CourcyInt

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

FROM: JKC de Courcy, Chairman, Strategic Intelligence Forum

DATE: 15 September 2007

SUBJECT: The definitive US position on Taiwan

Taiwan is by a wide margin the world's most important flashpoint.  There is no other dispute in the world today that has such potential to spark a superpower conflict.  It is our long-held position that for all the hedging and quasi-alliance forming inspired by China's rise, there is little chance of a rigid Cold War-style alliance system emerging in Asia, still less the kind of worldwide competition that existed between the US and USSR and that even a slight miscalculation could have precipitated into conflict at almost any time.  Nevertheless, the Taiwan issue, uniquely, does have the potential to spark a military conflict between China and the United States.

For this reason, the speech made on 11 September by Thomas J Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs warrants close reading.  Addressing the US-Taiwan Business Council Defence Industry Conference in Annapolis, Maryland, Christensen made it clear that his remarks represented "the agreed view of the United States Government".  He invited his audience to "consider my comments in that light".

In the run-up to Taiwan’s second democratic presidential election, held in March 2000, China’s highest institution of government, the Council of State, issued a White Paper which warned: “If the Taiwan authorities indefinitely refuse to settle peacefully the question of reunification [of China], the Chinese government will be compelled to resort to the most drastic measures conceivable, including the use of force.” The document, issued on 21 February 2000, reiterated Beijing’s refusal to waive its “right” to use force to “return Taiwan to the Motherland”.

That remains China's definitive position on Taiwan.

From the outset, the Bush administration has sought to achieve two things with its Taiwan policy.  First, to remove any ambiguity about its willingness to defend Taiwan against Chinese coercion.  But, secondly, to stop Taiwan from provoking China by trying to move towards de jure independence.

Having assumed the presidency, President Bush moved quickly and decisively to re-establish deterrence. His key moves were his huge April 2001 weapons package for Taiwan and his statement at the same time on nationwide television that his administration would do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack, both of which were strongly reinforced by the immediate post 11-September display of American willpower and firepower.

What President Bush did with those actions was to remove all "strategic ambiguity" over Taiwan – a highly significant move given the lessons of post-War Asian history. In 1950, the Soviet- and Chinese-backed North Korean decision to invade the South was precipitated by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s failure, in a widely noticed speech, to include the Republic of Korea in his definition of the American "security perimeter" in Asia. Kim Il-Sung took the omission as a signal that the US would not defend South Korea – so war broke out, and three million people died.

Since the advent of the Bush administration, Beijing will have been under no such illusion about its determination to defend Taiwan from unprovoked attack.

More recently, however, there have been two developments that may have undermined the Bush administration's early good work on Taiwan.  The first is the failure of the US to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan (compounded by the developing crisis over Iran's nuclear programme).  The growing weakness of the Bush administration as a result of these two failures (and the additional challenge of Iran) could be taken by Beijing as providing it with wider latitude over Taiwan.

The second adverse development has been the willingness of Taiwan to press its case for independence more actively.

Thomas J Christensen's 11 September speech was intended to address both questions.  He reiterated that "strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous US interest in Taiwan and its security". He recognized "the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing’s refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan". And he urged a strong Taiwan "that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time", that is a military capacity that can prevent China subduing it before the international community can react.  For good measure, he added: "Actions speak louder than words…[and] the United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our capability to respond to such coercion."

However, he was equally tough with Taiwan.  He started by saying: "We do not like having to express publicly our disagreement with the Chen administration on this or any other policy. Taiwan is a longstanding US friend, and we do not like there to be gaps between us on important issues. I can assure you that we would not have done so had we not exhausted every private opportunity through consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative messages over an extended period of time."

He then went on to explain why the US is so opposed to President Chen's plan to hold a referendum on applying to join the UN under the name of Taiwan.  He argued that the referendum would not achieve anything concrete in terms of "expanding Taiwan’s international space", and he bluntly told Taipei that relying on the US as its defender of last resort came with obligations, namely to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China. As Christensen said, supporters of the referendum "do not take seriously Taiwan’s commitments to the United States and the international community, are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan’s most steadfast friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for short-term political gain".

Christensen concluded: "In terms of security, the proposition is reasonably simple: as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing’s use of force."

Some of the headlines suggesting that the speech represents a US move away from Taiwan are misplaced.  The speech provided as strong a message to Beijing as to Taipei, and it is to be hoped that both hear Washington's message.  The danger lies in the possibility that one or the other or both will prove deaf to what is a simple, sensible, and sustainable proposition.  China might not like the prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the status quo, and Taiwan might be frustrated by its strange, even unique, position in world affairs; but maintaining the status quo should be a compromise that both sides can live with for the foreseeable future - and it is only to the good that Washington has sought reinforce this point in such strong terms.

Christensen's full speech can be downloaded from: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/91979.htm

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