Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

During the past week, it has been argued in a number of influential quarters that the Hamas-Fateh reconciliation agreement, brokered by Egypt and signed in Cairo last week, is a sign of Hamas’s weakness and in particular its fear that events in Syria could leave it isolated.  More generally, the optimists argue that the Arab Spring has convinced Hamas that it, too, needs to moderate its position.  Our own experts are more cautious on both points.

It is clear that events in Syria have caused difficulties for Hamas given that the Assad regime is one of its principal backers while the opposition in Syria is being driven by the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas springs.  But, as we have highlighted on a number of occasions in recent weeks, the real dynamic for Hamas’s move towards reconciliation with Fateh (the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization faction that is dominant in the West Bank) is the positive (from the Hamas point of view) change of regime in Cairo.  It is the post-Mubarak regime’s shift away from Israel and towards Hamas that has enabled this development.

Hamas believes that the shift in Cairo is genuine and permanent, and Khalid Mishal, the head of the Hamas politburo, believes that it presages an end to the division between the rejectionist and moderate Arab states.  Post-Mubarak Egypt has already proved its good faith to Hamas with the reopening of the Rafah crossing and other measures.  And now Amr Musa, the Arab League Secretary-General who is the favourite to be Egypt’s next president, has supported Hamas in an interview on 9 May with The Washington Post.  He told the paper: “The view that Hamas is a terrorist organization is a view that pertains to a minority of countries, not a majority.  Being a terrorist is not a stigma forever.”

The key point about Musa is that he is an old-fashioned Nasserist, that is a populist Arab nationalist.  He will follow popular opinion on the Palestinian question, and indeed on relations with the United States.  Musa’s hostility to Israel is well-established, and in 2001 there was even a popular song with the title “I hate Israel (I love Amr Musa)” that topped the Egyptian charts.

Musa might not be a natural supporter of Hamas, but he knows that Egyptian public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to the isolating of the Gaza Strip, and he knows that the Muslim Brotherhood will be the dominant bloc within the new Egyptian parliament.  This, combined with his natural antipathy towards Israel, will ensure a good relationship with Hamas.

Hamas sees all this as strongly positive, and it is this that is driving its support for Palestinian reconciliation not fear of what is happening in Syria.

Nor is there much indication that Hamas is responding to reformist pressure within the Gaza Strip.  There was an 8 April commentary by the pro-Hamas commentator Ibrahim al-Hamami which warned that the group could be left behind by the Arab reform movements and even face a revolt of its own.  Earlier, on 15 March there were protests in Gaza about Palestinian divisions.  However, a look at what happened over the killing of Osama bin Laden is instructive.

Hamas has never been a particularly ardent supporter of al-Qaeda, opposing publicly its killing of innocent citizens, including the 11 September 2001 attacks and the London 7 July 2005 bombings.  Nevertheless, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah caused an international outcry when on 2 May he described the killing of bin Laden as a “terrorist act”.  However, what was so interesting about his statement was that it was only published by pro-Hamas media outlets aimed internally at the Gaza Strip.  For example, the remarks were given prominence by the Gaza-based Al-Aqsa TV and the Filistin daily, but they were not covered by the externally oriented Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) or the Beirut-based Al-Quds TV.

What our sources in the region read into this is that Haniyah’s comments were designed to shore up radical support for Hamas within the Gaza Strip.  In other words, Hamas’s concerns are more about losing radical support to more extremist groups rather than about a loss of moderate support – which is the thesis of those who say that the reconciliation with Fateh is driven by fear of being left behind by the Arab revolutions.

Further evidence of Hamas’s thinking has been provided by Mishal in an interview on 9 May with the pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat.  There were four comments in particular that caught our attention and suggest no long-term conversion to moderation.

The first was in response to a question about terrorist actions against Israel.  Mishal replied: “We have said after the reconciliation ceremony that we need to run our political, security, and military decision in an accord way during this year and to avoid possible threats to the agreement.”

Secondly, asked if this was the last chance for peace, Mishal said: “We have tested the Israeli intentions for 20 years, and today, for the sake of Egypt and the reconciliation agreement, we are giving another chance for Israel.  However, we should start from today preparing for a new strategy, not to declare war, because between declaring war and capitulation there is a wide space, but to add strong pressuring cards at this period of time to support the Palestinian right through various means including the resistance...prosecution of Israel everywhere...We have a golden opportunity to prosecute Israel...[We need] a strategy by the Arab and Palestinian political circles that we declare part of it and hide other parts within a framework that serves the peace process.”

Thirdly, Mishal revealed that his ambitions are not just within the territories conquered by Israel in 1967.  He said: “We want peace for the Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank, abroad, and inside the Green Line.”

Finally, there was an outright threat.  Asked about negotiations to free Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Mishal said: “Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is responsible for the failure of the deal.  We believe that if Israel fails to act, then Hamas will arrest other soldiers...”

None of this will be lost on Israel, and hopes that Netanyahu can be pushed into any early or dramatic move towards a peace settlement are certain to be misplaced.  At the very least, he will wait until he has seen the outcome of both the Egyptian and the Palestinian elections.