Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Iran has faced the prospect of emerging either as the big winner or the big loser of the upheavals in the Middle East.  Its worst-case scenario was succumbing to regime-threatening domestic unrest.  Iran has avoided this, but it is increasingly possible that it will lose its key Arab ally, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.  In the circumstances, it is not a surprise to see Tehran turning up its anti-Israel rhetoric.  We noted in our 17 August issue that Iran was “moderating at home but keeping hard line abroad”.  The latter tendency has accelerated further in the past two weeks.

The Assad regime in Syria is a central component in the Iranian-led ‘Shia crescent’, stretching from Iran to Lebanon, that has so worried King Abdullah of Jordan, amongst others.  So Assad’s downfall would be a serious blow to Iran’s regional ambitions, and with the final ousting of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya the position of Assad looks ever-more precarious.

Iran has also been rattled by firm statements from Russia in recent days that “under no circumstances” will Russia supply S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran until UN sanctions have been lifted.  On 24 August, Interfax news agency quoted “a high-ranking source in one of the state structures dealing with arms exports”.  The source was quoted as saying: “The contract for the S-300 is not currently frozen, as some people believe, it has been cancelled.  There can be no question, not even in principle, of implementing it.”

Iran has responded to this by saying that it intends to sue Russia for non-delivery.  It says this is because it believes the contract is not covered by the sanctions and that getting a court ruling to this effect would help Russia.  But the Russians, through the foreign ministry, have said that they would have found it “much more constructive to embark upon a joint search for a mutually acceptable settlement”.  It would appear that there has been quite a rift over this.

Back in the Middle East, other setbacks for Iran include the crushing of the Shia unrest in Bahrain and the increasing pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Hezbollah’s problems come in part because of the difficulties faced by Assad and in part because of the naming on 29 July by the UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon of four Hezbollah suspects in the 2005 killing of Lebanese statesman Hafik al-Hariri.

One well-placed Lebanese analyst says that Hezbollah is facing “a carefully planned isolation strategy”.  The aim is to divide Iran from Syria, Syria from Hezbollah, and Hezbollah from Lebanese public opinion.  Any evidence linking Hezbollah to Hariri’s killing would play into the hands of the opposition, which is led by Hariri's son Saad and whose unity government was toppled by Hezbollah and its allies in January.   Hezbollah’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has talked about attempts to promote sectarian strife in Lebanon in order to discredit Hezbollah.

Faced with such pressure, Nasrallah really has only one option and that is to step up his anti-Israel rhetoric.  Hezbollah’s power is based on its weapons, and its only justification for being armed is the fight against Israel.
The last Friday of Ramadan (26 August this year) is celebrated in the Muslim world as International Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Day, and Nasrallah duly used last Friday as an opportunity to reassert Hezbollah’s total commitment to the destruction of Israel.  He warned against the Judaizing of Jerusalem, he reiterated his belief that “Palestine is from the Sea to the River”, and he praised developments in Egypt as strengthening the Palestinian cause.  Interestingly he also blamed Colonel Gaddafi’s fall on “the crime of distancing Libya from Palestine and its cause”.

Nasrallah’s Al-Quds Day rantings against Israel were more than matched by those of President Ahmadinejad of Iran and other Iranian leaders, and for exactly the same reason, namely the desire to refocus Arab minds on the struggle against Israel at a time when Iran is clearly worried that events could be moving against it.

Ahmadinejad, in an interview given to Lebanon’s al-Manar TV on 24 August, specifically admonished participants in the Arab Spring not to lose sight of the overriding importance of the Palestinian cause in their own demands for freedom.  He said: “Everyone must beware that demanding freedom, justice, and the right to choose their fates must be in line with countering oppression and the Zionist regime.  A supporter of freedom and justice cannot be at peace with the Zionist regime, whose foundations are set on injustice, oppression, and limitation of liberties.”  He added: “The nations that are after achieving liberty and justice should not...ignore the need to counter the Zionist regime, or the hegemonic tendencies of the Westerners, but on the contrary these tendencies, too, must be fortified in their movements.”

At the same time, Iran’s parliament speaker Ali Larijani has been trying to drum up regional support for a conference in support of the Palestinian intifada (uprising) to be held in Tehran in October.

NOTE:  Both Nassrallah and Ahmadinejad in their Al-Quds Day messages expressed support for the Palestinian quest for statehood within the 1967 borders, but only as a temporary measure on the way to full liberation of Palestine.

Ahmadinejad said: “If the establishment of a Palestinian government would be a step towards the liberation of the entire Palestine in the long run, the Islamic Republic of Iran welcomes it.”
Nasrallah said that declaring a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders was a Palestinian decision, however “a Palestinian state shouldn’t be at the expense of rights and borders...we should remember...1948 land and people and refugees”.