EU report points to split with US over China
Two weeks ago, we provided a briefing on US-China relations. A recent report from the EU-funded Europe-China Research and Advice Network (Ecran) on the economic opportunities presented by China’s 12th five-year programme (12FYP) indicates a large and growing gulf between European and US perceptions of China. Europe, which has relied upon the US for its security for nearly 70 years, apparently believes that China’s threat to US interests in Far East is none of Europe’s business, and that EU unconcern about China’s actions in the Far East is “something that promises to benefit the EU in its engagement with China”.
In our 14 March briefing, we noted that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s diplomatic words about the importance of China and her assurances that the US is not following a “contain-China” policy could not hide the underlying unease. This unease was apparent in the sub-text of her speech to mark the 40th anniversary of Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China. And, as we pointed out, the unease is even more explicitly displayed in the regular hearings conducted by the United States-China Economic and Security Commission (USCC). We quoted extensively from the latest USCC report on cyber-espionage and warfare capabilities.
During the past week, on 26 March, the USCC has heard further testimony on “Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities”, and once again the bulk of the testimony displayed uncertainty and concern about China’s capabilities and intentions. On the nuclear front, Mark A Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute noted: “As the United States and Russia continue a concerted effort to reduce the role and importance of nuclear weapons, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains the only original nuclear weapons state that is increasing its arsenal.”
Dr Mark B Schneider of the National Institute for Public Policy, noted that the current US estimate for the Chinese nuclear arsenal is “a few hundred weapons”, however, he added: “Republican Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee in their report on the New START Treaty estimated that the Chinese nuclear force would grow to 600-1,000 weapons over the next decade. I believe we ought to take this assessment seriously. Even a thousand weapons may underestimate the scope of the Chinese nuclear force 10 or 20 years from now.”
Schneider concluded his testimony by warning: “The PRC’s nuclear threat is serious not least because it is in the context of a general military build-up that is aimed at combating the United States and enabling the expansion of Chinese power in the Pacific...China is beginning to throw its weight around and its actions have generated serious security concerns in the Far East...No other country has increased its military spending by double digits for 20 years with the intent of a ‘peaceful rise’.”
The contrast with the tone of the report from the EU-funded Europe-China Research and Advice Network could hardly be more marked. Noting that the “China-threat discourse” emanates largely from the US, the Ecran report boldly states: “We would suggest that arguments about a ‘China threat’ should be viewed through Sinocentric and Eurocentric prisms. We should bear in mind too that China poses no military threat to Europe. Nor is it an exporter of international terrorism. Its sphere of influence is primarily East and Southeast Asia...where it seeks to protect its borders and to safeguard oil exploration projects in the South China Sea. It also aspires to develop a second line of defence through a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and potentially the Pacific. But in neither case are European interests directly involved – something that promises to benefit the EU in its engagement with China.”
This is quite a statement in that it seems to accept without question that China’s bullying actions in the East and South China Seas are legitimate acts “to protect its borders and to safeguard oil exploration projects” within its “sphere of influence”. Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam would take a very different view. Washington might also be surprised to see the European Union taking quite such an insouciant view about US interests in the Asia-Pacific when it is the United States that still ultimately provides the security for Europe.
The EU’s motivation is clearly economic, and the premise of the report is that China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, issued in March 2011, provides a blueprint for how the EU can maximize its economic engagement with China. It is, as the report puts it, “a signpost to opportunities”. The sectors in which the report sees the EU standing to gain most are listed as: high-tech industries such as telecommunications and aerospace; social welfare insurance (pharmaceuticals, hospitals, care homes); clean energy; consumer products (especially luxury goods); and services such as finance and insurance.
It is the suggestions for deepening collaboration in high-technology that will most concern the US. The EU report talks about science and technology being “at the heart of bilateral cooperation”, and it recommends that “wherever possible, EU Member States should undertake projects jointly with China rather than from what might be interpreted as an adversarial posture”.
The final message from the Ecran report is that China has little to fear from Europe on human rights. The report says it does not expect any significant political change in China during the next five years, “including in areas of human rights and democratization”; but this doesn’t trouble the authors, who argue that bringing pressure to bear in areas such as human rights should be eschewed as unhelpful. Change, they say, should be left to come from within.
To find influential voices within the European Union advocating that the EU should refrain from criticizing China on human rights, and that China’s behaviour in the East and South China Seas should be accepted as the legitimate protection of territorial and economic interests within its “sphere of influence”, is a dramatic illustration just how deferential EU policy towards China is becoming. Perhaps none of this is surprising given the difficulties that the European Union is now facing, not least with its single currency, but it points to a highly significant shift (should this become official policy) that will go down very badly in Washington. JdeC.
NOTE: China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping, and Geoinformation has issued a statement saying that China intends to issue a map of the South China Sea later this year to strengthen its claim to the region. The statement said: “[The government will] continue the research programme on mapping the South China Sea, making and publishing maps of the South China Sea and its islands with a view to laying out our [territorial] claim.”
Meanwhile, in the East China Sea, China has reacted angrily to the announcement on 26 March by Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura that Japan has registered one of four islands near the disputed Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu Islands by China) as a national asset. The move came after Tokyo earlier this month formally named the four islands. Last August, the government placed the 23 uninhabited islands on which Japan's 200-nautical-mile EEZ is based under state control, but the four islands near the Senkakus were left exempt out of consideration for China. Now one has been designated a national asset. However, the three other islands are unlikely to be registered as national assets because they are owned by civilians.
China reacted to Monday’s statement by saying: “Any unilateral actions adopted by the Japanese side concerning the Diaoyu Islands and their affiliated isles are illegal and invalid and cannot change the fact that they are part of Chinese territory.”