Evidence and logic suggest Iran is not serious
In last week’s issue we looked in depth at Iran’s national interests. Since then, Iran’s ostensibly moderate new president, Hassan Rowhani, has spoken at the UN General Assembly where he proclaimed that he was bringing “peace and friendship from Iranians to Americans”. When assessing this overture it is important to understand that none of the fundamentals on the Iranian side have changed, but they might be changing on the US side.
To recap, Iran’s key national interests are twofold. The first is to protect itself against foreign interference, with the 1953 US/UK-backed coup to oust Mohammed Mossadegh as the long-remembered warning of the potentially malign intentions of foreign powers, and with that lesson more recently reinforced by the US support for the Iraqis in their war against Iran in the 1980s, two US-led invasions of Iraq, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the regime-changing bombing of Libya.
The second Iranian strategic goal is to maximize its influence throughout the Arab Middle East through support for the (mostly downtrodden) Shia Arabs, while mitigating the negative effects of this strategy on the Sunni street by unwavering support for the Palestinian cause.
We can see no circumstances in which these fundamentals are likely to change. The goals may be pursued with more or less vigour, but they will not change. It may be premature to say for certain that Iran has no real intention of giving up its nuclear ambitions, but the sceptical view is bolstered by the fact that Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear capability serves both its principal strategic goals, namely enhancing its ability to resist foreign pressure and enhancing its influence in the wider Middle East (as the only power capable of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by Israel).
Further support for this view is provided by the strong opposition to any major compromise coming from powerful sections of Iran’s security establishment. Here are some examples from the past week:
- On 20 September, a statement from Iran’s Armed Forces General Command HQ was issued which said: “America and Western Zionism are the main cause of warmongering, insecurity, and the present challenges facing world peace. They engineer and manage threats against world peace.”
- Iran’s Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari warned on 20 September: “We have never surrendered and will never do so in future against enemies. We have the capacity to stop enemies’ threats in every area in the future.”
- On 21 September, on the eve of Rowhani’s trip to the US for the UN General Assembly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a statement warning: “Historical experiences make it necessary for the diplomatic apparatus of our country to carefully and sceptically monitor the behaviour of White House officials so that the righteous demands of our nation are recognized and respected by those who favour interaction.”
- A senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Major-General Seyyed Yahya Rahim-Safavi, issued a warning clearly aimed at Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arabs in an interview broadcast on 22 September. He said: “Hereby I caution neighbouring governments and tell them that friendship with Iran is better than friendship with America and Zionists. Moreover, enmity with Iran will harm you. Americans will finally leave this region, the Persian Gulf, and we and you will remain. Therefore, it is better for security, peace, economic welfare, progress, and preservation of your rule that you remain a friend with Iran, cooperate with it, and have comprehensive relations, based on progress, peace, and security.”
- On 23 September, the commander-in-chief of the Basij Resistance Force, Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, said that “heroic flexibility” should mean insisting on the “eradication of Israel”. Naqdi added that “nuclear and other negotiations must be pursued with this approach, since the dominance of Islam and the guardianship of the jurisprudent, as well as defending the oppressed, is our revolutionary flag”. He concluded: “These values will not be forsaken by any means at all.”
The phrase “heroic flexibility” had been used by Khamenei on 17 September, in a meeting with commanders of the IRGC, as suggesting the need for a new approach in negotiations with the Western powers.
- Also on 23 September, the deputy chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Masoud Jazayeri, warned against optimism about talks with the US. He said: “Optimism towards US suggestions and US propaganda is not accepted in the grand policies of the Islamic Republic…The USA has arrogant characteristics and it has shown in practice that it cannot free itself from these dominating characteristics. It should thus be viewed with pessimism.”
There can be little doubt that the drive for a more conciliatory approach to the Western powers is coming from the increasing effect of economic sanctions. According to the Islamic Consultative News Agency (ICANA), in the year to 20 March 2013 the Iranian economy contracted by as much as 5.4%, the worst performance in more than two decades and a stark contrast to the 8.75% growth recorded 10 years ago, in 2003. Inflation is now running at 39% year-on-year.
It is also coming from public opinion, which made its preferences clear in the election of Rowhani as president in June.
But the hardliners also have factors working in their favour, and these include the clear preference of the United States to avoid further military adventures in the Middle East. On 23 September, Keyhan newspaper reflected a strong segment of Iranian opinion when it argued that as the US was showing signs of weakness this was not the time to compromise.
It argued: “Saddam attacked Iran with a US green light. If the imposed war aimed to overthrow Iran’s Islamic regime and restore the old regime, as all historical documents maintain, we are pleased to say that we were victorious and the enemy failed to achieve its objective. Had the Americans reached even some of their goals in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Palestine, they would have attacked Syria without the slightest concern. Those bitter experiences and failures sparked opposition from the American people, the Congress, and the world, and Washington was finally forced to retreat from attacking Syria. We maintained respect and dignity, but the Americans were humiliated and embarrassed. We defeated the enemies in the war and they failed to achieve their objectives. With all our success, honour, and pride, talking about the need to restore relations with America is shameful and idiotic.”
A further tactical positive, from Iran’s point of view, is the (once again) rising threat of Sunni-based jihadism – as exemplified in recent days by the terrorist outrage in Nairobi. Iran may be seen in the West as an extremist power, but it is clearly at odds with the Sunni jihadist forces now dominating the opposition in Syria, and it opposes the spread of jihadism into Central Asia. It mostly supports terrorism only if it is aimed directly at Israel (Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas). The rise of Sunni-based jihadism, therefore, might give further pause to US anti-Iranian policies, particularly in Syria.
The past week or so has seen 140 people killed by Islamists militants in Nigeria, 60 killed in an attack on a church in Pakistan, and at least 72 killed in Nairobi. As a terrorist specialist wrote in the Israeli newspaper Maariv on 23 September: “Last week alone some 500 people were killed across the world by Islamist terrorists. In recent years, that had been the monthly average. In the past few months the number is consistently rising. In Iraq, Nigeria, Yemen and now in the conflict in Somalia that has spilled over into Kenya. And, of course, in clashes in the Sinai. The jihad is moving up a gear.”
That analysis failed to mention Central Asia where there is also increasing evidence of renewed activity. On 22 September, for instance, 10 suspected al-Qaeda operatives were detained in Dushanbe. They were thought to be plotting terrorist attacks to coincide with the 6 November presidential election.
India is also reporting increased activity. According to Indian intelligence sources, the Al-Badr group is once again trying to infiltrate operatives from Pakistan into Indian-controlled Kashmir. Al-Badr was active in Kashmir in the late 1990s but has not been detected in recent years. In all, there are currently said to be 250-300 militants waiting to cross over into Kashmir.
Russia is also greatly concerned about the radicalizing effects of the Syria conflict. On 20 September, Sergey Smirnov, deputy director of the Federal Security Service, said that 300-400 Russian citizens had gone to fight in Syria. He added: “They will come back and, naturally, it presents a great danger.”
And France, which is most concerned about northern Africa, is warning about a “jihadist arc of crisis”. On 19 September, France’s President Francois Hollande declared during a visit to Mail: “We have won this war.” Few believe him, other than in the narrowest sense of driving jihadist groups out of northern Mali. As France’s Liberation put it on 23 September: “Since Operation Serval was launched in January, bloody attacks have taken place in Algeria (at the In Amenas natural gas site), Libya (Tripoli and Benghazi), Niger (Agadez and Arlit), and let us not forget the deadly confrontations in Tunisia between soldiers and Islamists. The Boko Haram Islamist sect that is active in Nigeria claimed responsibility for the abduction of a French family…in northern Cameroon and, according to many experts, the group is posing a threat…to neighbouring Chad.”
Paris, points out Liberation, has troops in Chad, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire and “is preparing for a disguised long-term war”. French special forces are also stationed in Mauritania and Burkina Faso and units remain in Mali. There is also talk in Paris of a deployment of French forces to Niger.
For Iranian strategists, all this is helpful as it weakens Western resolve to pursue regime change in Syria, and it weakens Western resolve for further military adventures. Even the military intervention in Libya, hailed as a success at the time, is now seen to have had difficult and unforeseen consequences, feeding the “arc of crisis” that so frightens French experts.
Libya, of course, has a special resonance for Iran, as Colonel Gaddafi’s ending of his nuclear programme, eschewing of weapons of mass destruction, and turn towards the West in a much trumpeted UK-brokered rapprochement did nothing to save his rule or even his life when the West chose to support the Arab Spring uprising against his rule.
Finally, from the Iranian perspective, there is the welcome recent diplomatic performance of Russia which was so influential in heading off a Western military attack to punish the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons. All-in-all, these are powerful arguments for those in Iran against making substantial concessions to the West. A change in tone maybe tactically astute (feeding, as it does, the West’s preference for prevarication), but a change in substance (the hardliners can argue with force) is very far from justified. We think this view will prevail. JdeC.