Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

As dramatic as the fall of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi undoubtedly is, it was not the most important development in the Middle East during the past week.  For us, of far greater strategic importance is the further sharp deterioration in relations between Israel and Egypt following the raid into Israel from Egyptian-controlled Sinai by the Popular Resistance Committee (PRC) in which eight Israelis were killed, including two soldiers.  In a hot-pursuit retaliatory strike by Israel, in which seven of the attackers were killed, five Egyptian security personnel were also killed at the border.

There are three aspects of this episode that are significant.  The first is the further proof that it provides about the lack of Egyptian control in the Sinai.  As we explained in last week’s issue, even before this latest incident Israel was becoming increasingly concerned about the lack of control.  There have been five attacks in the last six months on the Sinai pipeline carrying gas to Israel.  These attacks on the gas pipeline have also coincided with an increase in the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip.  It is thought that the number of rockets in the Gaza Strip has increased from 5,000 to 10,000 since the end of 2010, and it is estimated that there has also been a sixfold increase in the amount of smuggled explosives.

The assessment of Israeli intelligence has for some time been that Egypt is “losing control over the Sinai region”.  The assessment was reinforced by the 29 July attack by 150 masked men on a police station in the Sinai city of Arish.  The masked men, thought to be al-Qaeda operatives, raised black flags and took control of the city for six hours, during which time seven people were killed and 30 injured.  Now this has been followed by the 18 August cross-border raid by the PRC.

As we pointed out last week (before the 18 August raid) Israeli hawks are arguing that Israel should retake control of the Sinai because neither of the two alternatives are acceptable, namely allowing the region to become a safe-haven for al-Qaeda and Palestinian militants or allowing an increasingly hostile Egypt to remilitarize the region in contravention of the Camp David accords.  This argument can only have been reinforced by the 18 August raid.

At the very least, according to Uzi Dayan, the former director of Israel’s National Security Council, Israel has to restore the ability of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to operate in Sinai.  Just after the PRC raid, Dayan said: “From a military perspective we need to prepare for a new reality...We do not want to heat up the region but we also do not want this border to become a terror border.  Therefore it is important to react and go after terrorists.  We must ask the Egyptians for the possibility of intervening in the Sinai if it is required.  We should also pressure Egypt from a strategic-political direction and use this attack to warn them to maintain security in the area and not violate the peace agreement.”

The second significant point about the 18 August attack and its aftermath is what it says about changing Egyptian attitudes towards Israel.  The point was well put by a group of politicians including presidential hopeful and former head of the Arab League Amr Moussa and other presidential candidates.  In a statement published in local newspapers, they said: “Egypt after the January revolution is not like Egypt before.”  They described the deposed Mubarak regime as “a strategic asset to Israel” and said that it had been replaced “by a strong popular will that does not know weakness or complicity and understands how to achieve retribution for the blood of the martyrs”.

The game-changer, as the statement suggests, is that post-revolutionary Egypt has to take account of poplar opinion in a way that the Mubarak regime did not, and Egyptian popular opinion is unambiguously anti-Israel.  Even under the transitional Supreme Military Council (SMC) this factor is having an impact on Egyptian policy, and that will be even more the case once elections have been held.  A reflection of the current highly charged attitude towards Israel was a report in al-Ahram last week which claimed that alleged Israeli spy Ophir Harari, whose trial in absentia has been set for 2 October, “planned to spread poison that will damage the fertility of men and women in Egypt”.

Further evidence for rising anti-Israel sentiment in Egypt can be seen in the social media responses to the killing of the Egyptian security personnel by Israel.  At about 2.00am Cairo time on 21 August, a 23-year-old Egyptian called Ahmad al-Shahat climbed to the top of the 13-story building that houses the Israeli embassy in Cairo and replaced the Israeli flag with an Egyptian one.  His exploit produced an outpouring of praise and anti-Israel sentiment on Facebook, Twitter, and Egyptian blogs, suggesting strongly that Egypt’s revolutionary youth are as vehement on the subject of Israel as their older more conservative and Islamic compatriots.
Facebook pages in homage to Al-Shahat were set up with names like “We are all the hero Ahmad al-Shahat” and “We are all the mythical young man who conquered the Jews”.  At least one page demanded that al-Shahat be the next president of Egypt.  He was referred to as “The Egyptian Superman” and “The Conqueror of the Zionists”.  Facebook users also specifically linked the anti-Israel actions of al-Shahat with the ‘spirit of Tahrir Square’, ie the revolution.  One posting read: “Thank you Ahmad al-Shahat, as you united the Egyptians and restored the spirit of Tahrir Square.”

A typical Tweet read: “Ahmad al-Shahat made us restore our strength and courage.  He gave us a moral momentum, and we should continue the path in order to restore our lost rights.”

All of this is well understood by Hamas, to which the PRC is linked, and by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  There is evidence that Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are working together to refocus the energy of the Arab Spring onto Israel and the Palestinian question and away from the purely domestic issues that were the initial inspiration.  Co-ordination between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood is growing, and the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Khalid Mishal, was in Cairo on 17 August to meet both with representatives of the government and with Muslim Brotherhood Controller General Muhammad Badi.

The final point that stands out from the 18 August PRC raid and its aftermath is how desperate Israel is to maintain peace with Egypt.  As one senior intelligence official pointed out to us,  it is one thing having fraying relations with Turkey, but losing Egypt would be on an altogether different plain of seriousness.  As a consequence, Israel has been remarkably restrained in its reactions not just to the PRC attack but also to the subsequent rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip.  Even the limited plan for a punitive operation in the Gaza Strip put forward by IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz was overruled by the political echelon because of fears of further damage to relations with Egypt.  The decision was taken not to launch a re-run of Operation Cast Lead against Gaza and instead to consider Egyptian proposals for Egypt to deploy additional military forces in Sinai.  This will no doubt prevent any immediate crisis with Egypt, but it will not change the underlying reality - so clearly reflected in the events of the past week - that sentiment in Egypt continues to move strongly against Israel and Camp David.  JdeC.

Note:  Some Israeli terrrorism specialists say that the modus operandi of the 18 August attacks suggests some element of involvement from Hezbollah.  Writing on 19 August, Boaz Ganor, the head of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, said: “The complexity of yesterday’s attacks is reminiscent of the kind of attacks that Hezbollah launched from southern Lebanon.  The close ties between the Popular Resistance Committees and Hezbollah, as well as Hezbollah’s patron Iran, obligate Israel to investigate the involvement of Hezbollah and Iran in yesterday’s attacks.”