Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Current tensions in the South China Sea have provided added significance to the consultation meeting on Asia-Pacific affairs between China and the US scheduled for 25 June in Hawaii, and if this week’s security meeting between the US and Japan is an indicator, the US will be determined to get across its resolve to protect its Asian allies from Chinese bullying.  However, an important aspect of the current period of rising tension between China and its neighbours is that, almost unnoticed, India appears to be going out of its way to improve relations with China.

Last week we detailed the recent incidents between China and Vietnam and the Philippines.  We also reported on joint 10-day naval exercise being held by the US with the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.  A further joint US-Philippines naval exercise will be held from 28 June to 8 July in the Sulu Sea, and the US is due to hold joint naval drills with Vietnam next month.

In the past week China has responded by publicising in the state-controlled media three recent military exercises of its own.  Although the military exercises referred to could be seen as routine, small scale, or not targeting neighbouring countries, the fact that China has publicised them in this way is seen as significant - and a warning to the Philippines and Vietnam (where 300 protesters gathered outside the Chinese embassy on 19 June shouting anti-China slogans).

On the other side, the US and Japan issued a statement on Tuesday (21 June) after security talks in Washington in which they recognized the need to continue to address challenges posed by the increasingly uncertain security environment, the list of which included (in an obvious reference to China) “the expanding military capabilities and activities in the region”.

They also specifically urged China to play a “responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity”, to adhere “to international norms of behaviour, while building trust among the United States, Japan, and China” , and to “improve openness and transparency with respect to [its] military modernization and activities and, strengthen confidence building measures”.

The statement also said that Japan and the US “welcome India as a strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner and encourage India’s growing engagement with the region and participation in regional architectures”.  They agreed to “promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, Japan, and India”.

India-China relations

India has long been viewed in the US as a balance to China and as a key component in an unspoken ‘contain China’ policy, and at times it has seemed happy to play this role.  However, there have been some indications in recent months of a move in the opposite direction.  One of these we reported in our 25 May issue.  We quoted a senior Indian official accompanying Prime Minister Singh on a tour of Africa saying that the West was trying to portray the engagement in Africa of both China and India in a negative light to protect its own vested interests.  He said: “The West is setting up Africa as a zone of contention.  They want to play India against China.  They want us to be at each other’s throats.”

Another indication came this week.  On 20 June, an Indian military delegation began a five-day visit to China.  There has been a hiatus in such contacts since last July when China refused a visa to an Indian general because his responsibilities included the disputed region of Kashmir.  The Chinese embassy in New Delhi had also begun to issue visas on paper slips to Indians from Kashmir rather than stamping their passports in the normal way.  This, too, has been resolved to India’s satisfaction, and India has duly agreed to send a delegation to China under a senior major-general, Gurmeet Singh.

India does seem to be engaged in a conscious effort – despite the continued rhetoric of some of its media outlets and a number of outstanding bilateral difficulties – to improve ties with China and to steer away from any suggestion of being part of a US-led ‘contain China’ strategy.

The mood at the recent Shangri-La security summit in Singapore, as we reported on 8 June, was overwhelmingly one of disquiet about China’s intentions.  The dynamic was well summed up by former South Korean presidential adviser Dr Lee Chung-min who said: “China’s basically pushing us all closer...It is too big to contain, yet somehow we at times have to act to constrain China...It’s about understanding , support, and leverage.”  India, which is comparable in national potential to China, does not have the same imperative to huddle together with other scared neighbours for protection.

On the contrary, India is in the enviable position of being courted by all sides.  Beijing, as we have discussed, is clearly moving to remove some of the obstacles to good China-India relations in order to facilitate closer ties at a time when it faces difficulties with its east and south-east Asian neighbours and domestically.  On the other hand, not just the US but Russia also is keen to enhance relations with New Delhi as a hedge against China.

As we have discussed on a number of occasions, Russia has made a strategic decision to develop a close strategic alliance with China.  But residual concerns about long-term Chinese ambitions in Central Asia and the Far East, coupled with a long-standing friendly association with India, ensure that Moscow continues to court New Delhi assiduously.

A number of apparently well-informed Russian media articles on last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit suggested that Moscow was concerned about the growing domination of the SCO by China and that it was hoping to bring India into the organization as a balance to China.  This would seem to be an unlikely development while serious territorial disputes  between India and Pakistan persist, but the suggestions on the direction of Moscow’s thinking are likely to be correct.

It is a good position for India to be in, and New Delhi seems determined to preserve this comfortable arrangement by ensuring that it keeps its distance from any increased anti-China sentiment engendered by the rising tensions in the South China Sea.