All Categories

Development: On 8 April President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa sent his proposals to reform the state oil monopoly, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), to the senate.

Significance: The move signals that the government now believes that it has to stop consulting and take action on Pemex. The problem is that the lengthy consultations with the opposition parties have failed to bring them on to the government's side. Key figures such as Francisco Labastida, now the chairman of the senate's energy committee but in 2000 the presidential candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), immediately criticised the reform on the grounds that the proposal had arrived too late in the congressional session.

Congress breaks up at the end of April until 1 September. The government clearly hoped that congress would convene an extraordinary session during the summer but Labastida's scepticism makes this unlikely.

The reforms themselves are pretty tentative, but they do, finally, represent an attempt by the government to convert Pemex from a revenue-collecting agency into a thrusting, risk-taking oil company. But there is method to the government's caution: Calderón prefers modest reforms that are implemented to grandiose reforms that aren't. His reforms on state pensions and tax in 2007 were modest but they have been implemented and are having an effect.

The government does not believe that it could get more fundamental reforms, which would involve ending Pemex's constitutionally guaranteed monopoly on oil exploration and production, through both congress and the country. Constitutional reforms need the support of a two-thirds majority in both houses of congress and a vote in favour from a majority of the country's 32 state congresses.

The most eye-catching of the six main reforms proposed by the government is that Pemex should issue bonds, which can only be bought by Mexican investors, to finance new projects. These bonds, issued at M$100 pesos each, would give holders a share in Pemex's earnings from the new developments.

In a national TV broadcast on 8 April Calderón said that his reforms would give Pemex greater financial and management autonomy. Pemex would no longer, he said, be bound the same rules as other state-owned companies in making contracts with commercial companies.

In particular, Calderón said that Pemex would commission private companies to build new refineries for Pemex. Currently Mexico exports crude oil but imports growing amounts of fuels and plastics because Pemex's refineries are elderly and inefficient. The final element of the reforms is an overhaul of Pemex's accounting to reduce corruption.

What was odd was that Calderón did not say anything in his broadcast about how Pemex would develop the strategically vital deep water fields in the Gulf of Mexico. In the run-up to the announcement of the reform proposals the government had floated the idea of allowing international oil companies to play a big role in the development on these fields. The actual proposals suggest that the government has given up on this idea.

Calderón stressed that his reforms did not mean that Pemex was being privatised. In his broadcast Calderón said: "oil is, and will continue to be exclusively Mexican. Pemex is not being privatised". The leftwing opposition, led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whom Calderón defeated for the presidency in 2006, does not believe him and rejects his proposals.

More damaging for Calderón's proposals is the equivocation of the third biggest party in the lower chamber of congress, the PRI. The PRI has 106 seats in the lower chamber and 33 senate seats. Labastida's refusal to contemplate a special session of congress is a nuisance: the government and the energy minister, Georgina Kessel, who formally delivered the reform proposal to the senate, had gone out of their way to appease the PRI. They dropped the idea of allowing joint-venture contracts which would have allowed international oil companies a share in Mexican oil because the PRI opposed the idea.

Even so, Calderón should get his modest reforms through congress. His Partido Acción Nacional has 207 deputies (out of 500) and 52 senators (out of 128). The leftwing Frente Amplio Progresista has 154 deputies and 36 senators. This would be enough, with support from smaller parties and dissident prií­stas, to thwart any attempt to change the constitution but it is not sufficient to derail these more modest reforms.

Development: On 13 May Ecuador's President Rafael Correa arrived in Belgium as part of a brief official visit to Europe, the main purpose of which is to 'set the record straight' on the Colombian version of events of 1 March.

Significance: Since the beginning of the diplomatic crisis caused by Colombia's unauthorised air raid on a guerrilla camp in Ecuador on 1 March, President Correa has shown himself to be a consummate diplomat, rallying support at home and abroad, and showing an acute awareness of the importance of the role of the media in shaping international opinion.

After the attack, Correa immediately launched a diplomatic counter-offensive against Colombia by travelling to several countries in Latin America to rally support for the Ecuadorean position. Now, unsatisfied with what he claims to be biased portrayals of the conflict in foreign media, he has come to Europe to do the same.

His brief European tour began on 12 May in Madrid, followed by a trip to Brussels, during which he met the vice-president of the European Commission, Jacques Barrot, and the EU commissioner for foreign policy and security, Javier Solana, and finally ended with a visit to Paris. Correa met both his French and Spanish counterparts to discuss possible agreements on the issue of immigration and to offer Ecuador's help in securing the release of the hostages held by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc), including the Franco-Colombian ex-presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.

For the first time, Correa offered French President Nicolas Sarkozy that an area of Ecuador's national territory be used for the humanitarian exchange with the Farc, should a hostage release be negotiated.

Above all, however, Correa's main objective in meeting both high-level officials and European media was to reiterate Ecuador's rejection of Colombia's military action on 1 March and to deny any complicity with the Farc whatsoever on the part of his government. “We came [to Europe] to counteract the campaign [in the Colombian media] to discredit us," he said, urging the EU “not to take simplistic positions" on events in Latin America; “not to succumb to the enormously strong propaganda machine".

“Ecuador is a victim of a conflict that is not ours, and of which we are neither accomplices nor authors," Correa asserted, repeating his request for support for the creation of an international peace-keeping force along the border between Ecuador and Colombia.

Development: On 18 June the US accused a Venezuelan diplomat in Beirut of providing financial support to Hezbollah, an Islamic organisation active in Southern Lebanon.

Significance: The accusation came from the US Treasury Department. The department froze the bank accounts in the US of two Venezuelans, one of whom is a serving diplomat, and alleged that the Venezuelans were acting with the support of the Venezuelan government.

Adam J Szubin, the director of the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), said that it was “extremely disturbing" that the Venezuelan government was employing and giving safe harbour to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers. The two Venezuelans are Ghazi Atef Nassereddine, who is currently a political counsellor in the Venezuelan embassy in Lebanon, and Faouzi Mustapha Kanaan, who owns two travel agencies in Caracas. The Treasury alleges that Kanaan used his travel agency to facilitate Hezbollah training in Iran.

Nassereddine, 46, is a well known Islamicist and has been president of the Islamic centre in Caracas. The US Treasury claims that he organised a trip by two Hezbollah members of the Lebanese parliament to Caracas at the end of 2006 and the setting-up of what is effectively a representative office for Hezbollah in Caracas.

The accusations by the US Treasury coincided with the announcement by Venezuela's development and planning minister, Haiman El Troudi, that Iran and Venezuela were creating a new joint development bank with an initial capital of US$1.2bn. The announcement is a direct challenge to US attempts to strengthen financial sanctions against Iran. The US and its allies want to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons.

Development: On 21 July three dissident organisations agreed to unite and form a single party, to be known as the Partido Arco Progresista.

Significance: The new party comprises the Corriente Socialista Democrática; Partido del Pueblo and Coordinadora Socialdemócrata (based in Miami). According to spokesperson, Manuel Cuesta Morúa, the group is moderate and social democrat in ideology and has the objective of uniting the “democratic left" within and outside Cuba.

The dissident cause however received a blow with the news reported in US daily, the Miami Herald, that the US congress has frozen US$45m in funds assigned for the US Agency for International Development Cuba 2008 program after cases of “massive fraud" and “troubling audits".

Development: On 25 August Honduras officially joined the Venezuelan-led trade and integration initiative, Alternativa Bolivariana de las Américas (Alba).

Significance: The move signifies a swing to the Left for Honduras and represents a coup for Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in terms of strengthening Venezuela's presence in Central America. Honduras has traditionally been one of the most pro-US countries in Central America: the current deputy US Secretary of State, John Negroponte, served as US ambassador to Tegucigalpa in the 1980s from where he organised support for the Nicaraguan Contras. The other full members of Alba are: Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Honduran President Manuel Zelaya announced on 30 July that Honduras would join Alba, arguing that it would help diversify Honduras' trade ties, just as belonging to Petrocaribe, Venezuela's oil-supply pact which Honduras joined in February, has helped to reduce the country's fuel import bill. While most countries in Central America are members of Petrocaribe - with Costa Rica being the latest to seek formal membership - Honduras is only the second country in the region to seek membership of Alba, a more overtly political and anti-US initiative.

At the official signing ceremony in Tegucigalpa, attended by Cuba's President Raúl Castro, Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega and Bolivia's President Evo Morales, Chávez said that through Alba, Honduras would obtain Venezuelan funds to establish a state agricultural bank as well an agreement regarding energy security. Zelaya added that the initiative would increase Cuban and Venezuelan cooperation in health, education and literacy programs.

The ceremony itself was not without controversy. Honduran family minister Selma Ucles resigned in protest at Ortega's visit because of allegations he sexually abused his stepdaughter. Ortega's stepdaughter Zoilamérica Narváez says he molested her for years, starting when she was 13. Ortega and his wife both deny the allegations and say Narváez is mentally unstable. Ortega's presence also drew multiple protests from womens' rights organizations. Paraguay's women's minister, Gloria Rubí­n, last week complained about Ortega's plans to visit Asunción for the same reasons.

In terms of the initiative itself, Alba membership is indicative of Honduras' shifting allegiances and its estrangement from the US. The first sign came in February when Zelaya signed up to Petrocaribe. The following month a diplomatic spat occurred when the US blocked imports of Honduran cantaloupes on the grounds that they were contaminated with salmonella (Venezuela later offered to buy all of the melons intended for the US).

Last month Zelaya accused outgoing US ambassador, Charles Ford, of “barbarous" comments after he claimed to have learned “ways of intimidating people_to keep them quiet" during his three years in Tegucigalpa. Days later he warned the US official to “pay greater respect" to Honduras after Ford claimed to local media that 30% of remittances sent back to Honduras from the US comes from money-laundering and drug-trafficking.

Zelaya has upped his anti-US rhetoric in a manner reminiscent of Chávez . In the signing ceremony he railed against the US, declaring that “Honduras and the Honduran people" don't need to ask permission from any imperialist country to join Alba". He added that the initiative doesn't “commit us to anything; it opens up hope for us in solving the serious problems created by global capitalism". He also reportedly said that Honduras now had a “centre-left" government.

Membership of Alba remains highly controversial within Honduras. Critics have complained about the lack of information regarding the agreement and have questioned what additional benefits Honduras would enjoy from joining the initiative, pointing out that it already gets discounted oil under Petrocaribe.

Fearing that joining the initiative could jeopardise relations with the US, the powerful Honduran council of private enterprise (Cohep) has argued out that trade with Alba members is negligible in comparison to total trade (including maquila exports) of around US$8.5bn with the US in 2007. Imports from Venezuela amounted to US$36.2m in 2007, according to the central bank.

The issue is also proving divisive within Zelaya's ruling Partido Liberal (PL). Roberto Micheletti, president of congress and a ranking PL official, has expressed his vigorous opposition. Congress still has to vote on joining the initiative.

Development: On 25 September Mexico's finance minister, Agustí­n Carstens forecast a fall of between 7% and 8% in remittances.

Significance: This is a bigger drop than has shown up so far. The year-on-year figures for July, the latest, showed a record 6.9% fall though the cumulative figure for the first seven months was down by less than 3% on the same period of 2007. Carstens is therefore implying that the US slowdown, almost certainly, will get worse before it gets better.

Cartsens was talking about the current year, 2008, which means that the finance ministry is expecting a double-digit drop in remittances in the third and fourth quarters. He said that he expected remittances this year to be between US$2bn and US$2.5bn lower than in 2007. Carstens was speaking to the senate.

Carstens claimed, wittily, that the traditional saying that if the US economy sneezed Mexico's developed pneumonia was now the other way around: “If they've got pneumonia, we're only sneezing."

Development:   On 20 October Venezuela launched its first telecommunications satellite,   Venesat-1,   alias Simón Bolí­var, from Xichang, 1,700km to the south east of Beijing, China.

Significance:   According to President Hugo Chávez , who watched the launch ceremony with his ally President Evo Morales of Bolvia at the Venezuelan base station of Luepa (Bolivar state), the US$406m satellite, which was made with Chinese technology and was partially funded by the Chinese government, is aimed at providing tele-medicine and tele-education to isolated populations in Central and South America and the Caribbean.

“This satellite is like any other communications satellite, what makes it socialist is its use", declared the minster of science and technology, Nuris Orihuela, who attended the ceremony in China.

The satellite has a projected life span of 15 years.   It will orbit over Ecuador (positioned at 78 degrees longitude west), from where it will reach much of Central America, the Caribbean and South America.

The satellite, which marks Venezuela's first foray into satellite communications, has prompted some concern in the US State Department (and also in neighbouring Brazil), amid fears that it might be used for defence purposes.

The use of Chinese technology allowed President Chávez to bypass a US ban on sales of defence equipment to Venezuela.

Back in April this year, New York court documents revealed an attempt by President Chávez to purchase a share in an Israeli satellite company, ImageSat, in 2006. Imagesat owns the Eros A and Eros B satellites, which are capable of discerning objects as small as 27 inches anywhere in the world. Chávez had apparently offered between US$100m and US$150m to acquire a 20%-30% interest in the firm.

Development: On 2 December a São Paulo court found the Brazilian businessman, Daniel Dantas, guilty of bribery, sentenced him to 10 years in prison and fined him RS$12m (US$5m).

Significance: Critics of Brazil's unwieldy legal system say the case, which has dominated the local media all year due to Dantas murky links with the establishment, illustrates the need for judicial and police reform.

Dantas was not taken into custody and is set to appeal the ruling, described by his legal team as a “judicial monstrosity". Lawyers for the public prosecution said they would also appeal, seeking a longer sentence. The likelihood of Dantas, now Brazil's most famous white-collar criminal, actually serving any prison sentence is fairly slim.

A financier, Dantas headed an investment consortium, including the US-based Citigroup and Telecom Italia, that took part in the privatisation of the Brazilian telecoms sector in 1997. He subsequently rose to prominence for his extensive web of ties to local businessmen and politicians. He has been under lengthy investigation by federal police for a string of offences including money laundering, corruption and fraud over the course of several administrations, all of which he has denied.

Federal police twice imprisoned Dantas earlier this year on suspicion of corruption, fraud and other crimes. Controversially, both times he was released by the Supreme Court, at the behest of its president, Gilmar Mendes, and a major row erupted between the police, the intelligence services, the government and the judiciary, largely over the use of unauthorised phone taps and the ability of the antiquated legal system to deal with corporate crime. The head of the federal police investigation was later fired for using illegal bugs.

The court found Dantas guilty of attempting to bribe a police officer to the tune of US$1m earlier this year in attempt to persuade him to drop the investigations. The court also found two of Dantas's associates, Humberto Braz, a former president of Brasil Telecom, and Hugo Chicaroni, a consultant, of similar bribery attempts on Dantas's behalf in July this year. The two men, who deny the charges, were sentenced to seven years in prison and also fined.

The case has had a political dimension because of Dantas's close links to the disgraced former powerful minister of the presidency, Jose Dirceu, who was forced out of office in 2006 over an alleged cash-for-votes scheme in congress. Dantas is suspected of channelling funds to Dirceu while at Brasil Telecom.

In a surprise move, Dantas suddenly opted to sell his stake in Brasil Telecom in May, paving the way for a R$12bn takeover of the firm by a rival operator Oi. The takeover, with the support of the Lula administration, was said to have been arranged by Dirceu. This merger, approved by the regulator in record time, will create Brazil's biggest telecoms company.

Development:   Over the weekend of 17/18 January, President Hugo Chávez began campaigning ahead of the 15 February referendum to lift the constitutional term limits on popularly elected posts, including the presidency.

Significance: This referendum is a high-risk strategy for President Chávez , who is banking on his continued popularity to secure a 'yes' vote.   The timing is crucial, with signs that Venezuela's lengthy oil-funded economic boom may be about to bust. As befits the high stakes, the campaign promises to be vicious and polarised, with the newly emboldened opposition, fresh from its gains in November 2008 state and municipal polls, regrouping over the weekend to present a coherent 'no' bloc capable of challenging the government's formidable electoral machine.

The three main opposition parties, Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT), Primero Justicia (PJ) and Acción Democrática (AD) over the weekend officially registered with the   'no' bloc at the   national electoral court (CNE). According to local press reports, the CNE officially registered 21 parties in the 'no' bloc, with seven parties, led by President Chávez 's Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV) forming the 'yes' bloc.

Over the weekend, Chávez ordered the police to break up “illegal" marches by various opposition groups in the capital, Caracas, on the grounds that the protestors have failed to obtain the necessary police permits. The president threatened to jail the leaders, who, he said, were being directed by the US.

Meanwhile, Chávez began the 'yes' campaign in the state of Carabobo, 165km to the east of Caracas. As in most elections campaigns in Venezuela, the president will seek to make the vote a personal plebiscite on himself . Chávez called on his supporters to turn out to vote, and warned the 'undecided' and those Chavistas that might be inclined to abstain that a failure to vote 'yes' would mean a return to the former traditional two-party politics that characterised Venezuela for decades before Chávez first came to power ten years ago.

A high turn-out typically favours the government, whereas a high abstention rate could put the 'yes' vote at risk. Around 17m Venezuelans are eligible to vote on 15 February.

The referendum needs a simple majority to pass. In December 2007 Venezuelans narrowly rejected the option of presidential re-election as part of a broader constitutional reform package.

Development: On 24 February President Evo Morales officially named Ramiro Carrasco the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy who had infiltrated Bolivia's state oil company, Yacimientos Fiscales Petrolí­feros de Bolivia (YPFB).

Significance: Carrasco's name had already been floated but Morales finally presented proof yesterday (24 February), as part of efforts to deflect responsibility for the scandal which rocked the YFPB last month, resulting in the dismissal of its president, Santos Ramí­rez.

In a radio interview, Morales said Carrasco had participated in training programs in the US and other countries between 1990 and 2004, financed by Washington. He added that Carrasco had worked for agricultural companies in the east of the country, the bastion of opposition to the government, before being appointed head of marketing for YPFB. Morales was quick to underline Carrasco's responsibility in Ramí­rez's downfall, lamenting the fact that the ex YPFB chief had “fallen into the trap" laid by Carrasco.

Ramí­rez was fired after a web of corruption in the state oil company was revealed in the wake of murder in late January of the manager of an Argentine-Bolivian company, Catler Uniservice SRL, Jorge O'Connor D'Arlach, when he was allegedly attempting to enter the house of Ramí­rez's in-laws with a US$450,000 bribe. In July last year, the company had signed an US$86m agreement with YPFB worth to build a natural gas processing plant.

The scandal - the worst to hit the Morales administration since it came to power in January 2006 - has since subjected the state oil company and the nationalization process, a key tenet of the new constitution, to considerable scrutiny. Experts are calling on Morales to overhaul the company, which has had six directors in three years, accusing him of stacking it with his cronies rather than qualified technical experts.

Development: On 1 April social organizations allied to President Evo Morales and the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) said they would march on congress if both houses fail to reach an agreement over an electoral framework law by its 7 April deadline.

Significance: The threat from the social organisations is upping the pressure on congress to approve the law which calls general elections for December and is essential to the process of implementing the new constitution.

As is often the case in Bolivia, the sticking point in the congress has been the opposition-led senate. The lower house, in which the MAS has the majority, has already approved a bill which, as well calling the elections, set autonomy votes in the five regions yet to approve their own statutes (Chuquisaca, La Paz, Potosí­, Oruro and Cochabamba). These votes are necessary to legitimatise the new system of decentralisation envisaged under the new charter.

The opposition however claims to have encountered “at least 21 violations" to the new constitution in the new bill.

The radicals' strategy of marching on congress has proved successful in the past - not least last October when 100,000 government supporters marched to La Paz to demand approval of the vote on the new constitution. The October march was kicked off by President Evo Morales himself. This time, however, the government is not taking an active role and has sought to persuade social leaders to hold off from such measures for the time being.

Who is he? He is running third in the presidential opinion polls. He is a film-maker, actor and media personality and a dissident member of President Michelle Bachelet's Partido Socialista (PS).

Why watch him? Enrí­quez-Ominami, 35, claims to represent a younger generation tired of traditional politicians. He broke with the PS after it refused to hold a primary to pick a presidential candidate. While the assumption has been that the presidential race would be between Sebastián Piñera of the centre-right Coalición por el Cambio and Eduardo Frei, candidate for the centre-left quadripartite Concertación (of which the PS is a member), an opinion poll by TNS Time, on 5 May, showed Enrí­quez-Ominami running on 14% support. Although this was less than half Frei's support (29%), no political commentator had previously considered the PS dissident to be much more than a token candidate.

Date of Birth: 12 June 1973.

Education: Graduated in philosophy from the Universidad de Chile. Also studied film at the Alta Escuela Femis-Paris, France.

Public Life: Marco Antonio Enrí­quez-Ominami comes from a political family. He is the son of a leftwing guerrilla, Miguel Enrí­quez (who founded the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria and was killed fighting against the Pinochet regime). His mother, Manuela Gumucio, a film maker, then married Carlos Ominami, who served as economy minister in the first Concertación government (1990-1994) and is currently a senator for the PS.

Enrí­quez-Ominami made his name as a film director, producer and actor, serving as executive director for the production company, Rivas y Rivas since 1998 and appearing as a regular on TV and radio panel discussions. He has made numerous films and documentaries including “Chile, Los Héroes están Fatigados", selected to open the International Festival of Audiovisual Programs, FIPA in Biarritz, France in 2002. In 2005 he set up Fundación ChileMedios, which, among other projects has organised televised meetings between leading political figures and aims to promote political debate.

Enrí­quez-Ominami worked on the senatorial campaigns of his adoptive father, Carlos Ominami, in 1993 and 1999 and together they published in 2004, “Animales Polí­ticos", a book about the state of political and cultural debate in Chile. He also worked on Ricardo Lagos's presidential campaign in 1993 and 1999 as well as the 2004 municipal elections. In December 2005, he was elected deputy for the 10th district for 2006-2010 with a record number of votes for the district. As deputy he sits on the permanent committees for science and technology as well as agriculture. In early May 2009 he confirmed he would run as an independent candidate for the December 2009 elections. This means he has to resign from the PS before July 2009.

Timeline:

1993: Works on Ricardo Lagos's presidential campaign and the senatorial campaign of his adoptive father, Carlos Ominami.

1998: Executive director for film and TV production company, Rivas y Rivas.

1999: Works on Ricardo Lagos's presidential campaign and the senatorial campaign of his adoptive father, Carlos Ominami.

2005: Creates Fundación ChileMedios.

December 2005: Elected deputy for the 10th district for the period 2006-2010.

May 2009: Confirms will stand as independent candidate for the December presidential elections.

Strengths: A youthful, media-savvy popular personality, Enrí­quez-Ominami is well placed to capitalise on the current discontent with the ruling Concertación. The ruling coalition has seen multiple desertions over the last few months by heavyweights such as Jorge Arrate and Alejandro Navarro who left the PS declaring themselves disillusioned with its increasingly centrist line. Enrí­quez-Ominami in particular took objection to the party's decision to back Frei, who comes from the Concertación's centrist Partido Democráta Cristiano (PDC) as presidential candidate for the ruling alliance. Frei, a former president (1994-2000), is the embodiment of the political elite and believed by many to be out of step with the times. This was implicitly acknowledged in his decision to opt for an overtly youthful campaign team, led by 27 year-old, Sebastián Bowen. In contrast, Enrí­quez-Ominami, who is campaigning on a progressive platform, is more convincing in his claims to represent genuine change. One sign of the threat he poses is the fact that his unexpected performance in the TNS Time poll prompted the Concertación parties to hold an emergency meeting. PRD President Juan Carlos Latorre, admitted that, while serving as a boon to the opposition, Enrí­quez-Ominami's candidacy “worried the Concertación".

Weaknesses: As an independent, Enrí­quez-Ominami lacks any party machinery. Critics say that he lacks credibility and his candidacy is aimed rather at castigating the ruling coalition than offering concrete proposals. Meanwhile Bachelet - who is enjoying unprecedented popularity ratings of 67% - has made her support for Frei clear and criticised Concertación dissidents for dividing the coalition.

Prospects: Enrí­quez-Ominami's surprising surge in the polls cannot be ignored by the ruling coalition. While unlikely to win the presidency himself, the PS maverick could well play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the elections. Local pollsters speculate Enrí­quez-Ominami could take 3% of Piñera's vote and 6%-7% of Frei's vote in the first round while in a second round - which is currently on the cards - half of those who would vote for Enrí­quez-Ominami could back Frei while only a quarter would back the rightwing candidate. His support could well prove decisive, a prospect which has not gone unnoticed by the Concertación; the deputy for another of its members, the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), Ramón Farí­as urged the ruling alliance to listen to Enrí­quez-Ominami and attempt to incorporate him into Frei's campaign. Enrí­quez-Ominami's adoptive father, Carlos Ominami, also admitted that his son's candidacy could have a negative impact on votes for Frei. It is worth noting, however, that with nearly a third (28.8%) of Chileans yet to decide on who to vote for (according to a poll published on 2 May by a national newspaper, El Mercurio), the outcome of the race is far from certain.

Development: On 17 June the four main candidates for the lower house in Buenos Aires city ('Capital Federal') took part in a televised debate 11 days prior to this month's mid-term elections.

Significance: This was the first formal pre-election debate. Like the rest of the campaign period, it was dominated less by discussion of policy than mutual mudslinging.

Taking part were Gabriela Michetti, of the centre-right Propuesta Republicana (Pro); Alfonso Prat-Gay, of the left-leaning Acuerdo Cí­vico Social; Carlos Heller, of the government-aligned Encuentro Popular por la Victoria; and Pino Solanas, of the independent Encuentro Sur. The debate appeared on the current affairs programme A Dos Voces, carried by the private cable television channel Todo Noticias.

It was nominally structured around three topics - the national model, city issues and insecurity. In the event, most of the discussion centred around two absent figures: former president, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), who is leading the government's challenge in the Buenos Aires province; and the mayor of Buenos Aires and leader of the Pro, Mauricio Macri.

Heller defended the Kirchnerista model against fierce attacks from the other three candidates, while Michetti stood up for Macri's record in the capital and called for a consensus-building approach to government. Prat-Gay, an economist and former governor of the central bank (2002-2004), focused his attacks on the government's economic policies, which, he said, have seen the gulf between rich and poor widen despite five years of growth. He questioned the lack of transparency in the management of funds from the country's recently nationalised private pensions funds (AFJPs) and, like Michetti, called for reforms to the government statistics office, Indec, which is widely believed to manipulate the country's inflation figures. According to the Indec, annual inflation was 5.5% in May; private analysts estimate it is running at nearer 18%.

The capital, an opposition stronghold, is the country's second largest electoral district (with a total of 13 seats up for grabs on 28 June), after the province of Buenos Aires (with 35). Recent polls suggest that the government is all but out of the running in the city, leaving a two horse race between Michetti and the Acuerdo Cí­vico Social challenge, headed by Prat-Gay and the 2007 presidential candidate, Elisa Carrió.

Development: On 26 July Peru's congress picked Luis Alva Castro as its new president.

Significance: Alva Castro is a long-time supporter of President Alan Garcí­a. He was prime minister in Garcí­a's first disastrous government (1985 to 1990) and was interior minister in the second Garcí­a administration which began in 2006. Alva Castro was first president of congress 20 years ago.

Alva Castro takes over from Javier Velásquez Quesquén, who has become Garcí­a's prime minister. The new congress opens today. The only other candidate for the presidency of congress was Rosa Florián from the right of centre Unidad Nacional.

Development: On 2 September the supreme court confirmed that from now on it will be responsible for investigating all legislators suspected of links to paramilitary organisations and other illegal groups, regardless of whether they resign their seat or not.

Significance: Until now, implicated legislators who have resigned from congress have been investigated by the attorney general (Fiscalí­a) rather than the supreme court. The former is widely regarded as a softer option, not least because, unlike the supreme court, the attorney general grants the right to appeal.

Since 2007, some 30 legislators have stepped down and thus handed their cases over to the attorney general.

A new precedent was set by a supreme court ruling on 1 September - the same day as congress approved the contentious presidential re-election referendum. This determined that the court had the right to continue to investigate former deputy, Édgar Eulises Torres, who had resigned his seat the same day. Torres was arrested on Monday (31 August) for alleged links to a powerful grouping headed by a jailed paramilitary chief, Freddy Rendón Herrera.

A total of 83 deputies and senators are now under investigation for links to paramilitary groups.

Brazil: Agri-exports were worth US$5.75bn in September, down 15.6% year-on-year. Agri imports came to US$876.5m, down 16% year-on-year, giving a trade surplus of US$4.86bn. Over the past 12 months (October 2008-September 2009), agri exports totalled US$65.89bn, down 7.1% year-on-year. China, Asia and the Middle East remain key destinations for   Brazil's agri exports, according to the agriculture minstry.

Chile: As expected, on 13 October the cental bank left interest rates on hold at 0.5% for a third consecutive month.

Colombia: Colombia sold US$1.0bn in international bonds in an effort to finance a growing budget deficit in 2009. The bonds, which will expire in 2041, sold at a yield of 6.16%.   The government recently lifted its budget deficit target for 2009 to 4.0% of GDP, up from 3.7% previously. The 2010 target is 4.3%.

Peru:According to preliminary figures from the National Tax Office (Sunat), imports totalled US$1.9bn in September, down 34.61% year-on-year. The decline was led by a contraction in capital and construction goods (-42.3%), followed by intermediary goods (-35.8%) and consumer goods (-13.2%). Imports fell 31.8% year-on-year overall in the first nine months of the year.   The US remained Peru's main import partner in that period, accounting for 20% of total purchases from abroad, followed by China (15%), Brazil (7%), Argentina (5%) and neighbouring Chile (5%).

Development: On 23 November the main presidential candidates for Sunday's general election closed their campaigns urging the international community to recognise the vote as the best solution to the country's five-month old coup crisis.

Significance: With the de facto president Roberto Micheletti set to absent himself from his duties from 25 November-2 December in order to remove the political crisis from the electoral equation, the US and the Organization of American States (OAS) are now pushing for the installation of a national unity government as soon as Thursday (26 November), as per the terms of the US-brokered 'Tegucigalpa-San José Accord'.

The new US assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, who made his debut at an 'informal' OAS meeting on Honduras yesterday, argued that this would allow the elections to have greater legitimacy and would facilitate the scheduled 2 December congressional vote on the possible restitution of the ousted president, Manuel Zelaya. The US is anxious to get to a position where it can give the nod to the elections, which it sees as the most pragmatic solution to this protracted political and institutional crisis in Honduras.

The OAS secretary general, José Miguel Insulza, who in an interview a day earlier (20 November) insisted that it would be much better if Zelaya was reinstated ahead of the election, appeared to accept this new US suggestion following the OAS meeting yesterday.

It remains to be seen however, what the regional heavyweight, Brazil, might make of this. Brazil has consistently said it will not recognise the polls without Zelaya's prior reinstatement.   Other regional leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have said the same. Notably, the OAS failed to agree on a common position on the elections yesterday.

Another question is whether Zelaya himself would nominate appointees to a national unity administration (he refused to participate in a first, failed unity cabinet after Micheletti insisted he himself would run it), and whether he would actually agree to return if congress voted in his favour on 2 December. Zelaya has declared the Tegucigalpa-San José Accord "dead letter" and last week insisted he would not take part in any restitution deal that served to 'whitewash' the coup.

Under the accord, congress, after receiving a yet-to-arrive 'opinion' from the supreme court, will vote on whether to revert the executive to its status prior to 28 June. The assumption is that congress would rescind its decree removing Zelaya, however Zelaya appears concerned that the congress might still assert, in some face saving statement, that its actions against him were in fact constitutional, therefore 'cloaking' his removal with a veneer of legitimacy.

Insulza warned at the weekend that the OAS would not condone the precedent of a 'corrective' coup.

The vote
An estimated 4.6m Hondurans are registered to vote for a president, three vice presidents, 256 deputies, 298 mayors, 3,000 municipal councillors and 20 representatives for the Central American parliament (Parlacen) on 29 November.

The leading candidate, Porfirio Lobo of the traditional opposition Partido Nacional (PN), looks set for victory, which would see the PN returned to power for the second time this decade (it was previously in power in 2000-2006 under the ultimately very unpopular Ricardo Maduro). Lobo barely lost the last 2005 election to Zelaya in a hotly contested vote, and has since viewed the presidency as rightly his in 2010. The most recent poll by Cid-Gallup, dated mid-October (the local publication of polls is not permitted in the month prior to the vote) put Lobo on 37%, compared with 21% for his main rival, Elvin Santos of the ruling Partido Liberal (PL).   Apathy was high in 2005, with an abstention rate of 45%.

The other candidates are Felicito Avila, of the Partido Democracia Cristiana (PDC), Bernardo Martí­nez of the Partido Innovación y Unidad Socialdemocráta (PINU-SD), both centre-right parties, and César Ham of the leftwing Unificación Democrática (UD). Ham, the only presidential nominee not to vote in congress in favour of the removal of Zelaya on 28 June, had said he would boycott the poll. However on 21 November the UD party assembly voted to take part after all, in order to allow its supporters to be “represented and to defend their rights" in the national congress and at municipal level. Ham said he would continue to push for a constituent assembly in the next congress (Zelaya's push for a constituent assembly was the trigger for the coup) and resolved to vote in favour of Zelaya's restitution on 2 December.

The UD currently has five deputies in the 128-seat unicameral congress. The ruling PL has 62, the PN 55, the PDC 5 and the PINU-SD 2.

Zelaya can be reinstated with just a simple majority - for that he would almost certainly need the support of Lobo's PN, which has indicated that it will vote as one bloc. Assuming Lobo is elected, it would clearly be in his interests to sanction Zelaya's symbolic return to see out his term until 27 January 2010.

The de facto government has declared a state of emergency for the duration of the election period, with 5,000 military reservists called up. The army is under the control of the supreme electoral court in the month prior to the vote. The OAS, which has not sent an observer mission, will convene a special session of its Permanent Council on 4 December to evaluate the elections and the aftermath.

Development: On 14 January the two candidates in Sundy's run-off election for the presidency called on voters not to abstain, vote blank or spoil their ballot papers.

Significance: The result will be extremely close. No rightwinger has been elected president since 1958, so history is against Sebastian Piñera, of the Alianza por el Cambio, who is challenging Eduardo Frei Ruiz Tagle of the ruling centre-left Concertación. The four-party Concertación alliance has run Chile since democracy was re-established in 1990.

Frei got an important boost on 13 January when he received the endorsement of Marco Enrí­quez-Ominami, a dissident Socialist who won 20% of the votes in the first round on 13 December (coming third). Frei took 29.6% in the first round, behind Piñera's 44%. The final published opinion poll suggested that Frei had recovered to stand at less than two percentage points behind Piñera, within the margin of error. This poll also indicated, however, that 19% of the country's 8.2m registered voters could either abstain (which is technically illegal); spoil their ballot papers or vote bank.

Besides the appeal from the two candidates for positive voting, President Michelle Bachelet, who is hugely popular (she ends her term with an approval rating of 83%), also called on the electorate to turn out to vote and to "make a choice" between the two candidates.

Development: On 25 February the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Frank Mora, said that drug traffickers were increasingly moving operations to Central America.

Significance: Mora's remarks, made in a talk at the US Brookings Institution, reflects growing concern in the US about the growing presence of drug gangs in the region, attributed to the success of anti-drug efforts in Mexico, Colombia and the Caribbean. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is due to visit Costa Rica and Guatemala next week as part of a “strategic evaluation" of Central America. Mora is also planning to visit both countries and El Salvador over the next few weeks.

Evidence for the growing presence of drug gangs in the region includes increased cocaine seizures, particularly in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua. An estimated 108.5 tonnes were seized in 2009, up 35% on 2008.

Notably, cocaine seizures in Costa Rica jumped 14.1t in 2009, from 10.2t in 2008. In July 2009 Costa Rica introduced a new law against organised crime, the first of its kind in the country.

Last year also saw the biggest single ever seizure of cocaine in Guatemala, after a makeshift submarine containing 5.0t of cocaine was seized off the Pacific coast in October by local and US authorities.

Nicaragua also registered several high profile seizures last year, attributed to the growing presence of Mexican drug gangs. In early December, a series of raids across the departments of Managua, Rivas and Chontales led to 21 arrests of suspected members of a Guatemalan-led drug-trafficking gang known as Los Lorenzana, thought to be linked to Mexico's Gulf cartel. Previous reports of Mexican involvement in the trade in Nicaragua, where traffic is conducted overland from Costa Rica and by air or sea along its Caribbean coast, had focussed on the Sinaloa cartel.

The US plans to assign US$100m in aid for fiscal year 2011 to combat drug trafficking in the region as part of the US$1.4bn Mérida Initiative, a multi-year programme to combat organized crime in Mexico and Central America.

Development: On 9 April a small bomb went off outside the US consulate in Nuevo Laredo, in the Mexican border state of Tamaulipas.

Significance: This is the first bomb attack on a US diplomatic installation in Mexico. Previously, grenades have been thrown at buildings and staff employed in consulates have been attacked and killed.

The bomb went off just before midnight on 9 April, but no-one was hurt and the devise appeared to be low-powered and homemade.

Tamaulipas has become increasingly violent in 2010. According to the Ejecutómetro (in Reforma, a Mexico City newspaper), 152 people have been killed by gangsters in the state so far this year. In the whole of 2009 49 were killed.