Courcy's Intelligence Brief - 1 June 2011

Items

• Musharraf eyes a return to power

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  It is easy to be pessimistic about Afghanistan and Pakistan, but there just might be some glimmerings of hope on the horizon, among which we would include the re-involvement in Pakistani domestic politics (albeit still from exile) of former president General Pervez Musharraf through the newly formed All Pakistan Muslim League (APML).

  The essential ingredient for establishing regional stability is somehow to find a path to peace between India and Pakistan.  It is the enmity with India that pushes Pakistan towards the exclusionist end of the Islamic spectrum; it is the motivation for many Pakistani youth gravitating towards jihadism; and it complicates all attempts to bring stability to Afghanistan because of Pakistani fears of Indian anti-Pashtun machinations.

  The fear of India also enables Pakistan’s notoriously unmanageable Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to pursue a destabilizing agenda that may or may not have included the November 2008 Bombay terrorist attack in which 170 people died.  This, in turn, provides the motivation for India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), to pursue its own destabilization policies, not least in Afghanistan.

  But the problems between India and Pakistan are very far from being unresolvable.  The problems over Sir Creek and Siachen Glacier are eminently negotiable, while Indian anti-Pakistan machinations in Afghanistan are a symptom not a cause.  Which leaves Kashmir, but even there the basis of a peace agreement has already been explored in previous peace talks.  It involves a dropping of Pakistani claims to Indian-controlled Kashmir and a soft border along the Line of Control.

  What India doesn’t seem to understand, however, is that the decisive move towards peace has to come from the bigger party.  Politically, if the weaker party gives ground it looks like capitulation, whereas if the stronger party makes concessions it looks like (and is) statesmanlike magnanimity.  Until now, India has lacked the maturity to recognize this.

  This is unfathomable when one considers the size of the imbalance between the two states.  India’s GDP is $1,430bn to Pakistan’s $175bn.  Its population is 1,200m against Pakistan’s 180m.  And its defence budget is $38.4bn against Pakistan’s $5.2bn.  It also has the much larger territory, Western support (not least because of its economic importance), US acquiescence in its nuclear ambitions, and realistic ambitions to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

  The importance of Musharraf’s possible return to the fray is that on the India front (despite his role in the 1999 Kargil conflict in Kashmir) he has a record of trying to find a path to peace, and during the 2004-07 peace process he established a good rapport with India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.  He even had a reasonable relationship with Hindu nationalist and former deputy prime minister LK Advani.

  Domestically, Musharraf also has attractions.  He may not be an Ataturk (the founder of modern Turkey), not least because he doesn’t believe in wrenching dislocations, but he is a moderate modernizer who understands the long-term nature of the challenge and the primacy of education.  He also has a reasonable record on corruption, unlike current President Asif Ali Zardari who is universally known as “Mr 10%”.  During Musharraf’s last tenure, the country’s corruption rating, as measured by Transparency International, improved by 30 places.

  Musharraf’s views on Afghanistan also chime with the emerging international consensus of reaching a negotiated settlement with moderate Pashtuns, even if they are now associated with the Taleban.

  The chance of defeating the Taleban militarily, if ever possible, was effectively lost with President Obama’s December 2009 declaration of July 2011 as the deadline for the beginning of the US withdrawal.  Now Nato, under US leadership, has recognized this and is trying to establish links with the Taleban.  The process is at an embryonic stage, but well-placed diplomats describe it as “promising”.  As it happens, talking to the Taleban fits in with Russian views.  Moscow’s main concern is limiting the flow of heroin from Afghanistan to Russia, and the Taleban did have a good record on eradicating opium cultivation during its previous rule.

  That the extremist end of the Taleban regime were brutal misogynists who happily harboured Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden does not necessarily render impractical the idea of reaching a working solution with the Pashtun.

  It may be too early to say what impact Musharraf’s involvement will have in Pakistan’s elections in 2013, but it is to be welcomed because his views coincide almost exactly with what is needed (both domestically and on the external front) – and it warrants close monitoring.  Three things are needed to stabilize the region: a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, a moderate modernizing government in Pakistan, and progress towards India-Pakistan peace.  A Musharraf return to power would help on all fronts.  JdeC.

• The Muslim Brotherhood Crescent

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  A new term has been coined in the Arab world: ‘The Brotherhood Crescent’.  The analogy is with the warning given in December 2004 by King Abdullah of Jordan about the formation of a ‘Shia Crescent’ stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.  Now the Arab Spring is giving birth to a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood Crescent stretching from Yemen in the south to Syria in the north via Egypt and Jordan.

  Clearly it is still too early to judge the final shape of the post-revolutionary Middle East, but the rising importance of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan and Egypt cannot be denied, and it may yet come to power in Syria where it is the only viable alternative to President Bashar al-Assad’s minority Alawite regime.  In Yemen, too, the main alternative to President Ali Abdullah Saleh is the MB-linked Yemeni Grouping for Reform (YGR).  In the Palestinian territories, the MB-allied Hamas is in power in Gaza and now has a share in power in the West Bank.  It has long been the dominant political force in Sudan.

  Assuming that this growing dominance of the MB is consolidated, two big questions arise, the first of which is the relationship between MB-linked Sunni Arab states and Iran.

  Our own soundings, and the evidence from Egypt, would suggest that relations with Iran will be friendly, and that is certainly what Tehran is hoping and working for.  Notwithstanding the recent arrest (and subsequent expulsion) of an Iranian diplomat in Cairo on suspicion of spying, there is no doubt that Iran is making a big effort to establish close ties with post-Mubarak Egypt.  On 30 May Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said: “I am optimistic about the future of relations with Egypt.  However, we should act patiently...”  He added: “The Egyptian government is under pressure [from the West and the Gulf states] at this juncture, and we understand its situation.”

  Salehi also noted, as an illustration of the multi-faceted nature of Iran’s move towards better relations, that "40 to 50 Egyptian intellectuals and thinkers who we have invited to Iran are arriving today”.

  Even before the fall of Mubarak, in October 2010, the two countries resumed flights after a three decade gap.  And one of the first acts of the post-Mubarak regime was to allow Iranian warships to transit the Suez Canal for the first time since the 1979 revolution.

  The second question is whether the MB, once in power, will (as many in the West seem to think, or at least hope) preside over a Turkish-style model.

  As yet we can see no evidence that the MB sees the Turkish model as something to aspire to, in part because the Arab states in question lack the Ataturk legacy in which Turkey’s Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP) has to operate.

  Besides, it is not yet clear what the final ‘Turkish model’ will look like, although that could become clearer in the coming year.  The AKP is seeking its third term in office on 12 June and is on course for a resounding win.  It increased its share of the national vote from 34% in 2002 to 47% in 2007, and it seems likely to increase its parliamentary representation once again.

  According to the latest opinion polls, the AKP looks likely to get 50% of the vote, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) 30%,  and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) just above the 10% threshold.

  NOTE:  The IMF has warned Jordan that there are economic dangers in the measures it is taking to mitigate political unrest.  Jordan has cut taxes on fuel and foodstuffs, increased subsidies, and increased civil service salaries and pensions.  The IMF says that these fiscal measures will have an annual additional cost of 2.1% of GDP, and it expects the overall budget deficit to increase to 6.8% of GDP.

• China reverts to form

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  No sooner was the ink dry on our report last week about China’s “charm offensive with Seoul and Tokyo” (Courcy’s Intelligence Brief, 25 May) than China was in a spat with Vietnam over an alleged violation of Vietnam’s territorial waters in the South China Sea.

  On 26 May, Chinese marine surveillance ships interfered with a Vietnamese survey vessel, the Binh Minh 02, within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.  The three Chinese boats threatened the Binh Minh 02 and cut a cable, saying that the Vietnamese ship was violating China ’s sovereignty.  The incident took place 128 kilometres off the south-central coast of Vietnam, and 643 kilometres south of China's Hainan island.

  China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu defended the actions of the Chinese vessels as "completely justified" and warned Vietnam about "creating new incidents".   A Chinese spokesman added that what China had done was “completely normal marine law-enforcement and surveillance activities in China’s jurisdictional sea area”.

  Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga said: “Vietnam resolutely opposes the Chinese side’s action that damaged and hindered Vietnam’s normal exploration and survey activities on its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.”

  Nga added: “China advocates peaceful solutions to disputes [and says] it’s powerful but not hegemonic.  We hope that China will fulfil its role as a power and strictly follow what Chinese leaders have declared.”

  A statement issued by Vietnam’s foreign ministry added: “The area where Vietnam conducted exploration activities situates entirely in the exclusive economic zone and the 200-nautical mile continental shelf of Vietnam in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  It is neither a disputed area not is it an area ‘managed by China’.  China has deliberately misled the public into thinking that it is a disputed area.”

  Even more strongly, the Vietnamese statement said that China’s ‘nine-dash’ line marking its alleged area of sovereignty in the East Sea (South China Sea) “is completely legally groundless” and it added that “China’s attempt to realize this claim is in fact escalating tensions in the region”.

  Chinese maps of the South China Sea dating back to 1947 include a dotted line that is usually referred to as the “nine-dotted line” or the “U-shaped line”.  The dotted line encloses the main island features of the South China Sea: the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands. The dotted line also captures James Shoal.  China submitted its 9-dash line map to the UN on 7 May 2009, but protests were subsequently filed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

  This incident comes only a few weeks after a reported intrusion by Chinese fighter jets into Philippines airspace in the vicinity of the Reed Banks in the Spratly chain.  Philippines President Benigno Aquino subsequently tried to play down the incident, accusing the media of sensationalism.  In part he could do this as it was not definitively established that the intrusion was made by Chinese aircraft.

  However Aquino did warn China’s Defence Minister Liang Gianglie, during the latter’s subsequent visit to the Philippines, that such incidents were likely to promote an arms race and even conflict.  He said: “We may not have the [military] capabilities now, but that might force us to increase our capabilities.”

  The main point of our 25 May report was to suggest that China’s conciliatory approach to the recent trilateral South Korea-Japan-China summit indicated that China under President Hu Jintao has not entirely forgotten Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum: “Hide one’s capacities and bide one’s time”.

  But these incidents in China’s neighbouring waters do just keep on coming.  They cannot be ignored or completely obscured by the occasional Chinese charm offensive.  Aquino, who has been accused by some sections of the Philippines press as being soft on China, is not a scaremongerer.

  NOTE: After a break of a year, following the denial by Beijing of a visa to an Indian army commander based in Kashmir (on the grounds that he came from a “sensitive” area), India and China have said that they intend to resume their defence dialogue.

  China’s Defence Secretary Ma Xiaotian is expected to visit New Delhi in the first week of June.  In the second half of June, an eight-member Indian military delegation led by a major-general will visit China.

• Risk pointers

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  *** Russian accusations against Georgia.  Russia’s state-controlled Channel One television aired a documentary on 30 May alleging that the Georgian government supports Islamist terrorism in the Russian North Caucasus.

  *** Turkish aid for Gaza.  Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said on 26 May that the Turkish government was working “on all possible scenarios” for a new aid flotilla to travel to the Gaza Strip to deliver humanitarian assistance.  On 31 May 2010, nine Turkish nationals were killed when Israeli troops raided the Mavi Marmara aid ship.  Davutoglu said: “We think that Israel is well experienced not to repeat the Mavi Marmara attack.”

  However, on the same day Israel’s Lt-General Benny Ganz said that Israel was preparing to stop any new aid flotilla.  He said: “We are preparing for the flotilla in accordance with the orders of the Israeli government.  We are preparing to stop it.”  Pro-Palestinian activists are preparing a flotilla of 15 ships carrying 1,500 people from 100 countries.

  Turkey’s foreign minister insists that the solution is in Israel’s hands.  He said that if Israel does not want to see new convoys it needs to recognize the Palestinian administration and end the blockade.

  *** Israel reiterates military option against Iran.  In an interview on 30 May with the Russian news agency Interfax, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon reiterated the possibility of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

  Yaalon said: “We very much hope that the whole civilized world will realize what threat the [Iranian] regime poses and take joint measures to prevent the nuclear threat from Iran, even if a pre-emptive strike will have to be launched.”

  Yaalon also suggested that a peace agreement with the Palestinians would not be worth the paper it is written on.  He said: “It seems to me that the idea of a peace treaty generally accepted in the West, as a paper document signed by the parties, is not applicable to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  In the absense of common interests and a constructive dialogue, a paper agreement of this kind will not have any force.”

  With regard to the Obama administration’s call for a settlement based on a modified version of the pre-1967 border, Yaalon said that “all attempts to resolve the problems with a territorial division based on 1967 borders are simply unacceptable to us”.  Quite apart from Israel’s need for defendable borders, Yaalon pointed out that no one on the Palestinian side is prepared to say that a territorial compromise of the type proposed “will put an end to the whole conflict”.