what is going on with Juan Guaidó right now?

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Ana Milagros Parra: Yeah, we don't talk about him. He was, like, this is stage or this pass in the opposition where we had all our hopes in him because we really could see the strong strategy and this coalition international community and the opposition to really overthrow the government.

But I don't think the strategy was effective enough. We can see we still have Maduro in power. But it was a really good couple of years when the government of Nicolás Maduro really felt the pressure of the international community and of the people here in Venezuela, and he realized he can't have free and fair elections because he was going to lose.

And then Guaidó loses his momentum. If you are an interim president and you have the legal the legitimacy and all that stuff, but Maduro have the real power. I mean, he had this capacity of doing things inside the country. And then the pandemic hit, and it was a blessing for all dictatorships in the world.

It was a blessing for Maduro because he used the pandemic as an excuse to really control all the people and control the country. And we forgot about Guaidó because he didn't have real power. You have the strategy. You have this support for President Trump at that time. We have this maximum pressure strategy with the sanctions. And it was a moment when we had our hopes in that strategy, but now we can say it wasn't like a really good strategy.

It wasn't a good one because we still have Maduro in power. But Guaidó, we don't talk about him anymore. A lot of people are disappointed of Guaidó, the party, of the opposition in general because they didn't do what they promised people they will achieve, but I'm not mad with Guaidó.

I understand that all the pressure and the things that he promised to do were impossible in that time. Yeah. So it was good for him to do what he did, but we are in another phase of the political conflict. The interim government is dissolved. The Asamblea Nacional, the National Assembly of 2015 was the one that gave the legal legitimacy to Juan Guaidó to be interim president, is extend.

It still existing, but we don't talk about it because they're not a relevant actor in the political system right now, in the political game. We are in another thing. The opposition with «La Primaria», the, this election to choose a candidate. It's more than a candidate because we're not talking just about election.

We're talking about a representative inside the opposition that can create a strategy and apply the strategy to maybe guide us to a transition to democracy. Yeah. But we are in a really tough process because we're just alienating the different actors and seeing what is going on because the government is changing too inside them.

It's changing. A couple months ago, there was this corruption scandal in PDVSA, the oil company, when Tarek El Aissami was the oil minister. He was something, someone really close to Maduro. He really close to the inner circle of power. We haven't heard from him since the corruption scandal, and we know there's been this purge inside the government taking people that is in corruption schemes and going and putting them in jail.

Simulating that they are against corruption, something that we don't believe. Something happened inside the government. They are organizing themselves in different things, and that's why they changed the CNE. They change different people from different ministers. So we are in a different place, in a different phase of the political agenda.

So it's not hard for, it's not easy for the opposition. And I think the government feels more safe that no one is going to say anything. Because there is another thing. Venezuela is a problem for the democracies around the world because they were so vocal against Maduro a couple years ago. And a lot of them are waiting for 2024 elections to say, "Okay, Maduro won an election.

I can forget about Venezuela now." Okay, he won an election. I can forget about Venezuela now and now that's their problem. And I think it's not fair, but I know that, any country, no country in the world has the, this, they don't have to democracize another country.

They don't want to. They don't have to give democracy to another country. We have to do it ourself, but with their help. And with an opposition that it's really undermined, an opposition that is scared, opposition that is really divided. It's hard, but I don't think it's impossible.

Richard McColl: Yes that, yeah, as you say, that glimmer of hope, you don't think it's impossible.

There was that hope under Juan Guaidó, but again, the regime has stacked everything against an opposition. It's all in the regime's favor towards this dictatorship. And it seems to me like these, this purge in the government or within, the halls of power it could be a reshuffling to concentrate power and strength, authority, but also to be able to say the right things to the population.

"Look at this. We are against corruption. Look at us." But of course, the whole, top to bottom to top is corrupt, and we know this. And that moves me quite nicely is that, the, President Maduro came out the other day and he makes statements obviously it's, very populist and so on.

He made a statement the other day against illegal mining and in favor of the environment and he said we need to get rid of this right now. We need to destroy it all." But it seems to me that this has been going on for as long as we can remember. We know from reports in the region that much of the illegal mining taking place is controlled or supported by illegal Colombian groups such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, the National Liberation Army.

That's the longest running guerrilla group from Colombia now. And it just seems to me that this is, this has more to do with Gustavo Petro in Colombia than Maduro himself. What can you tell us about this whole swathe of illegal mining and also Maduro speaking out against it, 10 days ago or so?

Ana Milagros Parra: Yeah. That is the open secret you mentioned here in Venezuela, that we know about it but we don't talk about it because it's a really dangerous topic to us for address because it's like A really bad thing they're, they are doing, there are a lot of things involved in the arco minero, in the illegal mining, and we have human trafficking.

We have narcotrafficking. We have a lot of things going on here, illegal things, and we don't talk about that enough because it's really dangerous. you don't hear that in radios. We don't have free speech. We don't have radios that we can talk about those things, but even in the internet, it's something we, you we address it in a really secure way because it could be something dangerous for us to talk about.

So you talk about the arco minero, and we talk illegal mining. That's something really normal that's happening in Amazonas and all the regions the border with Colombia. I don't think it has more to do with Petro than with Maduro because this thing happened before Petro, and they were happening before Petro, but why?

Because the National Liberation Army, that's what I say in English, ELN, it's using Venezuela for a refuge for them, and with the welcome of the government. They are okay with them being here, and they even have this agreement with the armed forces in Venezuela to do the narcotrafficking, human trafficking, and the illegal mining for them to have money, and that's something that the government allows to do.

Because when you have a authoritarian regime, what they have to do is give these incentives, economic incentives and power incentives for them to keep them in power and to support the government. The National Liberation Army, the guerrillas have been here in Venezuela since the '80s, but in that time, the governments of that time, they weren't okay with that. They were really hostile against them, and they even allowed the Colombian Armed Forces to follow these guerrillas and to really take care of them. When Hugo Chávez came to power, they have this ideological companionship or ideological things that make them to agree with Chávez, and Chávez were okay with them, and they just welcome the guerrillas in our territory, but something happened between Chávez and Maduro is that Venezuela was evolving in a criminal state. And that's something we have to talk about it because we have an autocracy in a way, a dictatorship.

We are talking just about politics, and when, but when you talk about the state capacity and how we can address the state is a criminal state. Why is a criminal state? Because we have government people that is in public office being in this time a symbiotic relationship with armed groups and illegal groups inside the country, and allowing them to control parts of the country and the territory.

If you go to El Zulia, that it's in the Catatumbo, it's really in the border of Colombia. That's where I'm from. I'm from Maracaibo, from Zulia, so I know about that. And you have these territories that are totally controlled for, are totally controlled the where, for the National Liberation Army.

People look for this armed group for protection and for food and security because the state is not present. So you have to think about this Venezuelan state as a state that the government is not fully control of the territory because they give the territory control to armed groups. So certain these couple years, the recent years, something have, is happening because certain faction have become like the target of continuous offensive by Venezuelan security forces. So we have these shootings, assassinations, landmines, kidnappings, disappearance. A lot of things are happening to Venezuelan people, and the armed forces are behind that because they are struggling with the guerrillas. But if we talk in general, the guerrillas are living rent-free here in Venezuela doing their illegal things, basically drug trafficking.

That's the most important thing. They control the production of cocaine. They have this territory, a big territory where they product the cocaine and they how can I say "la transportan"?

Richard McColl: They transport it.

Ana Milagros Parra: They transport it in this in all over the country and to Mexico and all that stuff. So we're basically living a criminal state with we can say a narco state, too, because they're welcome by the security forces, and Maduro knows that's happening. Maduro knows that a lot of the territory in Apure and maybe Táchira, eh, Amazonas, Bolívar and El Zulia, that's all the border of Venezuela that is in the Amazonas and with Colombia and Brazil. The control of that territory is with the ELN, no?

For decades, Colombia rebels have taken advantage of the, that border of Venezuela and Colombia. It does not, it's not new that the guerrillas are here in Venezuela. It's not something new. But now it's worse, and it's a threat to the security of the region because Maduro is totally okay with it.

He's totally okay with the guerrilla being here. They're welcome here. They're protected by the government, and they even have this relationship where they both work together. Even though something that I really want to talk about is that we can even talk about Colombian guerrillas because now the guerrilla is formed with Venezuelans and Colombians.

Now it's a big partisan of by, you have two nationalities because they have been recruiting people from Venezuela from, I don't know, 12 years old, 15 years old, really young boys to be in the guerrillas because the state doesn't, the state's not following what they're supposed to do, protect its people, and just the control is in the guerrillas.

And that's really, it's really dangerous for us and really dangerous for the region because we have this state that is not democratic, and they welcome and they're totally okay with illegal things happening in the country.

Richard McColl: Yeah, this is one of the big debates we have here is how, you create a ceasefire with the ELN or the National Liberation Army within Colombia.

But it's, as you say, it's now a multinational organization. It spreads all the way across Venezuela and of course it's expanded its numbers with Venezuelan youth and so on. And I think you touch on that, that issue about, the state not looking out for itself, and you also mentioned, these groups involved in human trafficking.

And I think this is a good moment to talk about the mass migrant exodus from Venezuela. I was up in the Darién a year ago, and a lot of the people I saw were Venezuelan, and we'd obviously talk about the Darién Gap, and there's been a lot of imagery. But this has been going on now for a while.

I'd like to ask you there in Caracas, what do you see on the ground in the city as the impact of losing so many millions of countrymen?

Ana Milagros Parra: Yeah the mass exodus here in Venezuela is bigger than Ukrainian people. It's the only country that has, that had so many people leave the country that it's not in war.

We are in, so many people have left the country running from the human rights abuses, running from the low quality of life, and we're not in war. And people like the Syrians the Ukrainians, and all the people that have this mass exodus, that four million, five million people, they are in war, and we are not in war.

And you can see this comparative thing. But yeah, something that, that it feels here in Venezuela is that we got used to it because the first wave of migration was maybe in 2014 and then in 2017, and it was really hard because you can see, you saw how your friends, your family, your coworkers, they were just leaving the country, and you have to get used to have a party when you just have to say bye to him, to them, and to live in a house when you don't have your mother because, your mother went to Colombia to work, or they were running from the country on feet.

There were people that were walking to another countries because they don't have the passport, because that's another thing. We don't have this right to identification or right to, for have our passport or, and our identification. It's not happening really well here in Venezuela. It's really hard to have a passport, but that's another thing.

When you're here in Venezuela right now, 2023, it's all reality. It is something that's always happening, a friend that is leaving the country. But that's talking about this middle class that maybe is not that strong here in Venezuela. But when you see the low classes or the people are really suffering the humanitarian crisis Those people are always thinking about running and escaping the country.

We can talk, we can say that this major maximum exodus is going to stop anytime soon because the conditions inside the country are the same or even worse than before. Maybe you can see it, maybe the propaganda or the media is not reporting it. But where we start researching about Venezuela, you see they were in the same spot if we talk about human rights, human right abuses, we talk about quality of life and all that stuff.

It's really hard living in This time Venezuela is more, is much more expensive than another country in Latin America. I visited Colombia in March, and I was really upset because I couldn't believe how cheaper it is if you compare to Venezuela. and compare to Caracas.

Caracas is really expensive. It's all really expensive, so it's really hard for people to live here. And that's, coming back from where your question, it's our reality. But a couple of weeks ago, I did this episode in my podcast called Amelia's Podcast, where we talk about Venezuela in Spanish, but with a not, it's not like just reporting it.

We talk with people and we try to make it more, more fun to watch, because a lot of people most Venezuelans, they're not interested in politics. They're tired of it, and they're just focusing on surviving. So that's what, our objective. But we talk about the migration crisis and the Darién Gap.

And the last numbers we have of Darién Gap They have increased the number of Venezuelan the Venezuelans go using it to escape yeah. So the first thing when we hear of the Darién Gap was, I don't know, maybe a year ago, when everyone was really focused on what's happening because it was really I mean it's not something you want to talk about because it's really crude and dangerous.

And then when we check the numbers again a year later, it was a lot of more people crossing the Darién Gap, and a lot of them were Venezuelans. And we don't even know how much, how many of them were crossing the Darién Gap because we don't have these official numbers of people going and crossing it.

We have Colombia authorities and we have eh, Panamanian authorities, but we don't know how many people are really crossing it, or people that are dying and crossing it, children violent violent groups that assault people that are crossing it.

But yeah, it's a reality. People leaving the country is a reality. We are sadly really just settled down to have and to have your family divided and knowing that you're not gonna see maybe your siblings, your family for many years because most of them are not able to leave the country they went to.

United States, most of them are there, and they can live in the United States, and we can enter the United States because it's really hard for us to have a visa or something like that. So that's the worst migration crisis in Venezuela that's still happening. Something that I want to really say is that's something that is affecting other countries in the region.

And I think those presidents and those governments can't ignore it because there are a lot of Venezuelan going to their country, and they are going to keep going to their countries, and they are going to keep leaving Venezuela because the only thing that's gonna stop is with a change of government and having a democratic government in power.

With Maduro over something, over someone inside the partido, the official party, it's gonna perpetuate all the circumstances and all the situation that we are living here in Venezuela.

Richard McColl: It will be a continuation of this, let's say, 21st century socialism brain drain that has taken place in, in Venezuela.

Ana Milagros, it has been a fascinating discussion what is obviously a terrible situation that is being experienced in Venezuela right now and of course we're talking to you there in Caracas. You're seeing it with your own eyes. You have your podcast in Spanish, A Medias. Obviously people can subscribe everywhere, as they can to this one, The LatinNews Podcast.

But we ask you, please keep reporting, but please stay safe. The, it's a dictatorship. It's authoritarian. You need to be very careful about what you say, and therefore we are immensely grateful that you are sharing this information with us here on The LatinNews Podcast. So thank you again, Ana Milagros Parra, political scientist and consultant based in Caracas.

Ana Milagros Parra: Thank you so much, Richard. I really love this space because usually I can talk about these things in Spanish because, censorship, but I want to thank you for this space, for this opportunity to talk about my country. So anytime you need something, I'm here.

Richard McColl: Thank you again. So we've been speaking to Ana Milagros Parra, political scientist and consultant, host of the A Medias podcast in Caracas, Venezuela.

This has been episode eight of The LatinNews Podcast. I've been your host, Richard McColl. Thank you so much for listening. Bye-bye.

Outro: You've been listening to The LatinNews Podcast. For more news and analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean, visit www.latinnews.com