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Development: On 17 June Lucho Garzón, a former mayor of Bogotá, announced that he was in negotiations with the Partido Liberal (PL) regarding the possibility of his running against President Alvaro Uribe if Uribe seeks a third term in office.

Significance: The talks between Garzón and César Gaviria, the head of the PL, indicate that Uribe's opponents are convinced that Uribe will run again. The president has not confirmed whether he will try to change the constitution to allow himself to run in 2010, but he and his ministers have hinted strongly that he will. On 14 June the vice-president, Francisco Santos, said that Colombia should not fear a third Uribe term and claimed that it was what most people wanted.

An alliance between Garzón, who belongs to the leftwing Polo Democrático Alternativo, and the PL appears to be the opposition's best chance of blocking Uribe's ambitions. Garzón was very popular during his stint as mayor of Bogotá (2003-2007) while the PL is the most respected party in Colombia and possesses a powerful electoral machinery. However, Uribe enjoys an approval rating of above 80% and is odds-on favourite to beat any opponent.

Development: On 21 July Raúl Isaias Baduel, an ex-defence minister, claimed that he had been the victim of an assassination attempt.

Significance: Baduel, who was personally close to President Hugo Chávez before breaking with him last year, said last week that he feared assassination. The police are investigating the incident, but the interior minister, Ramón Rodrí­guez Chací­n, was pointedly non-committal about it: he did not condemn the attack and he also pointed out on 16 July Baduel had speculated that he could be the target of an assassination attempt.

Baduel claims that two cars were involved in the attempt to kill him, at around 4am, just before he got on to the highway from Maracay to Caracas. Baduel claimed that someone from one of the attacking cars lent out of the window and shot at his car three times.

The direction of the attack suggests that the attackers came up the inside of Baduel's car, which had been blocked off by another car. Baduel was being driven by his son, and was sitting in the right-hand backseat of the car. The bullets hit the right side rear door of the car. Baduel had taken the precaution of armour-plating his car.

What is odd is that Baduel immediately returned home after the attack: assassins would almost certainly know where he lived.

The police are investigating Baduel's claim and questioned him for three hours. It is not clear what happened to the attacking vehicles. Baduel admitted that the police had behaved correctly towards him.

Baduel is one of the most prominent former Chavistas to join the opposition. He was a key figure in bringing Chávez back to power after the abortive coup against Chávez in April 2002. Baduel, however, opposed Chávez 's attempt last year to change the constitution to allow him to stand for re-election as president without limit. Under the current constitution Chávez is limited to two terms and the second term ends in 2012.

Baduel claims that the slow investigation by the authorities into allegations that he stole B$11m (US$5m) from the armed forces is entirely political. General Ernesto Cedeño, the military attorney general, said that Baduel's allegation was entirely wrong: Cedeño said that the investigation had nothing to do with politics and was entirely normal. The investigation began in February 2008. Baduel was invited to testify tomorrow (23 July) but has refused.  Cedeño said that things would move on if Baduel agreed to answer questions. Cedeño pointed out that Baduel did not have any privileges that exempted him from due process.

In the last few days Baduel has become more and more outspoken about Chávez demanding that he be ejected from power and argues that summoning a new constituent assembly (which changes the constitution) is the way to do this.

Friday

Panama: Final day of the XII Hemispheric Congress on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.

Saturday

Mexico: The 20th national assembly of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional will take place in Aguascalientes.

Sunday

Guatemala/El Salvador: Trade delegations from El Salvador and Guatemala will meet business representatives from Florida in Miami.

Guatemala: The executive committee for the ruling Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) will hold a meeting to discuss the party's future.

Monday

Honduras: Honduran President Manuel Zelaya will meet his Venezuelan, Cuban, Nicaraguan and Bolivian counterparts - Hugo Chávez , Raúl Castro, Daniel Ortega and Evo Morales - for an official Alba signing ceremony.

Uruguay: Uruguay's President Tabaré Vázquez will begin an official visit Israel to discuss bilateral ties as well as possible cooperation in scientific, health and agricultural issues.

Development: On 25 September the electoral campaign for the   country's proposed new constitution closed ahead of the public referendum on 28 September.

Significance: It is no coincidence that both 'yes' and 'no' lobbies chose to close their campaigns in Guayaquil. The city is Ecuador's biggest and wealthiest, and it is also the main   political opposition stronghold (led by the city's mayor, Jaime Nebot). The campaign, which has been marked by a high level of political polarisation, and even some minor violent incidents, has been at its fiercest in Guayaquil.

Nebot and President Rafael Correa have been at loggerheads ever since the start of the referendum campaign 41 days ago and Correa - who is also a Guayaquileño - is well aware that he needs to win over the city in favour of his constitutional project if he is to avoid major problems with Nebot in the future.

Correa closed his 'yes' campaign in the Albert Spencer stadium with a music festival. Correa and his ruling Alianza Paí­s (AP) hoped to attract some 30,000 people to the festival, with 60-80 busloads of supporters brought in from around Guayaquil. The 'no' campaign led by Nebot ended on a stage in the Monumental de Barcelona square in the historic centre of the city.

The 'yes' vote is likely to win overall nationally - albeit by narrower a margin than Correa would have liked - but there is a chance that it may lose to the combined 'no', blank and void vote in Guayaquil.

If this happens, Nebot has said that he will refuse to recognise the authority of the new constitution, which could lead to prolonged legal and institutional wrangling and may hamper President Correa's proposed reform programs, which are based on the new document, in 2009.

The main criticism of the new constitutional project has come from the political opposition, the private business sector, the Roman Catholic (RC) Church and some private university student unions. The Guayaquil chamber of commerce and other business lobby groups are concerned that the proposed new constitution is statist; would concentrate power in the executive; might not guarantee private property; and could further deter foreign investors. The AP rejects these accusations. It argues that the proposed new economic model envisaged by the constitution is based on the principal of 'solidarity' and puts people, rather than profit, at the heart of the system.

The RC Church objects to the constitution on the grounds that it is pro-abortion and could open the door to gay marriage - also strongly denied by the government. However, the Catholic Church has a major influence in Ecuador and the project's official condemnation by local bishops could seriously affect the outcome of the vote.

Either way, the electorate appears deeply divided and feelings are running high: people have taken to hanging flags from their windows or putting bumper stickers in their cars displaying their support for either the 'yes' or 'no' vote.

Even if the 'yes' vote wins, the 'no' vote is likely to remain a considerable minority, and one which Correa and his AP government cannot afford to ignore. Whatever the result of the referendum, the president will still have to deal with the same problems - and the same powerful social sectors that are determined to thwart his vision for a new Ecuador.

Voting begins at 7:00am (to 17:00) on 28 September. In most cities the mayors will now apply the 'Ordenanza', which requires that political parties begin removing the political propaganda from all public spaces. In addition, the so-called 'Ley seca' ('Dry-law') will enter into effect as of midday today (26 September) until midday on 29 September, during which time the sale and consumption of alcohol in public is forbidden; a common measure in Latin America during elections.

Development: On 28 October the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) said that they were willing to enter talks to negotiate a political solution to the conflict in Colombia.

Significance:   After suffering a series of crushing blows this year at the hands of Colombia's US-sponsored military, the Farc is desperately in need of respite. “This letter is the beginning of a written exchange to discuss the issues surrounding a political end to the conflict, the humanitarian exchange and peace," said a statement posted by the Farc on pro-rebel website Anncol.

The declaration by the guerrilla group, dated October 16 (10 days before the escape on 26 October of Farc hostage and former politician Óscar Tulio Lizcano), came as a response to a letter sent to the Farc on 11 September by a group of prominent Colombian intellectuals, politicians, former Farc captives and journalists that requested a “humanitarian agreement" with the guerrilla group. This letter foresaw the liberation of Farc hostages in exchange for the release “at the opportune moment" of prisoners belonging to the Farc. It is, however, far from clear whether the government will play ball, nor if the Farc would be willing to cooperate directly with President Alvaro Uribe's centre-right administration.

This is not the first time that the Farc has offered to negotiate a political end to the 44-year old conflict. Peace talks were held with the group during the administrations of President Belisario Betancourt (1982-1986) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), which led to the creation of a demilitarised 42,000sq km zone in Southern Colombia (known as Farclandia). These, however, merely served to give the Farc breathing space, which it exploited to regroup, rearm and, ultimately, renew its attacks.  

Nevertheless, the timing of the Farc's latest peace offer is significant.
 
The Farc is arguably at its lowest ebb since it was founded. Uribe's aggressive “Democratic Security" policy - propped up by some US$5bn in military aid from the United States under the “Plan Colombia" initiative - has subjected the guerrilla organization to a military onslaught that has been relentless, well-planned and well-informed. While the Farc is estimated to maintain an army of some 15,000, it is struggling to communicate across its various fronts and it appears to be fractured. In 2008 it has suffered several high profile desertions, the loss of three top commanders - including Raúl Reyes, who was killed in a Colombian raid on a Farc camp inside Ecuador on 1 March - and its founder and historic leader, Manuel Marulanda, or Tirofijo, who died of a heart attack (also in March), and the rescue by the military in July of a group of hostages which included what had been the Farc's most valuable bargaining chip, the French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt.

The escape last week of Lizcano, the Farc's longest held political prisoner, with the help of his Farc captor Wilson Bueno Largo (known as "Isaza") indicates the pressure that the organization is under. "Isaza", who is to receive a reward of some US$500,000 from the Colombian government, said that the Farc are “at this time very reduced as a group" and are facing “internal disintegration".

The significance of the peace offer is also increased by the Farc's recent change of leadership. Following Marulanda's death in March, Alfonso Cano assumed control of the organisation. Cano, a university-educated ideologue, comes from the political rather than military wing of the Farc and led the group's delegations to peace negotiations in Venezuela and Mexico in 1991 and 1992. These talks ultimately failed, but indicated Cano's openness to a political solution.

The Farc has also pointed to its unilateral release in January of six former politicians, following negotiations with Piedad Córdoba, an opposition senator who is heading this latest attempt at peace talks, and Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez , as a sign of its “political goodwill".

However, the Colombian government's involvement may be a sticking point in any future negotiations. The Farc has said that it is willing to enter into talks brokered by the prominent Colombians who suggested the deal in September, but not with the government.  

Meanwhile, Uribe has repeatedly refused in the past to contemplate the creation of a demilitarized safe-zone to allow for the exchange of prisoners and hostages, arguing that this would buy the Farc recovery time and emphasizing the success of Colombia's military operations.  

If, however, a wholesale hostage release and peace agreement is to be reached the Farc and the government will have to agree to embark upon protracted negotiations; at the present time, this appears unlikely.

Development: On 1 December three opposition deputies announced they would not support the bill proposed by the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) to nullify the 9 November municipal elections.

Significance: The announcement is a blow to the PLC and the party of defeated Managua mayoral candidate, Eduardo Montealegre, Vamos con Eduardo (VCE). It suggests that the opposition cannot muster the 47 votes necessary (out of 92) to approve the law, rendering more remote the likelihood that the elections will be nullified.

Two of the deputies, Mario Valle and Juan Ramón Jiménez are independent, while Guillermo Osorno is the president of the Camino Cristiano Nicaragüense (CCN), an ally of the PLC. Their announcement leaves the opposition with only 44 votes - 24 from the PLC, 15 from the VCE, three from the dissident Sandinista, Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) and two independents.

The ruling Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) meanwhile has 38 seats, plus six from the Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) and now the three from Valle, Jiménez and Osorno, providing it with the 47 votes necessary to defeat the bill.

Development: On 15 January President Lula da Silva met his Bolivian counterpart, Evo Morales, in two towns along the Brazil-Bolivia border.

Significance: Following a diplomatic exchange last week over the issue of natural gas, Lula re-affirmed Brazil's political and economic support for Morales. A stable Bolivia (which shares a 3,400km border with Brazil) has long been a foreign policy priority for Brasilia. For Lula, Bolivia has been one of the more testing challenges to his regional leadership ambitions. Lula will use 2009 to consolidate his regional aims for Brazil before heading into a lengthy general election campaign at home in 2010.

The two leaders met in two smaller towns on both sides of the border, where they inaugurated a section of the ambitious inter-oceanic road corridor that will eventually unite ports in northern Chile with those in southern Brazil, via Boliva. The project is being funded by the Andean Development Corporation (CAF).

Lula used the occasion to once again reaffirm his political support for Evo Morales. In September 2008, Brazil stepped in (under the auspices of the new Union of South American Nations [Unasur] to broker a truce between Morales's government and the regional autonomy movements. Lula's mediation, backed by the rest of the region's leaders, restored Morales's political authority.

Lula yesterday (15 January) again expressed his support for Morales' extensive political reform efforts: “A democratic re-founding is underway that seeks to reduce inequalities and value diversity. I am convinced that the referendum on a new constitution (due on 25 January) will be a decisive step on that path", he said.

Of course that political backing must also be supplemented by economic support for Bolivia, traditionally one the poorest countries in the region. Brazil has long offered financial and development cooperation to its neighbour. However economic relations are mainly dominated by gas: Brazil takes around 75% of Bolivia's natural gas exports, and the state energy company, Petrobras is heavily invested in the sector in Bolivia (despite Morales' controversial 2006 nationalisation of the sector). Indeed, Petrobras has long been one of the biggest foreign investors in the country.

Lula promised that Brazil would continue to invest in the natural gas sector and, more importantly, would remain Bolivia's number one customer. He noted that Morales had “been true to his word that there would never be a shortage of gas for Brazil" declaring that, in turn, “there would never be a shortage of Brazilian investors and consumers of this wealth of the Bolivian people".

In 2007, there was another tense dispute when Bolivia said it would divert some of its Brazilian gas to Argentina in order to deal with an energy crisis there - at that time the president of Petrobras, José Sergio Gabrielli, caused a diplomatic affront when he said that Brazil “could not do without a single molecule of its Bolivian gas". (Brazil subsequently agreed to sell at a discount some excess electricity to Argentina).

Despite Lula's promises, the reality is that Brazil is working hard to diversify its energy sources and its recent vast hydrocarbon finds mean that it will eventually be more than self sufficient in energy.

Bolivia, however, has struggled to find alternative markets for its gas - it sends small amounts to Argentina but the infrastructure is not in place to ship more. Chile is most obvious market, however the longstanding political animosities between the two neighbours prevent any agreement.

Who is he? Chauví­n is a former deputy interior minister accused of being a key link between the leftwing guerilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc,) and a gang of Ecuadorean drug smugglers, headed by the Ostaiza brothers.

Why watch him? The former minister is now in custody after being on the run and what he says about the links between the government of President Rafael Correa and the Farc may have a major bearing on the general elections due on 26 April.
 
Date of Birth: n/a

Education: n/a

Public life: Chauví­n is very close to Gustavo Larrea, a former interior minister under Correa who became security minister before resigning in February with a view to running for congress in the upcoming elections.   President Correa has since barred him from running because of the Chauví­n scandal.
 
In January-June 2007, Chauví­n served as deputy minister responsible for political coordination. A month into that job, Larrea appointed him to the Comisión Permamente de Evaluación, Seguimiento y Ajuste de los Planes Operativos de Derechos Humanos in Ecuador. In this post Chauví­n travelled extensively along the border with Colombia where the Farc maintained several bases.

Chauví­n left the interior ministry in mid-2007 to work on gathering names for the constituent assembly elections.

In November 2007, Chauví­n rejoined Larrea at the security ministry, where he worked as an adviser to the minister, though it is not clear whether he was on the ministerial payroll.

Chauví­n claims to have met Raúl Reyes, the late Farc second-in-command, seven times. He said that the meetings were to discuss the possible release of Farc hostages. Chauví­n maintains that he actually met Reyes more often than he had President Correa (who he says he has only ever met in person five times in all). The Reyes meetings, according to Chauví­n, took place between December 2007 and February 2008. The last meeting may have been just days before Reyes was killed in a controversial Colombian military attack on a Farc camp in Angostura, just inside Ecuador, on 1 March 2008.

After the attack, Chauví­n visited the site and is the original source for the claim that the bombing run and the ground attack on the camp was launched from the south (i.e. from inside Ecuadorean territory). The implication is that the Colombian forces worked their way around in order to attack the Farc camp from the side that the guerillas would least expect. This suggests that the Colombians had planned the attack in some detail and that it was not a hot pursuit or sudden attack, as the Colombian military originally claimed.

Time Line:
2006: took part in Rafael Correa's successful election campaign, heading the Movimiento Paí­s organisation in the important state of Pichincha.
2007: Deputy interior minister (January-June).
2007: Political activist for Correa's Movimiento Paí­s movement.
2007: Adviser to Minister Gustavo Larrea at the security ministry.
2008:   Assists in the Ecuadorean investigation into the Colombian army attack on the Farc camp.
2009: Arrested after being accused of links with drug traffickers.

Strengths: Chauví­n knows some secrets about the extent of any links between Correa and the Farc. According to the Colombian media, some of the computers recovered from the Farc base indicate that the Farc was prepared to finance Correa's election campaign in 2006. There is no independent validation of this.

Weaknesses: Chauví­n has not denied that he knows Jefferson and Edison Ostaiza, the businessmen accused, along with another brother, Miguel, of being drug traffickers for the Farc. Chauví­n claims he had no idea they were drug traffickers. Edison Ostaiza apparently offered to finance a Movimiento Paí­s political operation in the Galápagos.

In September 2008, 4.7t of cocaine was found on a farm in Campanita, owned by Jefferson Ostaiza. The drugs were apparently stamped with the names Nike and Apache which are, according to Ecuadorean police sources, well known brands for drugs produced by the Farc.

Prospects: Uncertain. Chauví­n probably knows things that would embarrass President Correa, who has been uncertain how to deal with the scandal. After a bit of too-ing and fro-ing, Gustavo Larrea has admitted that he also met Reyes in Venezuela. The Correa government maintains that its ministers have never met senior Farc commanders in Ecuaodor. Chauví­n may know differently and if he says so, it will give Colombia a diplomatic boost. Colombia has long maintained, much to Correa's anger, that the Correa government was in league with the Farc. Chauví­n may also have some embarrassing things to say about how Correa and the Movimiento Paí­s's elections have been financed.

Chauví­n is scheduled to begin his testimony today (24 February), although he refused to testify on an earlier scheduled date (12 February).

Development: On 1 April the leader of the leftwing Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) in Tamaulipas was arrested, accused of working with the murderous Los Zetas.

Significance: The arrest of the perredista has major political implications. The ruling Partido Acción Nacional is trying to argue that the opposition parties, the PRD and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, have close links with gangsters. This argument appears to be paying off: the PRI, which had been running at 40% support for the 5 July mid-term congressional elections has suddenly seen a quarter of its support evaporate.

The arrest of the PRD leader, Miguel Angel Almaraz Maldonaldo, was doubly sweet for the government because he is close to Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who still does not believe that he was defeated in the 2006 presidential election. Almaraz was arrested by the federal Procuradurí­a General de la República and accused of using Los Zetas in an oil smuggling racket. Almaraz stole crude oil from the state oil company, Pemex, and exported the oil to refineries in the US using false documentation.

He was accused of this by a political rival, Juan Antonio Guajardo Anzaldúa in November 2007. A couple of weeks later Guajardo was gunned down, along with two agents from the Agencia Federal de Investigación and three other people. These killings may have been the work of Los Zetas.    

Development: On 11 May Fidel Castro, the former president of Cuba accused Mexico of covering up the recent outbreak of swine flu.

Significance: Castro's gibe is a reaction to the decision by President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa of Mexico to postpone his long-awaited trip to Cuba. Calderón said that he could not go because Cuba had been so unfriendly to Mexico over the swine flu (AH1N1) outbreak. Cuba unilaterally suspended flights between the two countries on 29 April to try to escape infection, even though the World Health Organization's guidance was that such moves would not work. Indeed, Cuba now has its first confirmed case of AH1N1, ironically a Mexican medical student.

Castro accused Mexico of covering up the outbreak in order not to interrupt the visit by President Barack Obama from the US to Mexico City on 16 and 17 April. Castro pooh-poohed Calderón's postponement of his visit, but Calderón's decision is actually a serious diplomatic setback for Cuba. Under Calderón, Mexico had made a considerable effort to improve relations with Cuba. Calderón, however, has also shown himself to be a leader who does not forget slights and insults.

Besides the one confirmed case, Cuba has 84 suspected cases of AH1N1. The Mexican student, the Cubans say, had recently returned to his course in Matanzas after a holiday in Mexico.

Development: On 16 June Peru's prime minister, Yehude Simon, announced that he would resign in the next few weeks.

Significance: Simon, an independent, is going because the government's supporters in congress do not agree with his conciliatory line towards indigenous protesters in Amazonia. Simon has promised to rescind two decrees to which the indigenous groups object, but two of the government's main allies in congress, the right wing Unidad Nacional (UN) and Fujimorista Alianza por el Futuro, have doubts about this move.

Simon himself has become increasingly uncomfortable with his role. He only became prime minister last October, after a corruption scandal forced out his predecessor, Jorge del Castillo (who came from President Alan Garcí­a's Apra party). Simon's departure will narrow the Garcí­a government's support base even further. Garcí­a's support is largely urban, while Ollanta Humala, the radical leader of the Partido Nacionalista Peruana, is heavily supported in rural areas.

Simon, who made his political reputation as a regional president in Lambayeque, has infuriated the UN, in particular, with his indecisiveness. On 10 June, he endorsed the move by congress to suspend, rather than rescind, the two controversial decrees (1064 and 1090) which had sparked two months of unrest in Amazonia and culminated on 5 June in the massacre at Bagua of 24 policemen and at least nine indigenous protesters.  

Yet, on 15 June, Simon promised indigenous groups ahead of negotiations that the decrees - which ended indigenous people's ancestral rights to vet mineral, oil and lumber projects on their lands - would be rescinded.  

Simon said that rescinding the decrees should not be seen as a defeat for the government. His strategy is to set up a Grupo Nacional de Coordinación para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Amazónicos to agree on a framework for the development of Amazonia. Though one of the poorest regions in the country, Amazonia is rich in untapped natural resources.

On 16 June, the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Amazónica (Aidesep), the biggest and most radical of the indigenous groups in the region, announced that it would join the negotiations with Simon. The Aidesep's decision followed the announcement that the government had granted a safe-conduct to Nicaragua for Aidesep's president, Alberto Pizango, who sought refuge in the Nicaraguan embassy in Lima after the Bagua massacre.

The acting Aidesep president, Daysi Zapata, indicated that she understood that there would have to be compromises on both sides. The Aidesep wants an end to a government-imposed curfew and state of emergency in parts of Amazonia. It also wants the charge against Pizango and other Aidesep leaders dropped. Zapata said that the Aidesep would prefer Pizango to remain in Peru.

Pointer: With the economy slowing sharply (output contracted, year-on-year, for the first time in eight years in April), the Garcí­a administration may become even more beleaguered. Supporters argue that the slowdown will be manageable, given that there is plenty of money still in treasury accounts. Funds previously allocated for projects were not actually spent, largely because of weak officialdom in rural areas. Yet there is no evidence that local officials have become any more competent.

 Friday 24 July

Paraguay: Mercosur heads of state summit in Asunción .

Venezuela: Celebration of birth of war of independence leader Simón Bolí­var (b. July 24 1783).

Colombia: The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and indigenous people, James Anaya, continues a five-day visit to Colombia (from 23 July).

Saturday 25 July

Paraguay: Presidents of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and
Paraguay, Fernando Lugo, will hold talks on the renegotiation of the Brazil-Paraguay Itaipú hydroelectric dam treaty.

Sunday 26 July

Cuba: President Raúl Castro will lead celebrations of the 59th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada Barracks, led by Fidel Castro, widely accepted as the beginning of the Cuban Revolution.

Monday 27 July

El Salvador: School classes will be suspended from 27 July - 9 August by order of the national health authorities as part of measures to prevent the spread of the AH1N1 virus.

Tuesday 28 July

Colombia-Israel: Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, concludes a ten-day tour of Latin America with a two day visit to
Colombia. Lieberman began his tour in Brazil on 21 July and went on to visit Argentina and Peru.

Development: On 2 September, the governor of Buenos Aires Province, Daniel Scioli, announced the resignation of his secretary for agricultural affairs, Emilio Monzó.

Significance: Monzó's ousting is due to differences between the minister and the national agriculture ministry. Farmers believe that the federal government is looking to reign in Scioli and limit the autonomy of his administration.

Over the past few months, Monzó has distanced himself from the policies of the national government led by President Cristina Fernández. He recently supported a move to initiate talks with farming organisations that led to the farm sales' boycotts of last week. He is the second agricultural affairs minister to be removed from office under Scioli's administration.

Some farmers see Scioli's decision to oust Monzó as a sign of 'weakness' and 'submission to the national government.' The Sociedad Rural Argentina accuses Scioli of failing to manage the conflict effectively and simply following the direct orders of President Fernández's husband and predecessor, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007). Scioli has even been dubbed 'Nestor Kirchner's doormat.'

The president of the Buenos Aires province district of the Sociedad Rural condemned Scioli's decision, claiming that Monzó was 'the only government official who had a fluent dialogue with the farmers.' Monzó will be replaced by Ariel Franetovich, the mayor of Chivilcoy.

Development: On 12 October another soldier was killed in a confrontation with guerrillas, probably from the Sendero Luminoso.

Significance: Once again the guerrillas ambushed an army patrol, before apparently withdrawing and then attacking, perhaps in greater force, the military forces sent in to relieve the ambushed patrol which was protecting a wounded soldier. It also appears that the guerrilla sowed mines around the site of the ambush. The soldier who was killed, a sergeant, died after stepping on a mine when he moved down a track.

The attack was near Satipo, in the valleys of the rivers Apurí­mac and Ene, in the department of Junin, which is now the main battleground between the army and the guerrillas.

Who is she? Hilda Solí­s is the 25th US Secretary of Labour, appointed by President Barack Obama in early 2009. A Californian native of Nicaraguan-Mexican descent, she is the first Hispanic woman to serve in a US cabinet.

Why watch her? On 5 November Solí­s was appointed as the US representative on the so called 'Verification Commission' charged with ensuring that the US-brokered 'Tegucigalpa-San José Accord', signed on 30 October by the two sides in the five-month old Honduran coup crisis, is properly implemented. Her appointment appeared to underline the determination of the Obama administration to see the agreement through.

Born: 20 October 1957 in Los Angeles, California. She is the third eldest of seven children. Her Mexican father was a teamsters shop steward in Mexico and later in California. Her Nicaraguan mother worked for Mattel and United Rubber Workers. Both parents were strong advocates of labour rights, a concern they passed to their daughter, who was the first of the family to attend university.

Solí­s is married to Sam Sayyad.

Education: Solí­s gained degrees from California State Polytechnic University, Pomona (BA in political science) and the University of Southern California (MA in public administration).

Public Life: Solí­s served as an intern in the White House office of Hispanic Affairs under the Jimmy Carter administration where in 1980-81 she was editor in chief of a newsletter as part of her MA program. She spent a short time as a management analyst in the Office of Management and Budget under the new administration led by Ronald Regan.

In 1982, Solí­s became director of the California Student Opportunity and Access Program to help disadvantaged youth prepare for university. She then served as chief of staff for state senator Art Torres. She was elected to the US House of Representatives in 2000, where she focused mainly on labour causes and environmental work and was re-elected to four subsequent terms. In February 2009, Solí­s took the position of the US Secretary of Labor after being confirmed by the senate, becoming the first Hispanic woman to serve in the US Cabinet.

Time Line:

1985: Solí­s was elected to the Rio Hondo Community College Board of Trustees.

1991: Solí­s was named a commissioner to the Los Angeles County Commission on insurance, which gained her added political visibility.

1992: Elected to the California State Assembly in 1992.

1994: Elected to the California State Senate in 1994 and was reelected in 1998.

2000: She received the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award for her work toward environmental justice.

2001-2009:  Solí­s served in the US House of Representatives, representing the 31st and 32nd congressional districts of California (that include East Los Angeles and the San Gabriel Valley).

February 2009: Appointed Labour Secretary

Strengths: Solí­s is strongly allied with labour union organisations in the US, which themselves have alliances with union organisations in Honduras. The labour movement in Honduras has been strongly against the coup government and has agitated in favour of the restitution of the ousted president, Manuel Zelaya. A native Spanish speaker, Solí­s was probably appointed to the Verification Commission on the strength of her long experience as a negotiator with labour unions.

Weaknesses: Unfortunately, both Solí­s and the other international representative on the Verification Commission, the former Chilean president Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), spent just 24 hours in Honduras before returning home. The agreement has still not been implemented amid differences in its interpretation by the ousted president and the de facto government. Both sides can appeal to the Verification Commission as the ultimate arbiter of the agreement, although they have yet to do so. The other two members on the commission are representatives appointed by Zelaya and the de facto president Micheletti.

Prospects: In terms of her role on the Verification Commission Solí­s's appointment looks slightly redundant for now. However, the commission might be called upon should a national unity government finally be put in place in coming days, ahead of the general elections on 29 November. The deadline for the establishment of a national unity cabinet was 5 November. The Zelaya team declared the agreement dead letter on 5 November after the de facto president attempted to form a national unity cabinet without the ousted president.  Congress will also vote on Zelaya's restitution on 2 December.

Development: On 10 January the local press reported that the government of President Evo Morales was planning to launch a new coca-based carbonated drink, 'Coca Colla' (Colla being the term used to refer to those living in the Andean part of Bolivia).

Significance: As well as serving as a direct challenge to the more famous US brand (and 'symbol' of Western capitalism), the planned launch is part of the government's efforts to promote non narcotic industrialized uses of the coca leaf under its more general 'coca sí­, cocaí­na no' platform. This policy is likely to gather momentum under the next Morales administration, which takes office later this month.

A former coca grower himself, Morales has long sought to distinguish between the illegal narcotic cocaine and the raw coca leaf, an important symbol of indigenous culture which is recognised by Bolivia's new constitution as “a cultural heritage, a natural and renewable resource of biodiversity in Bolivia and a factor of social cohesion".

Along with plans to launch the new cola, which could hit the market in a matter of months, adding to an existing portfolio of coca-based products such as tea and confectionary, Morales has outlined other measures to boost the cocalero sector when he assumes office for his second term on 22 January. These include increasing the current 12,000 ha of coca currently allowed by law to 20,000ha; allowing individual farmers to legally grow small plots (1,600m2) of coca - a regulation which would apply only to the Cochabamba region, Morales' home turf, where the yield is higher, rather than Los Yungas in La Paz - as well as plans to export coca leaf to Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay.

Development: On 24 February the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reported that coca acreage fell by 8% in Latin America in 2008.

Significance: The INCB sees falling coca acreage in Colombia being balanced by increased acreage in Peru and Bolivia. The INCB, which is responsible for monitoring the UN conventions on illegal drugs, claimed that the coca acreage in Colombia fell by 18% between 1999 and 2008 to 81,000 hectares (h). The total coca acreage in South America is put at 167,600h (2008).

The INCB also reported that Colombia's potential cocaine production fell even more heavily between 1999 and 2008, declining 28% to 470t. It estimates that Peru's coca acreage went up by 45% in the decade to reach 56,100h. Peru's potential cocaine production is now put at 302t a year. South America's total cocaine potential production was 845t in 2008, the INCB estimated.

The report fell foul of leading drug-policy reform groups, the Transnational Institute (TNI) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), for its stance on decriminalization. In response to the report's concerns about the “growing movement to decriminalize the possession of controlled drugs, in particular cannabis", in the region, Wola and TNI issued a press release stating “the criticisms clearly overstep the INCB's mandate and constitute unwarranted intrusions into countries' sovereign decision-making."

The Wola-TNI also criticized the INCB for “being out of touch with reality" by demanding that Bolivia stamp out coca use. Bolivia operates a “zero cocaine but not zero coca" policy which is based on the distinction between the illegal narcotic, cocaine and the raw coca leaf an important symbol of indigenous culture. This policy was enshrined in Bolivia's new 2009 constitution.

Development: On 8 April the army withdrew from active patrols in Ciudad Juárez on the border with the US and was replaced by the federal police.

Significance: Politically the change is a strengthening of the position of Genaro Garcí­a Luna, the public security minister, who controls the federal police and has long had difficult relations with the army minister, General Guillermo Galván Galván. Locals in Ciudad Juárez have long complained that the army was ineffective and brutal.

Ciudad Juárez, the murder capital of the Americas, will now be policed by 5,000 federal policemen. According to Facundo Rosas Rosas, the coordinador general of the federal police, the police will have four helicopters and 510 squad cars as well as armoured cars and motorbikes. The army will still run checkpoints on the main roads leading to the city.

Rosas Rosas said that the authorities were containing the violence in Ciudad Juárez and claimed that neither the gangs nor the authorities had the upper hand.

Development: On 18 May, Miguel Vargas, the leader of the opposition Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), said he would request a recount of the votes from the 16 May legislative and municipal elections in 12 provinces (out of a total 32) following alleged irregularities.

Significance: Vargas, who is claiming that 300,000 votes have gone missing, is clutching at straws following the PRD's apparent defeat in the 16 May contest. With the results for the lower chamber of congress yet to be released, the latest report from the Central Electoral Authority (JCE), showed the ruling centrist Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) with 31 out of 32 senate seats (up from its current 22), while PRD lost all of its six seats. The other senate seat went to the smaller conservative Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC), which had struck an electoral alliance with the ruling party.

Although the municipal result showed a slight improvement for the PRD, with 58 out of 155 mayoral seats, up from its current 53, Vargas is now reportedly under pressure from the party to resign. In any case, the opposition's defeat had been on the cards, as a result of the ruling party's strength - bolstered by signs of economic recovery; increased social programmes' spending and its alliance with the PRSC. Vargas is being blamed for mismanagement, poor leadership and ill-advised choices of candidates. His decision to strike a pact with President Leonel Fernández last June to allow passage of the new constitution, which established him as one of the country's main power-brokers, also proved a source of ill-feeling within the party.

His resignation would have implications for the 2012 presidential contest, in which he was expected to compete. President Fernández cannot run in 2012 but can in 2016.

Development: On 25 June Fernando Alvarado, the secretary of state for communications, and Alex Mera, secretary of state for the presidency, presented email evidence of a planned coup to overthrow President Rafael Correa.

Significance: Mera said in his statement that although the government receives numerous such emails and letters, this one should be taken seriously because of the range of individuals supposedly involved. What makes this alleged coup more intriguing is that on 23 June Miguel Palacios, the president of the Guayaquil civic council, alerted that he had been approached by indigenous leaders wanting to oust President Correa from power.

According to the email - which did not name names - the unlikely coup coalition includes serving and retired military officers, indigenous leaders and important business groups.

In his report to congress Alvarado alleged that the email may have been sent from an account belonging to Fernando Balda, a former member of Correa's ruling Alianza Paí­s who defected to the opposition. According to the email, published in the government newspaper El Ciudadano, the sender demanded that any legal cases against Balda be dropped and US$1m paid if the government wanted to have names and further details of the plotters.