Mideast turmoil and Iran's nuclear ambitions
Current events in the Middle East are affecting Israel’s calculations over what to do about Iran’s nuclear programme. Three are three factors in particular that are contributing to an altered assessment. The first is that the Arab Gulf states, already privately in favour of a military strike, are becoming ever more concerned about “Persian expansionism”. The second is the dramatic shift in Egypt’s orientation towards a rapprochement with Iran. And the third is the fact that Iran is getting closer to achieving its goal as each day passes.
As is now common knowledge, thanks to WikiLeaks, even before the current deterioration in relations with Iran, the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait) were already urging Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear programme. One of the diplomatic cables revealed by WikiLeaks last year included King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia urging the United States to “cut off the head of the snake”. Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa was also quoted, in conversation with a US diplomat, as arguing forcefully for taking action “to terminate their [Iran's] nuclear programme, by whatever means necessary”.
Jordan’s position was similarly revealed, with Zeid Rifai, then president of the Jordanian senate, quoted as telling a senior US official: “Bomb Iran, or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives won’t matter.” In June last year reports also emerged that Saudi Arabia had a standing agreement with Israel to allow the latter to use its airspace in any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
All that was before the current sharp deterioration in GCC-Iranian relations. Now, almost daily, the officially guided media in the GCC states can be found railing against the ‘illegitimate’ regime in Tehran and about its attempts to foment sectarian unrest, particularly in Bahrain. The Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat, for instance, has been warning that Iran’s support for political and economic rights in the Arab world is all about “Persian expansionism” and nothing else. Evidence cited for this includes the discovery of an extensive Iranian spy network in Kuwait, Iranian support for Bahrain’s Shia, and Iranian support for the Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels in northern Yemen.
The GCC itself has openly accused Iran of conspiring against the Gulf states and of spreading sedition and sectarian divisions. And on 11 April, a commentary in the Saudi Asharq al-Awsat argued: “It is illogical for the Gulf states to continue to appease Iran while the latter stabs its daggers deep into the heart of Gulf societies...”
Egypt’s shift
The Egyptian question is another key factor in Israeli calculations, as all the signs point not just to a strong rapprochement between post-Mubarak Egypt and Hamas but also with Iran. This latter move has the support of the authoritative al-Ahram, which commented in an editorial last Friday (8 April) that developing normal relations with Iran “restores sanity to the country’s diplomacy after many years in which whims and narrow views prevailed”.
The key point about Iran and the Arabs is that it is feared by the oil-rich, population-poor Sunni-ruled Arab Gulf states, but Shia Arabs see it as a protector, and it has leverage in those countries that feel the need for strategic allies against Israel. Post-Mubarak Egypt appears to be moving into the latter category.
Hamas, of course, also greatly relies upon Iranian support – and now Hamas’s relationship with Egypt is being transformed. The latest intelligence from Israel is that Egypt has suspended the construction of an underground steel barrier along the Egypt-Gaza border that it had been building for the last year to help stop the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip through tunnels.
Israel will also have noted with alarm that Amr Musa, who is both secretary-general of the Arab League and a contender for the presidency of Egypt, has proposed a no-fly zone over Gaza. Another Egyptian presidential hopeful, Mohammad ElBaradei, was seen by Israel as far too soft on Iran when head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
All of this gains added importance given that the Stuxnet virus attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities (first detected in June last year) was not as devastating as originally thought. A reassuring assessment in early January by Meir Dagan, the departing chief of Israel’s intelligence agency, had reduced fears of any imminent action against Iran. Dagan said that Iran would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon before 2015 because of “measures that have been deployed against them”.
But since then Israeli sources have sought to counter that assertion by saying that only 10% of Iran’s centrifuges were destroyed by the Stuxnet computer worm, that they have been replaced already, and that Iran is maintaining its rate of production of enriched uranium. On 11 April, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told European Union ambassadors to Israel that Iran has recently accelerated its nuclear programme as it appeared to sense a reduction in international pressure.
There have also been hints from Jerusalem that both Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak favour an early strike. This is in part, sources say, because Netanyahu is fearful that he could lose the next election and that opposition leader Tzipi Livni would not have the courage to strike against Iran. Elections must be held by February 2013, but Israeli parliaments seldom run their full term.
The above three factors have added weight to the hawkish arguments. Against that, the doves are arguing that the last thing the Middle East needs is another major crisis. A strike against Iran could also play into the hands of President Assad of Syria who is struggling to maintain power (a refocusing of popular attention on Israel as the enemy would do him no harm).
There is also the possibility that the Iranian regime itself could fall. That the regime is frightened is clear. During the past week, for instance, there have been demonstrations in Iran in favour of Shia protesters in Bahrain. But rather than the authorities encouraging them, over 40 students were arrested in Mashhad at the end of last week for demonstrating in front of the Saudi consulate. A number of students were also held after similar demonstrations in front of the Saudi embassy in Tehran. As there is no sign that Iran wants to smooth relations with Riyadh, these moves suggest extreme nervousness about popular demonstrations, even when not challenging the regime.
For the moment, the likely conclusion in Jerusalem is that it should continue to watch and wait. But it is a finely balanced calculation. The arguments against action are powerful (it won’t work; it will further enflame an already highly combustible Mideast), but the hawks will continue to argue that a nuclear-armed Iran is totally unacceptable (particularly if Egypt is moving away from Camp David) and that the current sharp deterioration in Iranian-GCC relations provides an unparalleled opportunity for action. JdeC.
Note: Interestingly, a remark this week by Iran’s Assistant Secretary of the Surpreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Baqeri, to students at Zanjan Unversity shows that Iran does not itself believe that acquiring nuclear weapons is a guarantee of security. He said: “The Soviet disintegration, the US fiasco in Iraq, Zionist defeat in the 33-day war [against Hezbollah in 2006]...and during the 22-day war [in the Gaza Strip in 2008-09] are indications that such weapons cannot provide security.]