Al-Qaeda's new management
The burning question for Western intelligence agencies is how potent al-Qaeda will prove to be under its new leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The answer to this question rests on three points.
The first is whether the organization can survive the setback of 2 May, that is the death of its founder Osama bin Laden and the associated intelligence losses. The second is how support for the group will be affected by the Arab Spring. And the third is how effective a leader al-Zawahiri will prove to be.
The answer to the first of these three questions must, of necessity, be speculative, but ‘form’ is usually a good guide to future performance. The greatest challenge to al-Qaeda came immediately after the 9/11 attacks, and that it survived the American-led global onslaught and, in the process, inspired (and to a degree directed) a decentralized global jihadist movement is a clear pointer to the resilience of both al-Qaeda as an organization and of jihadism in general.
A far from exhaustive list of successful post-9/11 al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-inspired attacks includes the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the July 2005 London transport attacks, the 2005 Amman hotel bombing, and the 2009 Little Rock recruiting office shooting.
Other examples of post-9/11 al-Qaeda’s resilience and adaptability include the way in which it has employed the internet for communications, propaganda, and recruitment; and its evolution into a decentralized global franchise providing a focus point for dozens of otherwise locally oriented organizations, from the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.
None of this suggests that, in the absence of other negative factors, the killing of Osama bin Laden will prove to be a mortal blow to al-Qaeda.
But what about the Arab Spring? There are powerful arguments for the proposition that the Arab Spring has rendered al-Qaeda irrelevant, but we would urge caution for four main reasons.
The first is that no one yet knows what the final destination of the Arab Spring might be. At the very least, there is likely to be sustained unrest in Yemen, and quite probably in Libya and Syria as well, that could provide space for al-Qaeda to recruit and recoup.
Secondly, it is possible that those countries that do adopt democracy fail to deliver the expected economic dividend, frustrating high expectations in much the same way as Nasserite Arab nationalism did in an earlier generation. It also needs noting that democracy is not necessarily the panacea for jihadist extremism that so many Western commentators are suggesting. Where democracy is mixed with an unfavourable electoral balance, jihadist violence can persist as for example in Nigeria and the Philippines. And even in a quintessentially liberal and vibrant democracy such as Britain, significant numbers of disaffected Muslims (even third-generation immigrants) can look to jihadism to channel their frustrations.
Thirdly, the Arab Spring will not on its own remove the causes for which al-Qaeda was created to fight, namely excessive US influence over the Land of the Two Holy Places (Saudi Arabia); the perceived suffering of Muslim minorities on the Muslim world’s periphery, such as in Kashmir, the Philippines, and Chechnya; and, above all, the existence of Israel.
And, fourthly, if the Arab Spring does indeed render al-Qaeda irrelevant, it is less likely to be because it has satisfied Arab frustrations than because it has provided a more potent outlet for them. Islamic fundamentalism did not prosper in Nasser’s Egypt because Nasser was an Arab nationalist who sought to destroy Israel. It only prospered in Egypt once Sadat had made peace with Israel and made Egypt (in the eyes of most Arabs) a US puppet state. If post-Mubarak Egypt (as seems possible) returns to either its Nasserite heritage or a Muslim Brotherhood version of it, then al-Qaeda might indeed find its appeal diminishes – but that is not an outcome for which the West would be thankful.
In assessing the likely potency of post-bin Laden al-Qaeda, the final point that needs considering is the character and capability of al-Zawahiri himself. Some commentators have presented the new al-Qaeda leader as a weak successor to the charismatic (and wealthy) bin Laden. The intelligence sources we have been listening too are much less sanguine. For a start, they do not believe that the delay in announcing his anointment is a reflection of anything other than logistical problems. The indications are that there was no serious opposition to his elevation.
The same sources suggest that al-Zawahiri is likely to prove to be a better commander than bin Laden. It is pointed out that it was al-Zawahiri who planned the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the 2000 attack on USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden, and the 9/11 attacks.
They also suggest that al-Zawahiri is planning to rectify a strategic weakness of al-Qaeda under bin Laden by elevating Israel as the central target of al-Qaeda’s campaign. While bin Laden was obsessed by the US, mostly because of its domination of Saudi Arabia (particularly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), al-Zawahiri, intelligence sources say, is much more focused on Israel. Indeed, he was the head of the organization that assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 for signing a peace agreement with Israel and visiting ‘occupied’ Jerusalem. Finally, as an Egyptian, he is well-placed (or at least well-informed) to exploit whatever opportunities the overthrow of the Mubarak regime might offer. JdeC.