Consequences of Egypt's turn to Islam
There does seem to be a degree of denial in the West about what is happening in Egypt. Three Islamist parties polled 65% of the vote while the liberal Egyptian Bloc polled only 13.4%, much less even than the al-Nour Party, an extreme Salafi Islamist party, which took 24.4% of the vote. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won 36.6% while the moderate Islamist Wasat Party secured a 4% share. A common reaction among Western politicians and in the mainstream Western media has been that this unwelcome result mostly reflects better organization on the part of the Islamist trend rather than the extreme weakness of liberal tendencies in Egyptian society. The Reuters news agency, for instance, reported that “Islamist gains at the polls...reflect organizational skills and name recognition that liberal groups have so far failed to match.” Our view is simpler, it is that the results are an accurate reflection of the preferences of Egypt’s 50m voters, and the significance of this can hardly be exaggerated.
The final results of the lower-house elections will not be known until after the last run-off vote on 11 January. Then, before the final shape of post-Mubarak political landscape will be known, there will be the upper house elections between 29 January and 12 March, the selection of a constituent assembly by the new parliament, the drawing up of a new constitution by the constituent assembly, and the June 2012 presidential election. Accepting that the general balance of the new parliament will be Islamist, the two most important remaining issues are who becomes president and the relative power that the new constitution will allocate to parliament and the president (the FJP wants a more parliamentary system whereas the military wants a stronger president through whom it can continue to exercise influence).
As can be seen, there is a lot of politicking still to be done in Egypt, but from our perspective the essential ingredient is already known. Public opinion, which can no longer be ignored, is overwhelmingly Islamist. The coming months will see a huge amount of speculation about what this will mean in practice, both domestically and for foreign policy. Many pessimists foresee a straight-line progression from here to sharia law and the abrogation of the Camp David accords with Israel. We do not foresee such a straight-line progression, but we are very much among the pessimists when it comes to the impact of the Egyptian revolution on Mideast stability.
Domestically, an important modifying factor is that the FJP is in competition, not alliance, with the more extremist al-Nour Party. As one FJP activist put it this week when asked about relations with the al-Nour Party: “We may agree on certain things, but we are different in vision and strategy. It is easier for me to talk with a liberal and a socialist than a Salafi.” The leader of al-Nour, Emed Abdel Ghaffour, may have provided part of the explanation when he said: “We hate being followers.” Given the above, it is possible that the FJP will opt to ally itself with more liberal tendencies, which should moderate its own Islamist attitudes.
On foreign policy, the FJP and its Muslim Brotherhood parent have been vociferous critics of both Israel and the US-Egypt alliance. The FJP’s political programme refers to the “Zionist entity” and describes it as “a racist, colonizing, expansionist, and aggressive entity”. It has also said that international treaties such as Camp David must have public support to be sustainable. With regard to the US alliance, FJP Secretary-General Saad el-Katatni has said: “Any country that relies upon aid is a slave to others’ policies, and Egypt’s will must be freed.”
These comments certainly reflect the FJP’s true instincts. However, there are also signs that the FJP is prepared to be pragmatic, in the short-term at least. For instance, Deputy FJP leader Essam el-Erian has also said of Camp David: “It is a fact we have a treaty. We are not going to end it.” And as for the American alliance, whatever el-Katatni may wish $1.3bn in US military aid is a lot to give up, particularly given the need for any new government to appease the Egyptian military.
The FJP has also indicated that it might be reluctant to jeopardise tourism by banning alcohol and skimpily clad female tourists, or to risk inward investment by a dash towards all-Islamic banking. Hassan Malek, a business strategist for the Muslim Brotherhood, says: “We want to attract as much foreign investment as possible...There needs to be a big role for the private sector.” This is certainly true given that Egypt has a surging budget deficit, debts amounting to 85% of GPD and rising, and severely depleted foreign reserves. The economy, which had been growing at nearly 6% per annum before the uprising, will grow by only 1.3% in the year to June 2012, which is below the population growth rate of 1.7%.
So, as we said, we do not see a straight-line progression from here to sharia law or to conflict with Israel. But that is only marginally comforting. The key point is that we now know that the colour of Egyptian public opinion is overwhelmingly Islamist, and (on the external front) this must inevitably have an adverse impact on Egypt’s relations with Israel even if there is no formal abrogation of Camp David.
Our sources in Israel say the problem is not a sudden return to military confrontation between Egypt and Israel. The problem, they say, is the fact that a democratically elected Egyptian government (unlike Mubarak’s regime) will have to take into consideration the views of the Egyptian public, which we now know has a 65% Islamist majority.
The practical effect of this is that Israel may not in the future, without serious repercussions, get away with military operations such as the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank to suppress the second intifada, the 2006 Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah, or the 2008 Operation Cast Lead attack on Gaza. Whereas in the past these operations may have been criticized by Egypt, the peace treaty with Israel still held firm. Now, Israeli military planners are saying, no such assumption can be made; which either means Israel must constrain itself when dealing with future attacks from the Gaza Strip, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, or another intifada – or it must, simultaneously prepare to defend itself against Egypt.
So, while we do not expect the advent of a Muslim Brotherhood era in Egypt to lead to an immediate cancellation of the Camp David accords, there are some very easily foreseeable circumstances in which the weight of Egyptian public opinion would ensure a confrontation between Egypt and Israel, which in itself is destabilizing as it means that both Israel and Egypt must prepare for such an eventuality. JdeC.