Two weeks ago we warned against the prevailing assumption that Russia’s anti-Western outbursts (over Libya and missile defence, for instance) could be safely ignored, that they were just bluster mostly aimed at boosting nationalist support for the government in the 4 December elections. The past week has seen a further ratcheting up of Russian concerns over Nato’s missile-defence plans, and the impression that Russia is serious about challenging the West has been reinforced by the news that it is sending warships to the Eastern Mediterranean, and they may include a visit to the Syrian port of Tartus in order to, as a former navy chief of staff put it, “prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict” - in other words to prevent a Nato intervention in Syria.
There is no doubt that the Duma elections have been a factor in the Kremlin’s increasing anti-Western rhetoric in recent months, but they are not that important. There is no serious threat to the ruling United Russia party, even if some opinion polls suggest it could lose its ‘constitutional’ majority which gives it free rein in parliament. Only four parties are currently represented in the Duma – United Russia (315 out of 450 seats), the Communist Party (57), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (40), and A Just Russia (38) – and none of them provides or will provide any serious opposition to Vladimir Putin.
The ruling United Russia’s platform is one of political and socio-economic stability, a strong role for the state in all aspects of domestic and economic policy, and the restoration of Russia as a superpower. While the Communist Party opposes United Russia domestically, being strongly against the ‘financial oligarchy’, on foreign policy it has followed the government line on most issues, including the 2008 war with Georgia and opposition to the expansion of Nato’s anti-missile shield. It has seldom criticized either Putin or President Dmitriy Medvedev (who is now to become prime minister).
The Liberal Democratic Party, likewise, seldom if ever criticizes Medvedev or Putin, and it too believes in a strong Russia. Its leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy describes the party as appealing to people “who support a strong state, patriots and nationalists, political and cultural conservatives campaigning against the erosion of faith and morality, and are to a greater or lesser extent anti-Western”. The fourth party, A Just Russia, also expresses its support (and even admiration) for Putin, although it tries to put itself forward as a social democratic movement.
It can certainly be argued that it is logical for the government to be stepping up its anti-Western rhetoric as the election approaches in order to ‘out-patriot’ the opposition. But, if this were the explanation, it would still be only marginally comforting given the consensus among the main parties. They are all in agreement about the need to restore Russia’s international status by standing up to Nato. The second point is that Putin does genuinely believe that Nato’s propensity to stretch UN Security Council resolutions, as with Libya, and the development of its anti-missile shield, undermines Russian interests. The messages coming out of the Kremlin are not being manufactured just for electoral effect.
The latest Russian response to Nato’s anti-missile plans came with a statement by President Medvedev on 23 November. His main point was that Russia has suggested a joint-development of the anti-missile shield and the creation of “a common security perimeter” for Europe but that the US and Nato have rejected this and have refused to provide any legally binding assurances that the shield is not aimed at undermining Russia’s strategic deterrence.
Medvedev’s statement reiterated that if Nato takes Russia’s interests into account then “we will be able to reach an agreement”. However, if Nato does not, then Russia will take five steps to counter the effects of the missile plan. These are to:
- immediately put on combat duty a missile-attack warning radar station in Kaliningrad.
- strengthen “as a matter of priority” the protection of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.
- upgrade Russia’s strategic ballistic missiles with systems for overcoming missile defence.
- develop contingencies for the destruction of Nato’s missile-defence system.
- deploy, if the above are not sufficient, modern offensive weapons systems in the west and south of the country which “will ensure the destruction of the European component of the missile defence system”.
Beyond these five measures, Medvedev said that Russia reserves the right to abandon further steps towards disarmament and arms control and to leave the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start).
Following Medvedev’s statement, the absence of any obvious signs of a willingness to compromise by Nato has led to further expressions of anger from Russia. For instance, Dmitriy Rogozin, Russia’s permanent representative to Nato, has drawn parallels between the dispute over Nato’s missile-defence shield and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Speaking on 28 November, he said: “The Americans are effectively doing what Krushchev did in the 1960s. They are now deploying their missiles and their weapons near our borders.” He added that “the Americans still have the imperial logic of the Cold War” and that “the less we manage to agree with each other because of the absolutely stubborn position of Washington at these talks, the more our military-technical response will be”.
Rogozin also reiterated what is a common position throughout the Russian political spectrum, namely that “only the strong and self-confident are respected in this world” and that military strength should be at the heart of Russia’s drive to restore its greatness. He said: “We should stop babbling about our former greatness. It is time to restore a new strong and powerful Russia, a new Russian greatness based on the ability to foresee the future and the muscle that should guarantee the country’s defence capability.”
Rogozin’s words are reflected in the budget allocations for 2012-2014. Defence spending in 2012 is planned to be $65bn, which is 20% higher than 2011. In 2013 it will grow further to $81.7bn (+25%), and to $96bn (+17.5%) in 2014. If implemented, these are colossal increases, taking the defence share of the budget from 14.6% in 2012 to 18.8% in 2014.
This all points to an extended period of tension between Russia and the West. However, of more immediate concern is Russia’s despatch of warships to the Eastern Mediterranean. There is some confusion over what is intended, but the Russian battle group will consist of three vessels led by the aircraft-carrying missile cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, and whether or not they visit the Syrian port of Tartus the effect will be to bolster Syria’s President Assad.
Russia says the move was planned a year ago, and Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Nikolay Makarov, has said this week that the expedition is solely for the purpose of long-planned exercises and not linked to Syria. However, given Russia’s strong opposition to Nato interventionism, the timing is fortuitous. As former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Viktor Kravchenko told the Russian newspaper Izvestia earlier this week, the presence of a military force other than Nato’s is very useful because “it will prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict” – in other words a Nato intervention in Syria.
This week has also seen Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov speaking out strongly against an arms embargo on Syria. Once again, he has been drawing on the experience of Libya to explain Russia’s opposition. He pointed out that the arms embargo on Libya only worked because it was imposed on the regime but not on the rebels, who continued to receive arms from France and Qatar. Lavrov said Russia will respond to calls for an arms embargo on Syria by “taking into account the experience that has accumulated in the Libyan example and taking into account how some of our partners behave.” The disenchantment with Nato over Libya has clearly not faded.
Russian sources say that while Russia is being cautious about any expanded purpose for its naval expedition to the Eastern Mediterranean, it is nevertheless putting out a clear message, namely: ‘Syria is a Russian ally; keep your hands off’. Or, as Lavrov said on 29 November: “The most important thing is to stop exercising ultimatums and [to] transfer the situation into the political field.” Intriguingly, these same sources also say that a message has been sent to Ankara warning Turkey that if it goes too far in Syria then Russia could reactivate its support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas.
