Courcy's Intelligence Brief

The struggle for power in Egypt, implications for Israel

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What happens in the immediate future in Egypt depends to a large degree on who is officially pronounced winner of the presidential election when the result is announced on 21 June. If, as seems likely, the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate Muhammad Mursi is pronounced the narrow winner (which, by all accounts, he was), then that will presage a prolonged power struggle between the military and the MB over the new constitution, the powers of the presidency, and the holding of a new parliamentary election. It will be a period of uncertainty, but possibly also one of increasing instability. The future will be even more fraught if the official winner is the army’s preferred candidate Ahmed Shafiq. Either way, however much Israel might prefer the army over the Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely that Jerusalem will find much comfort in the latest developments. And this uncertainty will weigh heavily on its mind as it continues to ponder what to do about Iran.

With the Western powers opposed to any overt stealing of the election, Egypt’s military may feel it has to be cautious. But the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) did act audaciously in the immediate run-up to the presidential election with its virtual coup, and it is possible that it will be further emboldened by the apparent reluctance of the revolutionary youth to back the Muslim Brotherhood. The MB-organized protest in Tahrir Square on 19 June was noticeable for its lack of youth support and the predominance of middle-aged men with beards.

If the military does insist on Shafiq being declared the winner, there are huge dangers ahead, with the unfortunate precedent of Algeria in the 1990s being the most extreme. It will be recalled that after the Algerian military intervened to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from coming to power following its sweeping victory in the first round of the 1991 general election (in which they won 188 of the 232 seats decided), a civil war ensued in which between 150,000 and 200,000 people were killed in the next 10 years out of a population of between 25m and 30m.

Apart from being a dreadful outcome in its own right, instability on this scale would entail an inevitable influx of jihadists, increased radicalization, and no guarantee about the eventual outcome. Such large-scale instability would enable jihadist terrorists to flourish in the Sinai Peninsula and to commit the kind of attack seen earlier this week, in which an Israeli workman was killed in a cross-border incident. An escalation in such attacks would in turn lead to increasing tension between Israel and Egypt, possibly to the level of military clashes. There would be Israeli demands for the Egyptian military to impose a security solution on the Sinai, or, in the worst case scenario, a move by Israel to do this itself.

Faced with these dangers, and strong Western opposition to a stolen election, our sources in Cairo say that it is most likely that Mursi will be declared the winner. And, they say, this becomes even more likely when one considers how successfully the military has stacked the constitutional deck in its favour. Under its 17 June declaration, the SCAF has taken over all legislative powers following the earlier supreme court ruling that the parliamentary elections were unconstitutional. It has also retained complete control over army affairs and it will have a significant role in the writing of the new constitution.

Its role in the writing of the new constitution is key. According to the 17 June provisions, if the president of the republic, the head of the SCAF, the prime minister, the Supreme Council of the Judicial Authorities, or one-fifth of the members of the constituent assembly declare that the constitution includes wording that contradicts the "goals of the revolution and its basic principles" or "the principles mentioned in previous Egyptian constitutions", then any of them has the right to ask the constituent assembly to reconsider the text within 15 days at most.

If the constituent assembly insists, the case will be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) which will make a final decision that shall be "binding to all". The SCC is, of course, the pro-military body which ensured that the military’s presidential candidate could run in the election despite being a former Mubarak regime prime minister and which declared the parliamentary elections invalid.

And the military has a further lock on the constitution-writing process. If, for some reason, the constituent assembly fails to complete its work in writing the constitution, the SCAF will form "within a week", a new constituent assembly that represents "the segments of society" to draft a new constitution within three months from the date of its formation.

In the meantime, while the president can form a government, ratify and reject laws, and even declare war, he can only do so with the approval of the SCAF. In the case of unrest inside the country, the president can ask the armed forces to maintain peace and protect state institutions, but also only after the approval of the SCAF.

So, for all these reasons, we expect the military to hold back from an outright coup and for Mursi to be declared president. But this will be the beginning of a prolonged power struggle in which the outcome of the re-run general election will be crucial. Once a new parliament is elected, the SCAF will have to hand the legislative power back to parliament even if the SCAF will have secured its own position through the writing of the new constitution.

From Israel’s perspective, a weak Muslim Brotherhood government moderated by a constitutionally entrenched military is a relatively positive outcome given the alternatives of a fully-fledged MB takeover or a descent into Algerian-style chaos. However, one key consequence of the past 18 months cannot be undone, namely the fact that Egyptian public opinion can no longer be completely ignored, as it was under Mubarak. And there can be no doubt about the nature of Egyptian public opinion. The revolution may have been spearheaded by young urbanites, but mass public opinion in Egypt is Islamist, not liberal. This, say sources in Jerusalem, is why Israel will continue to plan on the basis that it cannot rely on peaceful relations with its southern neighbour persisting forever. JdeC.

Something maybe afoot in North Korea

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Since the diplomatic furore over the failed test of a long-range rocket in April, North Korea seems to be on something of a diplomatic offensive.

On 15 May, North Korea’s number two, Kim Yong-nam, visited Indonesia and Singapore for discussions on trade and investment. On 5 June, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister Hor Namhong visited Pyongyang for talks about how to resume the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme. A delegation led by a secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-il, has been visiting Laos, Vietnam, and Burma. And Pyongyang has accepted an invitation to attend the 19th Asean Regional Forum in July.

Trying to divine what is happening within North Korea’s policymaking inner circles is usually unproductive, but sources in the region do believe there could be a power struggle going on between the hawks and doves around the new leader Kim Jong-un.

The military seems determined to protect its position in the state by keeping up tensions with South Korea. And, as we reported last week, South Korean sources say that they have discerned “an unusual amount of military activity” recently. Kim Jong-un is said to have ordered an increase in the duration of military exercises, and Pyongyang has also been increasing its anti-Seoul propaganda through China-based social networking services. On the other hand, the North’s foreign ministry said last week that there were no plans to carry out a nuclear test, which was seen as a conciliatory gesture.

The power struggle, if that is indeed is what is happening, could be further influenced by divisions over how to approach the final stages of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s term, which ends next February, and the associated election of his successor in December. Another possible factor putting pressure on Pyongyang is the fact that South Korea has been improving its own relations with regional countries that have traditionally been relatively supportive of North Korea, such as Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma.

Indonesia, which claims to be “neutral” on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, is deepening ties with Seoul. It will have been noted in Pyongyang, for instance, that when Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudyohono visited South Korea for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit from 26-27 May, he was the only one of 53 visiting world leaders to be treated as a “state guest”. South Korea and Indonesia are also to sign a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with a view to increasing bilateral trade to $50bn by 2015 and $100bn by 2020.

Trade between Cambodia and South Korea is also surging, up 35% in the first quarter of 2012, and recently South Korea donated 200 military trucks to Cambodia. As for Burma, last month President U Thein Sein met South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak and reportedly promised not to buy any more weapons from Pyongyang. As part of its opening up, Burma is set to develop economic cooperation with South Korea and to collaborate in the development of energy and other resources.

Relations with China also appear to have cooled since Kim Jong-un came to power in December. According to Beijing-based international relations professor Shi Yinhong, quoted by the Japanese news agency Kyodo, “China is unhappy with the new leadership because it has exhibited bad behaviour, such as proceeding with the [April long-range rocket] launch despite international opposition, repeating provocative actions against South Korea and showing few friendly signs toward China". The professor added: "The launch caused deterioration in China's relations with North Korea. Chinese leaders were disappointed and offended by North Korea's new leadership."

At the same time as this apparent deterioration in North Korea’s diplomatic posture, there is no weakening in the resolve of the US and South Korea to fend off any North Korean aggression. On 14 June, South Korean and US defence and foreign ministers issued a joint statement pointing to North Korea’s continuing pattern of “defiance and provocative actions”, coupled with its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and they warned: “This behaviour will be met with solidarity from all threatened countries.”

On 22 June, US and South Korean forces are to conduct their biggest-ever joint artillery drill at Pocheon, timed to coincide with the 62nd anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War. From 21-22 June, South Korea, Japan, and the US are due to stage a joint naval exercise in South Korean waters around the island of Jeju. And on 18 June it was reported that US forces in South Korea (USFK) are increasing their capabilities with a plan to deploy surface-to-surface long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) artillery. A USFK official said: “We are aiming to extensively reinforce the forces before the end of the year.”

Europe still looking for free ride in Asia

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In our 28 March issue, we looked at a report from the EU-funded Europe-China Research and Advice Network (Ecran) on the economic opportunities presented by China’s 12th five-year programme (12FYP). The report was particularly notable for the cynicism of its view that because China poses no military threat to the European Union, the EU can leave concerns about the ‘China threat’ to the US and that this is “something that promises to benefit the EU in its engagement with China”. Another influential EU institution, the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), has just published a joint survey of EU and US foreign policy experts on the Asia-Pacific – Transatlantic strategies in the Asia-Pacific - which throws further light on this growing trans-Atlantic divide on Asia policy.

This latest EU expert report on relations with the Asia-Pacific lacks the cynicism of the Ecran report. However, it cannot conceal the many divergencies with the US. It seems to contradict Ecran when it argues that “it would be erroneous to believe that due to a lack of geographical proximity, Europe has no role to play in this area apart from purely an economic one”. Nevertheless, in an echo of the Ecran injunction that the EU should avoid getting involved in controversial issues, it says: “The EU has a broad range of options to choose from and decide where it wants to get involved, in which way, and with whom.” According to the EU experts, the issues on which the EU should mostly involve itself, apart from promoting its economic and trade interests, are the largely anodyne ones of promoting regional integration and global governance issues.

Further echoing the Ecran report’s priorities, the EUISS survey found that while 88% of European experts viewed trade and investment issues in the Asia-Pacific as of great importance to EU interests, only 14% considered territorial disputes to be so. It is also important to note that although both the EU and the US attach great importance to trade and investment issues, this does not necessarily mean that they believe in cooperating on such issues. On the contrary, a majority of European experts expressed the view that closer cooperation with China is more important that closer cooperation with the US.

The EUISS report does claim that its findings “demonstrate a substantial potential for cooperation between the US and the EU in the Asia Pacific”, with the transatlantic partners capitalising on “the different and complementary qualities that each of them brings to the table”. It talks about a “division of labour”, with the US leading on transparency on China’s military build-up and mediation in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation but with the EU, on the other hand, offering leadership in promoting human rights and engaging regional actors on global governance issues.

This does not sound like a particularly equal bargain, given the EU’s propensity to duck controversial issues such as Tibet (a propensity that can only be increased by the crisis in the Eurozone) and given that it would be the US that would be left to deal with the most confrontational issues concerning China’s rise such as its military build-up. More realistic is the report’s warning that “both the EU and US need to be aware of a potential for friction, in particular in areas like the economy and trade”.

Risk pointers

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*** Al-Qaeda speaks to Egypt. Al-Qaeda’s new leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has just sent his 10th message to Egypt since assuming the leadership of al-Qaeda after the killing last year of Osama bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri is Egyptian born, and in April 1995 he wrote a pamphlet entitled The road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo.

In his latest message, a 47-minute audio posted on jihadi websites on 17 June, al-Zawahiri urged Egypt to cancel its peace treaty with Israel and to establish Islamic rule. He also said that a priority goal was to prevent Israel turning Jerusalem into a Jewish city.

*** Israel looking for increased pressure on Iran. On the eve of the latest round of talks between Iran and the major powers, held in Moscow on 18-19 June, Israel called for more pressure from the international community to “make clear there is a credible military option”. Speaking on 17 June, an Israeli official said that the Iranians are “not yet convinced that when the US or others say that ‘all options are on the table’ they actually mean it”. The official said that there was need for “greater specificity” when saying that all options are on the table.

However, nothing in Iran’s approach to the latest round of inconclusive talks suggests that this message has got through. It is continuing to insist that its right to enrich uranium be recognized and that sanctions be removed in return for cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). After the talks, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov admitted that “the differences are very substantial”. The next stage will be an experts’ meeting in Istanbul on 3 July.

In the meantime, those in Israel who fear that the West might in the end prefer to opt for living with a nuclear Iran rather than risk another Middle East war will have had their fears reinforced by the main article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs in which a US academic argues that a nuclear Iran would be stabilizing, not destabilizing. Kenneth N Waltz argues that “by creating a more durable balance of military power in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran would yield more stability, not less”.

Of course, there is no chance of this becoming official Western policy, but it does emphasize a point about which Israel feels strongly, namely that the perspective from Washington (which is 10,000km from Tehran) is entirely different from Jerusalem’s. It is this that makes Israel so anxious about allowing Iran to prevaricate and delay until its nuclear facilities are in the ‘zone of immunity’, by which it means until the point when they become invulnerable to Israeli attack but not to attack by the United States.

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