Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Last week we reported on suggestions from sources in Ankara that Turkey might be looking at ways of reaching a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran in an attempt to minimize the fallout from the crisis in Syria and to prevent the prospect of a break-up of Iraq.  However, as we said, there is no certainty that Ankara would be able to pull this off, even if allowed to try by Washington, and so key policymakers in Ankara are also looking at contingency plans.  But these, too, are fraught with difficulty.

The Plan-B that Ankara is considering is the antithesis of a grand bargain with Iran; it is to try to forge a Turkish-backed alliance between Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq’s Arab Sunnis in order to undermine the dominance of the majority Iranian-backed Shias and, if necessary, to partition Iraq along such lines.  This would go against years of Turkish policy to maintain the unity of Iraq, but some influential voices in Ankara no longer believe that maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity is a sustainable policy.

The intention would be to undermine the ascendancy of Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and to play on tensions between al-Maliki’s government and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan led by Masoud Barzani.  Ankara, we are told, is making a concerted effort to persuade the Iraqi Kurds that its intentions are not inimical to Kurdish ambitions – or at least to the ambitions of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  As part of this drive, it is trying to find ways of resolving the dispute over the future of Kirkuk province, which as well as being rich in oil has a mixed population of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen but is claimed by the KRG.  Turkey is pushing for an accommodation between the Turkmen and the Kurds in the region.

The wider move by Turkey to forge an alliance between Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and Iraqi Kurds was hinted at in a speech by Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 24 January to parliamentarians of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).  In a warning to the Iraqi prime minister, he said: “Mr Maliki should know this: if you engage in a violent process amid a sectarian conflict in Iraq, it will not be possible for us to keep silent about that.”

The given facts are that that Turkey is trying to find a way of negotiating an acceptable regional settlement with Iran, but this might not be possible;  meanwhile in Iraq the pro-Iranian Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is continuing to strengthen his power at the expense of the Sunni Arab minority, who would welcome any support they can get from Turkey; and that the Iraqi Kurds will take any opportunity open to them to increase their autonomy.  With tensions between Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani and al-Maliki running high, there does seem to be a possibility for Turkey to pursue an aggressive anti-Iranian strategy in Iraq, if that is what is eventually decided upon (or forced upon Turkey by circumstances); however it is a big leap to assume that the ambitions of the Iraqi Kurds can be managed and channelled by Ankara in directions that would suit Turkey.  This leap of faith becomes even greater when the likely reactions of Iran are factored in.  In a bidding war between Turkey and Iran, the Kurds will go with the highest bidder.  So to many in Ankara, the ‘grand bargain’ with Iran still looks the better option.