Jordan squeezed in Egypt-Turkey push for hegemony
Last Friday we sent out a Special Alert highlighting King Abdallah II of Jordan’s concerns about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The King warned about the machinations of “two Arab states and a regional country” seeking to establish “a new extremist alliance”. The king didn’t identify the members of this “extremist alliance”, but he did attack Egypt’s President Muhammad Mursi for seeking to marginalize Jordan and to harm it by interrupting its gas supply.
King Abdallah’s primary concern seems to be the way in which Egypt and Turkey, strongly backed by Qatar, are seeking to consolidate a Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy in the Sunni Arab world, and that Egypt and Turkey are coordinating closely on such a vision cannot be doubted.
Turkey, under the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is trying to consolidate Turkish influence in all the Arab Spring states that have seen gains by the Sunni Islamist tendency, particularly Egypt and Tunisia. It is also working assiduously for the overthrow of the Alawite regime in Syria led by President Bashar al-Assad and its replacement by Sunni Islamists.
Turkey’s main enemy in all this is Iran, and the collapse in relations between the two was exemplified this week by the last-minute cancellation of the planned visit to Turkey on 17 December by Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The latest cause for tension has been the stationing of Patriot missiles along the Turkey-Syria border – which prompted Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi to warn that this was a provocation that could lead to large-scale war.
That this warning came from Salehi is important. In the past, following threatening remarks to Turkey made by Iranian military commanders and others, Salehi has told Turkey that it should only take seriously remarks emanating from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, President Ahmedinejad or from Salehi himself. According to Salehi, belligerent remarks by other officials could be dismissed as "personal opinions" and not reflective of official Iranian policy.
Iran’s deteriorating relations with Turkey are compounded by the dashing of its hopes for benefitting from the Arab Spring. Its initial hope was that it could benefit from the Arab Spring by getting closer to Egypt and through the increasing influence of Hamas. But the combination of US pressure and concern about the violence perpetrated in Syria by the Iranian-backed Assad regime, has pushed both Egypt and Hamas away from Iran, not closer. This move by Egypt has also helped to allay US fears about any possible Egypt-Iran rapprochement.
But opposition from Iran and civil-war in Syria are not the only problems for Turkey’s vision for an MB-dominated Middle East. First of all, as Jordan has shown, not all Sunni Arab regimes see this as a positive. Secondly, there is a danger that Iraq is once again going to be turned into a major battleground.
Turkey’s plan is to forge a coalition with the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the Iraqi Kurds to undermine the Iranian-backed Shia government in Baghdad. The Shia government in Baghdad, however, is not taking this lying down and is trying to rekindle Sunni Arab animosity towards the Iraqi Kurds in order to re-establish Arab unity in Iraq (albeit under majority Shia leadership). So while the Turks are playing the Sunni card (the Kurds are Sunni as well), Baghdad is appealing to Arab nationalism.
How successful this will be remains to be seen, but there is no doubt that relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad are continuing to deteriorate. This week, Kurdish leader declared that if the federal government implements threatened funding cuts to the region, this would be viewed as a “declaration of war”.
In his first interview for months, Barzani said this week: “Cutting the budget of the region from Baghdad we would consider it as war, a declaration of war and Baghdad will be held responsible for the consequences.”
Then, turning to the question of Iraqi purchases of F-16 fighter jets from the US, Barzani said: “If Baghdad or the federal government thinks about the usage of such things, then we will be obliged to go back to the times when we had to think about how to target the F-16s...We hope this will not be the case, but we have to get ready.”
Meanwhile, Israel is watching all this with alarm. It is more than happy to see Iranian influence curbed, but not at the price of establishing a Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy throughout the Sunni Middle East, of which one of the main beneficiaries will be Hamas. One of the factors that is causing particular alarm for Israel, we are told, is a concerted move by Hamas to rebuild its influence in the West Bank and to re-establish its military presence, particularly in the Hebron and Nablus areas.
One well-connected source told us this week that the relative quiet that has broken out in the Gaza Strip has been matched by increased street-level violence in the West Bank. The quiet period of 2008-12 seems to have come to an end. And a new poll by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research shows that, if an election were to be held today in the territories, Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh would defeat Mahmoud Abbas by three percentage points. The poll indicates that most Palestinians prefer Hamas’s openly declared aim to destroy Israel.
Highlighting their alarm, in recent weeks the Israeli defence establishment has let it be known that it considers the eruption of a third intifada to be only “one incident away”, and the army is making practical preparations for such an outbreak.
The US, for its part, believes it can control Egypt and Turkey, through its aid to Egypt and Turkey’s membership of Nato. It also believes that the Western powers have no option but to support the outcome of the democratic process in the Middle East. Israel is not so sure, and nor is the Hashemite regime in Jordan. The only certainty is continued instability, with further regime change and the possible break-up of established entities such as Syria and Iraq seemingly inevitable. JdeC.
NOTE: Kuwait’s new parliament, which held its first session since the general election on Sunday (16 December), now has 17 Shia MPs out of a total of 50 seats. This is a higher proportion than their share of the population.
The Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat summed up the concerns that this is causing when it wrote on 18 December: “Shiite MPs could well turn their backs on their traditional backing of the government and join the opponents of the PM Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak. Should this be the case, Shiite MPs should make sure not to misuse their power of oversight just for the sake of it, and also ensure that their loyalty is to the State of Kuwait and not to their Shiite sect, or to any outside power [such as Iran]. All eyes in Kuwait – and the Gulf in general – are on those 17 Shiite MPs.”