Israel: the China delusion
We have been watching carefully the reactions in Israel and elsewhere to the first-ever visit by a Chinese chief of staff to Israel, which took place two weeks ago. This visit followed on from the May 2011 visit to China by Israel’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Israel’s navy commander Admiral Eliezer Merom. That there are elements in Israel’s policymaking circles who see a closer relationship with China as giving a boost to Israel’s international position and as a balance to an over-reliance on the United States is certain: that they are misreading China’s interest in Israel is even more certain.
The pro-China lobby in Israel argues its case on a number of fronts. First, there is the indisputable fact that China is now the world’s number two power and could in due course become the dominant force globally. At the very least, it is an important market for Israel. Secondly, it is argued, China and Chinese society is not by nature anti-Semitic and has none of the reservations about Israel and the Jews to be found elsewhere. Thirdly, China’s only interest in the Middle East is stability and this will encourage it to act as honest broker between Israel and the Arabs and other hostile neighbours. Finally, there are senior politicians on the right in Israel who see getting closer to China as potentially providing additional leverage with the United States, particularly at a time when the Obama administration seems to be less supportive than its predecessors.
There may be something in parts of this, but the counter-arguments are more powerful, and those in the Arab world who see the rise of China as being in the long-term interests of their cause are much more likely to be proved right than wishful-thinkers in Israel’s pro-China faction.
The key underlying fact is that China is very carefully plotting its path to global superpower status, and no calculation of realpolitik will make it other than an ephemeral friend of Israel. Israel is supported by Europe because of guilt, and it is supported by the United States because Jerusalem is a Christian as well as a Jewish cause. China has none of these motivations; it only has the dictates of self-interest, and these all point in the opposite direction.
Oil is a factor, but by no means the most important. It is true that China currently imports 56% of its oil (rising to two-thirds by 2015 according to the latest estimates), and that much of this comes from Arab or Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia (21%), Iran (11%), Sudan (6%), Oman (6%), Iraq (4%), Kuwait (3%), and Libya (3%). However, there is no point having oil unless you sell it, and China’s policy on Israel (one way or another) is unlikely to have any but the most marginal effect on its commercial relations with oil suppliers.
A more important factor is Xinjiang, where China faces Muslim Uighur unrest and is desperate to avoid it becoming a cause for the global jihadist movement. This is one of the reasons China keeps so close to Pakistan, and it is a reason why it will not antagonize the wider Muslim world by overt support for Israel.
The most-important factor, however, is competition with America. As we pointed out in our 17 August issue, American unpopularity in the Middle East remains at exceptionally high levels. In part this is a consequence of its intervention in Iraq, but the US’s support for Israel is an important factor as well. As we reported, according to a recent Arab American Institute Foundation poll, the US has the following unfavourable rating in key Arab states: Morocco 88%, Egypt 95%, Lebanon 77%, Jordan 88%, the United Arab Emirates 77%, and Saudi Arabia 68%.
This astonishingly high unpopularity of the United States in the Middle East provides a strategic opportunity for China that it will not squander by being seen to move closer to Israel. No doubt China does see some advantages in enhanced hi-tech trade with Israel, whether electronic, medical, agricultural, industrial, or military, but this will not be at the expense of its wider relations with the Arab and Islamic world.
China will also know that there are limits to what it will be able to get out of Israel through hi-tech collaboration. As is well-known, massive American pressure prevented Israel from selling China the Phalcon airborne early warning system in 2000 and aerial drones in 2004. And, as was made clear in the latest US Defence Department report to Congress on China’s military and security developments, published last week, US concerns about China are increasing not decreasing - as will be (therefore) its sensitivities on hi-tech transfers from Israel to China.
One commentary on Chen’s visit, in The Jerusalem Post on 25 August, went as far as to argue that “China may be moving away from some of its traditional support for Arab positions...[and] there is little doubt that Chen’s visit...was followed closely and with suspicion by Ankara, Cairo, Tehran, as well as Ramallah.” This, we would argue, is a misreading of what Chen’s visit means. Ankara, Cairo, and Tehran have nothing to fear from China; Israel potentially does.
Israel, of course, is right to talk to China. But its central objective must be to ensure that China continues to view maintaining a stable Middle East as a strategic interest, not to count China as some potential saviour. The biggest disaster for Israel would be if China were ever to come to the conclusion that “delivering Jerusalem to Islam” could provide a short-cut to its long-sought status of global superpower. So talking to China is a legitimate defensive move for Israel, but it is no more than that. For Israel to view its relations with China in any terms other than “keeping your enemy close” (to employ an appropriate Chinese aphorism) would be a dangerous delusion. JdeC.