Courcy’s Intelligence Brief
The Russian power struggle
We have been monitoring closely the burgeoning power struggle between Russia’s President Dmitriy Medvedev and former president (and current prime minister) Vladimir Putin ahead of the 2012 presidential election. Medvedev’s further moves in the past week come as little surprise, but sources in Moscow urge caution over seeing the choice between Medvedev and Putin simply in terms of reform versus stability .
It will be recalled that Medvedev was Putin’s choice as surrogate in the 2008 presidential election as Putin was himself barred from standing for a third consecutive term. It has been assumed that Putin, having taken a sabbatical as prime minister, will run again for the presidency at the next election.
Hints of an escalation in the struggle for power between the two came in early March with a speech given by Medvedev on 3 March in which he alluded to events in the Middle East and argued: “One must not postpone freedom until later and one must not fear a free person who uses his freedom in some inappropriate way. That is the way to a dead-end...”
The disagreement became more obvious on 21 March when Putin made a strongly critical speech of the US military intervention in Libya. In what appeared to be a direct appeal to the Arab street, Putin said that the Western military action reminded him of a “medieval call for a crusade”. A few hours later, in an informal press briefing, Medvedev responded by saying it was “unacceptable to use expressions that essentially lead to a clash of civilizations, such as crusades and so forth”.
Since then, there have been efforts to play down the idea of a power struggle between Putin and Medvedev, but until a decision is announced on which one will run for the presidency in 2012 the rumours of serious disagreement will persist – and last week they were fed by the release by a pro-Medvedev think tank of what looked suspiciously like an election manifesto.
On 5 April, the Institute for Contemporary Development issued a report titled Discovering the Future which calls for extensive economic, social, and infrastructural reforms as part of a modernization drive. The report criticizes the current de-facto state control of the courts and main television channels and calls for the reinstating of direct gubernatorial elections. It also calls for a reduction in the state’s domination of the economy. In short, it is calling for a reversal of many of the measures introduced during Putin’s tenure as president from 2000-2008.
Then, in an interview with China Central Television (CCTV) recorded on 7 April (but not published in Russia until 12 April), Medvedev again outlined his programme for political and economic modernization in Russia. The alternative, he warned, is “conservatism, unwillingness to change and, after that, stagnation and collapse of state foundations”.
Asked directly about plans to seek re-election, Medvedev said: “I am thinking about it, it is my duty. I do not rule out the possibility...This decision...should take into account the existing social situation, current political environment and, most importantly, the attitude of the people.”
Medvedev believes that presenting himself as a popular reformer will give him the edge over Putin. But, sources in Moscow say, the choice may not be so dramatic as Medvedev is trying to suggest. The fact that he is seeking to differentiate himself from Putin by appearing as a reformer is not the same as being one. At least some well-placed Kremlin-watchers do not believe he would push a strongly reformist agenda unless forced into it by popular pressure. As one observer has put it: “For Medvedev, [modernization] is the iPad, the iPhone, the Skolkovo innovation project and not the establishment of a new modern society, a modern European democracy.”
In any event, Medvedev is trying to reassure the security echelon that any reforms would not be at their expense or at the expense of stability. In an address last week to senior army officers, he said: “We cannot leave our country without the sufficient development of the armed forces and law-enforcement bodies. We shall simply be torn to pieces.”
The image of Russia being “torn to pieces” if it allowed its defences to atrophy seems extravagant, but it matches views within the armed services and echoes the remarks of General Makhmud Gareyev, president of the Military Sciences Academy, that we reported last week. He has been arguing that Russia’s geopolitical position is as bad as it has ever been in its history, complaining in particular that US military forces “are present in any strategic direction – west, south, east, and north”.