Courcy's Intelligence Brief

The Sinai powderkeg

LatinNews 06 September 2011 Hits: 381

As dramatic as the fall of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi undoubtedly is, it was not the most important development in the Middle East during the past week. For us, of far greater strategic importance is the further sharp deterioration in relations between Israel and Egypt following the raid into Israel from Egyptian-controlled Sinai by the Popular Resistance Committee (PRC) in which eight Israelis were killed, including two soldiers. In a hot-pursuit retaliatory strike by Israel, in which seven of the attackers were killed, five Egyptian security personnel were also killed at the border.

There are three aspects of this episode that are significant. The first is the further proof that it provides about the lack of Egyptian control in the Sinai. As we explained in last week’s issue, even before this latest incident Israel was becoming increasingly concerned about the lack of control. There have been five attacks in the last six months on the Sinai pipeline carrying gas to Israel. These attacks on the gas pipeline have also coincided with an increase in the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip. It is thought that the number of rockets in the Gaza Strip has increased from 5,000 to 10,000 since the end of 2010, and it is estimated that there has also been a sixfold increase in the amount of smuggled explosives.

The assessment of Israeli intelligence has for some time been that Egypt is “losing control over the Sinai region”. The assessment was reinforced by the 29 July attack by 150 masked men on a police station in the Sinai city of Arish. The masked men, thought to be al-Qaeda operatives, raised black flags and took control of the city for six hours, during which time seven people were killed and 30 injured. Now this has been followed by the 18 August cross-border raid by the PRC.

As we pointed out last week (before the 18 August raid) Israeli hawks are arguing that Israel should retake control of the Sinai because neither of the two alternatives are acceptable, namely allowing the region to become a safe-haven for al-Qaeda and Palestinian militants or allowing an increasingly hostile Egypt to remilitarize the region in contravention of the Camp David accords. This argument can only have been reinforced by the 18 August raid.

At the very least, according to Uzi Dayan, the former director of Israel’s National Security Council, Israel has to restore the ability of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to operate in Sinai. Just after the PRC raid, Dayan said: “From a military perspective we need to prepare for a new reality...We do not want to heat up the region but we also do not want this border to become a terror border. Therefore it is important to react and go after terrorists. We must ask the Egyptians for the possibility of intervening in the Sinai if it is required. We should also pressure Egypt from a strategic-political direction and use this attack to warn them to maintain security in the area and not violate the peace agreement.”

The second significant point about the 18 August attack and its aftermath is what it says about changing Egyptian attitudes towards Israel. The point was well put by a group of politicians including presidential hopeful and former head of the Arab League Amr Moussa and other presidential candidates. In a statement published in local newspapers, they said: “Egypt after the January revolution is not like Egypt before.” They described the deposed Mubarak regime as “a strategic asset to Israel” and said that it had been replaced “by a strong popular will that does not know weakness or complicity and understands how to achieve retribution for the blood of the martyrs”.

The game-changer, as the statement suggests, is that post-revolutionary Egypt has to take account of poplar opinion in a way that the Mubarak regime did not, and Egyptian popular opinion is unambiguously anti-Israel. Even under the transitional Supreme Military Council (SMC) this factor is having an impact on Egyptian policy, and that will be even more the case once elections have been held. A reflection of the current highly charged attitude towards Israel was a report in al-Ahram last week which claimed that alleged Israeli spy Ophir Harari, whose trial in absentia has been set for 2 October, “planned to spread poison that will damage the fertility of men and women in Egypt”.

Further evidence for rising anti-Israel sentiment in Egypt can be seen in the social media responses to the killing of the Egyptian security personnel by Israel. At about 2.00am Cairo time on 21 August, a 23-year-old Egyptian called Ahmad al-Shahat climbed to the top of the 13-story building that houses the Israeli embassy in Cairo and replaced the Israeli flag with an Egyptian one. His exploit produced an outpouring of praise and anti-Israel sentiment on Facebook, Twitter, and Egyptian blogs, suggesting strongly that Egypt’s revolutionary youth are as vehement on the subject of Israel as their older more conservative and Islamic compatriots.
Facebook pages in homage to Al-Shahat were set up with names like “We are all the hero Ahmad al-Shahat” and “We are all the mythical young man who conquered the Jews”. At least one page demanded that al-Shahat be the next president of Egypt. He was referred to as “The Egyptian Superman” and “The Conqueror of the Zionists”. Facebook users also specifically linked the anti-Israel actions of al-Shahat with the ‘spirit of Tahrir Square’, ie the revolution. One posting read: “Thank you Ahmad al-Shahat, as you united the Egyptians and restored the spirit of Tahrir Square.”

A typical Tweet read: “Ahmad al-Shahat made us restore our strength and courage. He gave us a moral momentum, and we should continue the path in order to restore our lost rights.”

All of this is well understood by Hamas, to which the PRC is linked, and by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. There is evidence that Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are working together to refocus the energy of the Arab Spring onto Israel and the Palestinian question and away from the purely domestic issues that were the initial inspiration. Co-ordination between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood is growing, and the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Khalid Mishal, was in Cairo on 17 August to meet both with representatives of the government and with Muslim Brotherhood Controller General Muhammad Badi.

The final point that stands out from the 18 August PRC raid and its aftermath is how desperate Israel is to maintain peace with Egypt. As one senior intelligence official pointed out to us, it is one thing having fraying relations with Turkey, but losing Egypt would be on an altogether different plain of seriousness. As a consequence, Israel has been remarkably restrained in its reactions not just to the PRC attack but also to the subsequent rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip. Even the limited plan for a punitive operation in the Gaza Strip put forward by IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz was overruled by the political echelon because of fears of further damage to relations with Egypt. The decision was taken not to launch a re-run of Operation Cast Lead against Gaza and instead to consider Egyptian proposals for Egypt to deploy additional military forces in Sinai. This will no doubt prevent any immediate crisis with Egypt, but it will not change the underlying reality - so clearly reflected in the events of the past week - that sentiment in Egypt continues to move strongly against Israel and Camp David. JdeC.

Note: Some Israeli terrrorism specialists say that the modus operandi of the 18 August attacks suggests some element of involvement from Hezbollah. Writing on 19 August, Boaz Ganor, the head of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, said: “The complexity of yesterday’s attacks is reminiscent of the kind of attacks that Hezbollah launched from southern Lebanon. The close ties between the Popular Resistance Committees and Hezbollah, as well as Hezbollah’s patron Iran, obligate Israel to investigate the involvement of Hezbollah and Iran in yesterday’s attacks.”

Libya: the Russian dimension

LatinNews 06 September 2011 Hits: 422

Amongst the rejoicing at the fall of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, a point that should not be lost sight of is the degree to which Russia has been put out by Nato’s actions. Moscow has expressed its opposition on three grounds: the fact that what follows in Libya could be as bad or worse as what went before; its concern for casualties inflicted on civilians by Nato; and its opposition to the way in which Nato has unilaterally interpreted UN Security Council Resolutions. Of the three complaints, it is the third one that is the real source of Moscow’s anger.

Russia’s expressed concern for civilian casualties inflicted by Nato airstrikes can be dismissed as hypocrisy. Russia is no shrinking violet when it comes to the exercise of force, and it has been curiously unaffected by the fate of Syria’s demonstrating civilians at the hands of its ally President Bashar al-Assad. Besides, it admits that Gaddafi has brought on his own fate due to his own unreasonableness and “irresponsible actions with the use of violence against his own people”.

Its concern for the eventual post-Gaddafi outcome in Libya has more substance. From the outset, it has been Moscow’s view that radical Islamist elements would be the most likely beneficiaries of the toppling of Gaddafi. This may yet turn out to be the case, but no one can say that the Western powers are unaware of the threat or that they have not factored it into their calculations. Moscow can warn that the West has taken a misjudged gamble, but it cannot accuse the West of insouciance. A great many highly knowledgeable experts have been focused on this very point for months.

What really worries Moscow is the further evidence that Nato will do more or less what it wants regardless of objections. For some time, Moscow has been saying that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (imposing a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians) is being “grossly violated” by Nato. The Resolution “authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”. Russia thinks that Nato went too far in interpreting this as a green light to overthrow Colonel Gaddafi.

In an interview with the Interfax news agency earlier this week, Russia’s permanent representative at Nato, Dmitriy Rogozin, went even further in his criticisms of Nato. He said: “I think that the most serious conclusions should be drawn by the UN, with which Nato has now clearly placed itself on the same level, and which it by no means regards as the only force capable of making decisions to start or end a war”. He said that because of Nato’s actions, the UN “risks becoming a permanently ignored body”, and he concluded that “it will now be Nato that decides when to start a war and when to end it”.

That Russia is genuinely angry about this cannot be doubted. The big question is: does it matter? Certainly Moscow was unhelpful at the 11 July Middle East Quartet meeting (comprising the US, EU, Russia, and the UN) aimed at restarting negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. According to Israeli officials, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov took pro-Palestinian positions throughout the talks and would not allow a reference to Israel being a “Jewish and democratic state” being included in the concluding statement, so no statement was issued.

Russia is also in dispute with the US over its planned European missile shield. Russia wants guarantees that the system will not target Russia’s strategic forces but has so far not received them. It is particularly against the deployment of elements of the system in the Black Sea region. Rogozin has warned: “The European missile defence architecture should be approved by the end of this year. The plan will be finalized at the next Nato summit in Chicago in the middle of May next year. If by that time Russia does not discover itself an invited nation in this missile defence architecture, this will cause great problems in our relations.”

More signs of tension in South China Sea

LatinNews 06 September 2011 Hits: 351

We continue to monitor closely China’s relations with its neighbours. Two developments in the past week are worth noting.

First, on 24 August, two Chinese fishery patrol boats entered Japanese waters around the Senkaku Islands (controlled by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands). When the Chinese vessels were challenged by a Japanese patrol boat, the Chinese crew responded by radioing back: “Diaoyu and its neighbouring islands are Chinese indigenous territories. We are discharging our legitimate duties in Chinese waters.” The Chinese boats spent about 40 minutes in Japanese waters. According to Japanese officials this was the first time that Chinese fishery patrol boats had entered Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. Since last September when a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese patrol vessels near the islands Chinese vessels have approached the islands 11 times without crossing into Japanese waters.

Secondly, on 23 August, Philippines President Benigno Aquino inspected the country’s newly acquired warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar, a refurbished US Coast Guard cutter. On 1 August China’s People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, had attacked the Philippines following a report that Philippine navy engineers were building a structure on the Feixin Islet in the disputed Spratly archipelago. The paper said: “Parties concerned must soberly realize that [China’s policy of ‘shelving disputes and developing together’] does not mean that China will casually let certain countries take advantage of this opportunity to ‘nibble away’ Chinese territories. Any serious misjudgement will inevitably pay a necessary price.”

Aquino has clearly not taken the warning in the way China intended. On the contrary, during his inspection of the newly acquired warship, Aquino promised increased modernization of the armed forces and pledged: “This ship symbolizes our newly acquired ability to guard, protect, and if necessary fight for the interests of our country. This is just the beginning. Expect more good news because we will not stop at one ship.” In particular, the president said, “this will upgrade our capability to guard our exclusive economic zone...”

Risk pointers

LatinNews 06 September 2011 Hits: 268

*** Cyprus supported by Israel and Russia. In our 10 August issue, we noted that Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had warned the divided island of Cyprus against drilling for oil and gas in the Mediterranean. He said: “We will show the appropriate reaction if any further step is taken.” Turkey’s position is that the Greek Cypriot administration does not have the right to conduct oil and gas exploration until a government representing the whole island, including the breakaway northern Turkish element, is formed. The Cypriot government has said it will begin drilling for hydrocarbons off the island’s southern coast on 1 October.

We also noted that the issue forms a further bone of contention between Turkey and Israel at a time when relations between the one-time allies have deteriorated sharply. The exploration is to take place in an 800,000 acre area bordering Israeli waters where large natural-gas finds have been made. Greek Cyprus signed an accord with Israel last November demarcating the maritime border, but Turkey has called this agreement ‘null and void’ because it has not considered the rights of Turkish Cyprus.

As this issue goes to press, Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoulis is visting Israel less than three weeks after taking office, and a Cypriot foreign ministry official says that the speed with which the new minister has arranged to visit Israel is a sign of how importantly Cyprus views support from Israel. This is a marked reversal from 10 years ago when Greece and Cyprus were amongst the most unfriendly countries in Europe towards Israel. The change is a direct consequence of Israel’s own falling out with Turkey.

Separately, Cyprus has also received support from Russia in the past week over its dispute with Turkey. On 22 August, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Aleksandr Lukashevich described Cyprus’s exploration plans as being “consistent with international law and the scope of rights available to the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.

*** Russia’s stake in Syria. Russian arms experts say that if international sanctions are imposed on arms supplies to Syria, it will jeopardise 10% of Russian defence industry exports.
Konstantin Makiyenko of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies says: “One example is that Syria accounts for 24 out of 70 MiG-29 fighter jets which Russia’s MiG aircraft construction corporation has undertaken to supply to foreign customers, ie for one-third of the portfolio.”

According to Makiyenko, sanctions against Iran have resulted in direct losses to the Russian aircraft and defence industries of “at least $7bn-$8bn”.

Items