Netanyahu's state of mind
In our 13 June issue, ahead of the P5+1 talks with Iran in Moscow, we said that a key element in defining the speed and extent of any escalation of the confrontation with Iran would be the state of mind of Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his closest advisers – and we added that a major factor in determining Netanyahu’s state of mind would be the outcome of the Egyptian presidential election. The Iranian talks duly failed to produce any satisfactory advance, and we now know how the elevation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Mursi to the Egyptian presidency is being viewed in Israel.
From Israel’s perspective there was nothing positive to emerge from the 18-19 June talks between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1), but perhaps the most disappointing aspect has been the Russian position. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to assert after the talks that Russia and China were fully supportive of the Western line. She said: “One of the real successes of our diplomatic strategy towards Iran...is that the Chinese and Russians are part of a unified stance that we have presented to the Iranians.” She added that the Iranians “have been surprised” by the unity of the P5+1.
Our information, however, is that the impression that the Iranians have taken back from Moscow is a different one. A number of sources close to the Kremlin have been saying in public that there will be no progress unless Iran’s position is taken into consideration and that, therefore, the blame for the lack of progress lies in particular with the US, Britain, and France. That is exactly Tehran’s own line. And it will have been equally encouraged by the reported 40% month-on-month increase in Chinese purchases of Iranian oil recorded in May. It was always extremely likely that Iran would continue to prevaricate without making any meaningful concessions, but the lack of pressure from Russia and China has made that a certainty.
This has not led to an immediate crisis. Israel knows that it must wait a respectable time for the 1 July EU embargo on oil purchases from Iran to have an impact. On the other hand, Israel’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak has reiterated that he believes it is only a matter of time before stronger measures are required. Following the Moscow talks he said: “By the third meeting in a negotiation, you know whether the other party intends to reach an agreement or, alternatively, whether he is trying to play for time to avoid a decision. It seems to me that the Iranians keep defying and deceiving the whole world...We cannot afford to spend another three rounds of this nature just to allow the Iranians to keep manoeuvring.”
No one outside the inner sanctums of the US and Israeli security establishments knows what plans there are for dealing with Iran it if refuses to give ground. For those on the outside, the main unknowns include what level of Iranian compromise would be acceptable to the US; would the US be able to force Israel to accept the same level of compromise; would Israel risk acting alone if there were a fundamental disagreement with the US over what residual Iranian nuclear programme would be acceptable; and what is the timescale for decision making?
Another key unknown arises from the split in Israel’s security establishment over the wisdom and practicality of military action, most particularly military action carried out without the full support of the US. It is on this point, we believe, that the outcome of the Egyptian presidential election is important. As we have argued many times, Israel is secure against conventional attack for as long as Egypt remains a non-belligerent. The old Middle East saw that you can’t make war without Egypt (or peace without Syria) remains as true today as when it was coined.
The only circumstances (if indeed there are any) in which Israel might accept a nuclear or near-nuclear Iran would be under the severest American restraint. But even that most doubtful of caveats would become even more doubtful if Israel felt that there was a realistic prospect of Egypt turning hostile, which is why Israel’s reaction to the election of Muhammad Mursi is so important.
The official reaction, it is true, has been restrained, but the unofficial reaction of Israel as mirrored in the media has been one of almost unanimous horror. Here are some examples:
- Yedioth Ahronoth headlined its five-page day-after coverage with a reference to the biblical plagues, calling Mursi’s election the “plague of darkness”. One of the paper’s columnists wrote: “The day may not be far off when the cornerstones of the fragile peace with Egypt are smashed once and for all...It is expected that within six months we will see Egypt’s true colours.”
- For Maariv’s Ben-Dror Yemini, “the penny dropped yesterday”. He added: “It’s over: the army will remain in a position of influence, but its time has passed. The street, tradition, religion, the inbuilt Islamist identity – all of these have ridden roughshod over hope, which has been turned into an illusion...Tunisia and Libya have fallen. Now it’s Egypt’s turn. Syria is also knocking on the door.”
- Also in Maariv, Oded Granof argued that although the US hoped that Egypt would adopt the Turkish model, the problem is that the Muslim Brotherhood has already told Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that it does not see the Turkish model as suitable for Egypt. Yemini doesn’t think the Turkish model is very comforting anyway, saying that it is “dangerous and insidious and involves the systematic destruction of all the civilian centres of power in favour of a slow but sure process of Islamification”. He adds: “The only thing recommending the Turkish model is that the Iranian model is worse.”
- Haaretz has shown less concern than the others, arguing that the Muslim Brotherhood will not be free to do as it pleases. However, it also notes that “Mursi was a founding member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Committee to Fight the Zionist project”.
- Maariv’s Granof also argued that Mursi might be constrained to some extent by the need to provide for “85m hungry mouths”. He said Islam “cannot provide work for huge numbers of unemployed people...it cannot revive Egypt’s flagging tourism industry, and it cannot save an economy on the verge of collapse”. But these constraints are not seen as positive by Israel Hayom. Columnist Dan Margalit wrote: “The difficulties that Mursi faces will emerge gradually. When he finds it hard to bridge the gap between Egypt’s political and economic interests and the disappointment of the masses, he may be forced to take populist measures. And in the Middle East this usually means inciting against Israel...It is easy to envisage Mursi emulating the Islamic Republic [of Iran].” The paper warned that the people of Egypt had “voted for Islam” and that Israel needed to be ready for demands to renegotiate the Camp David peace treaty.
And nor is it just the Israeli press that sees dangers for Israel in Mursi’s election. Abdelbari Atwan, the editor in chief of the London-based pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi, wrote: “It is certain that the Israelis are trembling in fear of this victory because they will not be facing a servile president from now on; one who kisses their feet, submits to all their demands, and backs all their wars, as was the case before.”
Mursi himself made a reasonably conciliatory acceptance speech in which he said “we will maintain international charters and conventions and the commitments and agreements Egypt has signed with the world”. However, in an interview with the Iranian Fars news agency he was reported as saying that he was interested in better relations with Tehran and that: “This will create a balance of pressure in the region, and this is part of my program”.
It was later denied that Mursi had said this, but it is certain that Iran is making a concerted effort to build a relationship with the new Egypt. The counter pressure is coming from the United States (which of course has huge leverage) and the Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia. However, the Gulf states are no friends of the Muslim Brotherhood and may have limited influence. Saudi Arabia’s late crown prince, Nayif bin Abdelaziz was known for his view that the MB were the “source of all evil”. Elsewhere in the Gulf, General Dahi Khalfan, the commander of Dubai’s police force, has been Tweeting fiercely against the MB.
Then there is Turkey, whose opposition to an Egyptian rapprochement with Iran may not be as clear cut as might be thought. Back in March we first reported on talk in Ankara about reaching a “grand bargain” with Iran. It appeared that those advocating such a path had been defeated when it became clear that Turkey was allying itself with the Iraqi Kurds led by Masoud Barzani and Iraq’s Sunni Arabs against the pro-Iranian Shiites led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. However, since the Egyptian presidential election there have again been voices raised in Ankara arguing for a new Turkey-Egypt-Iran alignment. Given opposition from the US, such an alignment may be unlikely to mature, but the fact that it is being advocated by powerful voices in Ankara is a further indication that a return to the close relations that Israel until recently enjoyed with Turkey is not on the cards.
The practical consequences of what is happening in Egypt are already being felt. On 26 June it was announced that Israel is to deploy radar systems along the border with Egypt to detect rocket attacks from terrorists operating in the Sinai. The tension-creating possibilities of this do not need elaborating.
The point is that everything is in flux in the Middle East, but there are almost no scenarios (short of a sudden and completely unexpected counter-revolution in Iran) that are positive for Israel: just bad outcomes and even worse ones. For instance, a defeat for Iran in Syria would entail the replacement of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime by something equally anathema, probably to be followed by increased Islamist pressure on the Jordanian monarchy. And even if Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood does not become overtly hostile, it will not be friendly.
The final wild card is Russia, whose contribution to the Middle East continues to be muddled. On the one hand it is doing everything it can to shore up the Assad regime and to prevent serious pressure being applied to Tehran. Yet, on the other, suggestions continue to be made, including during President Vladimir Putin’s visit this week to Israel, that the Kremlin might not be overly upset by an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is easy to see why Israel might be keen to encourage such an impression, but denials from the Kremlin have been unconvincing.
Our conclusion from all this is that since the failure of the Moscow talks to produce any definitive progress, Netanyahu’s views can only have hardened. The counter-forces remain strong - including opposition to action within Netanyahu’s own security inner circle and of course from the Obama administration. But what is happening inside Netanyahu’s mind is what is really important. JdeC.