All Categories

BRAZIL | Industrial production up. Industrial production was up 2.8% in 2006 year-on-year. The result, however, was the lowest since 2003. In 2005 Brazil's industry expanded by 3.1% and in 2004 by 8.3% year-on-year. According to the official statistics agency, the Ibge, the main factor for last year's less than impressive result has been the strengthening of the Real against the US dollar, which led to Brazilian industrial goods losing competitiveness while at the same time increasing demand for imported goods. Industrial sales rose 1.72% in 2006 year-on-year. 

CHILE | Trade surplus. The trade surplus in January was US$2.79bn, almost tripling the surplus registered in the same month in 2006. Exports amounted to US$5.73bn; imports, US$2.94bn. The trade surplus in 2006 was a record US$23.02bn, with exports, driven by high copper prices, reaching US$58.99bn.

HAITI | Préval in Washington. Immigration and investment were the watchwords during President René Préval's three-day visit to the US last week, during which he met President George W. Bush and the Democrat Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. Préval pushed for the temporary protected status (TPS) designations granted to victims of natural disasters from El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua living and working in the US to be extended to Haitian immigrants. His visit came days after a small boat packed with some 160 Haitians trying to make it to the US capsized just off the coast of the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) on 2 May, claiming at least 61 lives. Some survivors claim that the boat was deliberately rammed by a TCI Patrol boat although the rough seas could explain any collision. Bush conveyed to Préval that, unlike Venezuela, the US would honour its financial commitments to Haiti - a mild rebuke for Préval's recent attendance at the Alba summit in Venezuela. Préval also appealed for better incentives in the HOPE Act, established in December 2006, which provides certain Haitian textiles and other goods with duty free status to help spur investment and create jobs in Haiti. 

NICARAGUA | IMF deal distant. After ten days of negotiations an IMF mission left Managua on 11 May without striking a deal with the government on a new three-year credit agreement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The IMF mission released a statement on 11 May on the need to strengthen anti-poverty policies as well as preserving a solid macroeconomic performance. President Daniel Ortega said that he would not permit the IMF to impose conditions controlling social spending on energy, water, education, and health. He said he was committed to increasing the salaries of teachers, health workers and soldiers. He said that the funds for this would be found through tax reform, notably the banking sector which he said paid no tax.

Venezuela's Hugo Chávez will mediate between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) to try and effect a humanitarian exchange. Chávez 's involvement has the blessing of Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe, who appointed Senator Piedad Córdoba, a vocal critic of Uribe and self-professed Chavista, as a "facilitator" for the exchange. Both Chávez and Uribe are taking a calculated political risk but the potential rewards are great. 

Chávez received 14 relatives of the 45 political prisoners being held by the Farc in a televised meeting in the Miraflores Palace in Caracas on 20 August.

"Starting today we will begin to work to try to make contact with the Farc high command ... so that we can start hearing positions. I have very, very much faith we will achieve that point of agreement," Chávez said before making a personal appeal to the leader of the Farc, Manuel Marulanda. "Marulanda, this is Chávez speaking to you from the Miraflores palace, wherever you are. I am waiting for a signal from you." 

Among the relatives to make the trip were the mother of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who last week reached 2,000 days in captivity and Gustavo Moncayo, the father of the longest-held Farc prisoner, who recently received massive press coverage for walking 900km to Bogotá to push for a prisoner swap. Chávez embraced and kissed each of them before speaking to them individually for some time. Chávez , who will meet Uribe in Colombia on 31 August to discuss exactly what role he might be able to play, also offered to provide Venezuelan territory for the exchange to take place.

The new "facilitator"
The designation of Senator Córdoba, a dissident member of the opposition Partido Liberal, as a "facilitator" shows the extent to which Uribe is prepared to go to secure an exchange. Córdoba is an inveterate opponent. A former hostage of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in 1999, she has traded sharp words with Uribe before, on more than one occasion branding him a narco-paramilitary. Uribe, in turn, has accused her of harbouring sympathies with the guerrillas.

Earlier this month Córdoba appeared on Chávez 's weekly broadcast, Aló Presidente, when she appealed to the Venezuelan president to intercede with Uribe over the humanitarian exchange [WR-07-31]. Chávez gave a cautious response at the time, saying that he would be willing to help if the Colombian government requested his assistance. Uribe clearly weighed up the import of Córdoba's appearance on Aló Presidente and took her by surprise during a scheduled meeting in the Casa de Nariño on 15 August.

Córdoba went to the meeting to discuss her proposals for a resolution of the hostage crisis. During the Cumbre Social por la Unión Latinoamericana y Caribeña in Caracas, sponsored by Chávez , she had raised three basic points: a meeting between Uribe and Chávez ; a gathering of all the Latin American heads of state to urge the Colombian government and the Farc to reach a settlement; and a plebiscite, to be held at the same time as regional elections in October, for the Colombian people to decide on a definitive solution.

Córdoba left her meeting with Uribe as the new "facilitator" and flew to Venezuela the very same day to see Chávez . She recognised her new role would be fraught with difficulties; "very risky, obviously dangerous, for the expectations and the hopes exceeding what can be delivered". Several politicians with more clout than her, such as former presidents Ernesto Samper and Alfonso López Michelsen among others, have filled the role before, but then none of them have enjoyed the open support of Chávez . 

Farc admiration for Chávez
The Farc has made no secret of its respect for Chávez . When Fernando Araújo (now the foreign minister) escaped from a Farc camp in December 2006 he reported that the Farc lapped up Chávez 's speeches, listened attentively to Aló Presidente, and would hold detailed debates on his policy-making. It is a moot point whether this respect will stretch to the Farc renouncing its demand for the two contiguous municipalities of Florida and Pradera to be turned into a demilitarised zone for the humanitarian exchange to take place.

Chávez is upbeat. He said that he had received a letter from Marulanda when former president Andrés Pastrana was in power in Colombia, asking him to visit the demilitarised zone in San Vicente del Caguán, but Pastrana vetoed any such visit. He said that, with Uribe's support, he would go to any lengths to speak to the Farc now. He pre-empted criticism from the opposition, however, saying that he knew he would be accused of "immediately rushing to call Marulanda to demonstrate support for the Farc's cause".

The Farc has been a thorny issue for the Uribe and Chávez administrations in recent years. Colombia has accused Venezuela of doing little to allow the Farc from crossing into its territory; Chávez announced a freeze on all cooperation with Colombia and the withdrawal of his country's ambassador from Bogotá in December 2004 after the Farc's so-called "foreign minister" Rodrigo Granda was "kidnapped" on Venezuelan soil and spirited back to Colombia.

Uribe's clever strategy
By turning to Córdoba and Chávez , Uribe is demonstrating to the international community that he is doing everything he can to secure a humanitarian exchange, short of granting the Farc the one thing it is demanding. The Farc's failure to offer any alternative, therefore, makes the group appear intransigent. Uribe's latest offer comes shortly after the improvised decision to release hundreds of Farc prisoners, including Granda, in the hope of securing a reciprocal gesture from the Farc. This earned Uribe fulsome praise from the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, and rhetorical support from the G8. It elicited nothing but criticism from the Farc. 

From Chávez 's perspective, if he is successful in paving the way for the release of the prisoners, among whom are three US citizens, it would be a diplomatic coup and lauded as a major achievement in Latin America. He could also dress it up as fulfilling the core objective of his Bolivarian Revolution: to unite the continent. Chávez has a predilection for the role of international statesman. He knows that the humanitarian exchange is viewed as an important step towards an eventual peace process between the Colombian government and the Farc - one of the great insoluble disputes in global politics today (see sidebar). 

US reaction
Despite the ideological differences between Uribe and Chávez there is plenty of mutual respect. It is not quite clear what the US (with Democrat congressmen poised to decide whether to approve an FTA between the US and Colombia) will make of Chávez 's involvement in the humanitarian exchange. What seems certain is that with Democrat congressmen seeking more objective relations with Colombia and President George W. Bush on the way out, Uribe will feel less compunction over failing to act the role of counterweight to Venezuela. 

• Chávez in his element
  Mediating between the Colombian government and the Farc guerrillas provides Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez with the perfect stage. Unlike his unsubtle intervention in the dispute between Chile and Bolivia, several years ago, over Bolivia's right to a slice of Pacific coastline - when Chávez professed a desire to sunbathe on a Bolivian beach - his involvement is wanted now.

In what the local daily, La Prensa, described as President Daniel Ortega's biggest political defeat of the year, congress voted against the citizen power councils (CPCs) on 20 November. As well as the defeat in itself, the result also suggests that the alliance between the liberals is finally gaining ground and a possible weakening of the pact between the ruling Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and the opposition party, the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) - or more specifically between Ortega and former president Arnoldo Alemán, the unofficial leader of the PLC.

After over three hours of discussions, 52 deputies, from the PLC, Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) and Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS), voted against a veto issued by Ortega on 24 September of a congressional vote to sever any link between the CPCs and the executive.

Ortega had maintained that, as an extension of the executive, the CPCs would simply encourage popular participation and co-ordinate the work of NGOs and public institutions in each of the country's 15 departments. However, the opposition warned that they could be exploited by the FSLN to consolidate its power.

The CPCs are due to be established on 30 November. The latest congressional vote effectively means that they will constitute nothing more than part of the FSLN party structure and will neither receive state funding nor exercise any influence over ministries or other government institutions as Ortega had hoped.

Ortega announced that he would be presenting an appeal of unconstitutionality before the supreme court on the basis that the vote violated the constitutional right of citizens "to organise". However, analyst Alejandro Serrano Caldera told La Prensa that the appeal was questionable given that the congressional vote does not prohibit participation in the CPCs but simply breaks the link with the executive. Meanwhile, the likely response of the supreme court is by no means clear, given that it was one of the public institutions politicised under the FSLN-PLC pact in which posts were divvied up between both parties. It currently comprises eight FSLN magistrates and eight PLC magistrates.

An end to the pact?

As well as a rejection of the CPCs, the result also suggests that the PLC-FSLN pact could be foundering especially in light of the recent approval by congress of the penal code on 13 November. The code - which takes effect next March - had also been crucial to the pact as it means that Alemán could be free by the end of 2008. The code stipulates a maximum 10-year sentence for money laundering (the charge against Alemán for which he began serving a 20-year sentence in 2002). Under the new law, prisoners can appeal to be released for good behaviour after serving half of the sentence.

Alemán currently enjoys provisional freedom. His case for "good behaviour" will be decided ultimately by the politicised supreme court, leaving him once again in the hands of Ortega. Given that many expected him to pressure PLC deputies into supporting Ortega's position and backing the presidential veto, the fact that the PLC bench voted against Ortega could suggest that Alemán is losing his grip on the party.

ECUADOR-CHILE | Strengthening ties. Ecuador's President Rafael Correa was the guest of honour at a party celebrating the second anniversary of Chilean President Michelle Bachelet's inauguration. Correa launched a charm offensive. He thanked Bachelet for her unconditional support for Ecuador's cause in the wake of the March 1Colombian air raid on its soil. Asked by the Chilean press if his fierce criticism of Colombia was indicative of a move to emulate Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez , Correa said he did not know about being a Chavista but was "absolutely sure about being a Bacheletista". He also wished Chile the best of luck in its case against Peru over maritime boundaries at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. This played well to the Chileans and must have riled Peru (although it claimed to be pleased with Correa's neutrality), particularly after President Alan Garcí­a stuck his neck out by supporting Correa in Ecuador's dispute with Colombia, a firm ally of Peru's. Ecuador is also a signatory to the two treaties from the 1950s which Peru contends did not define maritime boundaries but rather fishing rights.

Correa signed a strategic and political association agreement with Bachelet and an economic complementation agreement which supersedes one signed in 1995. The association agreement covers a wide range of issues including cooperation on defence, justice, energy, social protection, and anti-poverty initiatives. Correa said it would provide "powerful instruments" to develop both countries. Bachelet hailed an accord between Chile's state-run oil company Enap and its Ecuadorean counterpart PetroEcuador to conduct gas exploration in the Gulf of Guayaquil. This is especially important for Chile given its perennial energy supply problems.

The kidnapping and murder of Karina Reyes Luna, a niece of Hipólito Reyes, the archbishop of Xalapa, shocked middle-class Mexicans. Academics who research the changing trends in violent crime in Mexico suggest that the increase in kidnapping is a by-product of the government's offensive against organised crime. Some academics claim that as drug-related crime has become more dangerous for gangsters, violent gangsters have switched to kidnapping.

The public horror at what happened to Karina, 23, may tempt the government to change its strategy. The government has made its offensive against drug gangs the centrepiece of its policies. The middle classes, however, are probably more worried about kidnapping than they are about drug crime, whose victims tend to be other gangsters or policemen.

The very rich in Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America, can afford bodyguards and armour-plated cars which deter kidnappers. Middle-class Mexicans, however, have become a profitable source of victims for the gangs. To some extent, the gangs are making up in volume for what they have lost in ransom values.

President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, who launched the anti-drug gang offensives when he took office in December 2006, is already fretting about the mid-term elections in July 2009. His anti-gang polices have yet to deliver tangible results: indeed the death toll this year is on course to hit 3,500, up from 2,700 last year. The huge media coverage of what happened to Karina, and the academics' arguments may tempt the government to switch resources from the fight against drug gangs to combating kidnappers.

Karina was snatched on 12 June. Her family did what the kidnappers wanted and did not tell the police that she had been kidnapped. The family also delivered US$500,000 in ransom, even though the kidnappers had demanded US$1m. On 15 June her body was found in a plastic bag, just after her uncle had prayed publicly for his niece at High Mass.  

No-one knows how many people have been kidnapped and ransomed in Mexico, but almost everyone in Mexico knows a family where someone has been kidnapped. Mexican gangsters were the first to come up with the idea of the secuestro expreso. In this crime, an adult is picked up by a gang and driven around a city from cash machine to cash machine. At each cash machine the victim makes a withdrawal and hands over the cash to the gang. Most victims feel far too vulnerable to provide the police with descriptions upon release.

Several organisations, such as Consejo para la Ley y los Derechos Humanos, claim that Mexico has now overtaken Colombia as Latin America's kidnap capital. According to the organisation there were more than 1,000 “high profile" kidnappings in Mexico in 2007. High profile means kidnappings where the ransom demand was over US$100,000.

Kidnappers have become much more brutal in recent years. Most victims are now tortured, and women raped, almost as a matter of course. Gangsters appear to believe that violence, or the threat of violence, especially against children, encourages victims' families to cough up.

The Consejo para la Ley y los Derechos Humanos argues that the surge in kidnapping is a result of the government's enhanced efforts to combat organised crime. It is also worth noting that there is a considerable overlap between drug gangsters and kidnapping gangsters. On 14 June a joint police and army operation led to the arrest of Rosario Flores Rojas, a former police chief in the city of Ensenada in Baja California. He is accused of heading the Comando Negro, which provided “security" (killing) for drug gangsters and also dabbled in kidnapping.

The frequent involvement of senior policemen in organised crime has long been a feature of Mexican life. This is one reason why Mexican politicians were so sensitive about the US Congress's decision to insert conditions into the Iniciativa Mérida package of military aid for combating drug gangs. One condition for the aid was for Mexico to prove that it was purging the police of corrupt officers.

The problem of corruption has spread beyond the police. On 18 June four ex-special forces soldiers were arrested in the western state of Jalisco after they threw a couple of grenades into a parking lot at a police station, killing one policeman. Jalisco has been comparatively free of gang crime and the reasons for the attack are far from clear. Fernando Guzmán Pérez, the head of the state of Jalisco's security ministry said that the four soldiers were all former members of the elite Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (Gafes). They now, apparently, worked for the Los Zetas, the killers used by the Golfo gang.

• Death toll

The death toll for 2008, as plotted by a leading Mexico City newspaper, El Universal hit 1,701 on 17 June.  

On 22 September the security minister, Genaro Garcí­a Luna, said that the government would never make a deal with the drug gangs. Garcí­a Luna and the Procurador General, Eduardo Medina Mora, were testifying to senators. Several senators were deeply critical of the government's failure to curb killings by gangs. The gangs have killed 3,250 people so far this year, up from 2,700 killed in the whole of 2007. Medina Mora denied that the government had a choice between a truce or violence: he said that the violence was a fact.

The main opposition party in the senate, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), is clearly trying to make political capital out of the government's failure to combat organised crime. All but one of its 33 senators walked out of the senate when the two ministers arrived to testify. The PRI senators said that they were not happy with the question and answer format for the session.

The PRI feels that it can criticise the government because of the shocking terrorist attack at the “grito" in Morelia, Michoacán on 15 September. Eight people were killed when two grenades were thrown just as the governor of Michoacán began to ring the bell to start the Independence Day celebrations.

On 24 September the authorities finally made some meaningful arrests in Michoacán. The federal Procuradurí­a General de la República (PGR) and the Secretarí­a de la Defensa Nacional (Sedena) said that they had arrested four people with heavy weapons. The four people arrested (Héctor Muñoz Sánchez, alí­as "El Cejas"; Francisco Torres Romero, alí­as "El Flaco"; Dionisio Mena Deciano, alí­as "El Mudo"; y Marí­a Guadalupe Rauda Gaona, alí­as "La Chaparra") apparently opened fire on troops and PGR agents after the authorities were tipped off about the presence of suspicious people in the town of Pátzcuaro. Separately, the state authorities said that they had seized a bunch of explosives at Ario de Rosales.

The government and the media assume that the grenades were thrown by gangsters from La Familia which is active in Michoacán. Michoacán is a symbolically important state. Not only is it President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa's home state, but it is also one of only a few run by the leftwing Partido de la Revolución Democrática. The army has been deployed in Michoacán against drug gangs since President Calderón took office on 1 December 2006.

On 23 September, the country's most active guerrilla group, the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), denied that it was involved in the grenade attack at the “grito" in Morelia. Almost nobody in Mexico believed that the EPR was involved. The EPR has been careful in its terrorist attacks to avoid injuring people: its most successful attacks were on oil and gas pipelines in August 2007. The EPR claimed that the grenade attack was the work of rightwing agents provocateurs who wanted to justify the use of the army against drug gangs in Michoacán.

• Penal code
  The penal codes in 14 Mexican states allow a husband who kills his wife because he thought that she was unfaithful to claim extenuating circumstances. Three other states (Michoacán; Campeche and Tamaulipas) allow wife killers to receive less prison time than cattle rustlers. These examples come from the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres which wants to point out how obsolete a lot of the Mexican penal code is.
  

President Tony Saca accused the left-wing opposition Frente Farabundo Martí­ para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) last week of forging links with the mara gangs and other armed groups. He said his government would send an inter-ministerial report on the issue to the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN. The content of the report is less important than the timing of its presentation. It is designed to have maximum impact on the legislative elections on 18 January and presidential elections on 15 March, both of which the FMLN is favourite to win.

The report, which was drawn up by the foreign, defence and security ministries, has not been published, but the government supplied some details to the press, such as the alleged existence of 40 illegal armed groups in El Salvador. It claims that these groups train in five distinct geographical localities, coinciding with areas controlled by the FMLN during the civil war.

“I have no doubt at all that there are mara gang members in the FMLN; this party has had mara members for a long time," Saca told the press last week. When asked if the contents of the report contained proof of these links, Saca said the photographs given to the press by the government were more than convincing.

One of these photographs depicts a group of masked youths wielding AK47s in front of a table behind which FMLN officials are sitting. Many residents in the community where the photo was taken, on 16 December 2007, are former FMLN guerrillas. The right-wing daily El Diario de Hoy ran banner headlines three days in succession denouncing the FMLN's links to armed groups. However, when a reporter from the Associated Press travelled to the area he was assured that the youths were holding toy guns and were taking part in a “cultural event" held annually for the past 15 years in commemoration of the fallen Comandante, Dimas Rodrí­guez, after whom the community, north of San Salvador, is named.

Saca said the government would not ask the OAS or the UN to do anything in response to the report but that as president of a democratic country he felt obliged to send it. The head of the European Union's mission of electoral observers to El Salvador, Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, was less than impressed. He said the report had a “clear electoral slant". The international human rights federation (FIDH), based in France, denounced the report as “electoral skulduggery" and urged the investigation and punishment of all those in authority responsible for pulling together this type of “frame-up".

In the days before Saca's allegations, the head of the Policí­a Nacional Civil (PNC), José Luis Tobar, and the attorney general, Félix Safie, accused the FMLN of links to the maras: Tobar, indirectly; Safie, directly. Safie said that six FMLN activists arrested on 3 January for injuring two police officers, who were attempting to break up a tussle with supporters of the ruling right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena), had admitted to being mara gang members.

The presidential candidate for the FMLN, Mauricio Funes, has largely stayed out of the fracas. He confined himself to saying the party did not have full control over everyone campaigning in its name, but he accused Tobar of irresponsibility for making unsubstantiated allegations. Other members of the FMLN were more forthright, accusing Arena of scaremongering and mudslinging.

MEXICO | A horror story. The central bank cut interest rates on 17 April by 0.75 basis points to 6%. The Banco de México's move came after some grim industrial production figures. The central bank also forecast that the economy would contract by more than it had previously forecast in 2009, though the bank refused to put a figure on the size of the contraction. It did claim that the economy would grow by 2% in 2010.
On 22 April the IMF published its World Economic Outlook which forecast that the economy would contract by 3.7% in 2009. Only The Bahamas, with a 4.5% contraction, is forecast by the IMF to do worse in the Western Hemisphere. The IMF forecasts the US will contract by 2.8% in 2009.
The consensus amongst independent analysts polled by the Banco de México is for the economy to contract by 3.3% this year. Some long term Mexico-watchers, such as Alfredo Coutiño, now at Moody's, a credit rating agency, expect a contraction of between 4% and 6%.
Industrial production showed a 13.2% year-on-year decline in February. This was the biggest year-on-year drop since April 1995. In calendar 1995, GDP contracted by 6.2%. The big worry for policymakers was the 16.1% year-on-year fall in manufacturing output. Even electricity demand was down by 6.5%.
The central bank says that the current economic crisis is the worst for six decades. The bank is clearly not bothering about inflation, which is still running at around 6% a year. The recent strong showing by the peso (which recovered to M$13.2 against the dollar on 22 April from M$15.5 on 9 March) will help to lower inflation, but will not boost Mexican exports.

The leaking of a telephone conversation between family members of José Sarney, the president of Brazil's senate, has prompted public accusations between Brazilian authorities. The justice minister, Tarso Genro, accused lawyers of leaking classified tapes to the press, prompting a rebuke from the Brazilian Attorneys' Order (OAB). The supreme-court president, Gilmar Mendes, sided with the OAB and said the source of leaks were the federal police, which are under Genro's control. The judiciary argued that the Sarney clan managed to censure newspapers that run stories against them, while also keeping control of the coverage of the corruption allegations surrounding Sarney in their home state of Maranhão.

The spat was triggered by the transcript of a conversation between Sarney's son, Fernando, and his granddaughter, Maria Beatriz, in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo last week - which was later re-printed in other newspapers across Brazil. The conversation was taped by the federal police legally, forming part of an enquiry against Fernando, but should have remained classified until the case reached the courts. In it, Fernando and Maria Beatriz talked openly about finding a paid administrative position for her boyfriend in the senate, implicating Sarney in nepotism. Sarney has been accused of promoting a system of patronage to gain influence and using it to obtain financial benefits for his family in businesses involving the state. The federal police accused Fernando of being the Sarney clan's negotiator with authorities and businessmen.

This was the latest in a series of leaks of classified information contained in high-profile police investigations that have been published by the Brazilian press. Genro said in an interview to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo that the increase in leaks was due to a change in the law that granted lawyers access to police enquiries before they were passed on to judges, who should then decide what is in the public interest and what should remain classified while the case is on trial. “Judicial confidentiality has all but ended in Brazil ever since those under investigation were granted the right to access police enquiries," Genro declared. He then went on to accuse lawyers of leaking classified information in enquiries “to divert attention away from their clients" and seek their acquittal by casting doubt over the methods used by the federal police. 

Genro's accusation led the OAB to issue a statement deeming his declaration “grave" and “unacceptable". The OAB called for proof that the source of the leaks involving the Sarney family was their lawyers, adding that “it is clear that the leak is incriminating and therefore unlikely it would come from one of the lawyers" representing the family. Mendes sided with the OAB and accused the federal police of leaking classified information to advance its investigations. “The federal police have, right from the start of the Lula administration, leaked [classified information]," Mendes told journalists. He then went on to say that “political motivation" was behind the leaks.

While Brazilian authorities argued, the Sarneys' lawyers managed to censor O Estado - and other newspapers - with the help of Dácio Vieira, a judge who is also a family friend. Vieira issued a ruling forbidding O Estado from publishing any article that contained information about federal police investigations going on against the Sarneys, or face a fine of R$150,000 for every article published. The decision was deemed unconstitutional by press associations, who said they would appeal.

With less than one month to go until Chile's presidential and congressional elections on 13 December, Eduardo Frei of the ruling Concertación is clinging on to second place, but the independent candidate, Marco Enrí­quez-Ominami, is narrowing the gap all the time. Chile's most highly regarded opinion pollster, Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), which initially showed Enrí­quez-Ominami making little impression on voters, revealed in its latest survey released last week that if he emerges on top in the battle for second place, Enrí­quez-Ominami would stand a better chance than Frei of defeating Sebastián Piñera, of the right-wing Coalición por el Cambio, in the run-off on 17 January.

The findings of the poll suggest that the first round of elections on 13 December will be close. Piñera is the assured winner. Of those respondents registered to vote 36% said they would back Piñera; 26%, Frei; and 19% Enrí­quez-Ominami. Piñera fell by one percentage point on the previous poll released in September, Frei by two points, while Enrí­quez-Ominami picked up two points. This backs up Enrí­quez-Ominami's claim that he is the only candidate on an upwards trajectory but, at this rate of progress, he will not manage to overhaul Frei by mid December's elections.

The survey shows that Enrí­quez-Ominami's biggest problem is that many of his supporters are not registered to vote, partly because they were not enthused early enough to register. The CEP survey carried out a parallel poll of all respondents whether they are registered to vote or not. In this survey Enrí­quez-Ominami trailed Frei by just 24% to 22%, within the margin of error.

Enrí­quez-Ominami faces two other problems. The first is that a vote for him is still clearly seen as a protest vote. Only 8% of respondents to the CEP poll see him as the future president, well behind Piñera, on 49%, and Frei, on 27%. The second is that Jorge Arrate, who like Enrí­quez-Ominami is a Concertación dissident, has fought a strong campaign for the extra-parliamentary left-wing Juntos Podemos. A veteran politician, Arrate has seen support for his candidacy steadily pick up to a significant 5% on the back of his perceived credibility and decent showing in televised debates.

Enrí­quez-Ominami does have certain things in his favour, however, according to the CEP poll. The most significant of these is that the CEP poll upholds the findings in other surveys that Enrí­quez-Ominami would be much more likely to defeat Piñera in a second round. In a run-off scenario he trails Piñera by just 40% to 37%. Piñera would beat Frei by 43% to 37%. This might push those among the 47% of voters who have decided they definitely will not vote for Piñera away from Frei and into Enrí­quez-Ominami's camp, considering him a more solid bet in the run-off. A total of 54% of voters said they would definitely not vote for Frei; 48%, Enrí­quez-Ominami. Another interesting aspect of the survey is that only 20% say they have definitely decided to vote for Frei, 17% for Enrí­quez-Ominami; 14% say that they could vote for Frei, 22% that they could vote for Enrí­quez-Ominami.

The CEP poll points to other positives for Enrí­quez-Ominami. He overtook Frei for the first time in urban areas - 22% to 21%. Some 87% of Chile is deemed to be urban. But, in rural areas, although containing a much smaller overall percentage of voters, he trails Frei by 42% to 12%. He has established big leads over Frei in the 18-24 and 24-35 age categories (see table below) and even appears to be making inroads into Frei's support in the 35-54 age category. He has been unable to make any impact in the 55 plus category, however, which makes up 24% of registered voters.

The CEP survey also showed that Enrí­quez-Ominami climbed four points to 40% in a poll on who inspires most confidence. This is just one point behind Piñera, while Frei fell seven points to 36%. Enrí­quez-Ominami is also considered the most sincere and least manipulative of the principal candidates, and the most likeable, but in terms of confronting problems such as transport, health and education he lags behind the other two candidates by some distance, implying that there are still many who do not see him as cut out for the role of president.

Televised debate
The four presidential candidates participated in the fifth and final televised debate on 16 November. It was notable for Arrate's proposal that Frei and Enrí­quez-Ominami strike a pact with him to throw their weight behind whichever of them wins through to oppose Piñera in the second round. Neither Frei nor Enrí­quez-Ominami took him up on the proposal. Frei, however, challenged Enrí­quez-Ominami to make clear whether he would support “the Concertación or the Right" in the second round. Enrí­quez-Ominami ducked the question, saying that all the polls made it clear he would fare better in the run-off than Frei.

The question was particularly pertinent because the CEP poll showed that a large number of Enrí­quez-Ominami's supporters would back Piñera in the second round if Frei were to face him: only 39% would go to Frei; 29% to Piñera, while 23% would vote blank or void their ballot. Conversely, 54% of Frei's supporters would vote for Enrí­quez-Ominami should he face Piñera in the run-off.

Piñera, meanwhile, did his level best during the debate to portray himself as a moderate candidate, after the CEP poll showed that on a scale of one to 10, with one being extreme Left and 10 extreme Right, respondents put him at 8.3 (Arrate, scored 2.6; Frei, 4.3; Enrí­quez-Ominami, 4.5). Bearing in mind that the average of those surveyed was 5.3, Piñera is clearly perceived to be some way to the Right. He pointedly remarked that homosexuals would feature in his cabinet and would be permitted in the armed forces. The advantage Piñera has over his rivals, of course, is that there is no other option on the Right so he can afford to reach out to centrists in the knowledge that right-wing supporters will still have to back him.

• Voting preferences by age category (%)*

	18-24	25-34	35-54	55 plus
	17	20	39	24
Piñera	36 (41)	37 (41)	34 (35)	32 (29)
Frei	14 (18)	18 (23)	26 (29)	31 (37)
Enrí­quez-Ominami	32 (25)	26 (19)	19 (16)	11 (11)

* Italicised numbers indicate % of population within each category. Parentheses indicate result in previous poll released in September.

Source: CEP.

• Imaginacción

A survey by the pollster Imaginacción, released on 16 November, also shows Sebastián Piñera in a virtual tie with Marco Enrí­quez-Ominami in a second round scenario, a six-point swing in just one month. In the first round, however, Enrí­quez-Ominami lags Eduardo Frei by nearly five points (27%-22.3%), with Jorge Arrate, who is steadily moving up all the time, sitting on 6.4%.

It was unprecedented for a presidential pardon to be annulled in Peru - until 14 March. On this day, President Alan Garcí­a decided to revoke a pardon he granted in December to a septuagenarian former television mogul, José Enrique Crousillat, in prison for corruption. The pardon was granted on medical grounds. It was taken away when these were deemed to be at best exaggerated, at worst specious. The episode received huge press coverage after Crousillat took legal action to try to recover control of América TV from a group led by Peru's main two daily newspapers. The hunt is now on for Crousillat, who remains at large. The justice minister, Aurelio Pastor, who approved the pardon, has been dismissed by Garcí­a after severe pressure from both the press and the opposition.

Crousillat was sentenced to eight years in prison in 2006 accused of having received US$10m in bribes from Vladimiro Montesinos, the disgraced ex security adviser of former president Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), in exchange for “selling" the editorial line of América TV (Channel 4) to back Fujimori during a re-election campaign. Crousillat fled to Argentina in 2001 after one of the infamous 'vladivideos' emerged showing him accepting bribes from Montesinos. Argentina extradited him to face trial in Lima early in 2006.

Crousillat, 77, was pardoned in December after his family successfully argued that he was on the verge of death, suffering from cerebrovascular disease, moderate hypertension and heart disease. About a month later, however, IDL-Reporteros, a non-profit investigative reporting team, published pictures of Crousillat, looking in fine fettle on the beach, working out in the gym, and relaxing in top restaurants. A judge ordered Crousillat's arrest on 12 March for lying about the state of his health. Two days later, claiming to feel “deceived", Garcí­a annulled his pardon.

The opposition insists that Garcí­a, hardly a political ingénue, is far too canny to be duped. Former president Alejandro Toledo  (2001-2006) quipped that “whoever deceives Garcí­a deserves an Oscar" while the leader of the left-wing opposition Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP), Ollanta Humala, said “Garcí­a has a number of defects and virtues but being naí¯ve is not one of them."

Humala, along with the press, called for Pastor to resign as justice minister for his role in granting the pardon, but he said Garcí­a should “apologise to the nation for trying to control the media in a year of electoral campaigning." He elaborated slightly on this, alleging that Crousillat was behind a government plot to control the media ahead of October's regional and municipal elections and presidential elections in just over a year.

Crousillat filed a suit on 8 March in the small and remote north-eastern town of Motupe against the current owners of América TV, Peru's largest television channel, in an attempt to regain control of the station. He accused the present owners Plural TV - a group led by the directors of Peru's main dailies El Comercio and La República - and Toledo of collusion and fraud in purchasing América TV. The judge in Motupe archived the suit on the grounds of irregularities in relation to his proof of domicile, which he obtained in person from the local town hall earlier on the same day, probably by means of a bribe.

Conspiracy theory
The press and part of the political opposition, spearheaded by the PNP, argue that Garcí­a knew about Crousillat's intentions to recover América TV, which first broke the biggest corruption scandal to hit the Garcí­a administration, in 2008, involving alleged oil kickbacks, which forced Garcí­a to replace his prime minister and conduct an extensive cabinet reshuffle [WR-08-40]. They openly speculated that the pardon had been bought, and that the government was seeking to resurrect the Fujimorista mafia to scare the press into being less critical, even implying that Crousillat would do for Garcí­a what he did for Fujimori if he were to recover América TV. They pointed to the fact that Crousillat's daughter, Marisol, was named to a top position at the government-owned public service broadcaster, IRTP, in July 2009.

Pastor accused El Comercio of conspiring against Peru's democracy by suggesting he should resign after he called for congress and the attorney general's office to investigate irregularities surrounding the transference of América TV to Plural TV, tacitly supporting Crousillat's legal action. Pastor claimed that the Miró Quesada family, the majority shareholder in El Comercio, had ordered the paper's editors to call for his resignation to protect their own interests. “The fundamental problem is that they want to run the country. This could affect any elected authority," Pastor argued.

Pastor's lament fell on deaf ears. He had said he would resign if Garcí­a annulled the pardon but when it became apparent that he did not intend to honour his word, Garcí­a dismissed him on 16 March. The press and opposition attacks had made his position untenable. The PNP was not satisfied. It argued that Garcí­a had fired Pastor in order to stop embarrassing revelations about the pardon from coming out. It wanted congress to be able to censure Pastor, and for a congressional commission of enquiry to be set up to look into the award of the pardon.

Fighting corruption
Garcí­a was left with little option but to annul the pardon, and relieve Pastor of his duties, because of the damage to his image and the electoral prospects of the ruling Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP). The former anti-corruption prosecutor, Antonio Maldonado, denounced the pardon as “the largest betrayal of the fight against corruption in recent times." It was a savage indictment of the Garcí­a administration's efforts to take concrete action against corruption.

Peruvians are highly sensitised to corruption after living through a political culture of bribery under Fujimori. Garcí­a has made some populist gestures on corruption but question marks hang over his administration's political will to fight it. He recently called for a work camp in the jungle for those convicted of corruption. But, he has not announced any preventative measures, meaning that government corruption continues to go unpunished. In late 2007 he created a national anti-corruption office (ONA) after the opposition accused his then interior minister Luis Alva (now the PAP head of congress) of irregularities. Garcí­a said it would “drive the fight against corruption within the country, the government and public office". It was shut down by the government within a year.

Where next?
The prime minister, Javier Velásquez Quesquén, sought to sidestep opposition criticism of the presidential pardon and wider censure of the government's lack of commitment in combating corruption. Velásquez, who chaired a meeting of the PAP party leadership attended by Pastor the day before he was fired, argued that the main priority right now was just finding Crousillat - and then apportioning blame. Crousillat is now the most wanted man in Peru. Immigration authorities have declared a “red alert" and put photos of him up at ports and airports.

• Legal debate
  In addition to the political debate over corruption triggered by the issuance and subsequent revocation by President Garcí­a of the presidential pardon for José Enrique Crousillat, there is also a legal debate raging over whether the annulment of the pardon is actually permissible. The government is promising a full review of the medical reports used to justify the pardon granted last December.

Jaime Bayly, an outspoken journalist and talk show host, launched a political campaign this week with two huge advertising hoardings in Lima for his new party No nos ganan (NNG). Bayly has consistently jested about his intention to seek the Peruvian presidency, and is still yet to confirm it, but with just days to go to register candidates in time for regional and municipal elections in October, this campaign looks to be directed squarely at the presidential and congressional elections in April 2011. Bayly formed the NNG after falling out with José Barba Caballero, who had offered Bayly the presidential candidacy of his Cambio Radical party.

Bayly describes himself as “politically ambidextrous". His admiration for Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe and fierce criticism of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez suggests a more natural affinity with the Right but his policy proposals, such as legalising same-sex marriage or abolishing the armed forces, are either liberal or eccentric.

The latest opinion poll, released in mid June by Ipsos Apoyo, of 1,200 people in 17 cities, put Bayly on 5%. Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of imprisoned former president Alberto Fujimori, leads the presidential race on 22%, four percentage points up on the previous poll, followed by the mayor of Lima, Luis Castañeda, down one point to 21%, Ollanta Humala, of the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) on 13% and former president Alejandro Toledo on 12%.

President Evo Morales for the first time has acknowledged the role of coca producers (cocaleros) from the Chapare, his home turf, in the illegal drugs trade. The admission had a clear short-term political aim - appeasing the cocaleros from the Yungas in La Paz, who, long insistent that Morales favours their Chapare counterparts, are once again causing problems for the government. It is, however, likely to subject to fresh criticism his drugs policy of “coca sí­, cocaí­na no" - based on the distinction between the illegal narcotic and raw coca leaf, an important symbol of indigenous culture.
 
A former cocalero himself, Morales made the admission at a recent meeting of the umbrella organisation of coca growers, Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba, which he still heads. He rebuked the Chapare coca producers for not respecting legal production limits, acknowledging that some of the coca grown is funnelled into the illegal narcotics trade. The media linked this reversal to renewed unrest among the Yungas-based cocaleros over his government's alleged preference for the Chapare (see box).

As recently as last month, Morales denied the role of his 'coca sí­, cocaí­na no' policy in fuelling the drugs trade (see sidebar). His latest acknowledgement that it might do so is likely to fan criticism, particularly from the US which insists that tolerated coca production (raised to 20,000ha, up from the 12,000ha stipulated by law) exceeds any possible legal domestic demand - for uses such as chewing and tea. US opposition has become more pronounced since the diplomatic spat in September 2008, which saw the ejection of both ambassadors and the DEA [WR-08-44]. Since then the US has included Bolivia annually on its drugs blacklist, citing among other concerns an increase in potential cocaine production, which it claims rose by 50% from 130 tonnes in 2007 to 195 tonnes in 2008, remaining at that level in 2009.

Morales himself has tacitly recognised the growth of the drugs trade locally, not least in his recent decision to deploy the military to assist in anti-drugs efforts [WR-10-32]. However, his admission regarding the contribution of the Chapare cocaleros has yet to sway his policy, which under the US$47.9m five-year anti-drugs plan drawn up with the UN is based on integral development, industrialising coca for licit uses and fighting organised crime [WR-10-20]. Instead, he insists that any changes in legislation will follow the results of a survey into the actual licit demand for coca, due to be completed next year.

 Regional rivalries
The Yungas-based cocaleros' organisation, Adepcoca, recently staged a nine-day protest in La Paz. This was triggered by a new coca production law approved last month (already suspended by the government) which had stipulated that growers could only sell a little over 2kg of coca leaves per month, down from almost 7kg. Demands included better road infrastructure, a coca industrialisation plant and the removal of key officials such as the chief anti-drugs minister Felipe Cáceres and the interior minister Sacha Llorenti (both Cochabambinos). While some attribute the latest show of muscle to upcoming elections for the Adepcoca leadership, it serves as a reminder of rivalries between the two different groups of cocaleros, stemming from the Adepcoca's complaint that Morales favours those from his home turf. Once the only area of legal cultivation, the Yungas is  Bolivia's traditional coca growing area, accounting for 60% of the total yield of 30,000 ha (on 2009 UN figures). Of the 20,000ha of coca cultivation tolerated by the government, 12,000 ha is grown in the Yungas and 7,000 in the Chapare (where coca cultivation became legal in 2004 under the former president Carlos Mesa, following pressure from Morales). The Adepcoca, however, cites as evidence of bias the authorisation of one cato (1,600m2) of legal coca that can be cultivated annually per coca growing family in the Chapare; the lack of investment in the Yungas; and the prevalence of Cochabambinos in key posts relating to drugs policy.

• Legalising drugs
  President Evo Morales surprisingly came out last month against decriminalising drugs as a means of combating narco-trafficking. This sets him apart from most of his regional counterparts, who have increasingly backed the move in an attempt to curb the power of drug gangs. Morales explained his stance in terms of the fact that Bolivian culture is one of “coca leaf, but not cocaine or marijuana" - an attempt to deny that Bolivia has a domestic drug problem and to drive home the non-narcotic uses of coca.

“I would recommend that the US embassy (in Buenos Aires) hire more competent employees since a cut-and-paste job from the yellow press is something any idiot can do."

Argentina's Federal Planning Minister Julio De Vido reacts to a Wikileaks document published by Spain's El Paí­s.

“I do in private what any human being does, what nearly every prisoner does rather, because in reality we become prisoners in private. This (the Miraflores palace) is my prison."

Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez .

“The labour reorganisation in Cuba is a unique process in the world that aims to elevate the economic coefficients to improve the well being of the people."

Cuba's first vice-president, José Ramón Machado Ventura, on the massive cuts to the state workforce.

Belated compliance with 1996 peace agreements also includes disbanding the EMP, headquarters of past military repression.

Almost seven years after the 1996 peace agreements were signed, the Guatemalan government has begun to comply with provisions for a cut in the size of the army and the disbanding of the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP, presidential general staff), the umbrella domestic intelligence body that directed much of the repression in the period of military rule.

The dissolution of the 564-strong EMP began on 29 October. About 100 of the staff will actually be retained as members of the new unit that takes over one of the EMP's formal roles, that of providing security for the President, the Secretarí­a de Asuntos Administrativos y de Seguridad (SAAS).

At about the same time, the defence ministry unveiled the voluntary retirement scheme designed to slim the armed forces down to the 31,000 stipulated in the 1996 agreements. It is expected that 1,648 members of the military (among them 198 officers ranked above captain) will take up the offer, which includes a severance package expected to cost about US$22m.

Portillo defends military
Outgoing President Alfonso Portillo, presiding over the demobilisation of the EMP, contrasted the attitude of the military with that of their critics. `The army, he said, `is taking a step further than many civilian and political organisations have dared to take in Guatemala [...] There is much talk nowadays of peace and tolerance, but still political groups, factional and powerful groups claim the right to say that there is no justice when the law does not favour them and cynically say there is justice when they benefit.' These groups, he said, in the past `used the army against the people' but nowadays `nobody admits that the military risked their lives during the conflict or contributed towards democracy and peace.'

Portillo added that the overdue special commission with UN and OAS participation that will conduct an inquiry into `clandestine security groups' should not only investigate the military, but also the private sector, because `they have parallel groups that control courts and the state.'

President Hu Jintao's tour of Latin America in late 2004 and the accompanying signing of multi-billion-dollar letters of intent, plus the much-heralded oil deals with Venezuela - a key supplier to the US - has produced great demand, particularly in the US, for expert assessment of what China's rapidly growing involvement in the region portends. Scholarly and congressional papers present an array of interpretations that range from the highly alarmist to the surprisingly comforting.

At the alarmist end, China poses a grave threat to the stability of Latin America and the Caribbean, and ultimately to the US. At the opposite end, there are those who argue that the very nature of China's interest in Latin America might turn it into a powerful force for stability in the region.

Perhaps the most extreme version of the alarmist view is that presented by Albert Santoli, director and president of the Asia-America Initiative, to a hearing held by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on 21 July. He views matters through the prism of a perceived Chinese strategic plan to 'challenge, and eventually defeat, the United States'.  

The Santoli scenario
In tight précis, this is the scenario Santoli outlined. Part of China's strategy is a quest for control of critical natural resources. To achieve this, Beijing has been striking political, financial and military relationships with resource-rich, non-democratic governments who deny those same scarce resources to Beijing's rivals. Cuba and Venezuela are at the top of this list. Latin America, and particularly Cuba's proximity to the US and its radical leftist networks throughout the region, have provided Beijing the opportunity to implement its strategic plan of "unrestricted warfare". A key to this strategy appears to be keeping its chief rival, the US, bogged down with tactical and strategic instability in its own hemisphere.

One instance of the strategy at work was when Chinese businessmen in 1999 bribed the Panamanian government to obtain control of both ends of the Panama Canal, via a 50-year lease granted to Hutchison Whampoa. Its control of stevedoring gives China the ability to bring weapons and illegal aliens into the hemisphere including possible terrorists who, in partnership with Cuba and Venezuela, could prepare new terrorist cells to cross into the US through its southern border with Mexico. It also permits China to facilitate the transfers of sensitive dual-use military and hi-tech products and components back to China and the transfer of weapons to guerrilla and narco-terror groups in the region without the scrutiny of US customs or intelligence agents.

Another instance is China's use of Cuba since 1999 as a sensitive military listening post. A base of antennas in Santiago de Cuba is mainly dedicated to the capture of US military satellite communications, while in Bejucal the Chinese have created a complex interception system for telephone communications.  

To disguise these activities, the official Chinese station, Radio China International, is transmitting its programmes from Havana to the US and Latin America. Chinese military ties to Cuba, while not offering an immediate conventional military threat to the US, enable Beijing to open an asymmetrical cyber-warfare base near US shores. [Santoli sources this information to 'the international press, such as Agence France Press'.]

After President Hugo Chávez 's visit to China in 1999 Venezuela started purchasing Chinese military equipment within the year and Chinese military trainers started arriving in Caracas. 'Cuba, Panama and Venezuela,' said Santoli, 'combined with socialist drug lords in Colombia and newly elected leftist leaders such as Lula de Silva in Brazil (who is providing Beijing with aerospace assistance) have given Beijing a consortium of willing allies who idolise Fidel Castro's socialism. Their regimes can also be saved - as has Castro's - by the combination of energy assistance from Venezuela and financial, trade and military assistance from Beijing. This will further enable China to sustain an anti-United States consortium across the region.'

Toned-down version
While not as extreme as Santoli, a strongly cautionary interpretation had been presented earlier by the head of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June Teufel Dreyer, in testimony to two House subcommittees on 6 April. She said, 'While the PRC [People's Republic of China] does not wish to damage its relations with the United States, it appears to be attempting to use Latin America to challenge US supremacy in the region and build a third world coalition of nations with interests that may very well be at variance, or even inimical, to American interests and values.'

Following a line similar to Santoli's, she adds, 'A [...] troubling aspect of this strategy is that it has led Beijing to seek out Latin American leaders who have differences with the United States. Specifically, these include presidents Lula of Brazil, Castro of Cuba, Toledo of Peru and Chávez of Venezuela.' Teufel Dreyer also mentions China's electronic intelligence presence in Cuba at Bejucal [citing 'Australian sources'] and adds that 'unconfirmed exile sources in Miami claim that there has been cooperation among the Chinese, Cuban, and Venezuelan intelligence services'.  

She dwells more, though, on the economic aspects of China's current involvement with Latin America and on Beijing's diplomatic objective of weaning away from Taiwan the few countries in the region who still maintain diplomatic relations with it (11 in total; six in Central America, four in the Caribbean, and Paraguay in South America).

One point where she sees the economic and strategic aspects meshing is a Venezuelan-Colombian project to build a pipeline between the Maracaibo Basin and the Pacific, which 'would allow Venezuela to ship oil to China without going through the Panama Canal'. This, she adds, 'makes it in Chavez's interest to secure a pliant government in Colombia, and if successful, then he could dominate the region - destabilise the hydrocarbon-rich governments in Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador - ie have a regional monopoly'.

It may be worth noting that a very similar, though slightly softer, line was adopted by Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs and Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, in his 19 April lecture entitled 'China's Influence in the Western Hemisphere'. His main point was, 'The importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to China is multifold, but two issues predominate: Taiwan and access to raw materials, especially energy.'  

While noting that 'China is also on a military diplomacy offensive across the globe', Brookes is remarkably laconic on instances in Latin America. He notes that China 'obviously has a strong interest in the Panama Canal and access to good port facilities in the Caribbean,' and that its signals intelligence facilities in Cuba are 'longstanding and well known'. Beyond that, he mentions the increased two-way traffic of military officials, particularly with Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela and remarks, 'Chinese intelligence services are undoubtedly active in Latin America and the Caribbean, using Chinese front companies, students, visitors, and intelligence officers to steal and exploit technology and commercial secrets of interest to enhance their military prowess and economic competitiveness.'

Only in summing up does he show some concern. '[China's] actions,' he says, 'are worrisome in Latin America and the Caribbean because some national leaders, such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez , welcome the arrival of another world power to offer an alternative to the United States.'

Disconnecting the alarms
Cynthia Watson, a scholar who has spent her sabbatical year (2003-04) studying the competition between the PRC and Taiwan for access to South America, with emphasis on military relations, dismisses much of the alarmist viewpoint. At the same hearing in which Santoli presented his threatening scenario, she stated quite baldly, 'For the immediate and intermediate term, Beijing will do nothing to upset its trade relationship with the United States. The access to the US market far outweighs any possible benefits that China might gain from greater relations with Latin America, including access to Venezuelan petroleum.'

Unlike others who see Venezuela as China's prime strategic partner, Watson points elsewhere: 'Brazil,' she says, 'is the state which is bound to have the greatest ties to China in the future and has the most that could potentially affect the United States [...] More so than any state in the region, Brazil chafes at US dominance of the western hemisphere and seeks to be on a par with Washington. Beijing appears a logical, welcome partner in endeavours to remedy the disparity.'

Watson also deflates the perceived threat of Chinese dominance of the Panama Canal. 'It appears that there is a tenuous, if any, link between Hutchison-Whampoa and the Chinese military in Panama or anywhere else,' she says. 'Moreover, as one of many companies that operate in Panama, it is not clear why this speculation assumes this one company has extraordinary influence over the Canal, a facility rarely used by the US military.'

China as a regional stabiliser
At the antipodes of the Santoli scenario is one presented in what many would consider the least likely of places: the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the US Army War College. In June this year the SSI published a paper entitled US National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America, by R Evan Ellis, an associate with Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. Of all the experts who have been holding forth on the matter, he is perhaps the one bringing the most pertinent qualifications: he has studied political mobilization in Venezuela; 'democratic security' and US operations in Colombia; and, with specific reference to Latin America, what he calls 'emergent geopolitical viruses'.

Ellis's starting-point, gleaned from the pattern of Chinese investments in the region, is that what China is seeking is to 'assure access to critical commodities by constructing vertically integrated supply networks over which it has leverage'. Consequently, 'China, with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows, is likely to be a nation interested in reducing political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region, rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency.'

He believes that Venezuela is currently China's principal strategic partner in Latin America, both in terms of the volume of investment as well as in the nature of the relationship between the two countries - and that this relationship reflects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of President Chávez . This, however, is a two-edged sword: 'He is also a potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and antiglobalist causes could foment instability in China's trading partners in Latin America and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the region.'

In the light of the other views mentioned, it must be pointed out that Ellis cites the Miami Herald to note that 'Cuba may have permitted Chinese operations at the former Soviet listening post at Lourdes', but duly footnotes a reference to a study dismissing this as unproven.  

Ellis fleetingly introduces a subject that has attracted remarkably little attention in the China-Latin America outlook: the movement of people. 'In addition to tourism,' he notes, 'the number of Chinese living and doing business in Latin America also is expanding rapidly, albeit from a low level.' He only makes reference to one Chinese community, that of Venezuela, which he puts at 130,000. Determining just how many Chinese live in Latin America is no easy task as much migration has taken place unrecorded (see table below for our compilation). Some Latin American commentators have pointed out that, with several countries in the region now on the authorised list for Chinese tourism, awareness will soon spread that Latin America is largely empty.

Revelations keep emerging from the so-called 'parapolí­tica' investigations into the links between the paramilitary organisations and Colombia's political establishment. Separate revelations from the US, pointing to links between high-ranking military officers and the paramilitary, have led to a new suspension of US military aid to the country. Behind the scenes, confessions by demobilised paramilitary are guiding authorities to mass graves where the victims have been buried.

On 8 May, Vice-President Francisco Santos said in a television interview, "Between 30 and 40 legislators, perhaps more, will end up in jail" as a direct result of the parapolí­tica investigations. The supreme court has already ordered the arrest of nine legislators (one of whom remains in hiding) and has linked another five with its investigation into an agreement signed by 31 politicians and paramilitary leaders in mid-2001, to establish a 'new social contract'.  

The public prosecution service is separately investigating officials who do not enjoy parliamentary immunity, like Jorge Noguera, former head of the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS, the secret police), who is accused of passing intelligence on security operations to the paramilitary.

Noguera's successor, Andrés Peñate, has been trying to refute claims by a prominent former paramilitary leader, Rodrigo Tovar ('Jorge 40') that his mother and an uncle had been financing him. According to Peñate, Jorge 40 had extorted US$7,200 from his mother, then sought - unsuccessfully - to exact regular contributions from her and an uncle. Jorge 40 says Peñate's mother paid him US$1,800 a month until Peñate was appointed deputy defence minister in 2003; the uncle, five times more.

In late March the Los Angeles Times published a leaked CIA document which said the present commander of the army, General Mario Montoya, had been involved in the joint planning of an armed operation in Medellí­n with the paramilitary in 2002. The document also pointed to similar involvement of the present general commander of military forces, General Freddy Padilla.  

At the time, this did not prevent US Secretary of State from 'certifying', on 4 April, that Colombia was fulfilling human rights requirements, thus unblocking some US$55m worth of military assistance that had been frozen since last year by congress. The new revelations, however, persuaded the chairman of the Senate's state and foreign operations subcommittee, Patrick Leahy, to block the funds again on 16 April.

On 5 May, chief prosecutor Mario Iguarán reported that, with the conclusion of a fifth round of exhumations in the southern department of Putumayo, the number of bodies found since last year in mass graves dug by the paramilitary organisations had risen to about 900. Of these, 211 had been found since last August in Putumayo.

“This," said Iguarán, “has surprised us, even though we have lived through the thick of the conflict." He expects the figure to rise considerably higher, as his office has received reports of 3,000 other mass graves.

 

ECUADOR-US | Diplomats expelled over 'interference'. On 7 February, President Rafael Correa ordered the expulsion of US embassy attaché Armando Astorga. This followed a letter sent by Astorga to the head of the Ecuadorean police General Jaime Hurtado, in which he said that the US was cancelling its logistical and training support for the anti-smuggling unit (Coac) of the national police. In the letter Astorga said that the US aid that he was cancelling was worth US$340,000 a year. Astorga also demanded the return of material provided by the US to the police.

According to security minister Miguel Carvajal the 'root problem' had been the practice of US vetting of top appointments in the police, particularly in the special investigations unit (Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales, UIES) and the Coac, which received US assistance.  Astorga was absent from Ecuador when his expulsion was announced.

The following week, UIES computer data was handed over to the US embassy. When Correa learnt of this he ordered an investigation to uncover who was responsible for delivering to the embassy what he described as '15 years of data crucial to the security of Ecuador' and recommend action against them. Four days later, on 18 February, after receiving a report from the high command of the national police, Correa ordered the expulsion of the first secretary of the US embassy, Mark Sullivan, for interfering in Ecuador's internal affairs. Sullivan was given 48 hours to leave the country. Thomas Shannon, US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, immediately denounced this move as 'very regrettable_ unjust and unfriendly'.

State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid said that all US programmes in Ecuador had been managed transparently and with the full cooperation of Ecuadorean high officials. Correa said that the assistance provided to the police had been the result of a verbal agreement between the embassy and the police. Correa subsequently accused Sullivan of being the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Ecuador.

PERU | Turf war between Mexican & Colombian cartels. A spate of shootouts in mid-February in the port of Callao and the Chorrillos district of Lima is being interpreted by officials at the national police's anti-drugs directorate, Dirandro, as part of a turf war between members of the Mexican Sinaloa cartel and the Colombian Norte del Valle. They attribute 12 killings and at least 40 cases of injury from gunfire to this battle, said to have been triggered by the Mexicans' decision last year to terminate their agreement to ship cocaine provided by the Colombians. Last year the Peruvian authorities arrested 21 Mexicans and 17 Colombians in possession of 32 tonnes of cocaine (80% of the total seized countrywide).

The newspaper La República attributes to the US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) the estimate that the Sinaloa cartel is responsible for about 80% of the cocaine processed in the Apurí­mac-Ene valley (VRAE). It is worth noting that the 'Federation', the alliance of Mexican cartels of which the Sinaloa gang had been the initial hub, has split recently, and that the Colombian authorities consider the Norte del Valle cartel to have been disbanded.

President Alan Garcí­a recently warned that the Tijuana cartel is present in Peru and that the Sinaloa cartel is attempting to reverse the gains made by the government's coca eradication drive in the Monzón valley (Huánuco). He also revealed late last year that he had asked his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, to send 300 counternarcotics agents to Peru. Calderón said he had none to spare, but in early February sent a top-level team to Lima to discuss ways of improving antidrugs cooperation between the two countries.

So were the 30 September events in Ecuador an attempted coup, or a police mutiny over pay that was exacerbated by provocateurs within the force who were given an unexpected opportunity by President Rafael Correa's decision to confront the protesters in person? As in the case of Honduras, Venezuela and Correa's allies in the Alba alliance cried coup, the Organization of American States (OAS) followed suit and virtually all regional governments did likewise but did not subscribe to the majority Alba view that the US had been pulling the strings (not shared by Ecuador). The denouement suggests that, if this was a coup plot, it was a particularly ill-planned and badly executed affair.

President Correa said that when he had gone in person to confront the police officers gathered outside their Quito headquarters, he had believed them to be engaging in no more than an ill-informed action in defence of their incomes, but that he later realised that what was under way was a politically inspired attempt to overthrow his government. He blamed his misperception on a failure of the intelligence agencies to detect this.

The authorities were hardly unaware that unease in the police force had been growing. A year ago rumours had begun to spread through police ranks about the perceived negative impact of the proposed new public service law on their incomes. The police high command felt at the time that fears in this regard had been dispelled. The issue reemerged in mid-2010, as some police officers picked up statements made by opposition legislators, and even some of the pro-government camp, that played up the suppression, under the new law, of bonuses enjoyed by members of the force and perks enjoyed by the military. When the law was approved in early August, the assembly overwhelmingly supported the inclusion of a special exemption for the police and military. President Correa vetoed the exemption and. when faced with the prospect that this and other initiatives might be blocked by the legislature, announced that he was considering the use of constitutional powers to dissolve the assembly and call new elections.

By late August the unease over police pay become intertwined with another issue  that affected some police officers, specifically former members of the now-defunct Grupo de Apoyo Operacional (GAO) arrested on suspicion of arbitrary detention and torture and under investigation for a 'disappearance'. Shortly after their imprisonment, pamphlets and emails began to circulate, attacking police commander Freddy Martí­nez and other police generals for 'abandoning' the officers facing prosecution and for not standing up to the government on the question of police pay. By September emails of similar content but more belligerent tenor began to be received by serving police officers; they were signed by a previously unknown Grupo Armado Policial (GAP).

General Martí­nez acknowledged the unease in police ranks on 10 September when he issued a statement to the effect that officers under investigation were 'neither abandoned nor unprotected, by the police high command or by the state'. He drew attention to the fact that police pay had been increased and reminded the force that it must 'respect the law and, more than anyone else, ensure that it is enforced.' A week before the mutiny, interior minister Gustavo Jalkh attended the promotion of 100 police officers at the Regimiento Quito 1 barracks and assured them that no provision of the new law would entail cuts in police pay; he went on to tour police stations with the same message.

Awareness of the unease did not translate into appreciation of its depth. The rantings of the GAP were not taken seriously, and the preparations for the mass protest action on 30 September do not seem to have been detected. When that protest got under way, its ostensible purpose was to withdraw police protection from the streets to drive home to the government the vital role the force fulfilled (the extent to which looters took advantage of this situation might have proven their point had events not taken an unforeseen twist).

Correa's intervention and beyond
President Correa's presence at the protesters' main rallying point, the police's Regimiento Quito 1, was unforeseen. His attempts on the ground to persuade the protesters that they had misunderstood the implications met with heckling and some jostling. When he moved to the balcony of the regimental headquarters and challenged the protesters to kill him, no shots were fired. It was upon leaving the building that tear gas was fired at Correa and his bodyguards, and jostling turned to manhandling and a failed attempt to break Correa's injured leg. He ended on his knees, but his bodyguards were able to take him to the nearby police hospital. There he was treated and installed in an upstairs room under the protection of a police special forces unit that remained loyal throughout [see SSR-10-09].

Apart from the main protest rally, a group of about 150 air force personnel and police blocked the runway at Quito's international airport early in the morning. As the hours passed, reports arrived of police taking to the streets in several provinces (Guayas, Tungurahua, Esmeraldas), setting up barricades and burning tyres — a panorama more alike civilian protest actions than a coup in the making.

Correa remained in communication with his ministers. At 11:30 he ordered all radio and TV broadcasters to link up to an 'indefinite and obligatory' nationwide chain. Correa was also able to communicate freely with leaders abroad, with Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and OAS secretary-general José Miguel Insulza among the first. It was only after midday that Correa announced that he was facing a coup attempt — about the same time as police protesters, aided by members of the congressional guard unit, turned up at the national assembly building and nearby congressional offices, shutting down the latter and preventing access to the former.

The military
At 13:20 Correa ordered a countrywide 'state of exception' [emergency] under which the military were entrusted with maintaining public security. General Ernesto González, chief of the joint command of the armed forces, announced on state television that the military remained subordinate to the President and would fulfil their obligations under the state of exception. He urged 'the national police and sectors of civil society, as well as certain elements of the armed forces' [emphasis added] to desist from their protest actions. He also suggested that the public service law be 'reviewed or repealed' so that 'the rights of the [police] agents are not affected.' This is as close as the military came, publicly at least, to making a political demand during the events of 30 September. Much later [on 21 October], OAS secretary-general Insulza claimed, 'It was not the police but the military who approached the President [Correa] and asked him if he was willing to remain in power. I don't know about other countries, but in mine that is considered a coup attempt.'

There has been no indication that the military were specifically ordered to disperse the protesters surrounding the hospital where Correa was staying — nor, for that matter, that Correa made any attempt to break out, the protesters to break in or to prevent individuals from entering to see Correa. They did, however, use tear gas and batons to halt a march on the site by a pro-Correa crowd summoned by foreign minister Ricardo Patiño.

The military did act in the late evening, providing cover for a team of the police's élite Grupo de Intervención y Rescate (GIR; Intervention & Rescue Group) to break through the assembled protesters and enter the hospital, then extricate Correa. This operation involved a considerable exchange of gunfire; the vehicle carrying Correa received several impacts.

The instigators
Very early on, Correa claimed that former president Lucio Gutiérrez had been behind the 'coup attempt'. He first based this on the fact that he had heard police hecklers shout that it had been 'Lucio', not he, who had raised police pay. Gutiérrez, abroad at the time, denied this, but the claim continued to be repeated.

After Correa had been extricated from the hospital and returned to the presidential palace he began to expand his version. On 2 October he told Unasur ambassadors that, after the coup had failed to materialise, the plotters' 'Plan B' had been to assassinate him. On 6 October, after it had become public that a Grupo Armado Policial (GAP; see above) had been preparing the ground for a protest in email messages to several hundred police officers, he said that investigations were focusing on the core of the uprising, which he described as a group of police officers' without boundaries or scruples, with clear political connections, who do not hesitate to kill, to kidnap, to torture.' Though he did not spell it out, this description fitted the charges filed against the former members of the disbanded GAO. Three of the GAP emails were handed over to the public prosecution service by the television network Ecuavisa.

On 25 October, on his weekly radio and TV broadcast, Correa said that one of the police officers who had called for him to be killed was suspected of being a ringleader of the police uprising. He did not mention his name, but the presidential press office did: former sergeant Luis Martí­nez Vilañez, an ex member of the GAO who had evaded capture when 14 others were arrested earlier in the year. Eight other ex members of the GAO who had been remanded in custody were transferred to a maximum security prison on 19 October, on suspicion of involvement in the uprising.

The GAO, it must be noted, was disbanded by Correa in October 2009 after a number of its members had been accused of involvement in criminal activities, including false arrests, extrajudicial killings, kidnapping and 'disappearances'. Investigations into these cases have been proceeding very slowly; only a few ex-GAOs have been arrested (among them former GAO chief Olger Centeno) and most of these have been released on bail. The GAO was replaced by the Unidad de Lucha Antidelicuencial (ULA) — which incorporated former members of the GAO and other disbanded units.

Correa said there were 'indications' that the suspected ringleader had connections with the Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), the party of former president Gutiérrez. So far no hard evidence has surfaced of direct involvement of the PSP in the uprising.

On 6 October police announced the arrest of Fidel Araujo, a close associate of Gutiérrez, who was seen on television among the protesters in the early hours of the episode. He was later remanded in custody on a charge of 'instigating rebellion of the public force'. Araujo says that he had left before Correa arrived. The following day a public prosecutor announced that two civilians were under investigation: the alternate congresswoman Alejandra Cevallos, of the conservative Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), and the lawyer Pablo Guerrero, said to be close to Lucio Gutiérrez. Both had led a group that after midday on 30 September had burst into the state-owned Ecuador-TV, demanding to be interviewed. They said at the time that their purpose had been to clarify that there was no coup attempt under way.

Among the police officers charged with instigating rebellion is the brother of congresswoman Lourdes Tibán, of the indigenous opposition party Pachakutik. Tibán has been called in for questioning.

'Plan B'
Evidence for the existence of what Correa described as a 'Plan B' — the assassination of the President — had initially been confined to the fact that during his extrication his car was hit by gunfire. On 7 October the state-owned news agency Andes published six minutes of excerpts from communications between the mutineers on the police radio band, highlighting a call for someone to kill Correa, and messages relaying the progress of an army convoy on its way to the scene.

Longer clips of the radio messages were soon up on YouTube. An excited voice is heard shouting, 'Quickly, kill that son of a bitch of Correa [...] kill him so this can be over; kill Correa and the protest is over.' A calmer voice replied, 'Let's not talk about assassination; we are the police,' and added later the suggestion, 'That citizen should go.' Most of the rest was a barrage of coarse invective, much of it directed against the upper echelons of the police, the GIR 'traitors' guarding Correa, and the advancing army. There were a few calls on police radio for the GAP to go into action, and another couple saying that repeal of the public service law was not a sufficient condition for the protest to end: Correa also had to guarantee that the police would have 'the wherewithal to fight criminals'. This phrase reflects the language used by those defending the former GOU officers charged with abuses.

There were clearly desperate (and unsuccessful) calls for the police to advance and confront the army, and telling calls for the police to 'go and fetch rifles [armas largas]' — which strongly suggests that the protesters were not equipped for any major armed confrontation. Video clips show a majority of protesters in plain clothes, and those in uniform bearing side arms.

The advancing soldiers and GIR officers did come in for some fire from automatic weapons during the rescue operation. At the end of the day, the toll was 10 dead (three of them on the government's side) and 274 injured, 16 seriously. To put this into perspective, the number of protesters gathered in front of the Regimiento Quito 1 was estimated at somewhere between 800 and 1,000. The national police force has about 40,000 members.

By 18 October 37 police officers had been arrested and arraigned. Of these, 15 had been remanded in custody (prisión preventiva), 20 had been released on bail and two had been freed without charge. Another 104 policemen were facing disciplinary proceedings. The comptroller-general's office said that police who used their officially issued weapons, tear gas grenades and vehicles would be prosecuted for misuse of public property. By 12 October the air force had initiated disciplinary proceedings against 160 members of the force, suspected of involvement in the blocking of the Quito airport runway.

US involvement?
Venezuela's President Chávez said on 30 September after having talked to Correa on the phone that Ecuador was facing 'an attempted coup d'etat 'through' the insubordination of the national police to the authorities and the rule of law.' He later called on the Ecuadorean military 'not to allow a massacre of the people, nor a coup d'etat, nor even less the death of President Correa at the hands of those enemies of the people' — but went on to urge them to use 'dissuasion', not force. He said that behind the police hierarchy was the hand of 'rightwing politicians'. He also hinted at the involvement of the US, 'because first they pretended nothing was happening, then said they were watching events with great interest, but without condemning anything.' In Buenos Aires for an emergency summit of Unasur he said, 'I cannot point the finger at anyone in particular, but I have no doubt in pointing at the fascist forces of this continent, the same ones who set upon [Honduras's Manuel] Zelaya [ousted in a coup d'etat on 28 June 2009] and upon us — the bourgeoisie, the pitiyanquis and beyond them the Yankee empire, which pretends to halt the rebirth of Latin America and the Caribbean.'

On 3 October Bolivian president Evo Morales said that in the past decade there had been four coup attempts in the region, in Venezuela (2002), Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009) and Ecuador (2010) — all 'anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist countries'. He predicted, 'There will be no [coup attempts] in Colombia or Peru because their presidents are pro-imperialist, pro-capitalists, in favour of the free market and the privatisation of resources.' Morales added, 'In three of the four coup attempts, the peoples of Latin America overcame North American imperialism. In one, in Honduras, they defeated us and consolidated the coup.'

On 1 October, OAS secretary-general Insulza said that Ecuador had undergone a coup attempt 'because there was an armed corps rebelling against the democratic authority.' On 6 October he said, 'The reason [the coup attempt] failed was that from the outset it was clear that the immense majority of the Ecuadoreans were against an action of this kind.' [Days later he would add another two reasons: that 'the President confronted the police and the army was prepared to take control of the city'.] He conceded that many of the police officers involved might have been led to rebel with 'fundamentally economic arguments', but that the intention of the instigators was to 'take the country to a situation of ungovernability and thus provoke the destabilisation of President Correa's government.'

Insulza implicitly ruled out any US involvement, saying, 'There is absolutely no evidence that would lead us to assume the participation of any foreign country or force in what happened in Ecuador.' He did, however, say that he had erred in assuming that the 'coup' in Honduras had been an exception; the Ecuadorean episode 'proves that in our continent there still are those who, even though they are in a minority, are willing to act when circumstances allow it and take advantage of any situation to provoke the destabilisation of democratic régimes.'
 
Ecuadorean foreign minister Patiño said on 5 October, 'I firmly believe that Mr Obama had nothing to do with [the coup attempt] and I trust that neither did his main authorities — but I cannot say the same about the power groups that exist in the US.' Economic policy coordination minister Katiuska King said that behind the police rebellion there was the hand of 'powerful groups that disagree with the deep and radical changes' introduced by the Correa government.

Aftermath
Once fully reinstated, Correa ordered a purge of the national police's high command, a full investigation into the 'coup attempt' and punishment of all those involved. On 29 September the national assembly had fallen just short of the two-thirds majority needed to overturn Correa's veto of the police and military exemption from provisions of the new public service law. On 4 October the pro-Correa leadership of the assembly chose to let the time lapse for a further challenge to the presidential veto. The pro-government bloc in the assembly decided to accept the government's conclusion that there had been a coup attempt and a kidnapping of the President, and that there was no need for a congressional investigation of the 30 September events. They voted down an opposition call for summonses to Vice-President Lenin Moreno, interior minister Jalkh and defence minister Javier Ponce to explain who had asked the former to take over the presidency and whether the latter two knew of negotiations to end the rebellion and why the military had not acted sooner.