India shows its distrust of China
The growing and hugely serious tensions generated by China’s rise and increasing assertiveness have been attracting an enormous amount of comment in recent weeks, in part prompted by thoughts of the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I and of where unmanaged tensions can lead. The problem is how to accommodate a rapidly rising power, where to give ground and where to resist. This is often referred to as the ‘Thucydides Trap’ after the Greek historian’s comment on the 30 years of war that devastated Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC. He wrote: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.” As one commentator pointed out recently, out of 15 cases in the past 500 years of a rising power challenging an established hegemon, 11 have resulted in war. For now, most of the tension generated by China’s rise is concentrated in the East China Sea, where China feels able to push Japan as far as it likes because of the obvious constraints on Japan’s reaction. But India’s reaction to China’s rise is just as important and, as an interesting example this week has shown, New Delhi is very distrustful of Beijing even if in general it seeks to avoid antagonistic rhetoric and to show restraint in the face of provocation.
A good example of the restraint exercised by India with regard to China followed the incursion into Indian territory by Chinese troops in April 2013, which Delhi did its best to play down. But India is also a vibrant democracy, and not all elements were as restrained as the government. Former defence minister Mulayam Singh Yadav accused the government of being “cowardly, incompetent, and good for nothing”, and he did not hesitate to define China as India’s “biggest enemy”.
Following further incidents in the summer of 2013, and further fierce criticism not just from the opposition but also from some political allies, Defence Minister AK Antony admitted that India had made a strategic mistake in not responding more rapidly to China’s development of infrastructure along its side of the border. He said: “I have no hesitation to say that China is in a better position than India in terms of border infrastructure. It is a mistake, it is all of us who are to be held collectively responsible for it. It is a historical legacy.” He then added by way of reassurance: “After years of neglect, now I can say that we are moving fast.”
Also, in July, the Indian government’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved the creation of a new mountain strike corps for deployment along India’s border with China. At the time, sources in Delhi said that while the idea for a mountain strike corps had been around for decades, it was the April incident that prompted the move to approve the new corps.
In fairness, in the same way that India’s response to the April incident had been restrained so China responded with restraint to the CCS announcement. The Chinese foreign ministry’s response was simply to say: “The Chinese and Indian governments have signed several agreements on safeguarding peace and tranquillity in the border areas and on taking trust-building measures in the field of the military.”
But this restraint unquestionably conceals underlying distrust, particularly on the part of India, and this underlying distrust was revealed in an interesting fashion on 20 January with reports that the Home Ministry had issued an advisory to the Petroleum and Natural Gas Ministry saying that it should not award exploration and production contracts to Chinese companies for security reasons.
According to local sources, the advisory said: “China is already involved in developing various projects in Pakistan, including those located close to the Indo-Pakistan border. It is advisable that Chinese companies are not given contracts for exploration activities in such blocks and also in blocks close to sensitive defence installations, strategic assets, and in the north-east.”
The advisory added that these restrictions should also apply to sub-contractors, saying: “It would be pertinent to mention that these restrictions may be observed in respect of sub-contracts, leasing the work, consultancy, procurement of equipment, and utilising services for repair and maintenance of the equipment too.”
China may have taken some comfort during the past month from the furious spat between India and the United States over the arrest and strip searching of a female Indian diplomat in New York over allegations of visa fraud and the underpaying of a maid. Following what India considered to be an outrage, New Delhi curbed the privileges of US diplomats in India and asked Washington to withdraw one of its diplomats from the Indian capital.
This week, however, India’s ambassador to Washington, S Jaishankar, put the spat in a context that will give less comfort to China. He said that while India had been “perplexed” by the US’s behaviour, bilateral relations with the US were India’s “most important”. He said: “We are not holding up business, or Pentagon dealings, or congressional dealings…or science programmes.”
Then, in what could only have been a reference to China and its intentional escalation of tensions in the East and South China Seas, he said: “I think as uncertainties mount, as volatility grows, I think people do value a strong American presence [in Asia].”
This is the perplexing point. Everything that China is currently doing is producing exactly the reactions that one would expect but that China deplores, including making it more difficult for the Indian government to resist the anti-China sentiments of India’s hawks; reinforcing the strong urgings from China’s neighbours for the US to continue to deepen its pivot to Asia; and, of course, motivating Japan’s move away from its strict post-war pacifism and towards rearmament. JdeC.