CourcyInt

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

FROM: Alex Standish, Editor, Strategic Intelligence Review

DATE: 22 December 2006

SUBJECT: Turkmenistan after Niyazov: perils of instability

The death yesterday of Turkmenistan ’s mercurial dictator President Saparmurat Niyazov (the self-proclaimed ‘Turkmenbashi’ or father of Turkmens’) brings to an end the personal rule of a man who had created one of the world’s most bizarre personality cults. A notorious abuser of human rights who had ruled the former Soviet republic like a private fiefdom, Niyazov has failed to groom a chosen successor, raising the prospect of an impending power struggle in the energy-rich Central Asian state.

There are a number of key concerns:

1. Turkmenistan possesses the world’s fourth largest reserves of natural gas, as well as significant oil resources. It is also the tenth largest producer of cotton.

2. Russia has major strategic interests in the country, with state-controlled energy giant Gazprom handling the largest share – over 60% - of Turkmenistan ’s gas exports.

3. Moscow has every reason to interfere in the selection of Niyazov’s successor in order to install a more pliable leader than the Turkmenbashi

4. Instability, particularly a civil conflict, could have a serious impact on energy production and exports, with the potential to hit supplies to European consumers.

SERIOUS RISKS

Turkmenistan is entering uncharted political territory. Unlike most other former Soviet republics, it has never experienced any form of government other than authoritarian one-party rule – formerly by the Soviet Communist Party and latterly by Niyazov, President for Life, who ruled the country since 1985. Having been a loyal Soviet puppet, Niyazov took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 to become president and then impose his own increasingly eccentric form of Stalinism. Some critics have described the country as being akin to “ North Korea in Central Asia ”.

One key concern is that despite the rigid structure of the one party state established by the ‘Turkmenbashi’ there is no obvious successor. Although Niyazov acknowledged publicly that he was suffering from heart disease earlier this year, he left no heir and although the acting leader will be the deputy premier Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, few people have ever heard of him and it is thought unlikely that he will take the place of the late president.

MOSCOW ’S ROLE

Although Niyazov handed control of a substantial sector of his nation’s energy resources to Gazprom, he was at least capable of independent action on occasion. In September he even threatened to turn off gas supplies to the Russian energy giant following a dispute over the amount Moscow was willing to pay him. This act of defiance led to a rise in payments from $65 per 1,000 cubic metres to $100.

As part of the Kremlin’s increasingly centralist strategy towards energy supplies throughout the region, Moscow will be keen to ensure that there is no popular revolution against Niyazov’s one party state, particularly fearing that a more pro-Western leadership could threaten Gazprom’s economic influence in Turkmenistan . For this reason, there are concerns that Moscow will actively interfere in the process of selecting a replacement leader.

There is little, if any internal opposition to challenge Niyazov’s legacy. Political opponents and critics were ruthlessly suppressed and most of Turkmenistan ’s pro-democracy campaigners are either in exile, in prison or dead. There is no independent media or rival political parties. However, with the prospect of an end in sight to the Turkmenbashi’s bizarre personality cult may lead to a rise in popular discontent, offering the possibility that his Stalinist regime could crumble.

Although Turkmenistan is a predominantly Muslim nation, the regime has kept a tight control over religious groups. An estimated 70% of the population are Sunni Muslims, with Shias accounting for a further 20%. Despite his own Communist heritage, after independence Niyazov required that Islam was taught in schools. However, all religious leaders and teachers have been carefully vetted to ensure loyalty to the regime which has been keen to prevent the development of any kind of Islamic political movements.

Several Islamic leaders have been dismissed from their posts, including the former Chief Mufti Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, an ethnic Uzbek, who was sacked in 2003 before being imprisoned for 22 years in March 2004 on charges of allegedly plotting the assassination of the Turkmenbashi. Niyazov also promoted discrimination against Shia Muslims. Although there has been little evidence to date, a future resurgence of Islam – including the risk of rising fundamentalism – cannot be ruled out.

Despite his appalling record on human rights and his openly anti-democratic stance, US criticism of Niyazov was muted in recent years owing to his regime’s support for the ‘international war on terror’ and the granting of overflight rights and refuelling facilities for US military aircraft. However, speculation that permission might be given to establish US military bases was denied by the regime.

CONCLUSION

At present, there is little reliable information about who will succeed Niyazov, and there is the potential for future instability, particularly if whoever replaces the man once known as the ‘iron ruler’ of Turkmenistan is too weak to hold together a regime which has largely squandered its energy revenues on grandiose projects celebrating the Turkmenbashi while much of the country faces poverty. Should the current regime lose its grip on public order – or be challenged by pro-democracy activists currently in exile, continued stability cannot be taken for granted.

At the same time as Moscow is actively seeking to install a puppet successor, the West may consider that the time has come to support movements for democratic and economic reform. The Kremlin will view such moves as part of a wider Washington-backed plot to boost the US ’s own influence in Central Asia . Moreover, Turkmenistan ’s vast energy resources and Gazprom’s controlling interest in the country’s gas production and distribution networks means that it must be expected that any moves towards liberalisation will be opposed by Moscow .

Although the West would like to see an end to the repressive Stalinist cult of the Turkmenbashi, there are wider concerns about future instability, particularly as any disruption of energy production could have a knock-on impact on European gas supplies. Equally, any upsurge in Islamist militancy would also be viewed with grave misgivings. On the other hand, a pliable pro-Moscow leader could open the way for even greater Russian involvement in Turkmenistan – a state the Kremlin considers to be very much in its sphere of influence.

END