Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

A new term has been coined in the Arab world: ‘The Brotherhood Crescent’.  The analogy is with the warning given in December 2004 by King Abdullah of Jordan about the formation of a ‘Shia Crescent’ stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.  Now the Arab Spring is giving birth to a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood Crescent stretching from Yemen in the south to Syria in the north via Egypt and Jordan.

Clearly it is still too early to judge the final shape of the post-revolutionary Middle East, but the rising importance of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan and Egypt cannot be denied, and it may yet come to power in Syria where it is the only viable alternative to President Bashar al-Assad’s minority Alawite regime.  In Yemen, too, the main alternative to President Ali Abdullah Saleh is the MB-linked Yemeni Grouping for Reform (YGR).  In the Palestinian territories, the MB-allied Hamas is in power in Gaza and now has a share in power in the West Bank.  It has long been the dominant political force in Sudan.

Assuming that this growing dominance of the MB is consolidated, two big questions arise, the first of which is the relationship between MB-linked Sunni Arab states and Iran.

Our own soundings, and the evidence from Egypt, would suggest that relations with Iran will be friendly, and that is certainly what Tehran is hoping and working for.  Notwithstanding the recent arrest (and subsequent expulsion) of an Iranian diplomat in Cairo on suspicion of spying, there is no doubt that Iran is making a big effort to establish close ties with post-Mubarak Egypt.  On 30 May Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said: “I am optimistic about the future of relations with Egypt.  However, we should act patiently...”  He added: “The Egyptian government is under pressure [from the West and the Gulf states] at this juncture, and we understand its situation.”

Salehi also noted, as an illustration of the multi-faceted nature of Iran’s move towards better relations, that "40 to 50 Egyptian intellectuals and thinkers who we have invited to Iran are arriving today”.

Even before the fall of Mubarak, in October 2010, the two countries resumed flights after a three decade gap.  And one of the first acts of the post-Mubarak regime was to allow Iranian warships to transit the Suez Canal for the first time since the 1979 revolution.

The second question is whether the MB, once in power, will (as many in the West seem to think, or at least hope) preside over a Turkish-style model.

As yet we can see no evidence that the MB sees the Turkish model as something to aspire to, in part because the Arab states in question lack the Ataturk legacy in which Turkey’s Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP) has to operate.

Besides, it is not yet clear what the final ‘Turkish model’ will look like, although that could become clearer in the coming year.  The AKP is seeking its third term in office on 12 June and is on course for a resounding win.  It increased its share of the national vote from 34% in 2002 to 47% in 2007, and it seems likely to increase its parliamentary representation once again.

According to the latest opinion polls, the AKP looks likely to get 50% of the vote, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) 30%,  and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) just above the 10% threshold.

NOTE:  The IMF has warned Jordan that there are economic dangers in the measures it is taking to mitigate political unrest.  Jordan has cut taxes on fuel and foodstuffs, increased subsidies, and increased civil service salaries and pensions.  The IMF says that these fiscal measures will have an annual additional cost of 2.1% of GDP, and it expects the overall budget deficit to increase to 6.8% of GDP.