CourcyInt Focus

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• Japan tells Russia to look east - CIR 31 March 2005

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  On Monday Japan’s Defence Agency think tank - the National Institute for Defence Studies - published its 2005 East Asian Security Review. Not surprisingly, most of the general media coverage of the review has concentrated on the frank remarks it contains about China. In addition to this, however, we were also struck by some little noticed remarks about Russia.

  On China, the review notes that Beijing is accelerating its military modernization as it searches "for an effective policy to deal with the strengthening Taiwanese identity and moves for independence". And it says: "It is believed that China’s foreign policies and Taiwan policy under the administration of President Hu Jintao will be increasingly influenced by public opinion and nationalism."

  The review says that it is "of particular note" that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) "has been frequently conducting offensive ‘joint (Yitihua)’ training with a focus on the use of armed forces against Taiwan and blocking the US military intervention".

  On the wider security environment in East Asia, the review points with concern to possible maritime terrorism in key shipping routes; lack of effective cooperation in preventing traffic in weapons of mass destruction (it says "Japan and Singapore are just about the only countries in the region that actively participate in the [Proliferation Security Initiative]"); and to the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North Korea. It also seems to have some concern about the possible effect on East Asia of the US’s review of its conventional military posture.

  As far as Japan’s own posture is concerned, the review is frank about its need to build up its defensive capabilities to "effectively cope with the new threats and diverse situations that are likely to affect peace and security". It also says that Japan will be increasingly active in developing cooperative security efforts in East Asia, in part because "Asean still remains wary of China’s influence on its future, and expects Japan to play a leadership role as a restraining factor vis-à-vis the rapidly growing presence of China in this region."

  However, as far as Japan’s defensive capabilities are concerned, the review notes with concern "the increasing weight of restraining factors - such as the tightening fiscal conditions and the decreasing youth population" which could adversely affect Japan’s ability to create a "multi-functional, flexible, and effective" force.

  Overall, as far as East Asia is concerned, the report concludes: "The security environment in East Asia as it stands now gives no ground for optimism". Given the overwhelming importance of Asia in the world economy today, this is a conclusion that cannot be ignored. We happen to think that the terrorist threat to the maritime trade routes is probably exaggerated, and we have long argued that the threat from Pyongyang is overstated given that regime survival is its main concern, but on the question of China and Taiwan we are in full agreement with Tokyo’s analysis.

  But what about the aside on Russia that caught our attention? There are three aspects to it. First, Tokyo is not shy of agreeing with President Vladimir Putin’s critics in the West who say that his "authoritarian bent is mounting".

  Secondly, while pointing out that this "authoritarian bent" is not having any adverse effect on his popularity (indeed, the reverse is true), the review postulates that even "a slight fumble" in dealing with the Chechen problem "could heavily cost Putin’s popularity" and the issue has thus become "the biggest Achilles’ heel of the Putin administration".

  The third point about Russia that caught our attention was the assertion that given "the worsening strategic environment on its western front…Russia needs to strengthen its economic relations the Asian neighbours in order to recover its national strength". One of these "Asian neighbours", of course, is Japan, and the review notes with approval that Russia "has adopted the Pacific route, advocated by Japan, for its East Siberian oil pipeline project". Coincidentally, also on Monday (the day the review was published) Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said that he hoped Putin would visit Japan "as soon as possible" following a visit in May by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

  Talk of a major Russia-Japan rapprochement has been a recurring theme since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it has equally regularly stumbled over an unresolved territorial dispute dating back to World War II. However, another effort is being made to find a resolution to the dispute, and this looks like one to watch as the year develops. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

• Jordan reveals its fear of Iran - CIR 16 December 2004

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  Last week Jordan’s King Abdullah warned US President George W Bush that Iran was interfering in the Iraqi election with a view to establishing a "Shia crescent" in the region, extending from Iraq to Lebanon. There is nothing particularly startling or new about Abdullah raising this issue. What is startling, however, is the degree of fear of Iran that has revealed itself in Jordan following the publication of the king’s remarks.

  The problem for Jordan has always been that once the decision had been taken to overthrow the Sunni dictatorship in Iraq and to replace it with a democracy, the remorseless logic of numbers was always going to produce a Shia-dominated government - and a Shia-dominated government in Iraq could never be sympathetic to Jordan given Amman’s past close relationship with and support for Saddam Hussein.

  But Jordan’s fear of a Shia-dominated Iraq is compounded by the close association between Iraq’s Shias and Iran, which Jordan sees as the historic enemy of the Arabs. Iran, Jordan argues, takes every opportunity it can to exploit Sunni-Shia divisions to undermine pan-Arabism and to promote Iranian interests in the Gulf states, Iraq, and Lebanon. Jordanian strategists also argue that Iran wants nuclear weapons not in order to help liberate Palestine but to increase its influence over the Arab world.

  A commentary published on Monday in the Jordanian newspaper al-Rai, supporting King Abdullah’s remarks, provides an accurate reflection of the level of Jordanian fear of, and animosity towards, Iran. Amongst other things, this is what the commentary said:

  * "History proves that since the battle of al-Qadisiyah (637 AD), Iran has been waging big and small wars only against the Arab nation. Despite their successive losses in these wars, Iranians have managed to sow and nurture sectarian seditions in the [Arab] homeland, particularly in the Gulf region."

  * "When the US-UK aggression [against Iraq] began, Iranians, proceeding from an historical hatred and loathsome racism, headed towards Iraq to carry out various acts of looting and plundering, as well as assassinations…"

  * "Whoever examines the political reality of our brothers in the Arabian Gulf realizes the dangerous Iranian role that is being played by Tehran in the region, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain. Shia deputies in the Bahraini parliament rejected any stance by the parliament that opposes what took place and is taking place in al-Fallujah…Jordan and all the Arab brothers realize the danger that Iran posed and continues to pose towards their Arabism and their homelands."

  * "Since Iranians have a long history of stirring seditions inside the Arab homeland, cautioning in a loud and clear voice against the Iranian role in Iraq is the individual duty of each Arab, each Sunni Muslim and each Shia Muslim who refuses to wager his Arabism and sell it to anyone who harbours deeply rooted hatred."

  * "It is noteworthy that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons means an Iranian nuclear capability to strike us, for the Iranians have no enemy but the Arabs. The notion that Iran is preparing its forces to liberate Palestine is a ridiculous illusion. The utmost that the Iranian regime has offered the Palestinian question is the building that was occupied by the Israeli embassy and is now occupied by the Palestinian embassy!"

  The commentary concluded: "The problem with Iran is that it does not deal with us as Muslims whose one religion ought to unify them and close their ranks. Iran’s problem will remain that we are Arabs and they are Persians…All cards are now revealed and the Iranian regime has lost its balance and proceeded towards overt and covert alliances that seek to divide up Iraq, destroy it, slaughter Iraqis, and encourage sedition and internecine fighting…"

  King Abdullah has not been as outspoken as this, and foreign-ministry officials have since tried to play down the significance of his anti-Iranian remarks. But there can be no hiding Jordanian (and wider Arab) fears of Iran now that Iraq is no longer the bulwark against Iranian influence that it was under Saddam Hussein.

  Iran’s reading of its own position is also interesting. It naturally sees developments in Iraq as positive. However, that is only part of the overall position, and it remains concerned about a number of factors, including of course the US military presence to both its east and west coupled with increasing US pressure over its nuclear programme.

  It is also concerned about the lack of substantive Russian support in the row over its nuclear programme. However there are signs that it is trying to compensate for this by strengthening its ties with Beijing and by continuing to develop ties with lesser states that are opposed to the US – including Venezuela and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

  On the face of it, resurgence of interest in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process might also look like a negative for Iran, particularly as it appears to be supported strongly by Egypt. Relations between Iran and Egypt had been improving for a while, but they have now suffered a double setback as a result of Egypt’s apparent rapprochement with Israel and the eruption of a spy scandal. (An Egyptian citizen is under investigation for having spied for Iran – or rather for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which in turn is accused of recruiting and training extremists in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon and of plotting terrorist attacks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Sources in Cairo say that relations between Iran and Egypt are now "back to square one".)

  Interestingly, however, sources in the region say that Iranian officials are actually not overly concerned about the new push towards a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. At least some Iranian officials take the view that renewed US and European interest in the peace process will absorb a huge amount of Western diplomatic energy and divert attention away from Iran.

  In the meantime, Iran will continue to extend its influence in Iraq, which in turn should further increase its influence in Syria and Lebanon. King Abdullah’s fears are by no means misplaced - and given that the demographic reality of Iraq cannot be changed or sidestepped (the US cannot support a return to Sunni dictatorship), these fears will not subside until the counter-revolution finally prevails in Iran. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

• The Kurds, Kirkuk, and other complications - CIR 21 October 2004

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  Last week we pointed to some marginal improvements in Iraq, including the tentative disarmament of at least some al-Sadr militants in Baghdad and indications that Iraqi Sunni resistance factions might be trying to put some distance between themselves and foreign militants loyal to al-Qaida. It might not have been much, but it was something. However, a couple of developments in the past week have reinforced the essential point, namely that Iraq’s underlying complications, including the future of Kirkuk and Iranian/Shiite views on Iraq’s future diplomatic orientation, remain unaltered.

  At the time of the transfer in power to the interim government in Iraq in June, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Jalal Talabani was noticeably conciliatory on the subject of Kirkuk during a visit to Turkey. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul laid down the law, saying: "Everybody knows about Turkish sensitivities over Kirkuk. We would never allow [Kurdish domination to become] a fait accompli in Kirkuk. Everyone should have their fair share of the country’s wealth." Talabani, for his part, said: "Kirkuk is a city of brotherhood where Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen live together…We defend Turkmens’ rights and are working for this. We want to reach an agreement so that this city can become a symbol of Iraqi unity."

  But, as we pointed out at the time, although Talabani was as conciliatory as he could be when in Turkey, he was also on record as demanding the restoration in Kirkuk of "the normal situation, which existed before the ethnic cleansing [Saddam’s Arabization] policy began".

  There have been many similar Kurdish statements since then, and during the past week Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has been in Turkey and Syria stressing the importance of Kirkuk to the Kurds. When in Damascus he said: "Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with a Kurdish identity. Neither Turkey nor any other country has the right to interfere in its affairs. Neither Turkey nor any other country can be allowed to interfere in the issue of Kirkuk."

  But Turkey made it clear during Barzani’s visit to Ankara that it takes exactly the opposite position. Osman Koruturk, Turkey’s special envoy for Iraq, said specifically: "Kirkuk is not only an internal affair for Iraq; it concerns its neighbours as well."

  In private meetings with Turkish officials, Barzani was told that Ankara "would not remain a bystander if tens of thousands of Turkmens flood over its border to escape potential violence in Kirkuk", and he was warned against any attempts to change the demographic structure of the city.

  It should also be noted that the remarks that Barzani made in Damascus were mild compared with comments made last Thursday (14 October) by Sadun Fayli, a PUK official in Baghdad. He is reported to have said that the Kurds are ready to fight "if the Arab side insists on rejecting the Kurdishness of the oil-rich Kirkuk Province…"

  He said: "The escalation of the Kurdish political stand on Kirkuk is necessary as long as there are Arab tendencies inside Iraq that oppose the federal plan and refuse to annex Kirkuk to the greater Kurdistan region that includes the provinces of Al-Sulaymaiyah, Arbil, and Dahuk." And he added: "The PUK and KDP stand on this issue is one and the same."

  The other development that caught our attention this week was a broadcast by the pro-Shia Voice of the Mujahidin radio station which attacked the close ties between the Iraqi interim government and Jordan. The radio station is based in Iran and reflects the views of the Iranian regime.

  Jordan remains anathema to Iran for two opposite reasons. First, because it was an ally of Saddam Hussein; and, secondly, because it has since made peace with Israel and is therefore seen by Tehran (and, in should be said, by the Palestinians - see Mideast section for details) as little more than a US-Israeli pawn.

  Iran is concerned about the training of Iraqi security and police personnel and Iraqi diplomats in Jordan, and on Monday this week it voiced its concerns about the closeness of Baghdan-Amman relations when the Voice of Mujahidin broadcast the following commentary:

  "Because of the fact that Jordan was a strategic ally of the tyrant Saddam, the new government should at least have refrained from resuming the same strategic relations. Jordan’s relations with the Zionist entity cause suspicion. This country is regarded as a window for the Zionist entity. Through Jordan, elements from the Zionist Mossad intelligence infiltrate and spread into neighbouring Arab countries…The new government is directing accusations against Iran, which the tyrant Saddam regime had always fought, and maintaining its close relations with countries that caused harm and injury to Iraq and the Iraqis, such as the Jordanian government."

  So there are two messages from Iraq this week. First, positions on Kirkuk appear to be hardening; and, secondly, a Shia victory in the forthcoming elections will surely impact adversely on any hopes the US might have for tying Baghdad into a moderate pro-peace alliance with Jordan. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

• Japan decides to risk China fallout - CIR 7 October 2004

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  In our 16 September issue we said that there were indications that an advisory panel to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi intended to describe China as a military threat in a report due to be ready by the end of September. In the event the report, which will feed into a major defence-posture review that Japan is intending to complete by the end of the year, did not go quite as far as that, but there is still much in it that will anger China.

  On Monday, the advisory panel made up of academics and business leaders said that Japan should consider developing the capability to strike at missile bases when it has no other means to counter missile attacks. It also recommended the deepening of weapons-related cooperation with the United States and the abandonment of Japan’s self-imposed ban on exercising the right to "collective self-defence" (that is aiding allies that come under attack).

  A Japanese government official briefing on the report said: "China, by definition, is not a threat" - but for Beijing that will have taken little of the sting out of the report, not least because of the coincidence of Japan’s moves to provide itself with greater freedom of action in defence issues, including the right to participate in collective self-defence, with Taiwan’s courting of Japan as an ally.

  As we have previously reported, on 10 September Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian told two visiting Japanese parliamentarians, Seiichiro Murakami and Ichiro Kamoshita, that both Japan and Taiwan faced the same threat from China’s military build-up and missile deployments.

  Earlier in the year, on 24 July, Taiwan’s National Security Council secretary-general, Chiou I-jen, and Democratic Progressive Party MP Hsiao Bi-khim made a visit to Tokyo, the main purpose of which was reportedly to explore how Taiwan and Japan could develop cooperation on security issues.

  That a collective self-defence alliance is what Taipei has in mind was also made clear by Taiwan’s new representative in Japan, Koh Se-Kai, who before flying to Tokyo on 6 July to take up his post talked about an invisible alliance between Taiwan and Japan, saying: "The United States is mandated to come to Taiwan’s defence under the Taiwan Relations Act, while Japan is also obliged to maintain regional security under the US-Japan Defence Guidelines. The two agreements weave a web of common interest shared by the US, Taiwan, and Japan."

  Even the chairman of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), Lien Chan, has urged a greater role for Japan in regional security. He argued recently that bilateral relations between Japan and Taiwan should no longer centre only on economic areas. He said that the two shared "a common basis in terms of geopolitics and security structure" and that both sides should begin to talk about "collective security in East Asia".

  Against that background, almost the only part of the panel’s report that Beijing will have approved of was the rejection of any suggestion that Japan should develop nuclear weapons. The report said: "Japan must not possess nuclear weapons."

  But this is of little practical significance. As we regularly argue, nuclear weapons are all-but unusable against a country that can retaliate in kind, so it is inconceivable that Japan could use nuclear weapons (if it had them) against China. On the other hand, Japan itself is provided with immunity from nuclear attack by China by the closeness of its military alliance with the US (which includes the stationing of large numbers of US troops in Japan). The key issue, therefore, is the attempt to widen the circumstances in which Japan could use its conventional forces (it has 250,000 military personnel and a national defence budget that is fourth in the world, behind only the US, Russia, and China).

  The decision by Japan to risk displeasing China to the degree that it surely has cannot have been taken lightly. There could, for instance, be a serious economic downside to falling out with China.

  Equally, given Japan’s stated desire to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, there would be a serious diplomatic cost to any rift with Beijing. Even before the issuing of this report, following Koizumi’s address to the UN on 21 September, Beijing’s foreign ministry launched a scathing attack on Japan, saying that the UNSC was "not a board of directors" and its composition should not be decided "according to the financial contribution of its members".

  It also said, in a reference to Japan’s perceived failure to apologize sufficiently for its actions before and during World War II: "If a country wishes to play a responsible role in international affairs, it must have a clear understanding of the historical questions concerning itself."

  China’s opposition to Japan’s UNSC ambitions could be fatal given that China has a veto and that modifications to the UN Charter require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.

  So the fact that Japan is clearly willing to antagonize China to such a degree at a time when it is already struggling to gain Chinese support on such a key diplomatic issue is an unambiguous statement of how important Japan thinks it is to reconfigure its defence posture. And even if the prime minister’s advisory panel did not overtly finger China as a military threat, it is hard to see what other driving force there could be for this decision. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

• African jitters - CIR 30 September 2004

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  Last Sunday’s news that Nigerian rebels fighting in the eastern part of Nigeria’s oil-producing southern delta have said that they intend to expand operations to cover the whole of the Niger delta spooked oil markets early this week, but the development also needs to be seen in a wider context.

  Raising fears of a repeat of last year’s uprising by members of the Ijaw tribe which closed down 40% of Nigeria’s 2.5m barrels per day oil output, rebel leader Mujahid Dokubo-Asari said: "We have decided to declare Operation Locust Feast which will cover the whole Niger delta. It is going to be an all-out war against the Nigerian state. Now the whole Ijaw nation will be fighting against the Nigerian state."

  Asari has accused the government of breaking a ceasefire agreed on 3 September, and he has said that the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (the NDPVF, thought to be about 168,000-strong) will fight until the government calls a conference at which the country’s ethnic groups can renegotiate Nigeria’s federal constitution. Asari said that the NDPVF has already taken the decision to target the Italian oil company Agip and that it will decide soon on whether to target Shell, Total, ChevronTexaco, and Exxon as well.

  Securing energy supplies from West Africa is an American priority, and a US-led naval exercise this summer in the Gulf of Guinea (which currently provides the US with 15% of its oil supplies and might supply as much as 25% by 2015) led the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) to worry publicly that this could be a prelude to an eventual military intervention. It recommended that Nigeria and its neighbours increase their military profile in the Gulf.

  The spreading rebellion in Nigeria’s delta region is bound to feed both US concerns and corresponding Nigerian paranoia - not least because there is more than oil at stake. The US has wider concerns over instability in Africa and its impact on the war on terror. In March this year, General James Jones, the commander of Nato forces in Europe, warned that the "large ungoverned spaces" of Africa could provide havens for international terrorists.

  And the bad news from Nigeria comes in the same week as the UN Security Council has expressed its concern over its near neighbour the Ivory Coast. The UNSC warned on Monday (27 September) that lack of progress in implementing political reforms "is not only holding back the peace process in Ivory Coast but is also detrimental to further progress in the sub-region as a whole".

  Until civil war broke out in September 2002, the Ivory Coast was a model of stability - if not good governance - on the continent. Now it provides yet another example of endemic instability along Africa’s Muslim-Christian faultline, with the country divided between the government-controlled mainly Christian (and richer) south and the rebel-held mainly Muslim (and poorer) north.

  President Laurent Gbagbo is dragging his feet on promised reforms and a revision of a constitutional clause that bars opposition leader Alassane Ouattara from running for president. On Tuesday, Ivory Coast’s parliament abandoned efforts to pass the agreed reforms by the 30 September deadline. The rebel New Forces group, due to begin disarming by 15 October under the July peace accord, have said they will only begin disarming once the reforms are implemented.

  In the meantime, coup rumours have been sweeping Abidjan (it was reported locally on 22 September that the intelligence services had uncovered a plot to assassinate the president), and since last week roadblocks and other security checks have returned to the city. Tank patrols have been increased, and there have been flights of military helicopters over the city. The local media have also reported that up to 1,500 rebels have allegedly been infiltrated into the city "with livestock convoys entering by Noe", and this and other similar reports have been feeding the sense of crisis.

  The UN Security Council’s warning that the lack of progress in the Ivory Coast is "detrimental to further progress in the sub-region as a whole" is no doubt true. But it could have gone further. There remains a fear that the north may make a bid for secession, that Guinea could side with the government in trying to reimpose control over the north, and that, in turn, Mali and Burkina Faso (which Ivory Coast blames for backing the September 2002 rebellion) could be drawn into the struggle. Liberia has also been deeply involved in developments in the west of the country.

  On Tuesday (28 September), a government spokesman said that President Gbagbo had sent a delegation to tell heads of state in the region about an alleged plan by Burkina Faso to subvert Ivory Coast.

  Separately, Mauritania is accusing Burkina Faso of harbouring and training dissident soldiers who are said to have been behind a failed coup attempt in June 2003 and another in August this year. Over the weekend Mauritania’s Communication Minister Hamoud Ould Abdi accused Burkina Faso of training soldiers at two camps. Adding to this combustible mix, Mauritania has also blamed Libya for backing dissident officers.

  Meanwhile, on the other side of Africa, in Somalia, a rather different problem is developing for the US and the war on terror.

  Somalia is a failed state with no central government, and during this long period of anarchy concerns that al-Qaida might be establishing a presence in the country have been dealt with by the expedient of employing local armed groups to do the dirty work. Sources in the region say that there have been some 15 raids on suspected al-Qaida cells in Somalia in the past 18 months undertaken by Somali proxies on the bidding of foreign powers.

  Now Somalia is on the point of establishing a new government, with a president to be elected by members of an interim parliament meeting in Kenya on 10 October. Clearly the US and other Western powers have an interest in seeing legitimate government restored in Somalia, but the sort of raids that have gone on in the past (they have been roundly condemned by Muslim clerics) cannot continue without acutely embarrassing the new government. On the other hand, no one expects that the new government will have either the inclination or power to continue the policy itself. Being seen as a US puppet could be fatal to its existence.

  So, while it is growing instability that is causing concern in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and elsewhere in West Africa, ironically the latest concerns over Somalia relate to the long-awaited establishment of legitimate government - which just goes to show, there are never simple answers to complicated questions. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

• Rejection of Turkey by the EU would be "beyond disappointment" - CIR 24 June 2004

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  As we argued in some detail in our 11 March issue, the importance of Turkey’s European ambitions cannot be overstated. Turkey has been pursuing an unparalleled and single-minded policy of modernization and Westernization for over 80 years, since the foundation of the secular republic in 1923 by Kemal Ataturk. In 1963 it became an associate member of the European Union (or rather of the European Economic Community as it then was), and on 14 April 1987 it applied for full membership.

  The EU Commission will publish its annual report on Turkey’s candidacy on 6 October, and European Union leaders will decide at their summit in December whether negotiations for membership should be opened.

  As the recent European Parliament elections showed, there is considerable opposition within Europe - particularly in Germany - to Turkish membership. But in all things expectation management is important, and if the EU intends to further postpone the start of membership negotiations with Turkey, the message is not getting through.

  Diplomatic sources in Ankara say that the feeling amongst Turkey’s political elite is that the EU’s decision, taken at its recent summit, that membership negotiations with Croatia will start in early 2005 means that it cannot possibly say no to Turkey in December. There is a feeling in Ankara that the EU will agree to begin talks between July and October 2005 - that is during the period of the British presidency.

  Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in the Netherlands last week to discuss all this with Holland’s Prime Minister Jan Peter Belkenende, who will take over the EU presidency on 1 July.

  One element in Turkey’s case for membership that has been emphasized more and more recently is that Turkey can become a bridge between Islam and the Christian world, and this was argued strongly by Erdogan last week.

  In the past Turkey has more often emphasized its secular Western nature; now it is saying that it can help change the Islamic world’s perception of the European Union - particularly when Ankara has assumed the office of Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

  Speaking during his visit to Holland, Erdogan said: "We have to create an EU where civilizations meet and reconcile. If we are to eradicate terrorism, we have to achieve this goal."

  He repeated the same point when opening a symposium on Turkey’s European Union adjustment programme in Ankara on Monday (21 June), saying that the EU could become "an address where civilizations meet and reconcile" and that Turkey would join the EU "as a representative of the compromise among civilizations".

  This argument might persuade some waverers, but the opposition from those who see Turkey’s membership as potentially changing the whole nature of the European Union remains strong.

  EU Commissioner Guenter Verheugen, for instance, said recently: "Turkey’s accession will affect and change everything in the EU" - and the feeling in European diplomatic circles is that the most powerful voices still belong to those who want to find a way of maintaining a special relationship with Turkey without actually welcoming it in as a full member.

  That might be so, but the problem is that Turkey is now well beyond the point of accepting a compromise solution.

  As Erdogan told a press conference in the Hague on 16 June, when asked about how Turkey would react to a failure to set a date for accession talks:

  "I do not even want to consider such a negative decision because such a decision will lead to a result on Turkish people beyond disappointment. I should clearly express that Turkey has been waiting at this door for 41 years. Turkey has taken steps required by the EU acquisition more than the EU member countries. I think both the report that will be announced on 6 October and the decision that will be taken in December 2004 will take those into consideration."

  Hearing this, there can be little doubt that 6 October is a make or break date for Europe’s relationship with Turkey. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

• Egypt, Turkey, and Iran shaping new Middle East - CIB, 13 July 2011

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  With so much noise emanating from the Middle East, it is important from time to time to focus on the really important factors. What is happening (or not) in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran is of supreme strategic importance; what is happening in Libya, Syria, and Yemen is less so. The problem is that the Iranian regime remains untouched by the Arab revolutions at a time when Turkey has already made a significant shift away from its Ataturkist pro-Western orientation, and Egypt, inspired by popular revolt, is making the same reorientation as Turkey. Events in the past week have confirmed this unhappy combination.

  The slightly positive sign from Turkey that we reported two weeks ago, with the withdrawal of the Mavi Marmara from the second Gaza ‘Freedom Flotilla’, has been superseded by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refusing to accept a compromise solution to the dispute with Israel over the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010. The conclusion being drawn in Jerusalem is that the damage to the former strategic alliance with Turkey is indeed irreversible and that there will be no resumption of the defence, military, or intelligence cooperation that was so important in boosting Israel’s feeling of security.

  During his recent tour of North Africa, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was greeted with slogans of “Thank you, Turkey” and “Erdogan, Turkey, Muslim!”. It is this intoxicating popularity in the Arab Middle East that is now inspiring Turkey’s foreign policy rather than the forlorn hopes of membership of the European Union, and it will drive Turkey towards an increasingly active pro-Palestinian stance. Davutoglu has now been to Egypt four times in the last six months while Erdogan is due to make a visit within the next 10 days.

  Meanwhile, in Egypt itself, there has been a change in foreign minister, and the new foreign minister has being going out of his way to reassure the Egyptian public that this does not mean a retreat from Egypt’s post-revolution reorientation.

  When it was announced in May that Egypt’s first post-Mubarak foreign minister, Nabil Abdallah al-Araby, was to become Secretary-General of the Arab League there was dismay in pro-revolutionary circles. The key point about al-Araby’s short tenure as Egyptian foreign minister was the way in which he quickly re-oriented Egyptian foreign policy back towards a traditional Egyptian one of seeking Arab leadership and away from Camp David. His sudden and unexpected transfer to the Arab League post caused widespread concern that the move might presage a watering down of Egypt’s post-revolution foreign policy.

  Much of the grumbling in Egypt following the announcement that al-Araby was to move to the Arab League was along the lines that the move was orchestrated by the West to prevent Egypt from continuing with the new foreign policy instituted by al-Araby. One well-informed Arab commentator noted: “The popular reaction comes as a warning to...that group in charge of government in Egypt [not] to adopt alternatives to its current foreign policy.”

  Such concerns were heightened by the appointment of Muhammad al-Urabi as the new foreign minister. Al-Urabi, according to Al-Wafd newspaper, once said: “I believe that Mubarak is an unprecedented leader, and that Egyptian history will not witness another leader like him.” He also bears the stigma of having served for four years as deputy ambassador to Israel.

  However, although a former Mubarak loyalist, al-Urabi shows every sign of maintaining Egypt’s new orientation. In his first few weeks in office he has confirmed that Egypt is “correcting the course of foreign policy in a way that reflects the Egyptian people’s aspirations”. He has also confirmed that Egypt’s post-revolutionary concentration on relations with the Arab world and Africa will be maintained.

  The new foreign minister has confirmed his support for al-Arabi’s policy of rapprochement with Iran. In a 9 July interview with the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper he said: “I really felt a serious Iranian desire to establish healthy relations with Egypt more than one year ago during my visit to Tehran...Egypt, too, is ready, but the timing is an issue that will be decided later. Dr Al-Araby set a timeframe when he said: After the election of the new Egyptian parliament.”

  As we reported in our 15 June issue, Egypt has been under huge pressure from the US and the Gulf States not to resume diplomatic relations with Iran, and on 12 June al-Araby said that the decision to resume diplomatic relations will be left to the new Egyptian parliament to decide in about three months’ time. This looked like a neat way of by-passing US pressure as the US would find it harder to oppose democratic decisions taken by a newly elected Egyptian parliament. Al-Urabi, in his Al-Sharq al-Awsat interview, seems to have confirmed this strategy.

  What is particularly interesting about all this is that while a huge three-way battle for control of Egypt continues to be waged between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 25 January democratic movement, the question over Egypt’s future foreign-policy orientation appears to have been settled. It is to take Egypt back to the centre of Arab leadership, and to work for a new Mideast order in close coordination with the major non-Arab states of Turkey and (as far as maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia permits it) with Iran.

  This might be no bad thing were it not for two factors: the first is that Iran remains highly dangerous and is pursuing destabilizing policies in Iraq and the Gulf; the second is that the re-orientation of Turkey, and now of Egypt as well, hugely worries Israel, and for as long as Israel feels insecure there will be no peace with the Palestinians.

  The intelligence consensus in Jerusalem is that it will be at least 10 years before Israel will be able to fully assess the consequences of the Arab Spring. This is not just because of the uncertainties provoked by the shift in Turkish and Egyptian foreign policy; or by the continuing malign interference by Iran in Iraq, the Gulf States, Syria, and Lebanon; or even by the unfinished revolutions in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. It is also because of the likelihood of unfulfilled expectations even in those countries that manage reasonably complete and peaceful transitions. There are, after all, 100m people in the Arab world aged between 15 and 29, many of whom have never had jobs. They are looking for more than just democracy: they want genuine improvements in prosperity as well. JdeC.

  NOTE: All of this may go some way to explain an interesting opinion-poll result published this week in Israel which shows Israelis far more positive about Europe than is generally imagined. According to the survey published by the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev on 11 July, 81% of Israelis would support European Union membership for Israel.

  The survey, entitled Israeli Positions on the EU, questioned 1,000 people from a representative sample of the Israeli public, and as one of the compilers of the poll said, the survey shows "Israelis are really into strengthening and deepening the cooperation between Israel and the EU. Israelis understand the importance of the EU for the future of Israel and they want to strengthen the relations."

  Israel has in fact never applied to join the EU, but a debate held on the issue was sparked last year after Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi visited the Middle East and said that Israel should be admitted to the European Union.

• US gambles on Turkey - CIB 23 November 2011

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  Senior American diplomats are describing the relationship between the US and Turkey  as “the best since the one between George Bush [Snr] and Turgut Ozal” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This assessment is no doubt correct, and it is a reflection of the degree to which the Obama administration has bought into the proposition that it should rebase its Mideast policy in response to the Arab Spring and the seemingly inevitable ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Turkey’s Islamist-based democracy is seen in Washington as the best available role model for the region.

  This service has expressed considerable concern about Turkey under its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  Our worry has been the extent of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions – clearly expressed in his June election victory speech – and his lack of judgement.  In June, Erdogan’s Islam-based Justice and Development Party (AKP) won its third consecutive mandate.  Saluting the AKP’s victory, Erdogan proclaimed from the balcony of his party’s headquarters that “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.”  In other words, Turkey under Erdogan intended to be an active supporter of the Bosnian Muslims, the Sunni opposition in Lebanon and Syria, and, above all, the Palestinians.

  The advantage of close American engagement with Turkey (in addition to securing Turkish agreement to station elements of Nato’s anti-missile shield on its soil) is that it might be able to moderate Erdogan’s wilder enthusiasms and lack of judgement, and this is no doubt the message that Washington is trying to convey to Israel, which is the country most affected by Turkey’s lurch away from its pro-Western secularist tradition.  But Israel will take some persuading.

  As we reported in our 12 October issue, Erdogan continues to step up his anti-Israel rhetoric, and his remarks in Pretoria on 5 October were amongst his strongest so far.  He said that Israel imposes “state terrorism” in the region; that it has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians with “bombs that have rained down on them from Israel”, including phosphorus bombs; and that he saw Israel as “a threat for its region because it has the atomic bomb”.  He also said that the West applied double standards (by pursuing Iran over its nuclear programme and not Israel) and that the United Nations had failed to implement its resolutions against Israel (“89 from the UN Security Council and 247 resolutions of the General Assembly”).

  Then there is the wider context.  The Muslim Brotherhood has won the first post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia and will almost certainly emerge as the most powerful political grouping in Egypt if and when the election process is completed.  After Egypt, it is beginning to eye the prospects of power in Jordan.  The fall of Assad, now actively sought by Turkey, would also open the way to an MB ascendancy in Syria.  And in the Palestinian territories, Hamas is looking to extend its influence from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank through a rapprochement with Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

  These are the forces that the US is seeking to control through courting the Erdogan government in Turkey.  We are not suggesting this is a wrong policy, just that in all likelihood these forces will prove too powerful to control, and that Turkey will only modify its policies at the margins in response to US pressure.  The end result is likely to be an enhanced feeling in Israel that not only has it lost Egypt and Turkey, but that it may be losing the US as well.  This, in turn, can only fuel Israel’s determination to neutralize the Iranian nuclear threat and to avoid any territorial compromise.  A sense of how concerned Israel is about developments in general and Turkey in particular can be taken from a commentary by the influential academic Barry Rubin in the 21 November Jerusalem Post.  He wrote: “The Islamist regime in Ankara isn’t opposing the Syrian regime out of its love for democracy.  Erdogan’s government wants to have a fellow Sunni Islamist dictatorship in Damascus, preferably under its influence.  In this situation, Turkey is just as bad as Iran.”

• Israel conitnues to prepare for the worst - CIB 30 November 2011

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  If our assessment of Russia’s latest moves is correct (see following briefing), the Middle East equation has just become considerably more complicated as the prospects for an early return to stability remain remote.

  The overall picture is fairly clear.  The Arab Spring is ushering in a period of possibly prolonged Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy.  The MB–affiliated Ennahda party won the first of the Mideast’s post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia.  The MB-affiliated Justice and Development Party (PJD) has emerged as the strongest party in Morocco following elections there.  And the Muslim Brotherhood will almost certainly become the largest party in the Egyptian parliament following the elections that began on 28 November.  This latter development means, in turn, that the MB-linked Hamas group will be strengthened in the Palestinian territories, increasing its influence in the West Bank to go with its dominance of the Gaza Strip.  The alternative to the Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria is the Muslim Brotherhood, and the MB is gaining in strength in Jordan where King Abdullah is struggling to maintain stability in a rapidly changing Middle East. 

  Alongside this, Iran is set to increase its ascendancy in Iraq following the end-year withdrawal of US troops.  And now, with Russia’s determination to back Assad against both Nato and Turkey (see following briefing), there is a likelihood that Iran will retain its influence in Syria and Lebanon.  Meanwhile, there are signs of a rekindling of Shia unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

  Into all this must be factored the actions of an increasingly worried Israel, and not just with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme.  On Egypt, there is a concerted effort to play down the possibility of a breach, but the fears of what could happen continue to emerge from various corners.  On 23 November, for instance, former deputy IDF chief of staff Maj-General Uzi Dayan said during a security conference at Bar-Ilan University that it may become necessary to mobilize a counter-terrorism intervention force for the Sinai.  An even more apocalyptic view was put by Professor Eytan Inbar, the head of the Begin-Sadat Centre that organized the conference.

  Professor Inbar warned about a possible collapse of law and order in Egypt.  He said: “The collapse of law and order will allow terror groups to rise up.  We could find ourselves in an Islamic lake.  Turkey is not our friend...Syria was not our friend and will not be our friend under a new regime with an Islamist influence.  Lebanon is controlled by Hezbollah.  Sinai could turn into Somalia.”

  Israel’s new multi-year ‘Halamish’ defence programme (which is itself under review) goes beyond the previous Tefen plan in adding potential threats from the West Bank and Egypt to the established threats from Iran, the northern front (Syria and Lebanon), and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.  The Halamish plan says: “There is an increasing probability of conflict on multiple fronts.” 

  Many influential voices in Israel are still arguing that the Camp David peace treaty will survive the transition in Egypt, not least because of the economic benefits to Egypt of peace.  This is a valid point.  Egypt could lose $1.65bn in aid from the US if it abrogated the treaty at a time when the newly elected government has to cope with a collapse in tourism revenue by 25%, a near 70% decline in foreign direct investment, and economic growth down to 1.8% from 6%, which is only just above the rate of population growth of 1.7%.  Nevertheless, there are ways short of abrogating Camp David in which the new Egypt could become problematic for Israel, such as in its support for Hamas or if, as Professor Inbar warns, it were to lose control of Sinai.  And there is nothing hypothetical about the mounting dangers on the other fronts.  Israel has no option but to prepare for the worst, which is in itself, of course, destabilizing.  JdeC.