Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

What might seem odd about all the war talk in the Middle East is that it does not include the Palestinians.  It might seem that the Palestinians are just absorbed by their own internal power struggles, but another interpretation is that some astute Palestinian heads are playing a long game as they see the possibility of a transformation in their prospects.

The Palestinians are not much interested in the fate of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, knowing that a Sunni regime in Syria will be as supportive of their cause as Assad’s failing Alawite regime.  As for the Israel-Iran dispute, they know they can only be spectators.  They will do little or nothing to support Iran if it is attacked by Israel because they know that the road to Jerusalem leads through Cairo, not Tehran, and that they need to bide their time while the post-Arab Spring Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy is secured. 

The Palestinian tactics for the moment are to avoid any compromise peace with Israel while pursuing the goal of internal reconciliation between the mainstream secular Fateh faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The determination to avoid a compromise peace at this time was clearly implied on 12 February by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who told Arab League foreign ministers in Cairo that a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel depended on a full cessation of settlement building in the West Bank and Jerusalem, Israeli acceptance of a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.

These demands chime with the assessment made by one Israeli diplomat following the Israeli-Palestinian contacts in Jordan last month, who said: “Every time we start to make progress, Abbas runs away.  This also characterized him during previous rounds of negotiations.  Precisely when Israel starts to show flexibility is when he decides to blow up the negotiations.”

The effect of Abbas’s speech in Cairo was predictable.  Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Abbas had “turned his back on peace”.  He added: “Instead of entering negotiations to end the conflict, Abbas prefers to unite with the terror group Hamas, the same Hamas that embraces Iran.” 

This interpretation suits Abbas perfectly as it makes it easier for him to avoid serious negotiations and because it helps him with his relations with Hamas - and it is the Hamas question that is the interesting one.  Some leading Hamas figures in Gaza are against the reconciliation agreement signed in Doha between Abbas and Hamas’s politburo chief Khaled Meshal.  However Abbas is committed to the deal, and there are some very powerful forces pushing Hamas into a reconciliation, including Qatar’s Prince Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.  Furthermore, the more sensible Hamas leaders understand that Hamas’s position within a united Palestinian movement can only be enhanced by the wider advances of the Muslim Brotherhood.  It is Fateh that is in danger of being sidelined, not Hamas.  And the stronger the Muslim Brotherhood becomes in Egypt, Jordan, and (in due course) Syria, the less likely it is that a united Palestinian movement would be forced into compromises with Israel to which Hamas would be opposed.

So, what we are hearing from Palestinian sources is that Abbas sees 2012 as a year for focusing on domestic issues.  In other words, he will continue to “run away” from any serious talks with Israel,  And whatever Hamas hardliners may be saying to the contrary, a drive towards Palestinian unity while the Muslim Brotherhood consolidates its control of Egypt (and then, hopefully, Syria and Jordan) suits Hamas very well.  Those two factors, Palestinian unity and Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, would transform Palestinian prospects, regardless of what happens in the meantime between Israel and Iran.