Courcy's Intelligence Brief - 15 February 2012

Items

• Failed terror attacks encourage Israeli hawks

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  The terrorist attacks on Israeli targets in Tbilisi and New Delhi on 13 February have provided Israel’s hawks with additional ammunition for an early strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but not for the reasons that might be supposed.  It is not the fact of the attacks, but rather their comparative failure that has emboldened the hawks around Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

  That Israel’s security and political establishment is locked in a tense behind-the-scenes debate on the likely efficacy or not of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities is open knowledge.  We looked at this in detail last week and concluded that: “The past week has provided further strong indications that, with US acquiescence, Israel is seriously preparing for a military strike against Iran if tightening international sanctions do not have a nearly immediate effect in curtailing Iran’s ambitions.”

  During the past week, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Nikolay Makarov, has added to the belief that the time for action is nearing by saying that he believes a final decision will be taken at the start of the summer.  This fits in with the previously reported assessment of US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta that a strike is likely before the end of June.

  Now we have had the much-expected Iranian retaliatory terrorist attacks on Israel – or at least what looks like that and is being presented as such by Israel.  On the day of the attacks, Netanyahu said bluntly: “Iran and its proxy Hezbollah were behind the attacks”.  He also pointed to the “attempts to hurt Israelis” in Azerbaijan and Thailand.

  For the Israeli hawks, the interesting point about these attacks is not that they have taken place, but that they were relative failures, and this relative failure has been seized upon as an argument in favour of a military strike against Iran.  The one worrying aspect of the attempted attacks is their geographical spread (from Georgia to Thailand), indicating the range of Hezbollah’s overseas reach, but the hawks are maintaining that the failure of the attacks to do any serious damage shows that fear of massive Iranian retaliation in response to an Israeli strike against its nuclear facilities is overblown.

  The hawks have been pointing out that if this is the best that Hezbollah can do to mark the 4th anniversary of Israel’s assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, it really does indicate a declining capability when seen alongside Hezbollah’s retaliation in 1992 to the assassination of Abbas Moussawi.  Then, it took just one month to perpetrate the attack on an Israeli embassy building in Buenos Aires in which 29 Israelis and Argentineans were killed.

  The argument is complicated by a dispute within Israeli security circles as to whether or not Hezbollah might have pulled its punches with this week’s attacks.  But if it did, then that is almost as positive as the alternative view that Hezbollah is no longer capable of a major retaliation.  Given the fragility of the situation in Lebanon, and the difficulties faced by Hezbollah’s patron in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad, it is indeed possible that Hezbollah did pull its punches, being unwilling to risk everything in a major confrontation with Israel.  Hezbollah will be acutely aware that in June 1982, Israel launched the First Lebanon War in response to the assassination attempt on its ambassador to the UK Shlomo Argov.

  Also, while the word of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah may not be something to which Israel gives much credence, his 7 February comments about Hezbollah’s likely response to an Israeli attack on Iran give further weight to the argument that Hezbollah might be trying to avoid a confrontation.  Nasrallah said: “Iran does not command us. Even when it comes to regional developments, Iran will not request anything from Hezbollah and will not desire anything.  When this day comes [and Iran commands us], we are the ones who will sit down and decide what to do.”

  The key point is this: if Hezbollah is running scared, and/or if its capabilities really are as constrained as this week’s failed attacks suggest they might be, that would significantly undermine one of the key elements of Iran’s deterrent against an Israeli military strike - or at least that is what Israeli hawks have been arguing this week.  But then, if the opposite had happened, and the attacks in India and Georgia had been devastating successes, the arguments for a military strike on Iran would have been just as magnified.  In other words, what our sources are saying is that the only way in which a war with Iran can be prevented is if Iran demonstrably and quickly backs down on its nuclear ambitions - but that is not an outcome in which any close observer of the Iranian regime would be willing to put much faith.  JdeC.

• Why the Palestinians are content to wait and watch

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  What might seem odd about all the war talk in the Middle East is that it does not include the Palestinians.  It might seem that the Palestinians are just absorbed by their own internal power struggles, but another interpretation is that some astute Palestinian heads are playing a long game as they see the possibility of a transformation in their prospects.

  The Palestinians are not much interested in the fate of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, knowing that a Sunni regime in Syria will be as supportive of their cause as Assad’s failing Alawite regime.  As for the Israel-Iran dispute, they know they can only be spectators.  They will do little or nothing to support Iran if it is attacked by Israel because they know that the road to Jerusalem leads through Cairo, not Tehran, and that they need to bide their time while the post-Arab Spring Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy is secured. 

  The Palestinian tactics for the moment are to avoid any compromise peace with Israel while pursuing the goal of internal reconciliation between the mainstream secular Fateh faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The determination to avoid a compromise peace at this time was clearly implied on 12 February by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who told Arab League foreign ministers in Cairo that a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel depended on a full cessation of settlement building in the West Bank and Jerusalem, Israeli acceptance of a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.

  These demands chime with the assessment made by one Israeli diplomat following the Israeli-Palestinian contacts in Jordan last month, who said: “Every time we start to make progress, Abbas runs away.  This also characterized him during previous rounds of negotiations.  Precisely when Israel starts to show flexibility is when he decides to blow up the negotiations.”

  The effect of Abbas’s speech in Cairo was predictable.  Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Abbas had “turned his back on peace”.  He added: “Instead of entering negotiations to end the conflict, Abbas prefers to unite with the terror group Hamas, the same Hamas that embraces Iran.” 

  This interpretation suits Abbas perfectly as it makes it easier for him to avoid serious negotiations and because it helps him with his relations with Hamas - and it is the Hamas question that is the interesting one.  Some leading Hamas figures in Gaza are against the reconciliation agreement signed in Doha between Abbas and Hamas’s politburo chief Khaled Meshal.  However Abbas is committed to the deal, and there are some very powerful forces pushing Hamas into a reconciliation, including Qatar’s Prince Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.  Furthermore, the more sensible Hamas leaders understand that Hamas’s position within a united Palestinian movement can only be enhanced by the wider advances of the Muslim Brotherhood.  It is Fateh that is in danger of being sidelined, not Hamas.  And the stronger the Muslim Brotherhood becomes in Egypt, Jordan, and (in due course) Syria, the less likely it is that a united Palestinian movement would be forced into compromises with Israel to which Hamas would be opposed.

  So, what we are hearing from Palestinian sources is that Abbas sees 2012 as a year for focusing on domestic issues.  In other words, he will continue to “run away” from any serious talks with Israel,  And whatever Hamas hardliners may be saying to the contrary, a drive towards Palestinian unity while the Muslim Brotherhood consolidates its control of Egypt (and then, hopefully, Syria and Jordan) suits Hamas very well.  Those two factors, Palestinian unity and Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, would transform Palestinian prospects, regardless of what happens in the meantime between Israel and Iran.

• Beijing's fear of leftist backlash

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  In our 25 January issue, we reported that China's elite is engaged in deepening struggle over reform.  The treatment of Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai, following what seems to have been an attempt on 6 February to gain asylum in the US by his right-hand man Wang Lijun, has thrown further light on the intensity of the struggle.

  As we argued in our 25 January issue, a combination of unusual circumstances has been fuelling an increasingly fierce, but only partially visible, debate in China about the direction of reform.  These include the 14 January election in Taiwan, the 20th anniversary of the famous “southern tour” undertaken in 1992 by China’s late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, and the Communist Party of China (CCP) leadership changes due this autumn.

  The tone of the debate has been set by a recent report from the prestigious Tsinghua University which argued that vested interests are blocking further progress in China, which was now stuck in a “transition trap”. 

  The report, which clearly set off something of an internal power struggle, was authored by Professor Sun Liping, who was at one time an advisor to Xi Jinping, currently vice-president and the heir apparent to President Hu Jintao.  The report warns, in particular, about the malign influence of vested interests which are holding back further progress.  The vested interests that are holding back reform were defined at a conference in Beijing on 8 January by Wang Yukai, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, as being government officials, monopoly enterprises, resource industries, and the real estate sector.

  As we reported on 25 January, the charge for renewed reform is being led by the province of Guangdong, whose provincial party chief, Wang Yang, is a protégé of President Hu Jintao.  Wang said on 4 January that reform had to focus on “breaking the constraints of the existing pattern of vested interests”.  Guangdong’s new governor Zhu Xiaodan told his first press briefing on 17 January: “The biggest obstacle to deepening the reforms is the pattern of vested interests.”

  On 18 January, Premier Wen Jiabao also appeared to side with the reformers when he said in Doha on 18 January: “I have repeatedly stressed reform, not just economic reform but also political reform, because it is most important for the government to maintain close links with the people, listen to their views and voices, and improve the work of government in order to develop the economy, improve people’s livelihoods, and bring them benefits.”

  But the sensitivity of the debate has been revealed once more by the Wang Lijun episode.  On 6 February, Wang – who is deputy-mayor and former police chief of the south-western municipality of Chongqing, entered the US consulate in Chengdu and spent the day there in an apparent attempt to win asylum in the US.  The timing was particularly sensitive just ahead of Vice-President Xi Jinping’s departure for a much anticipated trip to the US one week later.  So concerned were the authorities about the Wang affair that they treated it as top secret and imposed a news blackout, even if they were unable to contain internet-based discussions of the incident.

  One of the more interesting aspects of the affair has been the way in which it has impacted on Bo Xilai, whose media appearances appear to have been restricted by the authorities.  According to some sources, local media were told that they needed permission from Beijing to report on Bo’s activities.  An 11 February meeting between Bo and Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper was given only rudimentary coverage.

  Bo is important as he is seen as one of the leaders of the leftist factions within the Communist Party, and Maoist websites such as Utopia and Maoflag refer approvingly to the “Chongqing model”.  They have also been blaming “liberal anti-communist forces” for trying to smear Wang Lijun.  A recent article on Utopia warned against undermining Bo.  It said if he was sidelined “a red movement will soon arise and completely shatter the liberal anti-communist corrupt forces”.

  In the meantime, no one knows where heir apparent Xi Jinping really stands.  He was born into the CCP’s elite, being the son of a revolutionary hero, but he suffered internal exile after his father fell from grace in 1962 during the Cultural Revolution, spending seven years experiencing the extreme poverty of Liangjiahe.  It was probably his Liangjiahe experience that lay behind his 2009 outburst during a tour of Latin America when he complained about foreigners “with full bellies who have nothing better to do than try to point fingers at our country”. 

  The only thing that can be said for certain about Xi is that he has the ability to appeal across the spectrum of politics.  The left will approve of his reputation for not being on the take, his Liangjiahe experience, and his uncharacteristic outburst in Latin America against meddling foreigners.  But the business community also seems reassured.

  However, the danger for Xi is that he will inherit a system in which rampant factionalism will be combined with increasing popular unrest.  The fear in Beijing is that as the power-struggle intensifies ahead of the 18th Party congress this autumn, it could spill onto the streets.  According to Hong Kong sources, on 11 February there were messages circulating on the internet calling for a mass demonstration the following day in Chongqing in support of Bo.  There is no sign that any such demonstration occurred – or at least not on any great scale – but it is a warning of what may be to come and of what Xi may be set to inherit.

• Risk pointers

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  *** Israel reconstituting alternative ‘alliance of the periphery’.  Before the fall of the Shah of Iran, Israel ‘s strategy to mitigate the consequences of being surrounded by enemy states was to forge an ‘alliance of the periphery’ at the core of which were the non-Arab regional states Iran and Turkey.  With both Iran and Turkey now hostile, Israel has been looking for other potential friends, including Cyprus, which Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is visiting this week.  This is a remarkable turn-around, as Cyprus, like Greece, was long seen as one of the more unfriendly European states.  But now Israel is exploiting the antipathy between Turkey and Cyprus/Greece to forge close ties.  It is also doing this with Romania and Bulgaria.  With tension between Cyprus and Turkey mounting over Cyprus’s intention to develop off-shore natural gas deposits without first settling the dispute with Turkish-backed Northern Cyprus, Cyprus is gratefully embracing Israel’s support.

  *** Russia’s problem with Russian-made weapons.  On 11 January, Russia’s deputy prime minister, and former representative to Nato, Dmitriy Rogozin, said that Russia must stop buying foreign arms, only doing so as an exception.  Unfortunately for Rogozin, the Russian Defence Ministry is not convinced.  Chief of the General Staff General Nikolay Makarov made it clear in remarks on 14 February that Russia’s arms manufacturers were inferior.  Referring to domestically manufactured weapons, he said: “We have practically stopped buying all the products for the ground forces because we are not happy with a single model.”  One particular area of concern for Makarov is that Russia’s defence industry has traditionally focused on the firing capacity of armoured vehicles and their mobility and manoeuvrability while “forgetting about people’s lives”.  According to Makarov, “the degree of personnel protection is extremely low”.  He said: “Any small mine explosion will lead to the entire crew being killed.”

  *** Clutching at straws over Iran.   A former chief of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, Ephraim Halevy, has been arguing that there is another way – other than sanctions or war - of stopping Iran going nuclear, and that is to do a deal with Russia over Syria.  Writing in the 15 February Yedioth Ahronoth, he argued that such a deal (under which Assad would have to go but Russia would be given a special position in post-Assad Syria) would deprive Iran of its position in Syria and that “the Iranian threat would be removed”.  Something seems to be missing from this argument, because if the removal of Iranian influence from Syria were a certain way to neutralizing Iran’s nuclear plans then it would be difficult to see what all the fuss is about.  Perhaps what Halevy has in mind is that Russia might act to prevent Iran going nuclear if Moscow were given special rights in post-Assad Syria.  But again, it is hard to believe that Moscow has not already been given every possible incentive to bring its influence to bear on Tehran.  Increasingly, the opponents of military action seem to be clutching at straws.